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ABSTRACT
THE ETHOS OF DISSENT: EPIDEICTIC RHETORIC AND THE DEMOCRATIC
FUNCTION OF AMERICAN PROTEST AND
COUNTERCULTURAL LITERATURE
Jeffrey T. Lorino, Jr., B.A., M.A.
Marquette University, 2018
My dissertation establishes a theoretical framework, the literary epideictic, for reading
the African American social protest literature of Richard Wright and Ralph Ellison, and the
American countercultural literature of Jack Kerouac and Ken Kesey. I argue that epideictic
rhetoric affords insight into how these authors’ narratives embody a post-WWII “ethos of
dissent,” a counterdiscourse that emerges out of a climate of dynamism deadlocked with
controlling ideologies. Epideictic rhetoric commends or censures a particular individual,
institution, or social practice, preserves or revises value systems, and builds social cohesion.
Postwar American society provides “epideictic exigencies” for these authors, i.e., historical
events that inform each novel’s counter-narrative – the script and myth of the black male rapist in
Native Son, the nonrecognition of African Americans in the social and political sphere in Invisible
Man, the Cold War’s ideology of domestic containment and desire in On the Road, and emerging
measures of social control in One Flew Over The Cuckoo’s Nest. These narratives reveal how
their respective social environments impede the realization of democratic freedoms for
individuals who refuse to adhere to cultural codes of acquiescence, and they feature alternative
values that clash with the dominant social forces attempting to control individual activity.
Chapter one applies Sarah Ahmed’s “affective economy of fear” to Wright’s Native Son
and helps elucidate Bigger Thomas’s traumatic fear as the impetus for his actions, an intense fear
embedded in violent histories of contact between black and white bodies. Chapter two attends to
Ellison’s Invisible Man and the theme of invisibility, which calls for the social and political
recognition of African Americans. In chapter three, I argue that Kerouac recodes postwar desire
in On the Road, and his novel offers a vision of mobility and authenticity that is akin to a
Deleuzian becoming, producing a shift in American values within a culture of containment.
Finally, chapter four examines Kesey’s Cuckoo’s Nest and how the narrative captures an emerging culture of surveillance and parens patriae, and counters with the notion, “play as power.”
“The Ethos of Dissent” offers two new insights: 1) my dissertation contributes to literary
scholarship by providing a new framework for reading authors who are not ordinarily compared,
but who, as Ellison proposes, “report what is going on in their particular area of the American
experience” during the postwar period; and 2) it adds to rhetorical criticism by extending
epideictic rhetoric from the public civic arena (oratory) to the private literary realm, as well as
contributes to a previously unexplored relationship between affect theory (in a broad sense) and
epideictic rhetoric. While scholars have attended to the function of communal values uniting an
audience, there is no work delving into the affective components of the epideictic process. These
social protest and counter-cultural novels strive to affect readers emotionally by incorporating
emotive discourse that relates to their targeted issues, and the novels instigate a moral
examination of the narratively depicted realities against the democratic ideals by critiquing the
broad values of racism, conformism, and authoritarianism. Ultimately, the authors and their texts
expose failing value systems, promote positive values alluding to a democratic interdependence,
and imagine alternative possibilities to the current state of social and political affairs.
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1
“What I am trying to do is grasp the implicit systems which determine our most
familiar behavior without our knowing it. I am trying to find their origin, to show
their formation, the constraint they impose upon us; I am therefore trying to place
myself at a distance from them and to show how one could escape.”
(Michel Foucault, interview with John K. Simon, Partisan Review, 1971)
“As I see it, the novel has always been bound up with the idea of nationhood.
What are we? Who are we? What has the experience of the particular group
been? How did it become this way? What is it that stopped us from attaining the
ideal?”
(Ralph Ellison, “The Novel as a Function of American Democracy,” 1967)
“I’ve also written a 550 page novel called ON THE ROAD which is a vision of
America that is so wild none of the publishers understand it – but it will be
discovered later.”
(Jack Kerouac, Letter “To Stella Sampas,” 1952)
“What Americans want to learn from their writers is how to live.”
(Saul Bellow, interview with Jason Epstein, New York Times Book Review, 1971)

Chapter I: Introduction
The American Protest and Countercultural Novel:
A Literary Epideictic Function of Democracy
The social advancements following World War II engendered new forms of prosperity in
a myriad of capacities (wealth, property, education, mobility, etc.), which resulted in a new wave
of individual freedoms. This progress ultimately led to a new set of values that affected
individuals across race, gender, and class, for example, and at the same time, delineated the larger
cultural climate of the postwar period.1 As a result, postwar American society appeared to
1

See Richard Abrams, America Transformed: Sixty Years of Revolutionary Change, 1941-2001.
Cambridge University Press, 2006; Theodore Roszak, The Making of a Counter Culture: Reflections on the
Technocratic Society and Its Youthful Opposition. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995; and Peter
Kuznik and James Gilbert, eds. Rethinking Cold War Culture. Washington: Smithsonian Institution Press,
2001. Abrams ambitiously interprets a vast history of the United States from the Second World War
onward. He argues that this time period was “revolutionary,” transforming American way of life socially,
politically, and economically, creating progressive change over the latter half of the century. He writes,
“the change that had the most profound and widespread effect was the unprecedentedly swift rise of
Americans to affluence,” which “would contribute significantly to at least three other developments of
profound social significance: the transformations of racial relations, the breaching of historic boundaries
between male and female roles, and the breaking of virtually all traditional limits on sexual behavior” (x).
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promise an expanded reach of individual agency, packaged in what Ralph Ellison calls the “ideal
of an open society, … in which a great landmass allowed peoples to move about, to change their
identities if they would, to advance themselves, to achieve results based on their own talents and
techniques.”2 However, the tension mounts when social forces attempt to control these newly
found potentialities, as a postwar society that promises democratic ideals for all individuals
necessitates ideological submissiveness in order to gain entrance into the “open society.” For
instance, the “American Dream” serves as such a controlling ideology and represents a core,
postwar cultural narrative, for Lee Artz explains how the American Dream is a “dream of
consumption” that is “defended by an ideology of individual merit that gently obscures collective
subordinate conditions and experiences.” The American Dream codes objects and behaviors as
living out the “good life,” which include the home and the pursuit of wealth, and it possesses
political implications in terms of how institutions package what types of behavior and beliefs lead
to the attainment of the American Dream.3 Adherence to normative social conditions, the

Roszak is the leading theorist who coined the term “counter culture” and he investigates the social and
cultural developments occurring during the years 1942-1972 or the “Age of Affluence” as he calls it (xi).
He writes, “What I have called ‘the counter culture’ took shape between these two points in time as a
protest that was grounded paradoxically not in the failure, but in the success of a high industrial economy.
It arose not out of misery but out of plenty” (xii). This rise in economic growth increased opportunities and
middle class wealth following WWII, which led to the belief – mostly among a white middle class – that
the universal abundance decreased poverty and conflict. However, a discord emerges as opportunities are
prevalent, but not equally accessible for all peoples. On the other hand, in Rethinking Cold War Culture,
Peter Kuznik and James Gilbert assert that Americans experienced the changing culture after WWII in
various ways that “reflected profound differences between generations, genders, race, classes, regions, and
religious groups” (11). For a more racialized historical perspective, see David Pilgrim, Jim Crow Museum
of Racist Memorabilia: Using Objects of Intolerance to Teach Tolerance and Promote Social Justice.
Ferris State University. Web. 23 Oct. 2013; Randall Woods, The Quest for Identity: America Since 1945.
Cambridge University Press, 2005. Essentially, the coming of World War II initiated another wave of black
migration from the South to the North and to the West, the induction of African Americans into the
military, and Executive Orders calling for equal treatment for all persons in the armed forces without regard
to race (Pilgrim). From the work of groups like the Congress of Racial Equality (founded in 1942) and
leaders like Martin Luther King, Jr., Civil Rights Acts were legislated in 1957,1960, 1964, and 1968,
although largely ineffective (Pilgrim).
2
Ralph Ellison, “The Novel as a Function of American Democracy.” The Collected Essays of Ralph
Ellison. Ed. John F. Callahan. New York: Modern Library, 1995, p. 761.
3
Lee Artz and Dr. B. A. O. Murphy, Cultural Hegemony in the United States. Thousand Oaks: Sage
Publications, 2000, p. 275. Also, Lawrence R. Samuel provides a cultural history of the American Dream,
stating that in the postwar years, the American Dream “turned into a ticky-tacky house filled with the latest
appliances. Everybody seemed to want to own the same things … this common desire for the ‘good life’
creating a more homogenous, less individualistic society.” See Samuel, The American Dream: A Cultural
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“implicit systems” influencing individual behavior, demarcates those who conform to the status
quo from those who are resistant – individuals who reject the sociocultural scripts are categorized
as “other,” or as “outsiders,” and postwar American society fails to reify democratic principles for
individuals that do not accept the structures in place.
Although the postwar period is viewed as a time of cultural conformity, it also witnesses
the rise of a counterdiscourse of nonconformity – captured literarily – that challenges the
accessibility of the nation’s “open society.” During the postwar period, which I define as the
years of World War II as well as the Cold War period that follows, the American novelists
Richard Wright, Ralph Ellison, Jack Kerouac, and Ken Kesey begin protesting societal ills, or
countering dominant cultural narratives, both of which expose the limiting consequences of
centralized systems of thought and behavior. Scholars do not typically discuss African American
protest authors and white countercultural writers in the same critical context; Wright’s and
Ellison’s novels belong to the protest tradition and have maintained a political bent, whereas
Kerouac’s and Kesey’s literature is lumped into the broader “countercultural movement” that
emerges in the 1950s, while their work is predominantly viewed as aesthetic and apolitical.4 But,

History. Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 2012, p. 57. More alarming, and more demonstrative of the
American Dream as a controlling ideology in the postwar period, is the historical “American Dream”
travelling pageant in which thousands of “national treasures” “were taken by four trucks on a fifty-city tour
in 1956,” and included objects like Teddy Roosevelt’s “pocket watch,” a replica of “the first lightbulb,” and
“war trophies” like paintings belonging to Adolf Hitler (53). Such an event like this only serves to control
the way people think of attaining individual successes evidenced by material “things” couched in a political
context, one which filters down into everyday, individual life.
4
Within the literary history of the American protest novel, scholarship recognizes texts that address
deplorable social conditions and grants them a fundamental politicization that is closely affiliated with
subject and theme – a politicization of which the countercultural texts of Kerouac, and to a lesser extent,
Kesey, seemingly lack. In her article, “Novels of Civic Protest,” Cecelia Tichi defines the social protest
novel as one that “expose[s] moral and social injustice in a bid to reshape public opinion and thus to hasten
positive social change in the United States of America and beyond.” See Cecelia Tichi, “Novels of Civic
Protest,” in The Cambridge History of the American Novel. Eds. Leonard Cassuto, et al. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2011, p. 393. Tichi designates Upton Sinclair as a monumental figure of
literature for social reform due to the conjunction of Sinclair’s The Jungle (1906) and the social action that
followed – namely, the Federal Meat Inspection Act that regulated industrial meat contamination and the
Food and Drug Act of 1906. Tichi credits Sinclair for giving voice to the American literary tradition of
protest writing that includes Harriet Beecher Stowe’s premier protest novel, Uncle Tom’s Cabin (1852),
Rebecca Harding Davis’s Life in the Iron Mills (1861), and establishes the literary foundation for John
Steinbeck’s Grapes of Wrath (1939) and Richard Wright’s Native Son (1940) that will follow. The protest
tradition incorporates many novels targeting various social issues: class privilege in Stephen Crane’s
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these four authors and their novels, Native Son, Invisible Man, On the Road, and One Flew Over
the Cuckoo’s Nest, grapple with social forces, even if only narratively and from “a distance” to
lived reality; they attempt to suss out the implicit systems and values that order individuals about,
and they display new ways of thinking about postwar existence that resist the power-constraints
imposed upon the individual. The narratives explore the abstract power relations that Foucault is
touching upon in the epigraph, and they offer a form of escape, or line of flight, from a society of
normalization and control by proposing new values that challenge the societal bankruptcy of
democratic liberty.5
In grouping these authors together, I do not intend to dismiss the category of race, or
deny the reality of Wright’s or Ellison’s black experience, and while these four authors occupy

Maggie: A Girl of the Streets (1893); women’s rights and suffragism in Charlotte Perkins Gilman’s
Herland (1915); gendered roles in Sylvia Plath’s The Bell Jar (1963); and environmental issues in The
Monkey Wrench Gang (1975) just to name a few.
Scholars view these novels and the way they interrogate, explicitly or implicitly, the society that
produces these injustices as politicized. The divide between social protest and countercultural literature, I
argue, stems from the public and popular (mis)reception of the political efficacy of Kerouac’s and Kesey’s
work that is the result of their inclusion within the countercultural movement as a whole, which ultimately
leads literary critics to focus more on the image of these countercultural writers as iconoclasts rather than
attend to their sociopolitical literary significance. Take, for example, the explicitly stated objective
proposed by Timothy Leary, arguably the most famous countercultural icon, in the foreword to
Counterculture Through the Ages: “the focus of counterculture is the power of ideas, images, and artistic
expression, not the acquisition of personal and political power.” See Christopher Gair. The American
Counterculture. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2007, p. x. It is baffling how someone as deeply
dedicated and intellectually involved with the movement as Leary could possibly disassociate the social
power of language from the rhetorical effect of artistic expression. It is time to reevaluate the relationship
between the countercultural and the political and it appears that Leary makes a fundamental mistake in
thinking the two are mutually exclusive. Postwar increases in affluence led to the development of an
unprecedented mass society and the permeation of an emerging “popular” culture, and rather than creating
a rift in society between the cultural and political, these advancements ushered in new beliefs, values, and
norms that shaped the way citizens related to the government, and the way citizens related to each other.
Indeed, the authors and the texts address social problems that are related to public life and appeal to readers
who are concerned with questions of authority.
5
On escape, Foucault writes, “For if it is true that at the heart of power relations and as a permanent
condition of their existence there is an insubordination and a certain essential obstinacy on the part of the
principles of freedom, then there is no relationship of power without the means of escape or possible
flight.” See Michel Foucault, “The Subject and Power.” Critical Inquiry, Vol. 8, No. 4 (Summer, 1982), p.
794. “Lines of flight” comes from Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari. A Thousand Plateaus. Minneapolis:
University of Minnesota Press, 1987. They write that lines of flight are “marked by quanta and defined by
decoding and deterritorialization,” which is a “coming undone,” or “decoding” process (222). Tamsin
Lorraine says of “lines of flight,” “Deleuze and Guattari deliberately designed A Thousand Plateaus to
foster lines of flight in thinking – thought-movements that would creatively evolve the connection with the
lines of thought of other thought-movements, producing new ways of thinking.” See the entry for “Lines of
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two separate literary classifications with arguably different agendas, rather than approach race as
an identifier of the author or of the novel’s subject, I look at Wright’s and Ellison’s focus on race
as it extends to a historical “situatedness” in a post-WWII social context.6 This situatedness
pertains to the “social environment,” which is a term I use to represent the postwar zeitgeist of
potentiality deadlocked with control. In discussing Bigger Thomas’s situation, Wright offers up
the term “social environment” as that which “supplies the instrumentalities through which the
organism expresses itself,” and he points out the social environment’s role in determining
individual behavior; and Max Scheler illustrates how the social environment can operate as a
stable entity for individuals within a given time period due to the presence of communal values.
Scheler defines the “milieu” apart from the physical world-setting, referring to it as “the valueworld experienced in practice,” and the milieu remains constant in its “structure” regardless of
whether or not objects or bodies undergo changes.7

Flight” in Adrian Parr, ed. The Deleuze Dictionary Revised Edition. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University
Press, 2010, p. 148.
6
I use the term “situatedness” (and the terms “historicity” and “throwness” somewhat interchangeably), to
refer to an individual and historical facticity that includes properties of race, class and nationality, for
example, as well as the historical, cultural, political moments that comprise individual existence. I use the
term historicity because of the term’s application to an individual’s situatedness in history, in time and
space. For instance, The Blackwell Dictionary of Western Philosophy defines “historicity” as denoting the
nature of human existence that is located in specific “concrete and historical circumstances.” See
“historicity.” The Blackwell Dictionary of Western Philosophy. Bunnin, Nicholas and Jiyuan Yu (eds).
Blackwell Publishing, 2004. Blackwell Reference Online. 21 December 2014. Wilhelm Dilthey views
historicity as defining the temporal structure of individual existence in relation to the expanse of history
that roots the individual’s existence in time. See Charles R. Bambach, Heidegger, Dilthey, and the Crisis of
Historicism. (Ithaca: Cornell University Press), 1995, p. 166. And Heidegger’s conception of historicity
viewed individuality as “a life history, a happening, an unfolding between birth and death and a flowing
outward into the future and backward into the past.” See Martin Heidegger. Being and Time. Trans. John
Macquarrie and Edward Robinson. New York: Harper & Row, 1962. Heidegger’s notion of “becoming,” or
an unfolding existence includes two temporal structures: “throwness” and “futurity.” “Throwness” insists
that Dasein always finds itself “thrown” into a particular cultural setting, with certain parameters revolving
around choices and expectations already set. “Futurity” pertains to the future directedness of Dasein’s
being-in-the-world and includes a striving to accomplish something. Furthermore, Heidegger claims that
human existence is embedded within a larger communal context as part of the “throwness.” The authors,
the characters, and the activities all occur in a postwar American “throwness” that the authors challenge
and grapple with. All of the texts I am dealing with confront their “throwness,” whether that “throwness”
has to do with race, economic status, or institutional power struggles.
7
The “social environment” is a prominent concept in Wright’s work, and he invests the term with a racial
context in order to indict the space in which black and white bodies navigate. In his essay, “How Bigger
was Born,” Wright professes, “I don’t mean to say that I think that environment makes consciousness, but I
do say that I felt and still feel that the environment supplies the instrumentalities through which the
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Correspondingly, each author constructs a narrative within a social environment that
pertains to the postwar situatedness of increased individuality and opportunity, even if to varying
degrees for various people. Therefore, I do not equate the impact of a white supremacist society
that oppresses and calls for the conformity of African Americans to the impact of an
overabundant society that shapes and establishes middle class values maintaining an insensitivity
to the underclassed. Yet, historically, the development of a movement that struggled against
unjust treatment of African Americans and the development of a generation of white
countercultural men and women that rejected the homogeneity of a bourgeois society occurred
alongside each other, and both literary movements take up the issue of national identity, or as
Ellison puts it, both represent how different groups contribute to this defining era in terms of who
and what America is in the present moment.8 Take, for example, Ellison’s mission statement in
the essay, “The Novel as a Function of American Democracy,” where he claims that citizens in
postwar American society are in most need of the “novel” because “race is by no means the only
thing which divides” the country, and he concludes that America is “at once very unified, and at
the same time diversified.” This predicament, he states, “gives the writer of novels a role beyond

organism expresses itself, and if that environment is warped or tranquil, the mode and manner of behavior
will be affected toward deadlocking tensions or orderly fulfillment and satisfaction.” See Richard Wright,
“How Bigger was Born,” in Native Son. Introduction by Arnold Rampersad. New York: HarperPerennial,
2005, p. 442. Max Scheler writes, “that which we call ‘milieu,’ or the value-world as effectively
experienced in practice, does not undergo alterations in content simply because we travel or change our
residence, etc. Although the objects that we meet during such changes do undergo alterations, the milieu
itself, with its structure, through which any thing is a milieu-thing (not only a ‘value-thing’ but also a ‘thing
of the environment’), remains completely constant throughout such bodily changes of place.” See Scheler,
Formalism in Ethics and Non-Formal Ethics of Values: A New Attempt Toward the Foundation of an
Ethical Personalism. Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1973, p. 142-143. Jörg Dürrschmidt
discusses Scheler’s theory and refers to it as an “ ‘alphabet’ through which the individual reads the
environment as a meaningful and practically structured configuration…. [which] serves as a relatively
stable filter through which the individual experiences different environments.” See Dürrschmidt, Everyday
Lives in the Global City: The Delinking of Locale and Milieu. New York: Routledge, 2000, p. 47.
8
Foucault too discusses collective identity in terms of power relations, stating that power struggles often
surround questions of “Who are we?” and the struggles are a “refusal of these abstractions, of economic
and ideological state violence, which ignore who we are individually,” stating that a potential target in the
modern time is “not to discover what we are but to refuse what we are.” See Foucault, “The Subject and
Power.” Critical Inquiry, Vol. 8, No. 4 (Summer, 1982), p. 781; 785.
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that of entertainer” by incurring the “responsibility of reporting what is going on in his particular
area of the American experience.”9
If one reads these major postwar novelists as writing during a time when new
opportunities were becoming available for individuals of different racial, sexual, and economic
status, and reads their novels as exposing how their respective social environments fail to embody
these democratic principles, the four writers occupy a literary spectrum of a post-WWII ethos of
dissent. By “ethos of dissent,” I mean the counterdiscourse that emerges out of the post-WWII
climate of dynamism met with powerlessness, a counterdiscourse revealing the lack of harmony
when certain individual realities are measured against ideals. Rather than portray characters
reaping the individual progresses promised by an “open society,” I maintain that the four authors
I have chosen, writing during this tumultuous time in American history, expose a regime
promoting a specious autonomy. Postwar dissent festers when social constraints are imposed
upon democratic ideals, and individuals begin to reject the social strata that fail to reify the
promulgated rights of freedom and liberty, and what emerges is a dual moral dilemma regarding,
among many things, the reality of equal rights for African Americans, and the promotion of a
questionably “shared” middle-class value system.
I argue that epideictic rhetoric affords insight into how the social protest and
countercultural narratives unveil a disingenuous social order. Epideictic is the branch of rhetoric
concerned with “praise and blame,” acknowledging or disparaging the merit of a particular social
practice, preserving or recreating values, and building social cohesion (among the many
conventions to be discussed shortly in more detail).10 Furthermore, epideictic addresses issues of
9

Ellison, “The Novel as a Function of American Democracy.” In The Collected Essays of Ralph Ellison, p.
763.
10
Aristotle defined epideictic rhetoric as “ceremonial oratory of display [that] either praises or censures”
some thing, which is also concerned with the “present.” For an Aristotelian overview of Epideictic, see
Book I, Chapter 3 in Aristotle, Rhetoric. Translated by W. Rhys Roberts. Mineola, New York: Dover,
2004, 1358b, p. 12-14. Lawrence Rosenfield refers to epideictic as a rhetoric of “acknowledgement and
disparagement in “The Practical Celebration of Epideictic,” in Rhetoric in Transition: Studies in the Nature
and Uses of Rhetoric. Ed. Eugene E. White. University Park, PA: The Pennsylvania State University Press,
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the present, and relies on amplification in order to operate as “an instrument for addressing
private and public ‘dis-ease,’ a discomfort with the status quo.”11 The novels, therefore, critique
and celebrate certain values related to the emerging postwar, democratic society, and the
epideictic rhetorical project is affective. By affective, I mean that the social protest and
countercultural novels in my dissertation strive to affect readers emotionally and instigate a moral
examination of the narratively depicted realities against the democratic ideals. Furthermore, the
novels incorporate emotive discourse that relates to their targeted social issues, and this affective
component reveals the oppressive social and cultural conditions that operate under the guise of a
purported democracy, critiques the broad values of racism, conformism, and authoritarianism (in
a sense), and calls forth positive values that promote a democratic interdependence.
Each of the novels approaches different themes and social implications, and each novel
engages in its own affective process; yet, the novels all carry out an epideictic process because
postwar American society witnesses power relations that impede the realization of democratic
ideals, or worse, they threaten the safety and personal freedoms of certain individuals. The events
that lead to this democratic defect make up what I refer to as the epideictic exigency – each author
takes up particular social and cultural conditions that provide an urgent need for change in the

1980, pp. 131-155. For more on the importance of values and establishing social cohesion, see Chaïm
Perelman and Lucie Olbrechts-Tyteca, The New Rhetoric: A Treatise on Argumentation. Notre Dame, IN:
University of Notre Dame Press, 1969.
11
The term, “public ‘dis-ease’” comes from Cynthia Miecznikowski Sheard’s article, “The Public Value of
Epideictic Rhetoric.” College English. Nov. 1996 (58:7), p. 766. Sheard believes that epideictic can “be an
instrument for addressing private and public ‘dis-ease,’ discomfort with the status quo.” She continues,
“Our students at all levels of literacy development need to be taught to appreciate epideictic rhetoric, to
understand the ways in which it invokes shared values as a basis for promoting a vision of what could be”
(766).
For more on the rhetorical technique of “amplification,” see Richard A Lanham, A Handlist of
Rhetorical Terms. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991. Amplification refers to enhancing,
embellishing, emotionalizing, and arranging in strategic manner to illuminate “attendant circumstances.”
For amplification in epideictic, see Chaïm Perelman and Lucie Olbrechts-Tyteca, The New Rhetoric: A
Treatise on Argumentation. Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1969, p. 51. They write,
“The speaker tries to establish a sense of communion centered around particular values recognized by the
audience, and to this end he uses the whole range of means available to the rhetorician for purposes of
amplification and enhancement” (51). Also, see Dale Sullivan, “A Closer Look at Education as Epideictic
Rhetoric.” Rhetoric and Society Quarterly, Vol. 23, No. ¾ (Summer – Autumn, 1994), p. 72. Sullivan sums
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postwar period, and each author uncovers diverse ways in which social forces attempt to control
individuals in different social contexts. I am not saying that the authors were necessarily aware
of epideictic rhetoric at the time they were writing their novels, or that they would have agreed to
being considered epideictic. However, there are strong affinities between the novels and
epideictic rhetoric that cannot be neglected, for these correlations provide valuable insight when
interpreting the texts within the influential postwar period, as well as within the social protest and
countercultural literary traditions.
In order to establish an epideictic framework for reading the novels aforementioned, I
rely on the social environment of the postwar period in order to contextualize the democratic
function of the authors’ texts, one which witnesses an increase in individuality, while at the same
time experiences new forms of power and control. The social and cultural upheaval stemming
from this social environment unites the authors and their texts. Therefore, I call upon
Foucauldian notions of power, or as Foucault puts it in the epigraph, “systems that determine”
individual behavior without awareness. Considering how the novels relate to their respective
themes of power and control will demonstrate how the authors uncover the various constraints
that disallow for “attaining the ideal,” and this literary approach calls upon the tradition of protest
writing, which also serves as a connecting foundation for the authors selected. I will build upon
that claim by discussing the conventions of epideictic rhetoric, and how a framework that I refer
to as the literary epideictic also places these authors and texts in conversation with one another in
an American literary and democratic context. Thus, the literary epideictic unlocks the novels’
“function of American Democracy.”
1) Postwar Power and Protest:
Attacking “Anonymous Authority” in Literary Form

up, “Epideictic praises or blames someone, is concerned with the present, and depends on heightening, or
amplification, leading to idealization” (72).
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As the postwar period takes shape, new classes emerge, new values take precedence, and
a moral confusion surges regarding the nature of the individual and society, specifically in terms
of power and control. Mark Carnes points out the rise of large institutions in the postwar period
and how this development affects individuals’ everyday decisions, what he refers to as the
simultaneous promotion of “institutional bigness” with “individual choice and freedoms.”12 Legal
and medical institutions, for example, assign particular behaviors with possible outcomes, and as
a result, they possess the ability and the power to guide individual behavior within given contexts.
Therefore, while individuality appears as a newly developing value, institutional power attempts
to regulate individual expression (essentially). I rely on a Foucauldian notion of power as
omnipresent, anonymous, and productive in order to connect these authors to the historicity of an
expanding “open society” accompanied by constraints.13 Freedom, individuality, and subjugation
are intertwined in the operation of power, for Foucault points out that in order for power to
enforce its effects, individuals must possess freedom: “By this we mean individual or collective
subjects who are faced with a field of possibilities in which several ways of behaving, several
reactions and diverse comportments, may be realized.”14 This ties in with Ellison’s, and postwar
12

Mark C. Carnes, The Columbia History of Post-World War II America. Columbia University Press, 2007,
p. 7. Carnes writes, “The persistence of individual subjectivity and expressiveness is itself significant and
perhaps surprising. The post-World War II period, after all, has witnessed the tremendous expansion and
significance of large institutions. Government plays an increasingly prominent role in nearly everyone’s
life, … mak[ing] fundamental decisions about our lives, taking more of our income and determining how
we spend it” (6-7). However, he notes that the rise of large institutions and their impact on life in the
postwar period is met with the “rise [of] a countervailing pattern of individualized expression and
consumption.”
13
See Michel Foucault and Donald F. Bouchard, ed., “Intellectuals and Power,” in Language, Countermemory, Practice: Selected Essays and Interviews. Translated by Donald F. Bouchard, Ithaca, NY: Cornell
University Press 1977. Foucault states, “It may be that Marx and Freud cannot satisfy our desire for
understanding this enigmatic thing which we call power, which is at once visible and invisible, present and
hidden, ubiquitous” (213). This is the main way I am using the Foucauldian theory of power. I believe that
David Garland succinctly sums up the complicated task of analyzing Foucault’s thoughts of power thusly:
“Instead of a single Foucauldian theory there are multiple Foucauldian theorizations, each one designed to
address a definite phenomenon in the course of a specific inquiry.” See David Garland, “What is a ‘history
of the present’? On Foucault’s Genealogies and Their Critical Preconditions.” Punishment & Society, Vol.
16 (4), 2014, p. 366.
14
Michel Foucault, “The Subject and Power.” Critical Inquiry, Vol. 8, No. 4 (Summer, 1982), p. 790.
Foucault also touches upon the “ethos of dissent” that I am trying to establish: “At the very heart of the
power relationship, and constantly provoking it, are the recalcitrance of the will and the intransigence of
freedom” (790, italics added).
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America’s, conception of an “open society.” However, because power relations influence the
ways individuals live, it resonates in everyday life, and therefore, power operates as a
“government of individualization,” or, as Foucault expounds, power “makes individuals subjects”
by systematizing individual or group conduct.15
In this context, struggles with power tend to focus more on a technique rather than on an
institution of power, what Erich Fromm refers to as “Anonymous Authority.” Fromm situates this
notion of power within the sociohistorical context of the postwar era, and this informs the
background or subtext of the narratives of Wright, Ellison, Kerouac, and Kesey. In a 1955 essay,
Fromm discusses the shift in authority taking place in the middle of the twentieth century, one
from “overt authority” to an “anonymous, invisible, alienated authority.” He explains that
“nobody is an authority except ‘It.’ What is It? Profit, economic necessities, the market, common
sense, public opinion, what ‘one’ does, thinks, feels.” And he questions, “Who can attack the
invisible? Who can rebel against Nobody?”16 The “Anonymous Authority” operating in the
middle of the century contributes to a climate of anxiety and despair in postwar American society,
one which expands its reach across races, decades, and literary movements, albeit, in different
contextual severity. In effect, the social forces that these authors target are more explicit at times
– the racial oppression and violence in the fiction of Wright and Ellison, for example – and more
insidious at others – consider Kesey’s critique of invisible power networks, or more to the point,
Kerouac’s rejection of the consumerist society that produces inauthenticity. Yet, Wright, Ellison,
Kerouac, and Kesey confront Anonymous Authority couched in the social values and beliefs
governing individuality, and in doing so, their narratives reveal the lack of possibility for
15

Foucault, “The Subject and Power,” p. 781; 790. Foucault further contextualizes this point:
“‘Government’ did not refer only to political structures or to the management of states; rather, it designated
the way in which the conduct of individuals or of groups might be directed: the government of children, of
souls, of communities, of families, of the sick” (790). Foucault states there are three types of struggles:
“forms of domination”; “forms of exploitation”; and “struggles against subjection” (781).
16
Erich Fromm, “Anonymous Authority – Conformity.” In The 1950’s: America’s “Placid” Decade. Ed.
Joseph Satin. Cambridge, MA: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1960: p. 28. Also, in “The Subject and
Power,” Foucault touches upon this notion of anonymous authority as a technique rather than an
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individuals who refuse to adhere to cultural codes of acquiescence. Moreover, recognizing that
racism is one of many forces that limits access to an open society, I propose a re-reading of
Kerouac and Kesey that focuses on how each author ultimately rejects the acceptance,
participation, and the cultivation of a white middle-class value system that has been established as
a prerequisite to move about in an “open society,” and that this, therefore, allies them with a
protest tradition.
A look at the definition of protest literature reveals that the classification of writing
within the protest tradition pertains more to a rhetorical effect – which I will argue is better suited
as epideictic – as opposed to the subject’s political value, which is often contrasted with an
aesthetic value. John Stauffer defines protest writing as the use of “language to transform the self
and change society,” and as literature that “functions as a catalyst, guide, or mirror of social
change.” Stauffer also discusses what he believes to be the difference between general literature
and protest literature, stating that “while the former empowers and transforms individuals, the
latter strives to give voice to a collective consciousness, uniting isolated or inchoate discontent,”
creating a specific literary tradition “inextricably linked to its time and place.”17 In her essay,
“On the Literature of Protest: Words as Weapons,” Kimberly Drake emphasizes that “readers’
emotions are more frequently the targets of protest writers than readers’ conventional
understandings of social relations.”18 Both Stauffer and Drake articulate the rhetorical objective
of striking a common antipathy in readers who share a communal value system, an activity that
registers with the epideictic. This value-laden rhetorical effect indicates that a subject and a
distinct, authorial intention of politicization are not solely responsible for classification as protest
writing. In other words, literature that does not appear overtly political – but aesthetically
institutional power: “To sum up, the main objective of these struggles is to attack not so much ‘such and
such’ an institution of power, or group, or elite, or class but rather a technique, a form of power” (781).
17
Zoe Trodd. American Protest Literature. Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University, 2006, p.
xii, italics added.
18
Kimberly Drake, “On the Literature of Protest: Words as Weapons,” in Literature of Protest. Ed.
Kimberly Drake. Ipswich, MA: Salem Press, 2013, p. 16.
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oriented, for example – can equally “function as a catalyst for social change” on a collective
level.19
I view Stauffer’s definition of protest literature as the use of language to give voice to a
“collective consciousness” of discontent, and as writing linked to a historical facticity, as very
adequately defining countercultural literature as well. The countercultural antiestablishment rings
of the evasion of official control, which, as Trodd and Ellison document, is part of an American
tradition of Revolution.20 In this way, these countercultural writers are not only aesthetically
oriented, or precursors to the hippie movement – which is the common, myopic view that
Kerouac rejects nonetheless21 – but they are better read as descendants of a literary protest
tradition that infuses narratives with what I view as a fomenting epideictic discourse to critique
the newly emerging social scene. The conception of power as anonymous, nonconcrete, and as
governing individualization is captured in the novels, for the activity depicted falls within the
19

For example, see “What Happened to Kerouac?” Directed by Richard Lerner and Lewis MacAdams,
appearances by Steve Allen, William F. Buckley, Allen Ginsberg, William S. Burroughs, Neal Cassady,
Gregory Corso. Shout Factory, 2012. William S. Burroughs acknowledges the cultural, rhetorical, and
political power of art to shape a population’s attitudes and actions, and this is an important distinction of
protest writing. In the film, “What Happened to Kerouac?”, Burroughs responds to the charge that Kerouac
“lacked direct involvement in political activism” by speaking to the “worldwide, cultural revolution” that
Kerouac ignited. Burroughs concludes, “By their fruits ye shall know them. Not by their disclaimers.”
Borrowing from Burroughs’s sentiment, I acknowledge the view that the countercultural movement, and
more specifically, the countercultural literature of Kerouac and Kesey, was a cultural revolution as opposed
to a political one (arguably), but this does not invalidate the social import of the counterculture, for the
cultural and the political are not independent of one another.
20
Trodd, American Protest Literature, xxvi. Ellison writes, “in turning now to the American novel, I wish
to emphasize that the American nation is based upon revolution” (“The Novel as a Function of American
Democracy,” p. 761).
21
In two separate interviews Kerouac alludes to his displeasure with both hippie behavior and communist
behavior and as well. He states, “America was an idea that was proposed and began to deteriorate at the
turn of the century when people came in waving flags. And now their grandchildren dance on the flag.
Damn them.” See Gregory McDonald, “Off the Road: The Celtic Twilight of Jack Kerouac.” Boston
Sunday Globe, August 11, 1968, Globe Sec., pp. 8, 11-12, 14, 16, 18. Reprinted in Kevin Hayes, Ed.,
Conversations with Jack Kerouac. Jackson, MS: University Press of Mississippi, 2005, p. 84. Also, see
Jack McClintock, “Jack Kerouac is On the Road No More.” St. Petersburg Times, October 12, 1969,
Floridian sec., pp. 4, 6-10. Reprinted in Conversations with Jack Kerouac. Ed. Kevin Hayes. Jackson, MS:
University Press of Mississippi, 2005, p. 91-95. McClintock’s article begins, “What happens to a Beatnik in
the age of Aquarius?”, and then he summarizes Kerouac’s appearance on “the Buckley show” with two
guests, who Kerouac refers to as “communists.” McClintock notes how the discussion turned to “hippies
and political activists,” and Kerouac voices his disproval: “Ginsberg … at a party with Kesey’s Merry
Pranksters Ginsberg came up and wrapped an American flag around me. So I took it and I folded it up the
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realm of sociality and speaks to the way people live their lives within postwar power networks.
The novels, the characters, and the narrative activity all address main social issues unraveling in
the postwar period, embedding the texts within the time and place they reflect.
As a result, the narratives demonstrate anonymous authority and the effect power
relations have on individual behavior. Foucault defines the effect of power as “a mode of action
which does not act directly and immediately on [individuals]. Instead, it acts upon their actions:
an action upon an action, on existing actions or on those which may arise in the present or the
future.”22 Native Son focuses on the fear that Bigger feels in his daily existence when his body
comes into contact with white bodies, and Wright comments on how an individual lives a life
drenched in fear, and he imagines the social consequences a community suffers when it instills a
racialized fear in the lives of black individuals. In terms of power’s effect in Native Son, Wright
attempts to challenge the fear invoked by the social scripts influencing Bigger Thomas’s actions
in the presence of white people, and how Bigger’s action incurs further suspicious and
consequential counteraction. Ellison demonstrates the power individuals wield when they refuse
to recognize the democratic worth of an-other individual, specifically black individuals, and he
writes a novel that comments on the social death caused by misrecognition, and he also narrates
the struggle involved in demanding recognition. The invisible man’s activity in the community
has consequential action as well, in terms of gaining approval, or procuring and keeping a job,
issues revolving around the decisions of others to grant or deny him access to the “open society.”
Kerouac focuses on the powerful effects the cultural narratives of domesticity and
consumerism have on individuals, as both of these social prescriptions regulate and anchor
individuals to the postwar conception of the home, and On the Road is a commentary on how to
live and desire authentically. Sal and Dean’s actions are met with delinquency as they reject the

way you’re supposed to, and put it on the back of the sofa. The flag is not a rag” (94). He also stated that
Kesey had “ruined Cassady” (93).
22
Foucault points out that “‘the other’ (the one over whom power is exercised) be thoroughly recognized
and maintained to the very end as a person who acts” (789).
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narrative of domestic containment in a capitalist society and move about in a country and an era
that codes stability in the home. And Kesey focuses on how the strategy of disciplinary power
can order the activity of those who are “mad” and subject to social control – individuals labeled
as a danger to society must submit to the psychiatric community before they can be released back
into the world. McMurphy and the mental patients’ noncompliant actions are therefore met with
disciplinary threats of future punitive action; however, they counter the Big Nurse’s disciplinary
power with play and laughter.
Applying an epideictic framework, I argue that these four authors represent a specific
brand of an American postwar protest literature, the literary epideictic. My main purpose is to
show first, how the voices of a post-WWII American nonconformity, captured in these novels, is
shaped and articulated; and second, how both the social protest and countercultural novel in the
postwar period function as rhetorical devices for social change. Both classifications of writers, in
rejecting power structures (racist, economic, psychiatric, etc.) hinder the further institutionalization of the dominating social and cultural norms and are accordingly labeled “outsiders.”
Thus, Kerouac and Kesey are not merely products of a culture of overprivileged discontents, as
some are led to believe, but rather these authors, along with Wright and Ellison, can be better
understood as progressing out of a historical and thematic break in the literary protest tradition
that begins in 1940 and encompasses a collective, post-WWII American ethos of dissent.23 These
authors’ novels are epideictic because they narratively depict activity that is embedded in value
systems unique to the postwar social environment, and ultimately, the authors reject the
prevailing values that they believe interfere with opportunities to live freely or authentically.
23

Indeed, Kerouac and Kesey faced a difficult challenge to locate an appropriate discourse to protest the
ills of a (predominantly) favorably viewed, prosperous, American society. In other words, the general
response to increasing economic prosperity was positive among middle-class officials and citizens, and
writers like Kerouac and Kesey, who would critique the newly developing social values, clashed with the
mainstream assumptions of the time. Essentially, Kerouac and Kesey contribute literary styles that build on
the literary protest tradition that came before them. Therefore, lumping the writers Kerouac and Kesey into
a Beat or countercultural movement immersed solely in an aesthetic, drug-infused, and/or spiritual context
perpetuates their literature’s detachment from sociopolitical concerns and depicts Kerouac and Kesey as
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2) Epideictic Rhetoric and Conventions in the Literary Epideictic
The literary epideictic, broadly speaking at this point, is a mode of literature, social
literature, that functions much like epideictic oratory in rhetorical theory. The social protest and
countercultural novels function as literary epideictic texts that reveal, critique, celebrate, and
reinvent value systems that provide guidelines for how individuals expresses themselves in
postwar society, and the social context of the postwar period in which the novels exist prompt the
authors to create texts that reflect the times. The narratives unveil textual space for readers to
contemplate values, individual and communal action, and they imagine actual and possible
worlds. However, the literary epideictic carries out its task narratively as opposed to oratorically,
and as a result, it adapts some of epideictic’s conventions and even invents some of them anew.
Epideictic rhetoric incorporates the following conventions:
1) A revelatory function (“to show forth”)
2) Praises or censures a person, place, or thing
3) A value-laden process (adhere to, or challenge value systems)
4) A goal of community cohesion
5) A display of ornateness (strategic language use)
6) An educative function
7) A concern with the present (addresses matters of the present moment)
8) Occasion-based (present events call forth epideictic rhetors)
These are the main conventions of epideictic rhetoric.24 While all these conventions work in
epideictic rhetoric and the literary epideictic, I will categorize them under three main operations –

cultural icons rather than literary authors who take their work seriously as it connects to a history of
literature as protest writing.
24
In an early and often cited scholarly review of Aristotle’s Rhetoric, E.M. Cope touches upon what would
be a dominant view of the third branch of rhetoric, the epideictic, stating,
The third branch is inferior to the two preceding in extent, importance, and interest. It is the …
demonstrative, showy, ostentatious, declamatory kind: so called because speeches of this sort are
composed for “show” or “exhibition,” epideixis, and their object is to display the orator’s powers,
and to amuse an audience … what are therefore theoroi rather than kritai, like spectators at a
theater, or a contest for a prize … rather than any serious interest or real issue at stake. (121).
See E.M. Cope, An Introduction to Aristotle’s Rhetoric. London: Macmillan, 1867. J. Richard Chase calls
epideictic a “wastebasket term that embraces all non-deliberative, non-forensic oratory,” and designates
praise and blame as the most prominent defining feature of epideictic. See J. Richard Chase, “The Classical
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the revelatory function, the value-laden process, and the presentist notion. These objectives
incorporate all of the epideictic conventions in one way or another within the novels Native Son,
Invisible Man, On the Road, and One Flew Over the Cuckoo’s Nest, and ultimately, these
characteristics comprise the literary epideictic.
Perhaps epideictic’s chief operation entails unveiling that which is “hidden,” or
illuminating the indiscernible. The word “epideictic” comes from the Greek verb epideiknumi,
meaning to “reveal,” and to “show-forth” (epi-deixis), and originally, epideictic had been
classified as the rhetoric of encomium, the rhetoric of praise and blame.25 Aristotle first identified
epideictic with public ceremonies that praise or censure a person or thing, often presenting the

Conception of Epideictic.” Quarterly Journal of Speech. Vol. 47, Issue 3, 1961, 293-300. Danisch defines
epideictic by “1) aesthetic practices of display that uncover what lies hidden, 2) a focus on outlining, on
describing, on making present the common values of audiences, and 3) mechanisms for generating
cohesion in a community.” See Robert Danisch, “Power and the Celebration of the Self: Michel Foucault’s
Epideictic Rhetoric. Southern Communication Journal. Vol. 71, No. 3, September 2006, p. 293. Dale
Sullivan articulates that epideictic has a “constellation of purposes: preservation, education, celebration,
and aesthetic creation,” and Cynthia Miecznikowski Sheard observes the educative function of epideictic
and claims that epideictic “is in many ways ritualistic, that it elicits judgment, that it can initiate, support,
influence, or lend closure to other modes of discourse, and we should add not only that it participates in
reality at critical moments in time but that it interprets and represents one reality for the purpose of positing
and inspiring a new one.” See Dale Sullivan, “The Ethos of Epideictic Encounter.” Philosophy and
Rhetoric, Vol. 26, No. 2 (1993), p. 116, and Cynthia Miecznikowski Sheard, “The Public Value of
Epideictic Rhetoric.” College English. Nov. 1996 (58:7), p. 765-790.
For a more general discussion of epideictic, see Theodore C. Burgess, Epideictic Literature. New
York: Garland Pub, 1987; George A. Kennedy, On Rhetoric: A Theory of Civic Discourse. New York:
Oxford University Press, 1991. For more on the revelatory function see Lawrence Rosenfield, “The
Practical Celebration of Epideictic,” in Rhetoric in Transition: Studies in the Nature and Uses of Rhetoric.
Ed. Eugene E. White. University Park, PA: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1980; for more on the
nature of praise and blame in epideictic, see Aristotle, Rhetoric, and Chase, “The Classical Conception of
Epideictic,” p. 293-300; for more on values in epideictic, see Sheard, “The Public Value of Epideictic
Rhetoric,” p. 765-794, and Danisch, “Power and the Celebration of the Self,” p. 291-307; for more on
community and communion, see Chaïm Perelman and Lucie Olbrechts-Tyteca, The New Rhetoric: A
Treatise on Argumentation. Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1969, and Richard Graff and
Wendy Winn, “Presencing ‘Communion’ in Chaïm Perelman’s New Rhetoric.” Philosophy & Rhetoric, no.
1, 2006, p. 45-71; for more on display and ornateness, see Rosenfield, “The Practical Celebration of
Epideictic,” and John Poulakos and Takis Poulakos, Classical Rhetorical Theory. Boston: Houghton
Mifflin, 1999; for more on the educative function, see Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca The New Rhetoric,
and Dale Sullivan, “A Closer Look at Education as Epideictic Rhetoric.” Rhetoric and Society Quarterly,
Vol. 23, No. ¾ (Summer – Autumn, 1994), p. 70-89; for more on the concern with the present in epideictic,
see Aristotle, Rhetoric, and Danisch, “Power and Celebration of the Self”; for more on the nature of
occasion and epideictic, see Celeste Michelle Condit, “The Functions of Epideictic: The Boston Massacre
Orations as Exemplar.” Communications Quarterly. Vol. 33, No. 4, Fall 1985, p. 284-299.
25
Thomas O. Sloane, Encyclopedia of Rhetoric: Volume 1. New York: Oxford University Press, Internet
Resource; Michael J. Hyde, The Ethos of Rhetoric. Columbia, S.C: University of South Carolina Press,
2004, p. xxi.
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opportunity for the speaker to advertise rhetorical skills to what has been deemed a passive
audience.26 Most of the traditional subject matter of epideictic revolves around ceremonial events,
funeral orations, or sundry objects of praise or blame, and the speaker’s abilities seem to consume
most of the early critical attention of epideictic discourse, which happens to overlook the social
function of epideictic. The audience, in that case, takes less of a role in the epideictic exchange
due to the prominence of the speaker’s strategic use of language, or rhetorical “skill” and
“ability,” as the rhetor works towards revealing or unveiling meaning.27 Thus, epideictic became
recognized and prized for its use of ornate and emphatic language designed to reveal or “show
forth” that which is hidden. As a result, epideictic has been more concerned with display – what
the language reveals about the speaker’s abilities – than with a civic function – i.e., what the
audience perceives and understands anew in regards to a communal identity.
Conventional understandings of epideictic have failed to grasp the fact that epideictic
possesses a larger social significance in terms of community and power. Rather than reveal a
26

George A. Kennedy explains the passive nature of epideictic as “speeches that do not call for any
immediate action by the audience but that characteristically praise or blame some person or thing, often on
a ceremonial occasion such as a public funeral or holiday.” See George A. Kennedy, On Rhetoric: A
Theory of Civic Discourse. New York: Oxford University Press, 1991, p.7. Christine Oravec also focuses
on the audience’s role as a group of “observers” who must receive the speaker’s decorous language, but
then “judge” the speaker’s abilities in presenting praiseworthy or blameworthy objects. This aesthetic
response, Christine Oravec has observed, functions as an act of “judgment” due to the audience’s role as a
group of “observers” who receive the speaker’s decorous language and other rhetorical devices that
represent some thing as praiseworthy or blamable. See Christine Oravec, “‘Observation’ in Aristotle’s
Theory of Epideictic.” Philosophy and Rhetoric 9 (1976): p. 171. Also, see Book I, Chapter 9 in Aristotle,
Rhetoric. Translated by W. Rhys Roberts. Mineola, New York: Dover, 2004; J. Richard Chase, “The
Classical Conception of Epideictic.” Quarterly Journal of Speech. Vol. 47, Issue 3, 1961, p. 293-300;
James A. Herrick, The History and Theory of Rhetoric: An Introduction. Boston: Pearson/Allyn & Bacon,
2009, pp. 77-97, specifically pp. 85-86. And for more on the role of the audience, see Chaïm Perelman and
Lucie Olbrechts-Tyteca, The New Rhetoric: A Treatise on Argumentation. Notre Dame, IN: University of
Notre Dame Press, 1969.
27
See Scott Consigny, “Gorgias’s Use of the Epideictic.” Philosophy & Rhetoric, Vol. 25, No. 3 (1992), p.
281 and n.4, p. 295. Consigny points out two translations of the Greek word dunamis as “ability” (Freese
translation), or “skill” (Roberts Translation). Also, see Book I, Chapter 9 in Aristotle, Rhetoric. Translated
by W. Rhys Roberts. Mineola, New York: Dover, 2004; and J. Richard Chase, “The Classical Conception
of Epideictic.” Quarterly Journal of Speech. Vol. 47, Issue 3, 1961, 296-297; and Theodore C. Burgess,
Epideictic Literature. New York: Garland Pub, 1987. Burgess discusses the affinities between epideictic
literature and poetry (114-115; 245). Aristotle referred to epideictic as “ceremonial,” and in Book I, chapter
9, he writes, “Praise is the expression in words of the eminence of a man’s good qualities” (35).
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“radiance,”28 or turn discourse into an “art object,”29 I view epideictic’s revelatory function as
providing a vision of the social imaginary, or the way in which value systems organize and
institute collective, normative practices.30 Because the social imaginary can shift over time,
epideictic can help elucidate the fluid and ever-changing values that inform how individuals
imagine their social surroundings and interactions with others, as well as distinguish the status
quo (how things actually are), from ideal states of how things ought to be. For instance, Robert
Danisch examines the epideictic nature of Foucault’s work on power and the individual, and he
claims that “the [epideictic] aim is to make present aspects of the social world that remain
hidden,” and that epideictic rhetoric “has the potential to reveal how discourse and power
organize and order communities.”31 A more fitting view of epideictic, then, entails a revelatory
function of discourse that attempts to understand how power can ensconce itself and operate
within value systems, and it works to uncover how power relations regulate the way in which an
individual navigates the social world as a member who is identified and ordered by communal
values. In this way, epideictic can reveal instabilities by illuminating the inconsistency of lived
reality against the value systems that are believed to govern sociality, especially in terms of how
28

Lawrence Rosenfield, “The Practical Celebration of Epideictic.” Rosenfield contends that epideictic
functions as a rhetoric of display, claiming that the audience perceives a “radiance” emanating from the
speaker that “acts to unshroud men’s notable deeds in order to let us gaze at the aura glowing within”
(135).
29
John Poulakos and Takis Poulakos. Classical Rhetorical Theory. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1999). John
and Takis Poulakos illustrate that epideictic rhetoric implements “elegant phrases that turn a piece of
discourse into an art object, thereby inviting audiences to experience language aesthetically” (61).
30
I borrow Charles Taylor’s conception of the “social imaginary,” which Taylor defines as “the ways in
which [people] imagine their social existence, how they fit together with others, how things go on between
them and their fellows, the expectations which are normally met, and the deeper normative notions and
images which underlie these expectations” (171). See Charles Taylor, A Secular Age. Cambridge, MA:
Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2007. Taylor insists on the terminology of “imaginary” because
ordinary people do not express their understandings in “theoretical terms, [but] it is carried in images,
stories, legends, etc.” (171-172). The social imaginary is “shared by large groups of people, if not the
whole society,” and it comprises “common practices and a widely shared sense of legitimacy” (172).
Taylor admits that at “any given time,” the social imaginary is “complex,” and that it is important to
“recognize ideal cases,” and he gives the examples of an election, a polite conversation, and ways to
organize a demonstration (172-173).
31
Danisch, “Power and the Celebration of the Self,” p. 298; 294.
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values determine expectations and a normative sense of how things should be versus how they
actually are.
It is important to remember that epideictic has always preoccupied itself with value
systems, and the way in which epideictic’s revelatory practice works in conjunction with value
systems had begun to shift epideictic discourse from a method of entertaining spectators, to one
of educating members of a social public.32 In fact, Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca refer to the
epideictic speaker as an “educator” whose task is to promote values with a mind towards
influencing the future action of audience members, and they argue that epideictic is less
concerned with “promot[ing] the speaker” as it is with creating “a certain disposition in those
who hear” the discourse.33 Much like Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca, Gerard Hauser also
touches upon epideictic’s correlation of values and behavior, or the “public norms for proper
political conduct” within a public sphere. In discussing epideictic’s ability to establish public
morality, Hauser proposes, “[epideictic] can educate us in the vocabulary of civic virtues that may
constitute citizens as an active public, and communicate principles on which responsible
32

Sheard, “The Public Value of Epideictic Rhetoric,” p. 766. As Sheard diligently puts it, “value rather
than reason has long been seen as the special province of epideictic rhetoric.” Sheard writes, “From
antiquity to the twentieth century, epideictic has been seen as a rhetoric of identification and conformity
whose function is to confirm and promote adherence to the commonly held values of a community with the
goal of sustaining that community” (766). And she acknowledges that contemporary epideictic rhetoric is
“ultimately about conduct and values within communities addressed or invoked” (771).
Also, see Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca, The New Rhetoric, p. 74. They explain, “one appeals to
values in order to induce the hearer to make certain choices rather than others and, most of all, to justify
those choices so that they may be accepted and approved by others” (75). They claim that values are
inherent in argumentation and they distinguish between “concrete” and “abstract” values, the former values
“attaching” to “a living being, a specific group, or particular object, considered as a unique entity,” and
abstract values, such as justice, truth, and discipline for example, existing “only in relation to concrete
values” (77). They reveal that a concern with abstract values is deeply tied with change, indicating that
abstract values possess a “revolutionary spirit,” and they claim that both concrete and abstract values are
“constantly being recast and remodeled” (79).
33
Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca, The New Rhetoric, p. 52-54. Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca point out
that the epideictic speaker, like an educator, must be qualified and “skillful” in her/hir/his presentation.
They claim that the “purpose of epideictic speech is to increase the intensity of values held in common by
the audience and the speaker,” values that also play a role in deliberative and legal speeches (52-53). They
affirm, “educational discourse, like the epideictic one, is not designed to promote the speaker, but for the
creation of a certain disposition in those who hear it” (54).
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citizenship may be based and a vibrant public sphere can survive.”34 Thus, epideictic not only
reveals values, but also educates individuals on how to conduct themselves in a civic realm.
Furthermore, the “vocabulary of civic virtues” inculcates a more desirable way to act, and the
relationship between education, values, and conduct, leads to communally-conceived desirable
states of existence, or social ideals. Epideictic offers a community the means necessary to
uncover the values operating underneath matters of social importance, and the means necessary to
evaluate, reinforce, or reinvent values that affect individuals and the community at large.
Because epideictic uncovers or promotes values that attempt to govern ways of acting in
the world, epideictic carries the charge of establishing a community, or more to the point, creating
a “communion” amongst individuals. As stated previously, the civic function of value-formation
has historically been assigned to the speaker with little activity on the part of the audience of
“spectators.”35 Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca rescue the epideictic audience, and genre, from
passivity by redirecting epideictic from the theatrical, to the argumentative, claiming that in order
for group consensus to come about, there must exist “objects of agreement,” and the main tactic
34

Gerard Hauser, “Aristotle on Epideictic: The Formation of Public Morality.” Rhetoric Society Quarterly.
29:1, 1999, p. 17; 20. On the other hand, Dale Sullivan reverses the relationship, arguing that education
itself functions as epideictic rhetoric because the “teacher” educates “students” about values and teaches
them communal perspectives tied to dominant or particular values, in order to prepare the students for
future action within the public sphere. See Dale Sullivan, “A Closer Look at Education as Epideictic
Rhetoric.” Rhetoric and Society Quarterly, Vol. 23, No. ¾ (Summer – Autumn, 1994), p. 73-75. Sullivan
argues in his thesis, “Education is a form of epideictic rhetoric that relies on the rhetorical acts of praise and
blame (1) to teach reasoning appropriate to professional and public practices, and (2) to instill in the student
sentiments or emotions considered appropriate within the orthodoxy which the teacher represents” (71). He
discusses epideictic’s concern with “virtue,” and the educational objective to develop virtuous individuals
who are defined as such by their ability to manage affairs concordant with society, which entails the use of
“practical knowledge and reason” along with “cultural knowledge and emotion” in order to respond
appropriately to issues facing the community.
35
See Book I, Chapter 3 in Aristotle, Rhetoric, 1358b, p. 12-13. Also, see Theodore C. Burgess, Epideictic
Literature. New York: Garland Pub, 1987. In terms of the audience’s role in epideictic rhetoric, most of the
focus has been on the “hearer,” for Burgess points out that Aristotle’s division of the branches of rhetoric
stem from the activity of the “hearer,” as opposed to the “judge” in other branches: the “judge” has “some
real interest at stake and is expected to make a decision,” and the observer is “so named from the analogy
of the theater, where the audience are mere spectators and entertainment is the chief purpose” (92). And
yet, Christine Oravec cites Aristotle’s emphasis on “observation” and proposes that it contains an
“intellective dimension” because the speaker constructs messages from a common body of knowledge
shared with the audience, and “the audience ‘learns’ or ‘understands’ the connection between the principle
and the manifestation of the principle” (166). See Christine Oravec, “‘Observation’ in Aristotle’s Theory of
Epideictic.” Philosophy and Rhetoric 9 (1976): p. 162-163.
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in establishing consensus or communion is through the appeal to distinct communal values. The
“speaker” attempts to “establish a sense of communion centered around particular values
recognized by the audience”; but, as Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca also point out, the audience
may accept or reject the particular values due to the possibility of the proposed values coming
into conflict with other prevailing values; as a result, it is more appropriate to regard the
epideictic audience with a more active role.36 In effect, epideictic pertains more to a participatory
process, what amounts to a transactional exchange, more than it does to a ceremonial, and hence,
spectatorial display.
Surprisingly, however, Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca fail to recognize the
transformative power of epideictic rhetoric, for they insist that epideictic rhetoric revolves
predominantly around “adherence” to already-accepted views, rather than epideictic’s possibility
for inculcating change. And yet, the interrelationship between the epideictic process and its
participants is more complicated than they suggest, for value formation and value sustentation
should be viewed as more fluid. More appropriately, Danisch emphasizes how epideictic
discourse is “constitutive of self, identity, and community,” and he recognizes the power of
epideictic to help a community “to come to know itself and to come to know the other
communities living in the same society,” which can potentially lead to “assimilation,
transformation, and change.”37 Thus, because epideictic is closely connected with community and
36

Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca, The New Rhetoric, p. 51. In discussing the three branches of rhetoric,
Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca mention the roles of the audience as “deliberating” (deliberative),
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Communication Journal. Vol. 71, No. 3, September 2006, p. 292; Robert Danisch, “Alain Locke on Race
and Reciprocity: The Necessity of Epideictic Rhetoric for Cultural Pluralism.” Howard Journal of
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values, it can assist a community in seeking out meaning when that community is faced with
staggering events, or finds itself experiencing new identity exploration; thus, epideictic’s valueladen, educative function then possesses the potential for change. Consequently, as new times
confront a particular community, the value system currently guiding how a community governs
itself might no longer meet the developing circumstances or of the changing needs of the
community. Thus, while epideictic can work to preserve a particular value or value system, one
must not dismiss epideictic’s capacity for change, for epideictic can also act as a discursive mode
catalyzing change.
It therefore seems appropriate, then, that one of epideictic’s chief concerns regards
matters of the present, which are further invoked by present occasions occurring within a society
or community. Aristotle assigns each branch of rhetoric a tense and awards epideictic with the
present, and Jonathan Pratt explains how epideictic “praises or blames its object in relation to
present realities.”38 Condit brings together the concept of community and the present moment
when she discusses the purpose of epideictic to work “not only to maintain community values,
but also to accomplish the progressive function of adapting [the] community to new times,
technologies, geographies, and events,” touching upon the unprocessed meaning an event can
potentially have for a group of individuals who naturally look for definition, contextualization,
and valuation.39 Similarly, Danisch calls epideictic “presentist,” acknowledging how epideictic

Communications, 19:4, p. 298. In discussing the epideictic and race, Danisch claims, “Epideictic rhetoric,
therefore, is a way for a community to come to know itself and to come to know the other communities
living in the same society. In addition, such exchanges lead to inevitable assimilation, transformation, and
change, demonstrating the ongoing process of defining race and determining values” (298).
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1988, p. 21-23.
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Celeste Michelle Condit, “The Functions of Epideictic: The Boston Massacre Orations as Exemplar.”
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involves “telling a history of the present” in order for “the individual to negotiate his or her
relationship with the dominant social structures of the present moment.” In asking, and then
answering, the questions, “how can I define, describe or explain the present moment? [and] how
will that definition, description, or explanation affect who I am?”, Danisch asserts that the
epideictic rhetor can “reinvent” the individual and the culture in which the individual is situated,
producing new understandings and new modes of agency.40 To this end, epideictic performs a
diagnostic function to begin with, uncovering the forces that give birth to whatever present-daypredicament a community finds itself facing. Additionally, epideictic also functions as a means
for critical engagement with those forces. That is to say, epideictic first reveals the complexities
involved in events that register on a community’s identity, and then it affords a discourse that can
do the work of definition, contextualization, and judgment. Therefore, epideictic can be viewed as
contingent upon “the critical convergence of time, place, and circumstance.”41 This convergence
of time, place, and circumstance make up what I refer to as the epideictic exigency.
3) The Literary Epideictic, the Epideictic Exigency, and
The American Social Protest and Countercultural Novel in the Postwar Period
To sum up to this point, the literary epideictic is a mode of literature that reveals value
systems that govern sociality and it is deeply connected to the time and the social environment
within which the text is written.42 The literary epideictic social protest and countercultural

“the event had to be subsumed and articulated within the communal history and the feelings and values of
the citizens” (294-295).
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novels focus on the present moment and depict narrative events occurring in a national,
democratic context to create a “communion” amongst readers; these texts ultimately construct a
rhetorical space for readers to interpret narrative events taking place in narrative social
environments that mirror the postwar social climate. Therefore, the values espoused to the notion
of democracy and the newly developing postwar society of social mobility operated as the
transcendental figure uniting the various peoples in the country, those who could potentially be
reading the novels. Hauser illustrates this epideictic process when he recognizes that “political
actors cannot unite out of a common interest without first recognizing shared bonds of
community that transcend individual differences,” and Richard Graff and Wendy Winn
emphasize the ability of “words and phrases closely associated with a particular milieu” as
capable of forming a communion amongst individuals. Essentially, the novels begin from the
premise of a shared, “prior existence of community” in terms of a democratic society of readers
who share with one another the principles and values associated with the developing “open
society.”43 Taking this into account, the literary epideictic – and especially the social protest and
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countercultural novel – alludes to a historical milieu through the narrative events, actions,
discourse, and dialogue used by the characters in order to construct a “communion” amongst the
readers, one which shares the social reality of postwar existence.
To establish the social environment, a historical postwar situatedness works in
conjunction with Lloyd Bitzer’s original theory of “situation,” making up the epideictic exigency,
a historic context that gives the novels their distinct character.44 Bitzer defines “exigence” as an
“imperfection,” “defect,” or “obstacle” possessing a sense of “urgency.” Therefore, due to
exigencies, not all attempts at communion within the literary epideictic intend to create a positive
identification with particular values, for epideictic can also expose the failure of certain values to
register within a social environment.45 For instance, there are times when individual conduct
does not reflect a communally-agreed upon set of values, so the literary epideictic writer engages
in a kind of educative capacity, exposing the dissonance between particular activities and beliefs
that clash with the prevailing democratic value system.46 Exigencies result in a “complex of
persons, objects, events and relations” that “invites” the creation of discourse that not only
responds to the situation, but participates with it as well. Additionally, what is important to note,
says Bitzer, is that this “complex” is “located in reality,” which links it with “observable historic
facts.” But the relationship between the discourse and exigency is not always direct – the
offer amounts to an invitation for communal engagement or involvement through the “interrogative mood,”
“figures of address,” and the shifting of “grammatical patterns,” specifically with pronouns (the use of “I”
and “we” for example) (57).
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Lloyd Bitzer, “The Rhetorical Situation,” Philosophy & Rhetoric, Vol. 1, No. 1 (Jan., 1968), p. 1-14.
Bitzer writes, “Rhetorical acts belong to the class of things which obtain their character from the
circumstances of the historic context in which they occur. … a work is rhetorical because it is a response to
a situation of a certain kind” (3). The rhetorical acts, Bitzer continues, are determined to “produce action or
change in the world … as a mode of altering reality, not by the direct application of energy to objects, but
by the creation of discourse which changes reality through the mediation of thought and action” (4).
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Bitzer defines “exigence” as “an imperfection marked by urgency; it is a defect, an obstacle, something
waiting to be done, a thing with is other than it should be” (6). For epideictic’s ability to destabilize, see
Walter Beale, “Rhetorical Performative Discourse: A New Theory of Epideictic.” Philosophy & Rhetoric,
Vol. 11, No. 4 (Fall, 1978), p. 243. Beale writes, “for better or worse, the epideictic or rhetorical
performative discourse is as much an instrument of social upheaval as of social concord.”
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See Dale Sullivan, “The Epideictic Character of Rhetorical Criticism.” Rhetoric Review, Vol. 11, No. 2
(Spring, 1993). Sullivan writes, “Unveiling a text can be an uncovering of the value system implicit in the
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exigence may be, as Bitzer points out, insignificant, may be unnamed, may only be alluded to, or
may even be reinvented, for instance. Yet, Bitzer maintains that there is likely “one controlling
exigence” that serves as an “organizing principle.”47
One way the literary epideictic utilizes the epideictic exigency is through the narrative
creation of a cultural frame of reference.48 The epideictic exigency refers to specific historic
happenings, and each novel comes into existence in response to its epideictic exigency. The
historic event and context “invite” – perhaps provoke is a more accurate word – the authors to
create narratives that contain particular discourse (in relation to the epideictic exigency) and
narratives that allude to postwar, democratic-value-laden oppositions through the events, actions,
discourse, and thoughts of the characters in order to generate a passional response in the
readership. In the literary epideictic, the authors and the textual elements work to amplify a
particular relation of democratic values with narratively depicted realities that can potentially
mirror postwar experiences on an individual and collective level, and help identify the readers
with the time period or the cultural milieu. For instance, Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca discuss

text,” adding that “describing and interpreting, normally considered initial stages in the act of criticism, are
epideictic acts of unveiling, exposing the value system of a text or person to the gaze of spectators” (342)
47
Bitzer, “The Rhetorical Situation,” p. 11. In regards to the “controlling exigence as organizing principle,”
Bitzer provides a fuller explanation,
In any rhetorical situation there will be at least one controlling exigence which functions as the
organizing principle: it specifies the audience to be addressed and the change to be effected. The
exigence may or may not be perceived clearly by the rhetor or other persons in the situation; it
may be strong or weak depending on the clarity of their perception and the degree of their interest
in it; it may be real or unreal depending on the facts of the case; it may be important or trivial; it
may be such that discourse can completely remove it, or it may persist in spite of repeated
modifications; it may be completely familiar – one of a type of exigences occurring frequently in
our experience – or it may be totally new, unique. (7).
Overall, Bitzer’s theory of the rhetorical situation involves the following: 1) it serves as an invitation to
discourse; 2) it grants a rhetorical significance to the rhetorical act; 3) it functions as a “necessary condition
to rhetorical discourse”; 4) it can be solved or remain unsolved; 5) it allows the discourse to participate
with the situation and alters reality; 6) the discourse “fits” with the situation; and 7) “the situation controls
the rhetorical response in the same sense that the question controls the answer and the problem controls the
solution” (5-6).
48
Richard Graff and Wendy Winn, “Presencing ‘Communion’ in Chaïm Perelman’s New Rhetoric.”
Philosophy & Rhetoric, no. 1, 2006, p. 56. Graff and Win discuss allusion and quotation within the
example of Martin Luther King’s “I Have a Dream” speech and they note that the notion of community is
concerned with the “audience members’ recognition of a frame of cultural reference they share with one
another and with the speaker employing the allusion,” and that a “prior existence of a community is
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the role of “allusion” in epideictic argumentation and how the power of allusion lies in its ability
to “evoke [meaning] without actually naming,” and they grant a “special affectivity attached to
these cultural facts,” or historical events.49 The novels evoke “a special affectivity” by alluding to
the social environment that witnesses various “obstacles” or “defects” impeding democratic
freedoms, all of which are locatable in the social reality (or imagination) of the postwar period;
and the narratives do so without specifically referencing the exact occasion prompting the
narratives, or, the actual historical events of Robert Nixon’s murder, Isaac Woodard’s blinding,
domestic containment and the Cold War, and psychiatric measures of discipline and control. My
theory of the epideictic exigency within the literary epideictic carries out this rhetorical theory of
a cultural frame of reference – the epideictic exigency serves as the narratorial “organizing
principle” that arises from a historic event.
The events that capture the social climate within each novel will be discussed in detail in
the respective chapters. In Wright’s Native Son, the 1938 case of Robert Nixon, a black male
who robbed a white woman and killed her in the process, accounts for the epideictic exigency.
Authorities immediately arrested Nixon, and swiftly accused him of raping the white woman,
even though there was little to no evidence to corroborate that charge.50 Native Son focuses on an
equivalent ordeal, as Bigger Thomas kills Mary Dalton and he too is accused of rape. Both the
necessary for an allusion” to have force. An allusion to a historical event, they continue, will conjure up
values “exemplified” or “rejected” (56).
49
Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca, The New Rhetoric, p. 177. They mention “events” and “cultural facts” as
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See Richard Wright, “How Bigger was Born,” in Native Son. Introduction by Arnold Rampersad. New
York: Harper, 2005, p. 455. In the essay, Wright explicitly links Nixon to the novel, first, by stating, “Any
Negro who has lived in the North or the South knows that times without number he has heard of some
Negro boy being picked up on the streets and carted off to jail and charged with ‘rape.’ This thing happens
so often that to my mind it had become a representative symbol of the Negro’s uncertain position in
America.” He indicates, “So frequently do these acts recur that when I was halfway through the first draft
of Native Son a case paralleling Bigger’s flared forth in the newspapers of Chicago. (Many of the
newspaper items and some of the incidents in Native Son are but fictionalized versions of the Robert Nixon
case and rewrites of news stories from the Chicago Tribune)” (455). Also, see Margaret Walker, Richard
Wright Daemonic Genius: A Portrait of the Man, A Critical Look at His Work. New York: Warner Books,
1988, specifically p. 122; Hazel Rowley, Richard Wright: The Life and Times. New York: Holt, 2001; Jerry
W. Ward and Robert Butler. The Richard Wright Encyclopedia. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 2008.
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Nixon case and the novel illustrate the moral panic that ensues as newspapers report the events
(Chicago newspapers reporting the Nixon murder, and the fictional newspapers reporting the
murder committed by Bigger), but more importantly, the “organizing principle” that both retain is
the racist social script of the black male rapist that a postwar racist society attaches to the black
male body. This event offers Wright the occasion to explore and write about the fear that a black
male consciousness suffers because of the racist scripts, and the tragedy that can occur as a result.
Wright’s narrative social environment mirrors the environment of the Nixon case, and he reveals
the fear predicated on the myth of the black male rapist, and the fear that surfaces when black
male and white female bodies encounter one another. In the end, Wright attempts to show that
white and black individuals are implicated in the prolongation of racialized fear because a social
environment that suffocates its members with fear – literally and metaphorically as Nixon’s and
Bigger’s victims were both strangled or suffocated – can most definitely lead to a tragedy like
Nixon’s or Bigger’s crimes.51
Ralph Ellison’s occasion is more abstract and thematic, as his novel Invisible Man deals
with the notion of recognition in a democratic context as opposed to the physical and
psychological nature of fear in Wright’s text. The social climate represented in Invisible Man
implicates the matter of visibility – African American abuse was thought to have sprung from the
51

Another historical event that weighs on Native Son is the Loeb and Leopold case of 1924 in which two
teenage Chicago socialites, Richard Loeb and Nathan Leopold, murdered fourteen-year-old Bobby Franks
to prove themselves Nietzschean supermen. See Hal Higdon, Leopold and Loeb: The Crime of the Century.
(Urbana, IL: University of Illinois Press), 1999. Higdon states that the Leopold and Loeb case earned the
title “crime of the century” because of the frightening nature of the crime – a kidnap, ransom, and murder
of a child. Additionally, the two young men had “IQs of 210 and 160,” and the case dominated the news in
1924, especially when the lawyer, Clarence Darrow, one of the most famous attorneys of the time, agreed
to represent them and changed their plea from “not guilty” to “guilty” in order to prevent the death
sentence. Darrow argued that forces beyond the young boys’ control influenced their action and that this
should be considered when sentencing the boys, who should ultimately be spared the death penalty. For
more on the defense, see Simon Baatz, For the Thrill of It: Leopold, Loeb, and the Murder That Shocked
Chicago. (New York: HarperCollins, 2008), p. 267-289. Max, Bigger’s lawyer, uses a similar defense
strategy, but to no avail. See Robert Butler, “The Loeb and Leopold Case: A Neglected Source for Richard
Wright’s Native Son. African American Review, Volume 39, No. 4. 2005, pp. 555-567; Hazel Rowley,
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high visibility of their black bodies, which a white supremacist society coded as inferior and
subjective.52 Yet, Ellison composes a novel portraying the narrator’s invisibility to comment on
the social and political (non)recognition of black men and women in a racist society, a society
that is supposed to be the semblance of democratic freedom. The historical event that captures
this social climate is the “Blinding of Isaac Woodard,” a World War II Army veteran who was
returning home in 1946 just hours after being honorably discharged, and who failed to act in
accordance with the subservient, white expectations of black men in a Jim Crow society.53 While
still in uniform and on his way home via a Greyhound bus, a heated confrontation between the
white bus driver and Woodard ensued over Woodard’s apparently overextended use of the
restroom. At the next stop, the bus driver called the police to report that Woodard was a drunk
and disorderly passenger, and consequently, Woodard was ordered off the bus, beaten, and
ultimately blinded for basically failing to properly address white people.54 Woodard’s case
represents the literal theme of visibility (and in-visibility as a result of his horrific blinding) as it
52

Lucas Morel helps put this in perspective: “The tragic irony for black Americans is that they have
suffered from both visibility and invisibility. Their ‘high visibility’ as blacks living in a predominantly
white society made them the legal and social target of racism, while their individuality remained in-visible
to a white society that judged them only by their color.” See Lucas Morel, “Should America Be Blind to
Race?” On Principle, August, 1998. http://www.ashbrook.org/publicat/onprin/v6n4/morel.html. See also
George Yancy, “African-American Philosophy: Through the lens of Socio-existential Struggle.”
Philosophy and Social Criticism, Vol. 37 (5), (2011), pp. 551-574. Yancy illustrates that AfricanAmerican philosophy develops out of a socio-existential context in which African Americans have lived an
experiential reality of the absurd in the form of white racism and racist acts of dehumanization. The socioexistential context presupposes a form of white supremacy, a world that is “anti-Black”. Therefore, Yancy
writes, “Unlike Descartes, Black self-understanding grows out of a social matrix of pain and suffering; a
site where the Black body is a site of marked inferiority, difference and deviance” (554). As a
consequence, the African American individual must struggle to understand the self in a world where
whiteness functions as a “transcendental norm.”
53
For more on the case of Isaac Woodard, see Carol Anderson, “Clutching at Civil Rights Straws: A
Reappraisal of the Truman Years and the Struggle for African American Citizenship,” in Raymond H.
Geselbracht, ed. The Civil Rights Legacy of Harry S. Truman. (Kirksville, MO: Truman State University
Press, 2007), p. 31-50; Ken Hechler, “Truman Laid the Foundation for the Civil Rights Movement,” in The
Civil Rights Legacy of Harry S. Truman, p. 51-66; Philip A. Klinkner and Rogers M. Smith, The Unsteady
March: The Rise and Decline of Racial Equality in America. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1999);
Bernard C. Nalty, Strength for the Fight: A History of Black Americans in the Military. (New York: Free
Press, 1986), p. 204-218; and Andrew Myers, “The Blinding of Isaac Woodard,” The Proceedings of the
South Carolina Historical Association, eds. Robert Figueira and Stephen Lowe. (Columbia, SC: The South
Carolina Historical Association – South Carolina Department of Archives and History, 2004), p. 63-73.
54
Philip A. Klinkner and Rogers M. Smith, The Unsteady March: The Rise and Decline of Racial Equality
in America. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1999), p. 202.

31
connects to the social issue of political recognition for black men and women in a postwar society
– regardless of his service in the fight for democracy at home and abroad, an American racist
society reminded Woodard that he is still a black man who must fear and subject himself to
whites. The Blinding of Isaac Woodard represents the type of social environment that the
invisible man must navigate in search of recognition, and Ellison sets up the visible/invisible
contrast in order to appeal to the hearts and minds of readers in hopes of revealing and
articulating a morally responsible democratic love.
Perhaps less an isolated historical event, but a more socially pervasive influence, the
political doctrine of containment serves as the backdrop On the Road stands out against.
Containment is the political concept of the post- and cold war era that is designed to stifle
communist sentiments not only abroad but domestically as well. The cultural narrative of
“domestic containment” codes the home, gender roles, and family stability as the ways of life
designated to fight national and global waves of communism, and the formation of this public,
middle-class knowledge serves as the epideictic exigency in Kerouac’s novel.55 On a more
specific note, the famous “Kitchen Debate” of 1959 between then Vice President Richard Nixon
and Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev reveals more, perhaps, about the conflict of the postwar
period than any international political event, mostly because it provides scripts for family
members on how to live the “good life” (despite the fact that it occurred after the publication of
On the Road. The important point to consider is the developing social and cultural landscape that
had been festering and leading up to the era of containment and the Kitchen Debate). During the
Cold War, the US relied on an American superiority connected to the suburban home, complete
with appliances demonstrating technological advancement. Material things, such as a house in the
suburbs, a washing machine, a refrigerator, a TV, and many other products, became linked to
55
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American values, like domesticity and pragmatism, which staved off the threat and the evils of
communism. Nixon argued that these domestic goods demonstrated the ideality of American life
over that of the Soviet Union.56 And, as a result, consumerism became entwined with a political
agenda, namely, with the theory of containment. 57 Thus, the “home” becomes the “sphere of
influence” that creates conformist and obedient civilians, and On the Road features a narrative
that challenges that social environment through movement and a desire for the authentic, for the
doctrine of domestic containment centers around the inauthentic due to the conformity that results
in homogenization. It is through the context of containment that Kerouac’s novel challenges
consumerism, for Kerouac views consumerism as an undesirable way to live life, and he
celebrates movement as an authentic way to resist a culture of containment.
Finally, Kesey’s Cuckoo’s Nest responds to the epideictic exigency of the postwar
development of psychiatric control, which is, in effect, a branch of social control. The psychiatric
implementation of Electro Convulsive Therapy (ECT), for example, embodies the social climate
that Kesey’s novel pushes back against. This psychiatric development, as evident in the novel
56
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also, features the discourse of the “patient’s good” (parens patriae),58 and through that discourse,
Kesey connects his novel to the social environment that is implicated by this historical
development. While Kesey was writing the novel, a conformist acquiescence towards
psychiatry’s mission statement to work for the “patient’s good” manifested.59 Psychiatry’s power
to pluck people out of society and classify them insane, and then to render them powerless in
terms of treatment that is for “their own good,” creates an intense desire to conform to whatever it
is that psychiatry deems normal. The way in which judgment, labeling, and power work in the
psychiatric process of ECT makes it a method of control, and as a result, psychiatry begins to
unleash a powerful hold over individuals who are determined “out of place,” “other,” or
eccentric. This is what Cuckoo’s Nest ultimately protests – forms of control, for the patients’
only choice is to conform or submit to psychiatric procedures. Kesey embeds this critique in
narrative form as it pertains to psychiatry, but it extends to the broader issue of social control,
akin to the “Anonymous Authority” that Fromm exposes. While ECT functions as a form of
social control, Kesey responds to the epideictic exigency in narrative form by displaying a
discourse of play as power, which utilizes forms of play and laughter as measures to evade and
challenge power and control.
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Once again, I am not saying the literary authors allude to the specific events, but the
events happen to be pivotal in influencing, shaping, and speaking to the social tendencies of the
postwar period, and the narratives allude to the social environments that create the tensions
leading up to the historic events that make up each text’s epideictic exigency. Each of the four
novels contains narratives that expose the lack of democratic values for certain individuals in a
certain context, and at other times, the novels contain discourse that works in a more celebratory
mode; but in either case, the discourse is influenced by, and participates in, the epideictic
exigency. An explicit reference to the historic event is not a necessary condition for the literary
epideictic, for Walter Beale points out the “reinforcement of values” – and, I would add, the
challenging and re-creating of value systems – “is seldom an explicit function of epideictic”; and
Dale Sullivan also notes that epideictic rhetors “are not likely to ground their assertions with
meticulous detail.”60 Therefore, what is important to take away from the rhetorical theory of
exigency for the literary epideictic is the way in which historic events influence, speak to, and
make up the cultural milieu or social environment that the novels find themselves mirroring.
When the narratives amplify themes connected to the epideictic exigency, the readers can then
judge the thematic allusion as it pertains to actual events that register within a communal history.

4) Conclusion
Constructing an Ethos of Dissent: The Literary Epideictic as a
Dwelling Place of Democratic Consubstantiality
In his article, “Power and the Celebration of the Self: Michel Foucault’s Epideictic
Rhetoric,” Robert Danisch poses the question, “Could we invent a kind of resistance that does not
ask questions about political effectiveness yet offers an alternative, viable form of agency?”61
Danisch sets up this question to argue that epideictic provides a form of resistance. However, the
60
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literary epideictic is even better suited for this task, especially as the American social protest and
countercultural novels discussed align with the social development of the Anonymous Authority
during the midcentury posed earlier by Fromm. While Fromm cynically asked who can attack the
invisible “It,” the social protest and countercultural novels provide a form of resistance. In
discussing the nature of power relations, Foucault provides a resistant strategy that reels in the
literary, and one that literary scholars would be wise to note. In “The Subject and the Power,”
Foucault discusses establishing new economies of power relations, and he writes,
It consists of taking the forms of resistance against different forms of power as a starting
point. To use another metaphor, it consist of using this resistance as a chemical catalyst
so as to bring to light power relations, locate their position, and find out their point of
application and the methods used. Rather than analyzing power from the point of view of
its internal rationality, it consists of analyzing power relations through the antagonism of
strategies.62
The literary epideictic is indeed more than capable to carry out this task. Literature, especially in
the case of social protest and countercultural literature, acts as a strategy of antagonism – these
authors and their texts are the “chemical catalysts” not only bringing to light power relations, but
also depicting social ills or societal shortcomings in a democratic sense. In Fromm’s line of
questioning, he asks about who can attack “It,” but if one were to ask how, the literary epideictic
provides a line of exploration to find the point of “It’s” application.
As novels within the social protest and countercultural traditions, Wright’s, Ellison’s,
Kerouac’s, and Kesey’s novels create, with the application of epideictic, a literary imaginative
space for readers to contemplate how the realization of the democratic principles of safety,
recognition, desire, and the “patient’s good” are controlled by social scripts. The emergence of
newly found individual freedoms and values are met with power and control, and the authors and

36
their texts attempt to disrupt the powerful grip particular social scripts have on the governization
of individuality. Jeffrey Walker notes how epideictic addresses the “experientially ‘permanent’ or
chronic issues in a society’s pattern of existence,” and it seeks a “moment or juncture within the
pattern” to intervene.63 In addition, I see social protest and countercultural literature embodying
what Michael Hyde refers to as “the ethos of rhetoric,” which incorporates this notion of
intervention and imagination in what I refer to as the ethos of a postwar, rhetoric of dissent.
The “ethos of rhetoric” comes from Hyde’s introduction to the essay collection of the
same name, and the anthology considers a specific meaning of “ethos” that predates the more
common translation of “moral character” and “ethics.” Hyde defines the term as, “the way
discourse is used to transform space and time into ‘dwelling places’ (ethos; pl. ethea) where
people can deliberate about and ‘know together’ (con-scientia) some matter of interest.” One way
to accomplish this, Hyde points out, is through the appeal to readers’ “inventive and symbolic
capacity to construct dwelling places that are stimulating and aesthetically, psychologically,
socially, and perhaps theologically instructive.”64 I am focusing on how social protest and
countercultural literature provide such “dwelling places” for readers to contemplate the
sociocultural architecture of behavior, so to speak, that governs human relations – representations
of the commonplaces of postwar existence or activity.
In this way, the social protest novels of Wright and Ellison, and the countercultural
novels of Kerouac and Kesey, within the framework of the literary epideictic, cultivate a
democratic consubstantiality among readers.65 By “democratic consubstantiality” I mean a
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rhetorical space for readers to ethically evaluate democratic values within a literarily-depicted
social context. This term coexists with the notion of “community” in epideictic rhetoric, although
I use the terms somewhat interchangeably, mostly because literature does not possess the extant
coordinates of time and space that the physical setting of an oral speech provides for an
audience.66 Yet, the social climate of a postwar American society can provide the experience, the
democratic values, and the social attitudes that allow individual readers to identify with – and
consequently, to consubstantiate with – others living in postwar society regardless of race,
gender, or class, for all postwar individuals live under the (specious) auspices of democratic
freedoms. Of course, a reader can refuse to participate in the particular contemplation of reality,
but that is why the act is a moral examination – this epideictic framework and the narrative create
a literary “dwelling place” for readers to contemplate the values of freedom, possibility, and
interconnectedness as those values are impacted by a newly emerging, post-WWII American
society. The epideictic exigency calls forth the epideictic writer (so to speak), and they feel called
or compelled to report on their experience within the developing American sociocultural
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joined and separate, at once a distinct substance and consubstantial with another” (21). Thus, “In being
identified with B, A is ‘substantially one’ with a person other than himself. Yet at the same time he
remains unique, an individual locus of motives” (21).
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Sullivan touches upon the role of the epideictic rhetor in establishing a “consubstantial space,” noting
how the speaker and the audience “enter timeless, consubstantial space carved out by their mutual
contemplation of reality,” and how the onus falls upon the rhetor to initiate this act, but the audience must
choose “to enter that space and participate in the celebration.” See Dale Sullivan, “The Ethos of Epideictic
Encounter.” Philosophy and Rhetoric, Vol. 26, No. 2 (1993), p. 128. Thus, I am arguing that epideictic
rhetoric reveals how social protest and countercultural literature function by confronting the relationship of
different individuals’ lived experiences to the professed democratic ideals of postwar society, and the act of
reading serves as an act of participation.
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landscape. Wright, Ellison, Kerouac, and Kesey see junctures within the social imaginary and
situate their narratives as critical commentaries on the social issues unraveling, and they do so by
imagining new perspectives and alternative visions, both condemnatory and celebratory. Thus,
conjoining epideictic and literature in the literary epideictic can perhaps be an effective method in
posing important questions, producing new understandings of power relations, opening up new
possibilities or alternatives, and ultimately, resisting power.
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“One of the best ways to instill fear in people is to terrorize them. Yet this fear is best
sustained by convincing them that their bodies are ugly, their intellect is inherently
underdeveloped, their culture is less civilized, and their future warrants less concern than
that of other peoples. Two hundred and forty-four years of slavery and nearly a century
of institutionalized terrorism in the form of segregation, lynchings, and second-class
citizenship in America were aimed at precisely this devaluation of black people. This
white supremacist venture [….] has left its toll in the psychic scars and personal wounds
now inscribed in the souls of black folk.”
Cornel West, Race Matters (1994), p. 85
“I feel that for white America to understand the significance of the problem of the Negro
will take a bigger and tougher America than any we have yet known. […] Therefore if,
within the confines of its present culture, the nation ever seeks to purge itself of its color
hate, it will find itself at war with itself, convulsed by a spasm of emotional and moral
confusion.”
Richard Wright, Black Boy (1945), p. 272

Chapter II: “Bigger Thomas Conditioning” and
“The Affective Economy of Fear” in Native Son
Introduction
In Book Three of Native Son, Max at one point proclaims, “Fear and hate and guilt are
the keynotes of this drama!”67 Within the narrative of Native Son, Bigger Thomas’s emotions
fluctuate and are triggered by exchanges between various individuals as he navigates the social
environment. Wright weaves emotional discourse into the novel in order to “blame” systemic
oppression for effecting a social death in Bigger Thomas. The social environment creates a
distorted worldview for men and women like Bigger in which little opportunity exists for them to
move about freely and live a life unimpeded by racialized fear.68 When the narrative amplifies
67

Richard Wright, Native Son. Introduction by Arnold Rampersad. New York: HarperPerennial, 2005, p.
386. All future references from Native Son will be taken from this edition and page numbers will appear in
parentheses.
68
The “social environment” is a prominent concept in Wright’s work, and he invests the term with a racial
context in order to indict the space in which black and white bodies navigate. In his essay, “How Bigger
was Born,” Wright professes, “I don’t mean to say that I think that environment makes consciousness, but I
do say that I felt and still feel that the environment supplies the instrumentalities through which the
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the emotions of fear, hate, anger, guilt, and shame, Wright’s objective is to magnify the
destructive psychological effects produced by racist social practices in 1930s American society,
but in doing so, he links emotions and activity within a racial context to call upon a historically
situated race problem as it informs the present. Thus, Wright creates an imaginative space for
citizen-readers to evaluate the nation’s racial history and to conduct a moral examination –
readers witness Bigger’s psychological state degenerate as Wright exposes the lack of human
dignity extended to Bigger.
For Wright, the traumatized character of Bigger Thomas is a portrait of the psychological
damage brought on by a racist society, and in depicting the psychological unraveling of Bigger’s
psyche, Wright engages in literary epideictic project of “blaming” racist social conditions by
suggesting that they could drive an individual like Bigger Thomas to commit a most heinous act
murder out of intense racialized fear. In doing so, Wright reveals the trauma that potentially
resides in the depths of the African American consciousness of those who suffer from the
ongoing continuation of racist public social scripts, and he exposes the deleterious effects racist
social environments can exert on African American individuals.69 By social script, I mean the

organism expresses itself, and if that environment is warped or tranquil, the mode and manner of behavior
will be affected toward deadlocking tensions or orderly fulfillment and satisfaction.” See Richard Wright,
“How Bigger was Born,” in Native Son. Introduction by Arnold Rampersad. New York: HarperPerennial,
2005, p. 442. The social environment provides the means for an individual to express herself, and those
means can determine the ultimate ends in which an individual acts towards. Of course, Wright depicts
Bigger’s environment in Native Son as “warped” by racist social scripts and Bigger as “deadlocked” by
racial tension.
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Social script theory explains how individuals are engaged in various day-to-day activities that maintain
typical practices and norms, which are situationally (and culturally) dependent. The standards of behavior
pertaining to a particular social situation is established over time and revolves around social interactions of
self and others. Thus, the specific externalization of the behavior reinforces the social script based on the
context. For more information, see Jack D. Douglas and J John M. Johnson. Existential Sociology.
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), 1977; Roger C. Schank and Robert P. Abelson, Scripts, Plans,
Goals, and Understanding: An Inquiry into Human Knowledge Structures. (Hillsdale, NJ: L. Erlbaum
Associates), 1977.
A very prominent example of a social script is the paradigm for dining in a restaurant. See Robert N.
St. Clair, “Social Scripts and the Three Theoretical Approaches to Culture.” Intercultural Communication
Studies. XVII: 4 (2008), pp. 171-183. St. Clair states, “One does not just enter a restaurant: One must
follow a script. That script already exists” (178). He explains how social scripts dictate what one should
be doing at a particular time and place if one is to adhere to the social script already established. He gives a
detailed dialogic exchange between a restaurant server and a patron to illustrate social script theory in
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situational concept of adhering to internalized social norms in particular situations that are
grounded in interactions with others, and in the context of Native Son, the typical day-to-day
activity of a black individual externalized in accordance with the internalized racially motivated
expectations – those submissive behavioral conventions expected of black men and women by
whites, what Wright refers to as “Bigger Thomas conditioning.”70 Social scripts that established
subjugated behavior on the part of black men and women in relation to whites, and then punished
any detraction from those scripts with great violence under the guise of “justice,” produced a
traumatizing effect on African American consciousness. The fear sparked by systemic racial
tyranny is experienced and felt in/on the bodies, and as a result of this violent past, the “psychic
scars” are represented in forms of intense racialized fear that surface when black bodies encounter
white bodies in the social environment.
The important point to consider, however, is that the majority of the text portrays Bigger
suffering not from physical harm, but from excessive emotional onslaughts of fear. While Bigger
does have visceral responses throughout the text, Bigger’s emotional responses to the events of
his life – his fear, shock, and excitement, along with his internal struggle to understand his
individual plight – are associated with his black body.71 The narrative shares Bigger’s thoughts
after he kills Mary and reflects,
action. This theory very much applies to racist social scripts in American history that dictated particular
behavior for black individuals relating to the dominant, white cultural expectations.
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See Wright, “How Bigger was Born,” pp. 431-462. Wright alludes to the social scripts imposed by the
white world in “How Bigger Was Born,” defining them as, “a whole panoply of rules, taboos, and penalties
not only to insure peace (complete submission), but to guarantee that no real threat would ever arise” (438),
and he refers to this practice as “Bigger Thomas conditioning” (439-40). For instance, Wright explains how
he modeled Bigger Thomas after five young black youths he had known in his childhood, black adolescents
he both admired and feared who rebelled against the Jim Crow establishment. He indicates the violent ends
that their insubordinate behavior incurred: they were “shot, hanged, maimed, lynched, and generally
hounded until they were either dead or their spirits broken” (437). The social environment of white
superiority intended “to build up a vast, dense ideology of racial superiority that would justify any act of
violence taken against [it] to defend white dominance; and further, to condition him to hope for little and to
receive that little without rebelling” (438).
71
According to Kaplan and Sadock’s Comprehensive Textbook of Psychiatry, the main characteristic of
psychological trauma is the emotion of “intense fear, helplessness, loss of control, and a threat of
annihilation.” See Benjamin J. Sadock & Virginia Alcott Sadock, Kaplan & Sadock's Comprehensive
Textbook of Psychiatry. (Philadelphia: Lippincott Williams & Wilkins, 2009), p. 134.
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It seemed that [Mary’s] actions had evoked fear and shame in him. But when he thought
hard about it it seemed impossible that they could have. He really did not know just
where that fear and shame had come from; it had just been there, that was all. Each time
he had come in contact with her it had risen hot and hard. It was not Mary he was
reacting to when he felt that fear and shame. Mary had served to set off his emotions,
emotions conditioned by many Marys. And now that he had killed Mary he felt a
lessening of the tension in his muscles; he had shed an invisible burden he had long
carried. (114, italics added)
The narrative illustrates how Bigger suffers from an intense racialized fear when he reflects back
upon his contact with Mary. Bigger is described as feeling “fear and shame,” but these affective
values are attributed to social conditioning, and arise when he is in contact with Mary. The
narrative at one point articulates, “[Mary] was not real to him, not a human being,” but “to Bigger
and his kind, white people were not really people; they were sort of a great natural force, like a
stormy sky looming overhead.” In essence, Mary was an idea or part of a script, one that
perpetuated the psychological suffering of Bigger “and his kind” as they tried to navigate the
social environment of raced bodies in 1930s America. Most importantly though, Wright connects
the treatment of particular African Americans, like Bigger Thomas, to a racialized fear that is
based on histories of social contact. The emotion of fear is based upon a past of racial violence,
and even more striking is the fact that whether or not Bigger and other African Americans
directly suffered such experiences has no bearing on their current psychological state of fear.
For Bigger and the other black men and women, they acknowledged the presence of the “invisible
white force” and its control over them couched in the social scripts that were prevalent in a white
supremacist society. While Mary did not feel “real” to Bigger, the fear and shame that he felt is
real because it is connected to a history of cultural trauma, for the narrative stresses that “each
and every day of their lives they lived with [the white force]; even when words did not sound its
name, they acknowledged its reality” (114).72
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See Richard Wright, Black Boy. Introduction by Edward P. Jones. (New York: Harper Perennial Modern
Classics), 2005, p. 74. Wright personally reflects upon this instrumental tension in 1945’s Black Boy. This
is not to conflate the two works as autobiographical, but Black Boy offers an autobiographical account of
this “fundamental problem” from the fictional Native Son. Wright recalls specific episodes in his life that
opened his eyes to race relations between white and black people that taught him about white “men who
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Within the novel, Bigger struggles psychologically to understand his existence in his
daily environment, suffers tremendous fear and dread, and undergoes extreme emotional
pulls/swings, and all of these psychological elements serve as motivating factors for his activity.
Bigger’s psychological condition represents an intense anxiety that is historically situated, and
Wright amplifies the traumatic fear Bigger suffers as a result of the myth of the black male rapist
and the violent ramifications attached to that charge for a black man, illustrating the very kind of
psychic toll that results from a history of “institutionalized racism.” Racist social scripts devalue
the worth of African American lives, and perhaps, in the context of the 1930s and the narrative of
Native Son, the most disabling of them all is the myth of the black male rapist. The myth of the
black rapist entailed a (fabricated) belief that black men suffer from an intense desire for sexual
relations with white women, a myth invested with political motives to retain white supremacy.73

could violate [his] life at will.” Wright offers a haunting theory of “invisible whites” in Black Boy that
captures the effect racism has on him and other African Americans. He writes, “A dread of white people
now came to live permanently in my feelings and imagination,” and he mentions how the “hostility of
whites” was “implanted in his mind.” For Wright, and other African Americans, news about the fate of
black men and women at the hands of white people would stir a “vast complex of emotions,” and he feared
“the threat of some natural force whose hostile behavior could not be predicted. I had never in my life been
abused by whites, but I had already become as conditioned to their existence as though I had been the
victim of a thousand lynchings.” He later poses the question, “What kind of life was possible under that
hate?” (164). The only existence possible within the racially motivated social environment for a black
individual is a fearful one, one in which a traumatized fear oppresses individual expression. Native Son is
the fictional account, with an epideictic objective, to illustrate the lack of life that was the reality for Bigger
Thomas. Wright uses the character of Bigger to illustrate how a black individual reacts to the “vision of the
world” that is predicated upon an intense racialized fear.
73
See Martha Hodes, “The Sexualization of Reconstruction Politics: White Women and Black Men in the
South After the Civil War.” Journal of the History Of Sexuality, Vol. 3, No. 3, Special Issue: African
American Culture and Sexuality (Jan. 1993), p. 402-417; Robyn Wiegman, “The Anatomy of Lynching.”
Journal of the History of Sexuality, Vol. 3, No. 3, Special Issue: African American Culture and Sexuality
(Jan. 1993), p. 444-467; and Angela Y. Davis, Women, Race & Class. (New York: Vintage Books), 1983.
Hodes places this belief in a historical perspective in her article, acknowledging that sexual relationship
between white women and black men threatened the institution of slavery because a child’s legal status as a
slave or free individual followed the mother; and she observes, “therefore, when white women had children
by black men not only were racial categories eroded, but boundaries of slavery and freedom were eroded
too” (402). She views the sexual liaison between white women and black men as linked to the possibility
of black men’s political and economic independence. The demise of racial slavery following the Civil War
made the separation of blacks and whites even more crucial to the Southern whites who wished to retain
supremacy, and she writes, “because it was the men among the former slave population who gained
suffrage rights and a measure of political power – and who therefore had the potential to destroy the racial
caste system – whites focused on the taboo of sex between white women and black men with a new
urgency” (403). She points out that Klansmen took offense at even the slightest interaction between black
men and white women and they believed that rape would be the resulting action if the institution of slavery

44
In Book Two, Wright touches upon this as the narrative elaborates: “[Bigger] knew that sex
relations between blacks and whites were repulsive to most white men. He knew that whites
thought that all Negroes yearned for white women, therefore he wanted to show a certain fearful
deference even when one’s name was mentioned in his presence” (197). Bigger’s defense
strategy here is warranted by a cultural history for, as Angela Davis contextualizes, a racist
American past had called upon this narrative in order to maintain superiority and incite fear: “The
myth of the black rapist has been methodically conjured up whenever recurrent waves of violence
and terror against the Black community have required convincing justifications.”74 In other
words, rape became the most cited accusation for inciting mob violence against African American
males by white males, and even a slight suspicion of rape deemed violent repercussions justified.
Again, Wright references this cultural history in Book Three: Fate during Bigger’s
conversation with Max:
Yeah, I reckon it was because I knew I oughtn’t’ve wanted to. I reckon it was because
they say we black men do that anyhow. Mr. Max, you know what some white men say
we black men do? They say we rape white women when we got the clap and they say we
do that because we believe that if we rape white women then we’ll get rid of the clap.
That’s what some white men say. They believe that. Jesus, Mr. Max, when folks says
did not restrain black men, and even the accusation of rape would warrant lynching (409-410). As for the
threat posed by black men as perceived by whites, Robyn Wiegman points out the intersection of sex and
politics in the time period following the Civil War, where the “social transformation from enslavement to
freedom” depended upon the “African American’s claim to citizenship in precisely his status as a man,”
and that castration consign[s] the black male to the fragmented and decidedly feminized realm of the body”
(449). Wiegman concludes, “The rise of black lynchings in the late nineteenth century and the attendant
articulation of the mythology of the black male rapist demonstrates an increasing reliance on the discourse
of sexual difference to negotiate race within the newly emergent economic structures of the twentieth
century” (456).
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Angela Y. Davis, Women, Race & Class. (New York: Vintage Books), 1983, p. 151. Thus, the institution
of slavery was replaced by a system of Jim Crow tactics that stigmatized African Americans as socially
inferior in order to maintain white privilege. As Davis reports, “In a society where male-supremacy was allpervasive, men who were motivated by their duty to defend their women could be excused of any excesses
that they might commit. That their motive was sublime was ample justification for the resulting
barbarities.” Physically terrorizing and psychically shaming tactics formed the “institutionalized terror” that
Cornel West talks about, culminating in the event of lynchings, which the Jim Crow Encyclopedia defines
as “extralegal murders carried out by a mob or a group of vigilantes.” See Nikki L. Brown and Barry M.
Stentiford. The Jim Crow Encyclopedia. (Westport, Conn: Greenwood Press), 2008, p. 486. Also, see
Jonathan S. Holloway, Jim Crow Wisdom: Memory and Identity in Black America Since 1940. (Chapel
Hill: The University of North Carolina Press), 2013. Amy Wood puts this in perspective in Lynching and
Spectacle, explaining that between 1880-1940, at least 3,200 black men died in the South alone due to
white mob violence. See Amy Wood, Lynching and Spectacle: Witnessing Racial Violence in America,
1890-1940. (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press), 2009, p. 3.
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things like that about you, you whipped before you born. What’s the use? Yeah; I reckon
I was feeling that way when I was in the room with her. They say we do things like that
and they say it to kill us. (351, italics added)
Bigger touches upon a violent past in which white men fabricated myths regarding black men and
white women in order to “kill” black men. An entire history of this narrative of sexual desire,
constructed by the white men, precedes this event. As Bigger’s reflection suggests, black men
have fallen victim to this false belief and have been killed, and this narrative is so prevalent that it
has seeped not only into the imagination of white men who actually believe it, but also into
Bigger’s imagination. He is aware of his inability to escape its power over him and even
concedes that he “reckons [he] was feeling that way” because white men have transformed that
belief from an imaginary tale to a social conviction.
Wright evokes this inexplicit history of the horrors of lynching in the scene when Bigger
and Jack are in the movie house and they see a newsreel showing Mary Dalton frolicking on the
beach. After Jack expresses his desire to comingle with the white girls, Bigger responds that if he
were there, “[he’d] be hanging from a tree like a bunch of bananas” (32). The image that Bigger
depicts of Jack’s body hanging from a tree references a violent past of lynching performed by
whites on black male bodies. However, Bigger makes this comment in jest: Jack and Bigger had
just finished masturbating prior to the newsreel of Mary Dalton, which Wright cleverly sequences
to hint at the myth of the black male rapist, and after Bigger points out the consequential
outcome, they “laughed.” Here, Wright conceals the normativity of such measures by conjoining
the imagery of black bodies hanging lifeless like bananas from a tree, along with Bigger and
Jack’s lighthearted response to what has become not a justifiable punishment in their eyes, but an
expected ramification for the offense of black men interacting with white women. The fact that
Bigger and Jack come to accept that image as an expected consequence, and then (fearfully)
laugh about it, indicates its permeation into both the social consciousness and the individual
African American consciousness. Socially, the white citizens judged such violent acts as a form
of justice, and while Bigger laughs about it here only to illustrate its penetration into the social

46
imagination, the potential act and violent punishment pose the gravest of threats to an African
American male, and Bigger will come to know this fear much more intimately once he begins
working for the Dalton family. Bigger is excited for the opportunity to work for a rich white
family, but a social environment that can mete out violent consequences that underscore racist
social scripts – as evident in this scene and the hanging bananas – robs Bigger of the opportunity
and will replace it with intense fear.
In order to demonstrate the epideictic function of fear in the novel, I apply what Sarah
Ahmed terms an “affective economy of fear” to Wright’s narrative. Ahmed establishes affective
economies to consider how emotions are more than psychological dispositions – they work “to
mediate the relationships between the psychic and the social, and between the individual and the
collective,” therefore, “aligning individuals with communities.”75 Fear does not reside in the
individual, or the other, however. Emotions, as Ahmed explains, do not reside in a subject;
rather, emotions “circulate between signifiers in relationships of difference and displacement.”
The affective economy of fear is social, material, and psychic – it circulates among subjects,
signifiers, and objects based upon the social relationships. Ahmed points out that fear has been
traditionally attached to objects, and in the case of social relationships, fear is correlated with
bodies that are situated in a social space. Ahmed explains that the affective value of a particular
emotion (fear) accumulates over time, which suggests that contact involves cultural histories that
have come before the present social relation.76 The affective economy of fear, then, operates
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Sarah Ahmed, The Cultural Politics of Emotion. (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2004), p. 119.
See the introduction to Ahmed, The Cultural Politics of Emotion, p. 5-8. Ahmed gives an example of a
child encountering a bear, which she points out is a very cited hypothetical case study often used in
psychological literature on emotions. The scenario depicts a child seeing a bear and then running away.
Ahmed labels the “Dumb View” as that which reads the bear as the cause for the child’s fear and automatic
bodily symptoms. She also rejects the “functionalist” model that interprets the fear of the child as a
survival mechanism. Rather, Ahmed points out that the situation is not so simple: “The child must ‘already
know’ the bear is fearsome” (7). The fact that the subject is a child is important, for Ahmed states that this
suggests a possible “first time encounter,” or, at the very least, it presents a “not-yet subject.” She
continues,
We have an image of the bear as an animal to be feared, as an image that is shaped by cultural
histories and memories. When we encounter the bear, we already have an impression of the risks
of the encounter, as an impression that is felt on the surface of the skin…. It is not that the bear is
76
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epideictically by revealing the psychological trauma of Bigger Thomas (and, I will argue as part
of the epideictic discourse, African Americans collectively) generated by the narrative’s notion of
the “white force” – the fear-inducing social environment that relies on racist social scripts that
have ignited an intense racialized fear when African Americans come in contact with white
bodies.
In this chapter, I will lay out Wright’s epideictic objective that combines psychological
and emotional discourse to craft his epideictic assault on a midcentury, racist American society
that has continued to practice racist social scripts that deprive African American individuals of
human dignities. Wright portrays the intense fear that racist social scripts have impressed upon
Bigger Thomas, taking the reader on an unprecedented tour into Bigger’s consciousness, and he
connects the psychological disposition of Bigger Thomas to the collective African American
consciousness because it is conditioned by all-pervasive racist social conditions. Thus, Native
Son’s critique attacks American, racist sites of oppression (social environments) that incorporate
other men and women like Bigger Thomas who find themselves suffocated by fear, and the novel
does not just localize the problem to one troubled African American male, but it references an
entire cultural history of racist social practices that have robbed black individuals (in this case,
African American males) of life.
Reading Native Son as a literary epideictic project will help the reader understand
Wright’s critique of the social and cultural forces that are implicated in the motivation for, and
the murder by, Bigger Thomas. At one point, Max addresses the court regarding Bigger’s fate
thusly: “The all-important thing for this Court to remember in deciding this boy’s fate is that,

fearsome, “on its own,” as it were. It is fearsome to someone or somebody. So fear is not in the
child, let alone in the bear, but is a matter of how child and bear come into contact. This contact is
shaped by past histories of contact, unavailable in the present, which allow the bear to be
apprehended as fearsome. The story does not, despite this, lead to the same ending. Another
child, another bear, and we might even have another story. (7)
Ahmed argues that individuals are relational in that they instigate notions of “towardness” or “awayness” in
relation to particular objects and this is predicated upon how an individual reads the contact – as beneficial
or harmful. Thus, “the ‘reading’ then identifies the bear as the cause of the feeling. The child becomes
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though his crime was accidental, the emotions that broke loose were already there; […] that the
accidental nature of his crime took the guise of a sudden and violent rent in the veil behind which
he lived, a rent which allowed his feelings of resentment and estrangement to leap forth and find
objective and concrete form” (392, italics added). The social environment must be taken into
account, as Max states, “Through the instrument of fear, we determined the mode and the quality
of his consciousness” (402).
In order to demonstrate this complex process or affective economy at work in the novel, I
will first establish and analyze the prevalence of racist social scripts; the fear that rises through
the contact of white and black bodies in the scenes where Bigger interacts with Mr. Dalton, Jan,
and Mary, and specifically the murder scene; the racist language of hate and fear, as well as its
associations with the myth of the black male rapist existent in the newspaper sections of Book
Two: Flight; and then I will conclude with Max’s epideictic argument in Book Three that
mediates the psychological and the emotional discourse within an epideictic framework.

1) Establishing Native Son’s Epideictic Framework:
(Re)Situating The Social, Psychological, and Emotional Discourse
When it comes to writing about Native Son and Bigger Thomas’s predicament, critics
have been prone to taking particular psychological approaches to the narrative.77 Some critics

fearful, and the bear fearsome: the attribution of feeling to an object is an effect of the encounter, which
moves the subject away from the object. Emotions involve such affective forms of reorientation” (8).
77
Most recently, Jay Garcia’s book, Psychology Comes to Harlem, discusses Wright’s role as a literary
artist who concentrated on the issue of race within the psychological discourse of the 1930s. Garcia
acknowledges Wright’s interest in “psychotherapeutic models as a means of addressing the pressures of
racist social environments,” and claims that in his work, Wright established a “psychological literacy” that
“offered avenues for broadening and deepening the critique of white supremacy and bringing the subject of
racism’s pervasive harms into public view in dramatic and potentially transformative ways,” specifically by
focusing on the criminal mind in conjunction with the psychology of the racial minority (15). See Jay
Garcia, Psychology Comes to Harlem: Rethinking the Race Question in Twentieth-Century America.
(Baltimore, MD: The John Hopkins University Press, 2012). Garcia summarizes the various theories of
psychologists and sociologists that influenced the thinking of such literary figures as Ellison, Baldwin, and
Wright and he explains how Wright utilized psychological theories of fear and aggression, psychoanalysis,
and social and economic environmental factors to explore racial discrimination and the deleterious effects
such forces had on individuals and society. Garcia’s study, however, serves more as a biographical look
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have alluded to the traumatic register of the social and cultural ramifications of Bigger Thomas’s
activity and treatment.78 W. Lawrence Hogue sees Bigger’s traumatic existence as the impetus for

into the intellectual background and influences of the writers and does not treat Native Son in detail, failing
to illustrate how the novel “transformed” a reading public.
One main area of interest in the psychological import of Native Son lies is the issue of identity. Joseph
Skerrett corrals his discussion of the novel into an exploration of how society and the familial unit impacts
Bigger, who is left feeling alienated from family and society, which leads Skerrett to claim that Bigger’s
purpose “is the search for … an identity denied him by both his social milieu and his family situation” (31).
See Joseph Skerrett, “Composing Bigger: Wright and the Making of Native Son.” In Richard Wright: A
Collection of Critical Essays. Ed. Arnold Rampersad. (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall), 1995.
Matthew Elder pits Bigger’s identity issue along with the tension of living in a Jim Crow-era Chicago
whereby “enslavement was replaced with economic oppression and geographic racial demarcation.” Thus,
Elder claims “Wright’s central insight in Native Son, however, is that the sociological problem and the
psychological one take the same form, a dissociation of parts. He sees the individual damage among
African-Americans as a psychological fracturing of identity that reflects and necessarily mimics the
fractured society that whites work to maintain and blacks are forced to accept” (35). See Matthew Elder,
“Social Demarcation and the Forms of Psychological Fracture in Book One of Richard Wright’s Native
Son.” Texas Studies in Literature and Language. (Spring 2010), 52.1, p. 31-47. Masaya Takeuchi calls
Native Son a “male-centric narrative,” and proposes that Wright portrays a character that illustrates Du
Bois’s notion of “double consciousness” – Bigger is “an assertive [self] among blacks, and a submissive
one in front of whites.” Takeuchi concludes, “Bigger, on the one hand, displays his ‘tough’ masculine self
among his own people; on the other hand, he performs his subservient feminized self in front of white
people. Both selves are conditioned by whites” (56). Masaya Takeuchi, “Bigger’s Divided Self: Violence
and Homosociality in Native Son.” Studies in American Naturalism. (Summer 2009), Vol. 4., No. 1, p. 5674. Caren Irr steers her discussion towards the emotion of fear and she believes “the major psychological
pattern that Wright traces is claustrophobic anxiety.” She views the first half of the novel as manifesting “a
fear of enclosure,” of portraying Bigger’s character as confined to Chicago’s Black Belt. Once he commits
his crime, Irr comments, the novel becomes “agoraphobic” and traces Bigger’s fear of exposure. See Caren
Irr, “The Politics of Spatial Phobias in Native Son.” In Critical Essays on Richard Wright's Native Son. Ed.
Keneth Kinnamon. (New York: Twayne Publishers, 1997), p. 199.
One of the main problems with these views is that they tend to focus on Bigger as an individual on a
quest for identity which is not Wright’s ultimate purpose. Wright is not zooming in to illuminate Bigger’s
internal, existential quest; he is examining Bigger’s existence in relation to the social forces that assist in
his identity formation. Wright emphasizes the way in which the social forces create an intense racialized
fear that is embedded in a history of cultural trauma and therefore, Native Son is not a novel on identity, but
a social critique that extends Bigger’s experience to a collective African American body.
78
See Terry Bozeman, “Mind-Blown: Possibility and Trauma in Native Son,” in From the Plantation to the
Prison: African-American Confinement Literature. Ed. Tara T. Green. (Macon, GA: Mercer University
Press, 2008). In his article, Bozeman applies Kierkegaard’s philosophy of dread to Native Son and claims
that this philosophical framework can provide more “clarity on how Bigger’s life is guided by his lack of
possibility, his comprehension of his infinity, and ultimately his fear of annihilation” (61). Bozeman never
fully fleshes out the nature of “trauma” in this book chapter; his emphasis is on the lack of possibility and
actualization and he concludes, “[Bigger is] someone trapped in a life without hope, without feelings of joy,
and quite simply without possibility of anything other than acute stagnancy” (60). For another discussion
on trauma in Native Son, see Jonathan Elmer, “Spectacle and Event in Native Son.” American Literature,
Volume 70, Number 4, (December 1998), p. 767-798. Elmer sees the murder scene of Mary as
representative of a traumatic event that “takes place in a temporal suspension.” According to Elmer, in the
murder scene, Bigger is symbolic of the traumatized black individual, and Mrs. Dalton represents the white
world, but her presence, while it does not witness the event due to her blindness, induces Bigger’s fear that
manifests the racialized and sexualized fantasy of the black man raping the white woman. Elmer claims
that the encounter is missed in “the field of visibility,” and the real traumatic event is the “change of state”
that occurs in Bigger when he goes from desiring Mary sexually to fearing the “visibility” of the fulfillment
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Bigger’s murderous act. Hogue applies a postcolonial and existential reading to Native Son, and
claims that the novel relates a “psychic revolt and transformation” of a subaltern subject in Bigger
Thomas. Hogue writes, “Stripped of African culture and simultaneously not allowed to
assimilate into mainstream American commercial culture and society, many African Americans
became dislocated, trapped and subalternized, particularly in urban centers.”79 However, Hogue
views the murder of Mary Dalton as the “catalyst” for revolt that enables Bigger to become an
existential being bringing about a psychological freedom whereby Bigger has options and
possesses agency. Ira Wells assesses Bigger’s murder of Mary as both accidental and political.
He notes that Bigger was aware of the racist myth of “black man as rapacious beast,” and that
stereotype led Bigger to suffer great fear and hysteria, which ultimately led to the murder of
Mary. He writes, “Bigger’s actions were accidental, but that ‘accident’ was permitted by the
forms of structural violence that had brought Bigger into the Dalton home as a charity case, and
then determined by Bigger’s awareness of ingrained cultural stereotypes. Indeed, it is in the very
‘accidental’ nature of Bigger’s violence, in its very unintentionality, that Wright locates the
essence of modern terror.”80 Wells goes on to define “modern terror” as “a profoundly selfless,

of the fantasy by Mrs. Dalton. He concludes, “Trauma would be the impossible experience of the selfdividing of the event, the change of state. It is not the fantasy of rape that traumatizes; and it is not the
accidental murder of Mary that traumatizes. It is in the ‘in-between’ that the traumatic event resides”
(785). The problem with Elmer’s reading is that he focuses the traumatic context of the novel to a singular
event for the most part. Elmer discusses trauma as “event,” and I argue that Wright infuses the narrative
with trauma as a rhetorical strategy. I argue that Bigger existed as an already-traumatized individual and
the murder scene connects Bigger’s fear to a cultural trauma produced by the black male rapist and
critiques American society for continuing to invest in this racist script.
79
W. Lawrence Hogue, “Can the Subaltern Speak? A Postcolonial, Existential Reading of Richard
Wright’s Native Son.” Southern Quarterly. (Winter 2009) 46.2, p. 12. Hogue argues that Bigger is
conditioned by social and economic forces that deny him human meaning, and as a result, Bigger suffers an
internal colonization in which political, economic, and social forces condition him to act in a particular way
– namely, as inferior and full of fear of white people. Hogue suggests that the killing gives Bigger a “self
with a free will,” and “The existential Bigger recognizes his options, makes choices, and takes control of
his psychological destiny, which is something no other black character in the novel does” (24).
80
Ira Wells, “What I Killed for, I Am”: Domestic Terror in Richard Wright’s America.” American
Quarterly 62.4 (2010): p. 880-881. Wells begins his essay by drawing the connection between the time
Wright began writing Native Son (around 1937) and the international political event of the assassination of
Yugoslavian king Alexander I and a French foreign minster by Croatian separatists in 1934 in order to
illustrate the modern definition of terrorism that was forming via the League of Nations (Wells, 873).
Wells claims that the legal institutionalization of “terrorism” coinciding with Wright’s creation of Bigger
Thomas was no accident. He argues that in the novel, Bigger represents a “single representative among
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seemingly automatic form of terror that takes place more because of the existing relations of force
than because of the conscious intent of any terrorist.”81
Despite Hogue’s exceptional reading of the novel, I do not view the murder of Mary
Dalton as a form of (un)conscious revolt for Bigger, or as the novel celebrating such a distinct
form of agency solely on the part of Bigger Thomas. Rather, I will illustrate how the murder
scene is connected to a racist script of the black male rapist that Bigger would wish to avoid
rather than fulfill or use as an act of revolt. Just as Hogue is right to focus on the traumatic nature
of Bigger Thomas, Wells focuses on a key motivating factor for the murder as well: the myth of
the black male rapist. However, Wells emphasizes the way in which Wright uses Bigger and his
act as a method of terror. I argue that Wright fuses the myth of the black male rapist and trauma
in a rhetorical manner, which does not lead to an act of revolt like Hogue argues, or just a way to
terrorize white readers like Wells insinuates, for Wells concludes, “In short, while Bigger’s
strangulation of Mary is politically neutral as far as its perpetrator is consciously aware, Wright’s
representation of Bigger’s violence is overtly political, and intended to create a ‘state of terror’ in
the minds of white readers.”82 What is more important is how the murder is an act of societal and
communal complicity – white society’s “belief” in the myth of the black male rapist perpetuates
and fosters fear in Bigger and that is what Wright is trying to illustrate, and any notion of
Bigger’s excitement or freedom or agency is rhetorically designed to grab a white readership and
make them aware of the extreme dangers of such racist scripts. I agree that part of Wright’s
objective is to invoke terror, but Wells fails to complement Wright’s initiative with an

armies of the disaffected,” and that “In Wright’s prophesy, however, the towers are not brought down by
some outward, external violence, but by a compromised foundation. Wright imagines this terrifying event
as a kind of social earthquake in which our celebrated symbols of modernity are flattened by force that is
simultaneously beyond our control and somehow self-induced” (874). Key to this analysis is the definition
of “terrorism” by the league to include not the external properties of the act itself, but in the “presence of an
‘intention’ or calculation in the minds of the terrorists, and by a corresponding ‘state of terror’ in the minds
of the ‘general public’” (877).
81
Ibid., p. 893.
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Ibid., p. 882.
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educational component, and assigning an epideictic purpose underscores how Native Son reveals
terror in order to create change.
Rhetorically, scholars have explored Bigger’s quest for “voice,”83 the rhetoric of
“blindness,”84 and the rhetoric of “the death-bound-subject.”85 Mark Bernard White has noticed
83

James Miller, “Bigger Thomas’s Quest for Voice and Audience in Richard Wright’s Native Son.”
Callaloo, No. 28, Richard Wright: A Special Issue (Summer, 1986), p. 501-506. James Miller writes about
Bigger’s quest for audience and voice, and he challenges the notion that Bigger is inarticulate in the novel.
Miller points to the concluding scene of the novel and argues that rhetorically, Max attempts to speak for
Bigger, but he fails in the end. He references Bigger’s declaration, “What I killed for, I am!” as Bigger
finding his voice. Miller states, “And even thought Bigger does not understand Max’s language, he
nevertheless appropriates it for his own purposes,” and the reader is left “with the final image of Bigger
Thomas facing his impending death in proud and lonely isolation, a soloist listening to the sound of his own
song” (505-506).
84
Karl Precoda and P. S. Polanah, “In the Vortex of Modernity: Writing Blackness, Blindness and
Insight.” Journal of Modern Literature 34.3 (2011): 31-46. Karl Precoda and P.S. Polanah argue that
Native Son is about reading/misreading, suggesting that for Bigger, the world-is-text. They refer to
Bigger’s defining characteristic of “cultural illiteracy” whereby “Bigger is a helpless prisoner of a
deterministic fate that is grounded and plotted by his inability to read, to interpret, in the novel’s terms, to
see. Native Son’s rhetoric of blindness thus locates the heart of its, and Bigger’s, textual mystery” (31-32).
However, the rhetoric of blindness works paradoxically, for the authors point out that Bigger must
deliberatively misread his “personal text,” meaning, his place in history as a black man, in order to survive.
But they argue that “Bigger wrestles from latency the will to authorship” by killing Mary and experiencing
a rebirth. They conclude, “The impetus to self-authorship ultimately transforms Bigger’s blindness, if only
momentarily, into genuine insights that manifest a historical or political consciousness illuminating the
material ground of his existence,” affirming to the readers that Bigger’s narrative act is “one of hard-won
redemptive insight, a successful inscription of his own subjectivity in the face of obliteration” (32).
85
Abdul JanMohamed, The Death-Bound-Subject: Richard Wright's Archaeology of Death. (Durham, NC:
Duke University Press, 2005). Abdul JanMohamed frames his discussion of Native Son around the rhetoric
of, what he refers to, as the “death-bound-subject.” JanMohamed defines the “death-bound-subject” as,
“the subject who is formed, from infancy on, by the imminent and ubiquitous threat of death” and he uses
Bigger Thomas as an example (2). JanMohamed describes African Americans’ subjectification and violent
treatment as “instrumental” in this death-bound process because this treatment serves as “the occasion that
is designed to produce the terror of death” (6). The conflict that the death-bound-subject undergoes,
JanMohamed states, is that “the death-bound-subject’s ‘life’ is thus defined by the need to avoid the
possibilities of life as well as the possibility of death,” because in living a subjectified life, the constant
threat of death awaits, but the subject does not wish to fulfill that threat (19). JanMohamed says that Native
Son is “structured like a dream and has to be read as such” in order to “unveil the unconscious structures of
the dialectics of death by which Bigger is produced, bound, and motivated, structures that have been in
place throughout slavery and Jim Crow society” (77). JanMohamed views the temporal and spatial
structure of events, intentions, the forms of knowledge and the attitudes of the narrator and characters as
part of the unveiling process and concludes, “Native Son is not about the development of character, or the
tragic fate of its protagonist, or the unmitigating cruelty of an impersonal social system that crushes
helpless individuals, and so forth, but about the need for the protagonist and the narrator to come to
consciousness regarding the structure and function of the threat of death as a form of coercion” (84-85).
Also, see David Guest. Sentenced to Death: The American Novel and Capital Punishment. Jackson, MS:
(University Press of Mississippi, 1997). David Guest also sees Bigger as a tragic figure fated unto death.
He applies a rhetoric of capital punishment to Native Son and suggests that Wright charges the criminal
justice system with “allow[ing] myths about race to influence the outcome of an individual defendant’s
trial,” and he concludes, “Ultimately, Wright suggests our criminal justice system is an instrument of racial
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the epideictic function of what he calls African American Didactic Literature; in particular, White
observes the correlation of the “edifying and shaping” of individual and communal notions of
character in didactic literature, with the ethical, epideictic purpose of shaping individual and
communal values in epideictic rhetoric.86 He lists Native Son as an example of African American
Didactic literature, but does not discuss Wright’s novel in detail. Yet, White claims that African
American didactic literature employs the epideictic function of edifying character, or ethos, by
challenging the audience to become more virtuous. However, as Walter Beale has pointed out,
the “reinforcement of values is seldom an explicit function of epideictic.”87 I believe this to be
true in regards to Native Son and White’s recognition of how epideictic “edifies and shapes”
communal values is accurate, but he misses the complexity in Wright’s mission to challenge the
audience to become more “virtuous.”
One rhetorical impasse in Wright’s project was confronting a white readership. For
instance, Michel Fabre notes, “Wright’s first ambition was to shock his public, largely the white
liberals, into realizing the truth of the racial situation.”88 In Wright’s case, he is not necessarily

oppression not because it fails to live up to its mandate but because it expresses the [racist] will of the
people” (91; 103).
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Mark Bernard White, “The Rhetoric of Edification: African American Didactic Literature and the Ethical
Function of Epideictic.” The Howard Journal of Communications. (9): 1998, pp. 125-36. White defines
didactic literature, by way of M. H. Abrams’s Glossary of Literary Terms, as literature with the primary
aim “to transform its audience by teaching.” He states, “Such literature calls forth an imaginative
experience that moves the heart and enlarges the understanding…. of serious issues of the real world,” and
emphasizes the major role didactic literature has had on African American cultural history (126). White
provides a brief overview of some of the functions of African American didactic literature: it includes, “(a)
calling for justice, (b) exhorting and encouraging, (c) exposing the evils of racism, (d) verifying African
American humanity, (e) exploring issues of identity, (f) celebrating the lives and the value of common folk,
and (g) exploring relationships between Black men and Black women” (128).
87
Walter Beale, “Rhetorical Performative Discourse: A New Theory of Epideictic,” Philosophy and
Rhetoric. Vol. 11, No. 4 (Fall, 1978), p. 223, italics original.
88
Michel Fabre, The Unfinished Quest of Richard Wright. (Urbana: University of Illinois Press), 1993, p.
183. See Caleb Corkery, “Richard Wright and His White Audience: How the Author’s Persona Gave
Native Son Historical Significance,” in Richard Wright’s Native Son. Ed. Ana Fraile. (Amsterdam:
Rodopi), 2007, pp. 3-20. My analysis takes up the question posed by Corkery: “How could a liberal white
audience who generally enjoyed privilege identify with a black man who grew up poor in the South
resenting white people?” (9-10). Corkery provides an intellectual and sociological history, whereas I am
analyzing the rhetorical strategies that would address such an audience – taking into consideration their
awareness and their potential resistance. Dorothy Canfield Fisher, in her introduction to the original 1940
publication of Native Son, described the predominant attitude Wright assumed in his audience: “the outlets
of native power which would have been open to any white boy were closed to Bigger. [Wright] knows he
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addressing a social issue that is confusing or troubling to his audience; the challenge that Wright
found himself facing was how could he reach a readership that included white individuals who
could have been unaware of the problem, contributed to the problem, or individuals who were
sympathetic, but not actively confronting the race problem? For instance, in “How Bigger Was
Born,” Wright explains that when reviews of Uncle Tom’s Children came forth, he felt perturbed:
“I found that I had written a book which even bankers’ daughters could read and weep over and
feel good about. I swore to myself that if I ever wrote another book, no one would weep over it;
that it would be so hard and deep that they would have to face it without the consolation of tears”
(“How Bigger was Born,” 454). Wright felt that with Uncle Tom’s Children, he had not fully
achieved his goal, and he frames his assessment in terms of the affective value of white readers’
responses.
In order to get the reader to consider the effects of racist practices, Wright creates a
fictional story that revolves around the psychologically damaging effects of a black protagonist,
and the horrifying acts that can result from such social conditioning. He explains how Bigger’s
life had to be “couched in imaginative terms acceptable to a common body of readers,” and the
moment he began writing, the plot “fell out, so to speak,” that “life had made the plot over and
over again, to the extent that I knew it by heart” (“How Bigger was Born,” 455). Wright knew
“by heart” the denial of basic needs of life to African Americans by a racist society and the text
works epideictically because it challenges the social forces that create, construct, and affect
communal values, specifically, ones that assume the inhumanity of black life. Therefore,
Wright’s psychological excavation (so to speak) serves as epideictic discourse because it allows
him to target misplaced white sympathy by giving readers no consolation, challenging them to
come to terms with Bigger’s African American social reality, for he concludes, “so, when the

does not have to prove this ... every one of his American readers will know all that without being told” (xi).
And Robert Felgar touches upon the possible resistance by Wright’s audience thusly: “Whites [who
rejected Native Son] did not and do not want to acknowledge what their racism has produced” (Felgar,
Richard Wright. Twayne, 1980, p. 98.
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time came for writing, what had made him and what he meant constituted [the] plot” (“How
Bigger was Born,” 454). In essence, Wright’s rhetorical strategy amplifies horror. This is not a
common way to go about changing communal values with an intent on making a reading
audience more virtuous, but it most explicitly exhibits epideictic discourse because it amplifies
the psychological horror and terror in order to educate the readership on the social realities of
African American individuals like Bigger Thomas.
The previous scholars have misinterpreted the significance of the psychological discourse
and the establishment of Bigger’s traumatized state, and no scholarly work explores the dynamics
of the psychological discourse as a rhetorical strategy. I argue that by applying an epideictic
framework to Native Son, it becomes clear that the novel uses psychology in order to reveal the
negative effects of racism in order to implicate the public’s role in conditioning Bigger Thomas.
Rather than give the white readers an account of black life evoking tears of sympathy, Wright
amplifies the terror in the mind of Bigger Thomas, and the terror in the minds of the white readers
for creating this problem, thus educating them about the aftermath or consequences of “Bigger
Thomas conditioning.” Wright presents a view inside African American consciousness that is
otherwise unavailable to the members of the white community, juxtaposing Bigger’s desire for a
dignified, meaningful life, with Bigger’s fear resulting from the debilitating effects of racism. He
provides a shocking potentiality to the white world couched in Bigger’s psychological responses
of fear and hatred that lead him to murder Mary as, ultimately, the only way Bigger can find
meaning in his life, a devastating outcome that both Bigger and the white world suffer. Wright’s
objective is to critique the current state of race relations in the country, but, because racist social
scripts are rooted in the country’s history, Wright reveals how a racist past informs the present.
2) The Cultural Imposition of the Black Male Rapist:
Native Son’s Epideictic Exigency
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In the essay, “How Bigger Was Born,” Wright clarifies his epideictic exigency when he
explains that, for his “race,” there existed no “fictional works” addressing and critiquing the
problems embedded in the “dark roots of life” (443). After Wright talks about his relationships
with other white writers and how he would learn their “white reactions” to the “lurid American
scene,” he reflects, “as they talked, I’d translate what they said in terms of Bigger’s life…. I took
these techniques, these ways of seeing and feeling, and twisted them, bent them, adapted them,
until they became my ways of apprehending the locked-in life of the Black Belt areas” (443). He
proposes, “In a fundamental sense, an imaginative novel represents the merging of two extremes;
it is an intensely intimate expression on the part of a consciousness couched in terms of the most
objective and commonly known events” (433). In Native Son, Wright depicts the social
environment that inflicts fear into the mind of African American individuals and he is filtering the
lived realities of black life in 1930s American society through Bigger’s consciousness.
The epideictic exigency for Native Son revolves around two historic criminal events,
namely, the Leopold and Loeb trial of the 1920s and case of Robert Nixon in the late 1930s.89 In
“How Bigger was Born,” Wright explicitly links Nixon to the novel, first, by stating, “Any Negro
who has lived in the North or the South knows that times without number he has heard of some
Negro boy being picked up on the streets and carted off to jail and charged with ‘rape.’ This thing
happens so often that to my mind it had become a representative symbol of the Negro’s uncertain
position in America” (455). He indicates, “So frequently do these acts recur that when I was
halfway through the first draft of Native Son a case paralleling Bigger’s flared forth in the
newspapers of Chicago. (Many of the newspaper items and some of the incidents in Native Son
89

See Robert Butler, “The Loeb and Leopold Case: A Neglected Source for Richard Wright’s Native Son.
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Greenwood Press), 2008.

57
are but fictionalized versions of the Robert Nixon case and rewrites of news stories from the
Chicago Tribune).”90
In 1938, an eighteen-year-old black male, Robert Nixon, and his accomplice Earl Hicks,
broke into the apartment of a white woman, Mrs. Florence Johnson, in an attempt to rob her.
Johnson discovered the young men, and Nixon panicked and beat the woman to death with a
brick.91 In a matter of hours, the police apprehended Nixon with bloody clothes and injured
hands and officials alleged that all the evidence strongly implicated Nixon. Although no
evidence conclusively proved that the woman had been raped, authorities and news outlets
accused Nixon of a rape and murder.92 Police held Nixon in custody for two days despite
Nixon’s pleas of innocence. Finally, on the second night, he confessed to the murder, although
Nixon’s lawyers suggested that he had been both “enticed” and “coerced” by pleasurable and
painful means.93 In the days following Nixon’s confession, he confessed to the unsolved murders
of four other white women in the Chicago and Los Angeles areas, mostly due to the correlation of
the murders with a brick as the weapon.94 The newspapers reported the details of the murder and
90

Wright, “How Bigger was Born,” p. 455. Also, see Margaret Walker, Richard Wright Daemonic Genius:
A Portrait of the Man, A Critical Look at His Work. (New York: Warner Books, 1988), p. 122. Walker
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Nixon’s confessed crimes put the media, the city, and the white community into a frenzy. Nixon
was ultimately executed.95
Wright incorporated the “objective and commonly known event” of the Robert Nixon
case into his narrative, specifically in regards to the additional allegation of rape along with the
murder charge for both Nixon and the fictional Bigger, despite the fact that there was no solid
evidence that rape had been committed. Additionally, the police coerced Nixon into confessing
to other crimes that he potentially did not commit, and in Book Three of Native Son, the district
attorney tries to get Bigger to confess to other crimes.96 Michel Fabre writes, “Wright took an
interest in Nixon’s case more out of a desire to study the behavior of whites once they turned
against a black man than out of curiosity about the psychology and motivation of the murderer
himself.”97
However, Wright’s major rhetorical objective in paralleling the Nixon case is his use of
the newspaper accounts in Native Son. Wright models the news reports about Bigger’s crime to
that of the Nixon case, and I will show how Wright’s purpose is to illustrate how public agencies
inscribe the black male body with the myth of the black male rapist. I argue that Wright is
amplifying the fear that a black male suffers from the racist social scripts, such as the black male
rapist that entrapped Nixon and Bigger. I disagree with Fabre’s notion that the behavior of whites
and the motivation for Bigger’s murder are divorced. In fact, as I will show, the behavior of
whites in imposing racist social scripts and upholding them actually contribute to the motivating
factors in Bigger’s murder case, which ultimately lead to his execution as well.
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Robert Butler acknowledges the influence of the Robert Nixon case on Wright and the
composition of Native Son, but he argues, “very little attention has been paid to his use of the
Loeb/Leopold murder and trial even though they played a more prominent role in the shaping of
Wright’s masterpiece.”98 In 1924, two teenagers of wealthy Chicago socialites, Richard Loeb and
Nathan Leopold, committed the “crime of the century.”99 Both young men were highly
intelligent and privileged, and they attempted to prove themselves Nietzschean supermen, based
on Leopold’s obsession with the philosophy of Friedrich Nietzsche and the mythical superman
“who, because he was a superman, stood outside the law, beyond any moral code that might
constrain the actions of ordinary men. Even murder, [Leopold] claimed, was an acceptable act
for a superman to commit if the deed gave him pleasure.”100 Loeb and Leopold planned the
kidnap, murder, and ransom of a child from a wealthy family in their neighborhood, and they
chose Bobby Franks who was a fourteen-year-old distant cousin of Loeb’s.
On May 21, 1924, Bobby Franks was walking home from school when Loeb and Leopold
pulled up next to him in their car. They lured the boy into the car by asking him about a tennis
racquet. Once in the car, Loeb killed the boy by delivering several blows to the head with a
chisel and covered his mouth with a rag soaked in chloroform to keep him quiet. Afterwards,
they drove to a discreet location and proceeded to pour hydrochloric acid onto Franks’s corpse to
make the body unrecognizable and dumped Franks’s naked body. Then, they composed a ransom
note, mailed it, and later called the Franks residence and told the family that the boy had been
kidnapped, but was safe, and they demanded $10,000.101 While this was happening, Franks’s
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body was discovered, along with a pair of horn-rimmed glasses that belonged to Leopold. After
tracing the glasses to an optometrist who prescribed the glasses to Leopold, the interrogation
intensified and eventually Loeb confessed, followed by Leopold, although they both blamed each
other for the murder.102 The families eventually hired Clarence Darrow for the defense and he
changed the boys’ initial please from “not guilty” to “guilty” in an effort to prevent the death
sentence that would most certainly be handed down by an outraged jury. Darrow argued that
forces beyond the young boys’ control influenced their action and that this should be considered
when sentencing the boys who should be spared the death penalty.103
Robert Butler points out the many similarities between the Loeb and Leopold case and
Native Son. He acknowledges that the victims were chosen by chance, were suffocated to death,
the bodies of both victims were mutilated, both Bigger and Loeb and Leopold wrote similar
ransom letters, and, most importantly, Max’s defense is modeled after Darrow’s defense of a
guilty plea to “argue that the crimes committed were produce by unhealthy social environments
that emotionally distorted their clients and stunted their human development.”104 He concurs that
both defense attorneys saw the fates of their clients as indicative of “the larger cultural calamities
experienced by modern society,” and each lawyer viewed his trial “as a pivot on line in history
dividing barbarism and civilization.”105 As David Guest points out, the Leopold and Loeb case
“may have provided Wright with valuable source material for his novel, but it had little to say
about race.”106 However, Butler does make a minor point that challenges Guest’s assessment
when he points out that Loeb’s letter reveals his privileged education, whereas Bigger’s is “barely
literate” due to a lack of formal schooling.107 Butler finally concludes that the Loeb and Leopold
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case and the Robert Nixon murder were influential in Native Son because they “weighted”
Wright’s novel in “public, historically verifiable events” and “provided an authority and
resonance it otherwise would not have possessed,” and “transformed” those known events
through Wright’s consciousness into a “durable work of art.”108
However, while Butler is more invested in demonstrating the similarities between the
Loeb and Leopold case and Native Son, I am interested in how Wright amplifies elements from
both of these events through an epideictic sensibility in order to blame social forces for
contributing to the traumatized psyche of African American individuals. For instance, in Book
Three, Max addresses the judge thusly: “But we have had many, many such cases to come before
the courts of Illinois, The Loeb and Leopold case, for example, . . . Shall we deny this boy,
because he is poor and black, the same protection, the same chance to be heard and understood
that we have so readily granted to others?” (376).
What is interesting here, and what Butler misses, is that Wright’s purpose in drawing this
connection is to adapt the historically verifiable events not to make a “vibrant work of art” as
Butler claims, but to construct epideictic discourse. For example, in the Loeb and Leopold case,
Clarence Darrow argued that the young men’s genetics and privileged upbringing gave them an
“excess of intellect and a deficit of emotion, diminishing their moral character.109 Darrow turned
to scientists that would argue that endocrinology, the study of the glands and hormonal secretions,
produces a hormonal imbalance that leads to mental illness and explains the motivation for the
murder. What is most important for my analysis is Darrow’s reliance on a hereditary cause, and
his declaration that the young men’s crime “was inherent in his organism,” and that their mental
states came from “some ancestor,” and he did not know “how many ancestors” may have “sent
down the seed that corrupted” the young men.110 Wright has Max use a similar defense of social
factors, but the overriding element of Native Son is fear. The social forces that Max claims
108
109

Butler, p. 563.
Baatz, p. 374-375.

62
influenced Bigger are forces that instill fear in Bigger’s consciousness, but Wright transforms the
import of the Loeb and Leopold case through a racially traumatized consciousness that is
connected to a violent and oppressive history. Wright parallels the Darrow defense, but he
alludes to it only to invert it – Wright amplifies the affective economy of fear that continues the
racial social scripts and the ongoing cultural trauma. And while Darrow emphasized the limited
moral capacities of the accused, Wright is critiquing the moral code of society for maintaining the
racist social scripts that are responsible for the Bigger Thomas’s “vision” of the world. In this
way, contrary to Darrow’s fabricated defense, Wright actually implicates society’s role in
creating the “moral horror of Negro life in the United States” (461), which could only be
registered through Wright’s delving into Bigger’s consciousness.

3) Fear, Flight, Fate: A Native Son’s Affective Economies
In order to explain Native Son’s epideictic discourse, I turn to Sara Ahmed’s work in The
Cultural Politics of Emotion. Ahmed is interested in formulating a theory of emotion that views
emotions as a social and cultural practice, meaning, emotions do not originate in individual
subjects, but “produce the very surfaces and boundaries that allow the individual and the social to
be delineated as if they are objects.”111 Therefore, she breaks down the barrier that separates the
internal subjective states of emotions, and the external cause-and-effect states of objects, in order
to demonstrate that emotions shape how we respond to objects and others; in other words,
emotions help to maintain surfaces and boundaries and are shaped by “contact.” Ahmed
illustrates how emotions perform on bodies and incorporate bodies within communities, or situate
other bodies outside of particular communities, thereby creating a rhetoric of sociality that
establishes a self versus an other, and by extension, an “us” versus a “them” (based on likeness
and unlikeness).
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However, while the emotions help to differentiate subjects in social space, Ahmed is
interested in how emotions circulate between bodies, and in particular, how they move and
“stick.” Therefore, she contends, “emotions are shaped by contact with objects, rather than being
caused by objects.”112 As a result, Ahmed claims that “emotions do not inhabit anybody or
anything,” but rather, the individual subject exists as “one nodal point in the economy, rather than
an origin and destination.” 113 Borrowing from psychoanalysis, Ahmed develops a theory of
emotion as economy that starts from the premise that unconscious emotions are disconnected
from the original event that incited the affect. She writes, emotions “involve a process of
movement or association, whereby ‘feelings’ take us across different levels of signification, not
all of which can be admitted in the present,” and this process creates a “rippling effect” in which
emotions “move sideways (through ‘sticky’ associations between signs, figures and objects) as
well as forward and backwards (repression always leaves its trace in the present – hence ‘what
sticks’ is bound up with the ‘absent presence’ of historicity).” Borrowing from a Marxian critique
of capital, she continues,
[E]motions work as a form of capital: affect does not reside positively in the sign or the
commodity, but is produced as an effect of its circulation. I am using ‘the economic’ to
suggest that objects of emotion circulate or are distributed across a social as well as
psychic field, […] What I am offering is a theory of passion not as the drive to
accumulate (whether it be value, power or meaning), but as that which is accumulated
over time. Affect does not reside in an object or sign, but is an effect of the circulation
between objects and signs (= the accumulation of affective value). Signs increase in
affective value as an effect of the movement between signs: the more signs circulate, the
more affective they become.114
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In this way, Ahmed claims that emotions endow bodies with value, and through repetition and
historical context, the emotional value is generated and accumulates, which then ultimately
determines inclusion or exclusion. Ahmed writes, “Emotionality as a claim about a subject or a
collective is clearly dependent on relations of power, which endow ‘others’ with meaning and
value.”115 Ahmed’s theory shifts the focus on emotions from an “inside-out” or an “outside-in”
model to explore how emotions work in social relations of power. The social and cultural force
of emotions is evident in the affective value that particular emotions, like hate and fear for
example, accumulate when individuals associate certain bodies with those affective meanings,
creating a power dynamic that regulates social relationships amongst definitive groups.
Discussing the emotion of hate, for example, Ahmed points out that hate hinges on the
characteristics of “likeness” and “unlikeness,” where the hated is paired with “unlikeness.”
Characteristics demarcating “unlikeness” inscribe the bodies of individuals, and Ahmed proposes
that “hate works by providing ‘evidence’ of the very antagonism it affects; we cite the work that
it is doing in producing characteristics of likeness and unlikeness when we show the reasons for
its existence,” and she reasons, “the politics of racial hatred involve attributing racial others with
meaning, a process we can describe as the ‘making of unlikeness.’ Hatred is a negative
attachment to an other that one wishes to expel, an attachment that is sustained through the
expulsion of the other from bodily and social proximity.”116 Therefore, the emotion of hate
belongs to a vulnerable, endangered self, distinguishing and loathing an “other” who presents a
threat to the security of those within the community (i.e., those who are “alike”).
Most important for my analysis is Ahmed’s discussion of fear. She begins by
differentiating between fear and anxiety by emphasizing that “fear has an object,” but she argues
That is, through circulation and exchange ‘M’ acquires more value (Marx 1976: 248). Or, as he puts it:
‘The values originally advanced, therefore, not only remains intact while in circulation, but increases its
magnitude, adds to itself a surplus-value or is valorized. And this movement converts it into capital’ (Marx
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converts into affect” (45).
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that “fear is linked to the ‘passing by’ of the object.”117 “Passing by” has to do with spatial
proximity, temporal proximity, and object displacement. The object of fear can be directly in
front of the individual or not, but the proximity will determine the affective value of fear.
Additionally, Ahmed points out that fear is an intense feeling of unpleasantness towards an object
that is approaching, thus, projecting an individual from the present into a future anticipation. To
put this another way, because emotions can be displaced among objects and signifiers, one could
experience great difficulty in trying to pinpoint an object to contain a particular fear. Ahmed
touches upon this by explaining how fear is related to the future, or, “an anticipation of hurt or
injury.” Ahmed cites Heidegger’s remark that fear arises due to the “absence of the object” that
incites fear. She claims,
It is the futurity of fear that makes it possible that the object of fear, rather than arriving,
might pass us by. But the passing by of the object of fear does not mean the overcoming
of fear: rather, the possibility of the loss of the object makes what is fearsome all the
more fearsome. If fear had an object, then fear could be contained by the object. When
the object of fear threatens to pass by, then fear can no longer be contained by an object.
Fear in its very relationship to an object, in the very intensity of its directedness towards
that object, is intensified by the loss of its object.118
As Ahmed observes, if fear could be contained by an object, there would be no threat of the
object “passing by” (i.e., the fear stems from an object drawing nearer, or, it is the outcome of an
anticipated fear of future injury intensely registered presently). Thus, the proximity of the object
in terms of space and time is not fixed and an individual may try to flee from the object of fear,
although the fear may be displaced amongst objects.119 Thus, an object of fear can “pass by” in
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terms of physical contact – the object can come into contact with the individual who fears;
temporally, the object’s production of fear can pass from the future to the present; and/or the fear
can be displaced amongst many objects and signifiers.
Ahmed’s theory of emotionality figures predominantly in Native Son. For instance, in
Book Three, while in the cell, Max asks Bigger questions about his life and gives Bigger an
opportunity to explain why he murdered Mary Dalton, but the importance of the exchange lies in
Bigger’s articulation of the affective economies of hate and fear in which Bigger finds himself
immersed. The narrative reads, “in Max’s asking of those questions [Bigger] had felt a
recognition of his life,” despite his “acts of fear and hate and murder and flight and despair”
(360). This causes Bigger to reflect on his own life, and the narrative relates, “He stood upon the
middle of the cell floor and tried to see himself in relation to other men, a thing he had always
feared to try to do, so deeply stained was his own mind with the hate of others for him,” that this
“new sense of the value of himself gained from Max’s talk, a sense fleeting and obscure,” created
a “strong counter-emotion” in him, “urging him, warning him to leave this newly-seen and
newly-felt thing alone, that it would lead him to but another blind alley, to deeper hate and
shame” (361). In Native Son, fear, hate, anger, guilt, and shame are all interrelated, for the white
world’s hate of Bigger causes him to feel fearful and shameful of his black skin and life, but it
also causes him to hate. His hate, therefore, is predicated upon fear, and the white world’s hate is
also connected to fear – the white world fears that which is not like it, and it attempts to expel the
differentiated other. In the novel, Wright portrays whites associating a meaning and value with
black skin, a value of unlikeness and inferiority, which causes them to mark the body as a
separate object, which in turn incites shame for Bigger.
The affective economy of fear plays a prominent role in Native Son, causing Bigger to
suffer a profoundly fearful existence throughout the novel and illustrating how his fear is often
displaced amongst different individuals, different signifiers, and different events on a temporal
continuum – meaning, the racialized public script is an already-established social force within the
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novel’s depiction of 1930s American society, giving it a historical precedence and a current
impact on the present of the narrative. For instance, Bigger and Gus engage in a dialogic
exchange when they role play in a game they call “playing white,” which is “a game of
playacting” in which they “imitated” the “manners of white folks.” The caricature takes off from
a pre-established history of white domination. Bigger acts as a General in the military alluding to
the white world’s control over military might, and Gus plays J.P. Morgan emphasizing the
exorbitant amount of money that he possesses and manages, and lastly, Bigger acts as the
President of the U.S. and pretends to call for a very important meeting because “the niggers
is[sic] raising sand all over the country, … We’ve got to do something about those black folks
…” (19). At one point, the narrative reads, “Then they guffawed, partly at themselves and partly
at the vast white world that sprawled and towered in the sun before them” (18).
Wright is establishing the “white world” as the social environment that influences Bigger
and dictates his very existence – what he can and cannot do, where he can and cannot go. Bigger
begins to feel fear and hate after Bigger and Gus complete “playing white,” and Bigger voices
frustration, exclaiming, “[the white folks] don’t let us do nothing” (19). Gus retorts that this is an
old custom, but Bigger states, “I just can’t get used to it … We live here and they live there. We
black and they white. They got things and we ain’t. They do things and we can’t. It’s just like
living in jail” (20). The social environment demarcates the space for white and black bodies, and
it not only assigns value and meaning to the bodies (i.e. worth), but it also contains the bodies in a
certain geographical locale that is connected to future potentiality. White individuals mandated a
divide between white and black bodies that was enforced by a racialized terror. Bigger and Gus
know that they cannot cross the “line” and they fear to transgress the racial boundaries of “here”
and “there.” Bigger refers to the living situation as a prison, where bodies are confined and lack
freedom, and he forebodes the fear attached to the (non)proximity of white and black bodies:
“Every time I get to thinking about me being black and they being white, me being here and they
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being there, I feel like something awful’s going to happen to me …” (20). Finally, Bigger asks
Gus,
“You know where the white folks live?”
“Yeah,” Gus said, pointing eastward. “Over across the ‘line’; over there on Cottage
Grove Ave.”
“Naw; they don’t,” Bigger said.
“What do you mean?” Gus asked, puzzled. “Then, where do they live?”
Bigger doubled his fist and struck his solar plexus. “Right down here in my stomach,” he
said. (21)
Bigger makes his first prophecy regarding his predestined path and he makes it based upon a
racialized traumatic fear. Wright juxtaposes the actual specifics of geographic location with the
figurative locale of the white peoples’ residence in order to show Bigger’s trauma as rooted in a
violent history of contact between whites and blacks. A social system of fear and control has kept
African Americans from moving about freely in an open society. They are restrained from
“doing things” and “going places.” Aimé Ellis references this scene – as well as the subversive
plotting in Doc’s poolroom, and the masturbation scene in the movie theater – as incidences of
the black males reinforcing their social deviant practices and challenging white authority due to
the characters “assert[ing] themselves within and against a culture of racial terror” and racial
subjugation.120 While Ellis is right to point out the resistance in these communal, social-bonding
experiments, she overlooks the fact that Bigger is unfulfilled and still yearns for a realized form
of living with others. Bigger’s community of black males cannot achieve Bigger’s – and by
extension, the other black men’s – desired outcome. What Bigger wants is “to merge himself
with others and be a part of this world, to lose himself in it so he could find himself, to be allowed
a chance to live like others, even though he was black” (240). However, the African American
male community in the novel and its attempt to indirectly resist racial subjugation fails to offer
this vision in realized form, for Bigger is compounded by a fear-imposing white society that
wants the opposite – to maintain separation as indicated by the geographical allocation of black
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housing in the Black Belt and the socioeconomic stagnation of the African American working
class within the novel. This notion of playacting is not enough for Bigger anymore. The
excitement and joviality witnessed in the beginning of this passage disappear as Bigger ends this
scene on a dejected note.
Applying the affective economy of fear to the narrative will elucidate Wright’s literary
epideictic project that reveals Bigger’s traumatic fear based on his proximity to white bodies and
the traumatic associations that have accumulated through the histories of contact designed to
violently maintain the separation of black and white bodies. In the scenes where Bigger interacts
with Mr. Dalton in one instance, and Mary and Jan in another, the historically racist scripts call
for behavioral expectations that make Bigger aware of his black body as subjugated to white
authority. Bigger’s fear is further impacted by Mr. Dalton’s, Mary’s and Jan’s different
approaches to the previously established social order, reinforcements and/or departures which
ultimately confuse Bigger in terms of how he should act in the presence of whites. For instance,
when Bigger is on his way to meet Mr. Dalton, he comes to Drexel Boulevard, a representative
“white world” described as a “cold and distant world; a world of white secrets carefully guarded,”
which made Bigger feel “constricted inside,” with “only fear and emptiness fill[ing] him now”
(44). Bigger has crossed over the line, and his trespass comes with negative associations of black
bodies in white spaces. When he arrives at the Dalton residence, Bigger did not know if he
should go in the front or the back of the house, and the narrative reflects, “Suppose a police saw
him wandering in a white neighborhood like this? It would be thought that he was trying to rob
or rape somebody. He grew angry … This was not his world” (44). Bigger is about to enter a
world in which whiteness was “carefully guarded” by this distinct social environment that has
separated white and black bodies, assigned them meaning and value, and as a result, set up a
geographical system to contain the objects of white fear.
As George Yancy shows, historically, a black body has become a value-laden object that
functions as “a signifier of negative values grounded within a racist social and historical matrix,”
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and the construction of blackness is configured against whiteness as a transcendental norm.121
Bigger’s very presence in the white neighborhood serves as a trespass, and his presence is a threat
to the object of fear passing by the white gaze. Bigger is going to meet Mr. Dalton, who “was
somewhere far away, high up, distant, like a god,” a man who owned property in the Black Belt
and in the white neighborhoods. The narrative reflects, “But Bigger could not live in a building
across the ‘line.’ Even though Mr. Dalton gave millions of dollars for Negro education, he would
rent houses to Negroes only in this prescribed area, this corner of the city tumbling down from
rot” (174). Mr. Dalton functioned as the transcendental white norm that dictated where Bigger
could live and what he could do. He appears to help African Americans through his philanthropy,
but he also keeps them confined to a space with unsuitable living conditions. Mr. Dalton is like a
god who relegates Bigger to his corner of the city to live apart from the white community.
However, Bigger’s presence in Mr. Dalton’s neighborhood is perceived by whites as a breach.
Mr. Dalton’s wealth, power, and influence increase the socioeconomic distance between him and
Bigger, and they invest the white man’s gaze with authority and instill fear in Bigger.
The scene where Bigger flounders as he looks for the employment letter from the relief
agency that referred him to drive for Mr. Dalton demonstrates the affective economy of fear at
work in the novel. In this scene, Bigger does not fear Mr. Dalton because Mr. Dalton is an object
of fear. Rather, Bigger fears Mr. Dalton because of the racial histories of the white gaze that have
preceded such encounters of black and white individuals. While Bigger represents an object of
fear in the white world because he is not contained by the Black Belt, but is moving and posing a
threat of “passing by,” Mr. Dalton also serves as an object of fear for Bigger; however, Mr.
Dalton equally cannot contain Bigger’s fear because of the racial history of terror that his body
and gaze represent. For instance, Mr. Dalton greets Bigger with a smile, but the narrative relates
how Bigger felt uneasy in the white man’s presence: “The man was gazing at him with an amused
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smile that made him conscious of every square inch of skin on his black body” (46). George
Yancy notes that the white gaze is “historically grounded in material relations of white power: it
was deemed disrespectful for a black person to violate the white gaze by looking directly into the
eyes of someone white.”122 When Bigger begins to fumble while looking for the note from the
agency that set up the job interview, the narrative reports,
He had not raised his eyes to the level of Mr. Dalton’s face once since he had been in the
house. He stood with his knees slightly bent, his lips partly open, his shoulders stooped;
and his eyes held a look that went only to the surface of things. There was an organic
conviction in him that this was the way white folks wanted him to be when in their
presence; none had ever told him that in so many words, but in their manner had made
him feel that they did. He laid his cap down, noticing that Mr. Dalton was watching him
closely. Maybe he was not acting right? Goddamn! Clumsily he searched for the paper.
(48, italics added)
Bigger is afraid that he is not acting appropriately based on the social scripts that are in place for
social interactions between black and white individuals, but what is most important is the fact that
the narrative underscores the lack of first-hand knowledge of such expectations for Bigger. At
one point, Bigger “suddenly remembered the many times his mother had told him not to look at
the floor when talking with white folks or asking for a job. He lifted his eyes and saw Mr. Dalton
watching him closely. He dropped his eyes again” (49). Bigger’s reflection of his mother’s
advice taps into a further history that incorporates her past experiences, as a member of an older
generation, with white people and illustrates the social customs that are in place – Bigger knows
better than to look the white man in the face, but the case of prospective employment calls for a
shift in decorum, even though the notion of subservience subsists. The behavioral expectations of
black men and women are coded in the bodily behavior of whites, for the narrative mentions the
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previous “manners” of white folks as contributing to Bigger’s belief. The narrative is suggesting
the customary behavior of white individuals is designed to foster feelings of subjection.
Mr. Dalton’s gaze functions as a racist, authoritative gaze, and when the narrative reveals
that Bigger is aware of “every square inch of skin on his black body,” Wright is tapping into the
“historicity” of American racism and its effect on Bigger in the present of the narrative, namely,
to be aware of his black body and its inferiority in relation to white bodies. “The history of the
black body in North America,” according to Yancy, “is fundamentally linked to the history of
whiteness, primarily as whiteness is expressed in the form of fear, sadism, hatred, brutality, terror,
avoidance, desire, denial, solipsism, madness, policing, politics, and the production and
projection of white fantasies.”123 Yancy further historicizes that the cultural trauma that results for
African Americans includes memories that associate the experience of whiteness with a long
history of white racism that includes lynching, castration, and other violent acts of terror.124
Wright conjures up these associations as elicitors in the affective economy of fear, which create a
psychological and moral distancing between white and black bodies. Bigger’s fear of being
judged by Mr. Dalton is evident when the narrative reads, “He hated himself at that moment.
Why was he acting and feeling this way? He wanted to wave his hand and blot out the white man
who was making him feel this. If not that, he wanted to blot himself out” (47). As Masaya
Takeuchi points out, Bigger “hates both the compulsory performance and Mr. Dalton, whose
presence forces him to play the stereotypical Jim Crow. In a society in which a black man’s
violence against a white man is strictly taboo, Bigger’s aggression again turns inward.”125 The
potential loss for Bigger is not only the job; in both of the instances when Bigger expresses a
desire to “blot” out Mr. Dalton or himself, Bigger experiences a threat to his existence. Bigger
fears the object that is judging and threatening his existence and he wants to eliminate it, but more
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importantly, because he has no power to counter Mr. Dalton, and, the possible violence against a
white man is unthinkable, Bigger becomes a danger to himself. Additionally, while Mr. Dalton’s
gaze elicits fear in Bigger in a manner connected to their different placements on the social
hierarchy, Mary and Jan provoke fear through their ostensible behavior.
Bigger’s interactions with Mary and Jan have an even more profound impact on the
affective economy of fear, for Mary and Jan push the boundaries of the racist social scripts in
place, an act which causes Bigger to become conscious of his black skin in a way that evokes a
history of cultural trauma produced by racial shaming. A racialized history of interactions among
black and white people influences how Bigger interprets Mary and Jan’s behavior towards him.
Mary and Jan attempt to break down the physical and abstract barriers between them and Bigger,
but this attempt is corrupted by a history of racism. For instance, when Bigger meets Jan, Jan
extends “an open palm” towards Bigger as a gesture of respect, but “Bigger’s entire body
tightened with suspense and dread” as his “right hand gripped the steering wheel and he
wondered if he ought to shake hands with this white man” (66). Furthermore, Jan tells him not to
“say sir to me. I’ll call you Bigger and you’ll call me Jan. That’s the way it’ll be between us.
How’s that?” But Bigger is taken off-guard, for this violates everything Bigger was conditioned
to know – it violates and contradicts his lived reality, his actual world. He reflects, “How on
earth could he learn not to say yessuh and yessum to white people in one night when he had been
saying it all his life?” (73). When Bigger meets Mr. Dalton, for example, he relies on the
expected, racially motivated social script in order to show him respect. Jan has withdrawn from a
long tradition of historical social scripts that have dictated proper responses for black individuals
in social situations involving whites. The only assurance Bigger can muster lies in fulfilling his
job responsibility; however, Jan even robs Bigger of the solace from doing one’s job when he
literally takes over the driving and then, Mary decides to move from the backseat of the car into
the front seat, and as she climbs in, she physically touches Bigger’s arm. As a result, Bigger
begins to feel suffocated by Mary and Jan: “There were white people on either side of him; he
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was sitting between two vast white looming walls. Never in his life had he been so close to a
white woman” (67-68).
Furthermore, Jan incorporates Bigger into his worldview and vision for the future, using
the collective pronouns of “we” and “ours” to speak about a revolution in which “there’ll be no
white and no black; there’ll be no rich and no poor” (68), but a world that belongs to all. And yet,
to further confuse matters, Jan and Mary state they want to “see how [his] people live” (69).
Mary expresses, “they must live like we live. They’re human” (70). However, at this point,
Bigger, and his African American identity, has been transposed back into an objectified state, just
after Jan’s speech incorporating “we,” “us,” and “our” and a shared ownership of the world at
large. Mary and Jan try to depart from racist forms of social interaction between whites and
blacks; however, the past histories are inscribed on their white and black bodies and they cannot
undo that turbulent past. The separate worlds that they inhabit do not register the same
opportunities to express personal freedoms. For instance, at one point, Bigger reflects, “She
responded to him as if he were human, as if he lived in the same world as she. And he had never
felt that before in a white person. But why? Was this some kind of game? The guarded feeling
of freedom he had while listening to her was tangled with the hard fact that she was white and
rich, a part of the world of people who told him what he could and could not do” (65). This
connects back to “playing white” with Gus – Mary is part of the “white” world that never allows
Bigger do anything because he is black; but, she has discarded an entire historical, class-based,
and racialized fixed social order in one brief encounter.
Although Bigger oscillates between the emotions of confusion, anger, hatred, and shame,
Bigger ultimately suffers from fear, the overriding emotion of the novel, because he cannot locate
a containment for his emotional suffering. In other words, because Mary and Jan are violating the
racialized scripts, he cannot anticipate or decode the objects causing his intense fear. Therefore,
he is in a constant anticipatory dread because he cannot possibly understand why Mary and Jan
are going against the social norms that regulate interactions between black and white individuals
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and this causes him great hysteria that begins to register both physically and mentally. The
circulating emotions are what separate and mark the surfaces of Bigger’s, Mary’s, and Jan’s
bodies, and they are differentiated based on a racial history. Bigger conscientiously observes his
black skin and their white bodies and a historical traumatized past is evoked in which the black
skin was invested with the affective value of “shame.”
In this scene, Wright weaves an ironic twist here because Mary and Jan’s behavior
towards Bigger incites an intense fear because of their departure from, and violation of, the
affective economy of racialized hate (responsible for Bigger’s fear) that has been historically
situated. At one point, Mary begins to giggle in the backseat of the car in response to Bigger’s
awkward behavior and response to Jan. The narrative reads:
He flushed warm with anger. Goddamn her soul to hell! Was she laughing at him? Were
they making fun of him? What was it that they wanted? Why didn’t they leave him
alone? He was not bothering them. Yes, anything could happen with people like these.
His entire mind and body were painfully concentrated into a single point of attention. He
was trying desperately to understand…. He was very conscious of his black skin and
there was in him a prodding conviction that Jan and men like him had made it so that he
would be conscious of that black skin. Did not white people despise black skin? … What
could they get out of this? … But they made him feel his black skin by just standing there
looking at him, one holding his hand and the other smiling. He felt he had no physical
existence at all right then; he was something he hated, the badge of shame which he knew
was attached to black skin. It was a shadowy region, a No Man’s Land, the ground that
separated the white world from the black that he stood upon. He felt naked, transparent;
he felt that this white man, having helped to put him down, having helped to deform him,
held him up now to look at him and be amused. At that moment he felt toward Mary and
Jam a dumb, cold, and inarticulate hate. (67, italics added)
Bigger cannot understand what is going on – the white people were breaking social customs that
he was conditioned to follow and he could not understand their intention. Whatever Jan and
Mary’s intention, Bigger knows the ramifications of accepting their treatment.
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At one point later in the novel, the private detective, Britten, alludes to the social system
that is set up to keep Bigger and white men and women like Jan and Mary separate. While
investigating Bigger, Britten asks Peggy, the house cook, “Has [Bigger] ever sat down in your
presence without being asked, like he was used to being around white people?” (192). It is not
natural for white people to treat Bigger this way, and he is unable to put his feelings into language
for they are “inarticulate,” but the problem lies in the fact that Jan and Mary are now distorting a
social code that was a) designed to maintain separation of bodies, and b) also served as an
abstract containment of Bigger’s fear. In other words, while their bodies do not contain his fear
because they are treating him civilly, the behavioral deference he was conditioned to show to
white people kept him safe; now, Jan and Mary have complicated that and Bigger cannot even
imagine the danger of becoming too desensitized to white people. He is paralyzed by confusion
and fear. For example, in Book Three, Max sates that “Social custom had shoved [Bigger] so far
away from [Mary and Jan] that they were not real to him” (395). More importantly, the narrative
indicates, “These people made him feel things he did not want to feel. If he were white, if he
were like them, it would have been different. But he was black” (69, italics added). Bigger “felt
trapped,” “distrust[ful],” and “puzzled.” He could not understand them or their intentions and he
begins to hate them because in addition to causing him confusion, they are making him aware of
his “unlikeness” and this interaction begins to foster feelings of shame.
Bigger’s emotions register on his black skin in the passage, and the narrative implicates a
cultural history of white “men like [Jan]” who have produced the affective economies of hate and
fear he is now navigating. What once was a “No Man’s Land” for Bigger has been opened up by
Jan and Mary, but it is precisely Bigger’s former exclusion from the “shadowy region” that
invests the scene with the affective value of shame. As an African American, Bigger has been
denied an equal playing field with whites, and if he accepts Jan’s and Mary’s hospitability, he
will be in direct violation with the social codes that keep him safe. As Ahmed points out, shame
is “the affective cost of not following the scripts of normative existence,” an emotion concerning
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how the self feels about itself, often requiring a witness. She writes, “Shame feels like an
exposure – another sees what I have done that is bad and hence shameful – but it also involves an
attempt to hide, a hiding that requires the subject turn away from the other towards itself.”126 For
Bigger, he has not done anything disgraceful here, but the shame is “attached to black skin.” Jan
and Mary have abandoned the social scripts, and if Bigger accepts this behavior and becomes lax
in the presence of whites, his reaction could be deemed “bad” and nonnormative. As a result,
Bigger must assess the real life consequences of his response to their behavior and he feels
“naked” and “transparent.” His attempt to hide manifests itself in “cold, inarticulate hate” for
himself and the black skin that signifies his “unlikeness.”
Furthermore, the scene insinuates that Bigger was already-traumatized prior to his
murdering of Mary Dalton, for Bigger already possesses the belief that his black skin represents a
“badge of shame” in a white-dominated society. Bigger wishes they would leave him alone, but
he cannot turn inward as Ahmed suggests because his racially charged shame has become a badge
or marker for black people. The racial hate that has preceded him begins to foster a self-hatred.
His anger is tied to the fear, for in Book III, Max attempts to convince Bigger to let him handle
his case and the narrative relates that at that moment, Bigger felt “as self-conscious as when Jan
had taken his hand and shaken it that night in the car. It made him live again in that hard and
sharp consciousness of his color and feel the shame and fear that went with it, and at the same
time it made him hate himself for feeling it” (346-347). Bigger’s fear turns to hate, but the two
emotions are always tied back to the view of black skin as a “badge of shame” that white people
conditioned Bigger and other black individuals to accept.

4) The Black Male Rapist and Racially Traumatized Fear in the Murder of Mary Dalton
Wright embeds into the narrative a cultural trauma produced by the myth of the black
male rapist, as well as the violent repercussions that follow the accusation of any interracial
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affairs. Bigger eventually finds himself in a precarious and vulnerable situation with Mary
Dalton, predicated upon the affective economy of fear that carries traces of the myth. Hoping to
end his unorthodox night with Mary and Jan, Bigger drops off a very intoxicated Mary at the
Dalton residence. As she is experiencing trouble getting out of the car, and as Bigger is helping
her, he wonders “what a white man would think seeing him here with [a white woman] like this”
(81), referring back to his earlier premonition when he entered the Dalton’s neighborhood that the
police would think that he was “trying to rape somebody” (44). Mary’s capricious behavior is
expected, and she has little accountability for her actions; but Bigger, as a black male, is left to
deal with the racially infused consequences that pose grave circumstances for him. What unfolds
in this scene is the historical and cultural trauma an African American male is subject to in a
social situation such as this, a traumatic fear that has accumulated over a history of lynching and
brutality for any association, real or imagined, between black men and white women, and it is
that history that threatens Bigger’s existence in the present of the novel.
When it comes to the murder scene in Mary Dalton’s bedroom, critics often discuss the
sexual imagery and language used to describe the events taking place.127 However, I agree with
Sondra Guttman who reasons that the narrative description, despite Mary’s drunkenness, portrays
consensual sexual desire between Mary and Bigger. Guttman argues that Wright is concerned
127

The murder scene reads:
[Bigger] wanted to move from the bed, but was afraid he would stumble over something and Mrs.
Dalton would hear him, would know that someone besides Mary was in the room. Frenzy
dominated him. He held his hand over her mouth and his head was cocked at an angle that
enabled him to see Mary and Mrs. Dalton by merely shifting his eyes. Mary mumbled and tried to
rise again. Frantically, he caught a corner of the pillow and brought it to her lips. He had to stop
her from mumbling, or he would be caught. Mrs. Dalton was moving slowly toward him and he
grew tight and full, as though about to explode. Mary’s fingernails tore at his hands and he caught
the pillow and covered her entire face with it, firmly. Mary’s body surged upward and he pushed
downward upon the pillow with all of his weight, determined that she must not move or make any
sound that would betray him. His eyes were filled with the white blur moving toward him in the
shadows of the room. (85-86)
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with aligning sexual desire with political desire.128 Guttman points out the references in the news
reel in the movie house that equate Mary with Mr. Dalton’s capitalist wealth, and she asserts,
“Mary continually violates the prescribed distance between white and black, rich and poor
bodies,” becoming a “disembodied symbol of white wealth and power.”129 Her sexual desire for
Bigger is a symbolic representation of her and Jan’s “revolution” of “no white and no black,” “no
rich and no poor” (68). Guttman also declares that Bigger’s sexual desire for Mary is a “desire
for black political agency,” for “the will to sexually possess the white woman substitutes for the
desire to overthrow white supremacist society.”130
While Guttman interprets the scene in line with the cultural stigmas attached to the sexual
liaisons between black men and white women historically, her claim that Bigger desires to
overthrow white supremacist society does not account for the fact that Bigger’s actual desire
portrayed in the narrative is to flee the object causing him to fear for his existence. Mary’s white
female body and Bigger’s black male body are two nodes on the affective economy of fear and
impressed upon them is the racist script of the black male rapist – Mary as an object of sexual
desire for Bigger, and Bigger as a black subject raping Mary. Here, the affective economy of fear
informs the contact between Bigger and Mary’s bodies in the bedroom based on past histories of
contact, real or imagined, impressed upon the black male body and the white female body.
Wright reveals the intense racialized fear as a part of the cultural trauma fostered by the
(re)actions inflamed by the myth of the black male rapist.
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What is important to note in the murder scene are the emotions circulating between
Bigger, Mary, and Mrs. Dalton which have accumulated affective value due to the historically
situated myth of the black male rapist and have – and are concurrently – registering a traumatic
effect on Bigger. For instance, Bigger is first described as “tightened with hate,” and then he
becomes overtaken with “excitement and fear,” only to once again return to hate, his “muscles
flexed so taut they ached,” and “his teeth clamped, his fists clenched” (83-86). Despite Bigger’s
oscillating emotions, the scene primarily depicts Bigger suffering from a “blazing terror.”
Bigger’s emotional fear is exacerbated exponentially by the anticipation of being caught with
Mary, but not an anticipation in an excited fashion as the sexual implications might suggest.
Rather, his fear intensifies based on the anticipation of a third-party viewer misapprehending his
bodily contact with Mary; thus, his emotion of fear circulates various nodal points on the
affective economy. As a case in point, Bigger’s fear climaxes when Mrs. Dalton enters the room.
The narrative reads, “Then he stiffened. The door behind him creaked. He turned and a
hysterical terror seized him, as though he were falling from a great height in a dream. A white
blur was standing by the door, silent, ghostlike. It filled his eyes and gripped his body. It was
Mrs. Dalton. He wanted to knock her out of his way and bolt from the room” (85). Mrs. Dalton’s
presence – technically a physical body, but represented narratively as a “ghostly” presence – taps
into a history of the social issue revolving around the black male rapist.
Jonathan Elmer points out that Wright constructs the scene as if it were an actual rape and
that there results a “missed encounter” for Bigger and Mary in relation to the fantasy because it is
disrupted by Mrs. Dalton. Elmer writes, “When this white blur blocks his exit, we have a fictional
realization of the phenomenological impasse that lies at the heart of Bigger’s deformed
experience: we have racial aporia.” Elmer argues that the suspension “exacerbates” the drama.
He writes, “what Wright ruthlessly delivers here is the image of Bigger becoming the fantasmatic
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phallus of the white supremacist fantasy.”131 Mrs. Dalton acts as a type of “witness” to the event
and there is no exit for Bigger. The narrative describes Bigger “hold[ing] his breath, intimidated
to the core by the awesome white blur floating toward him” (86). While Elmer is right to point
out that Mrs. Dalton represents the white world, I argue that she functions more as a phantasmic
image embodying the traumatic history of violence inflicted upon black male bodies accused of
raping white women. For one, Mrs. Dalton is blind, and in order for her to confirm Bigger’s
presence in the room, there needs to be an utterance – a vocal expression by Mary which would
then corroborate Bigger’s physical situatedness in the room. The narrative reads, “[Bigger] bent
over [Mary] his fists clenched in fear. He knew that Mrs. Dalton could not see him; but he knew
that if Mary spoke she would come to the side of the bed and discover him, touch him. He waited
tensely, afraid to move for fear of bumping into something in the dark and betraying his
presence” (85).
Wright knew the power of a white female utterance in the racially charged context
revolving around the social interaction of black males and white females. A perfect example is
the cultural history of rape accusations by white females against black males, evident in the cases
of the Scottsboro Boys and Emmett Till.132 Such accusations are predicated upon false charges
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traveling on a train from Tennessee to Alabama and were accused of raping two white women also on the
train. On the train, a fight between the black youths and some white youths on the train broke out, and
when the train stopped in Scottsboro, Alabama, a rumor regarding rape began to circulate and was
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that are not witnessed visibly. Wright also connects to the case of Robert Nixon, for in that
instance, there existed no evidence that Nixon had raped the white woman. It is irrelevant what
Mary would have said regarding Bigger in her room – for instance, that she was drunk and Bigger
helped her up the stairs. The scene registers fear based on histories of contact between black and
white bodies, and in this scene, without visible confirmation that Bigger is in Mary’s room, any
sound or an utterance could implicate Bigger. Mrs. Dalton would approach the bed and “touch”
his body and discover the racial transgression. The narrative reports that Bigger wanted to move
away from Mary’s bed, but he was afraid that Mrs. Dalton would hear him stumbling through the
room. Bigger was caught in a frenzy: “He held his hand over her mouth…. Mary mumbled and
tried to rise again. Frantically, he caught a corner of the pillow and brought it to her lips. He had
to stop her from mumbling, or he would be caught … she must not move or make any sound that
would betray him” (85).133 Wright alludes to the impact the affective economy of fear has on
Bigger, for any sound can “betray” Bigger because his presence in the room is coded with the
intention of rape regardless of the real reason he was in the room – to help Mary get to bed safely.
Whether or not words accuse or name the crime, the white bodies are objects of fear and
signify threats to Bigger’s existence. Mrs. Dalton then is representative of an object for Bigger to

kids he had gone to school with and bragged to the other boys that one of the girls was his girl friend.
Upon hearing this, the other boys pointed out a white girl in the store and dared him to enter and talk to the
woman. As he was leaving the store, Till allegedly said, “Bye, baby” and in doing so violated the racial
codes of Money. His friends warned him that there would be trouble when the woman’s husband found out
what happened. The following Saturday, two white men – the husband and his half brother – entered Till’s
house and threatened his uncle not to intervene. They took Till outside of town to a barn and beat him
severely and shot him in the head. Days later, Till’s body was found in the Tallahatchie River, his face
disfigured, eyes gouged out, and a bullet found in his skull. See Hazel Rowley, Richard Wright: The Life
and Times. (New York: Henry Hold, 2001), pp. 470-471; and Davis W. Houck and Matthew A. Grindy,
Emmett Till And The Mississippi Press. (Jackson: University Press of Mississippi, 2008).
133
Mary, in a way, had already betrayed Bigger earlier. When Bigger meets Mary for the first time, she
asks him about unions in front of Mr. Dalton and the narrative reflects, “He knew nothing about unions,
except that they were considered bad. And what did she mean by talking to him this way in front of Mr.
Dalton, who, surely, didn’t like unions?” (52). Bigger worried that he would not be hired after that
incident, and after everything turns out in his favor, while driving Mary, she asks whether or not Bigger is a
“tattle-tale.” When she goes to meet Jan, Bigger felt it was a trap, and that Mr. Dalton had spies watching
him and that he would be fired. And when Bigger shows reluctance to go into Ernie’s Chicken Shack with
them, Mary cries and Bigger perceives her to be “contaminated with an invisible contagion,” capable of
doing the “unexpected any minute” (72).
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contain his fear. Bigger anticipates the future injury throughout the scene, and when Mrs. Dalton
enters the room, his fear intensifies because he cannot avoid or run from the object. He could be
found out and then he will have to suffer the consequences. Mrs. Dalton, representing a “white
blur” – the “invisible whites,” the invisible white force – created a fear so great in Bigger that he
ultimately killed Mary trying to keep her quiet so that he would not be discovered by the white
blur. After some time, Mrs. Dalton leaves the room, and the narrative exclaims, “He felt that he
had been in grip of a weird spell and was now free” (87). It is interesting to note that the entire
action of this murder scene is reliant upon the “white blur” that is in the room. Once Mrs. Dalton
leaves, Bigger experiences release from the haunting spell.
Most importantly, Mrs. Dalton is described as “a white blur … silent, ghostlike,” who
incites a “dominating frenzy” over Bigger’s mind and body. She represents the traumatic history
that follows the violent effects of the myth of the black male rapist. For instance, Anne
Whitehead examines the figure of the ghost, who “represents an appropriate embodiment of the
disjunction of temporality, the surfacing of the past in the present.”134 In a similar vein, Nicolas
Abraham and Maria Torok in The Shell and the Kernel: Renewals of Psychoanalysis, write, “the
concept of the phantom redraws the boundaries of psychopathology and extends the realm of
possibilities for its cure by suggesting the existence within the individual of a collective
psychology comprised of several generations.”135
While Mrs. Dalton is not a phantom per se, she is described as a “blur” and “ghostlike”
which is a distinct move in order to reveal the cultural trauma caused by the myth. The scene of
Mary’s murder is informed by the cultural history that preceded the 1930s context of Native Son,
and Bigger’s inability to manage his emotions reflects the traumatic effect the myth of the black
male rapist can impose, especially considering the fact that Bigger was not raping Mary.
134

Anne Whitehead, Trauma Fiction. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2004, p 6.
Nicolas Abraham and Maria Torok. The Shell and the Kernel: Renewals of Psychoanalysis. Vol. I.
Trans. Nicolas T. Rand. (Chicago: university of Chicago Press, 1994), p. 166.
135

84
Additionally, Bigger is unaware of what is transpiring in Mary’s room, and following the
event, he is haunted by images and nightmares of Mary’s body, resemblant of traumatic
experiences.136 This psychological distress results from what Gabriele Schwab refers to as
“transgenerational trauma.” In Haunting Legacies: Violent Histories and Transgenerational
Trauma, Schwab defines transgenerational trauma as a process in which “Traumatic historical
legacies may be transmitted individually via unconscious fantasies of parents and grandparents as
well as collectively through the cultural unconsciousness. Psychoanalysts have theorized such
transmission as a form of psychic haunting, arguing that both children of victims and children of
perpetrators unwittingly live the ghostly legacies and secrets of their parents and the parental
generation.”137 Schwab concludes, “in violent histories, the personal is inseparable from the
collective and the political.”138 This creates a post traumatic stress effect, which Cathy Caruth
calls a “haunting power,” or the overwhelming response to certain events that take “the form of
repeated, intrusive hallucinations, dreams, thoughts or behaviors stemming from the event, and
possibly also increased arousal to (and avoidance of) stimuli recalling the event.” She concludes,
“To be traumatized is precisely to be possessed by an image or event.”139
In similar fashion, the narrative reports that Bigger felt “strange, possessed, or as if he
were acting upon a stage in front of a crowd of people” (84). The narrator relates the haunting
power of the event for Bigger: “[Bigger] wanted to laugh. It was unreal. Like a nightmare. He
136
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had to lift a dead woman and he was afraid. He felt that he had been dreaming of something like
this for a long time, and then, suddenly, it was true” (89). Jonathan Elmer refers to the news reel
at the movie theater and says, “If Bigger knows this script, if in all his dealings with the drunken
Mary he feels ‘strange, possessed, or as if he were acting upon a stage in front of a crowd of
people,’ it is because this scene has been well-rehearsed.”140 However, the catalyst for Bigger’s
immense fear is Mrs. Dalton. Throughout the novel, Bigger senses a horrific fate, a feeling that
appears to originate in his unconscious. When Mrs. Dalton enters the room and approaches
Bigger’ space, his unconscious takes on the psychology of a collective suffering from past
generations. Up until this point, Bigger has never had intimate contact with a white woman
before, but he is all too consciously aware of the potential ramifications of even the nonsexual
interactions with a white woman, interactions that could be falsely and racially construed as
trespassing into “No Man’s Land.” Thus, Bigger begins to experience a cultural trauma that leads
him to unintentionally fulfill the script that was already-written for him as a black male caught in
this situation, and the narrative implicates the script of the black male rapist:
Though he had killed by accident, not once did he feel the need to tell himself that it had
been an accident. He was black and he had been alone in a room where a white girl had
been killed; therefore he had killed her. That was what everybody would say anyhow, no
matter what he said…. His crime seemed natural; he felt that all of his life had been
leading to something like this. It was no longer a matter of dumb wonder as to what
would happen to him and his black skin; he knew now. The hidden meaning of his life –
a meaning which others did not see and which he always tried to hide – had spilled out.
(106)
The passage indicates that the events that took place that night were already written, that the myth
of the black male rapist is so powerful that it overrides Bigger’s understanding of the events that
lead up to the accidental murder of Mary. In the context of a white supremacist society, Bigger’s
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murder and rape are “natural” – there is no other plausible explanation for Bigger’s intrusion into
the space and contact zone of a white female. Wright further underscores the power and the
dangerous vulnerability attached to the myth by indicating that Bigger’s fate is predestined in a
very simplistic style; the narrative informs, “she was dead; she was white; she was a woman; he
had killed her; he was black; he might be caught; he did not want to be caught; if he were they
would kill him” (89).
Later in the novel, the narrative compares Bigger’s killing of Bessie to the murder of
Mary, stating, “Mary’s death had caused him the most fear; not her death in itself, but what it
meant to him as a Negro” (331). What is important to point out is that the meaning of the death
of a white woman by the hands of a black man was already-established prior to the murder. The
way in which racist social practices have oriented black bodies and white bodies, specifically the
black male body and the white female body in the context of the black male rapist, involve power
relations that determine the violent punishment handed out for breaking the social custom. The
affective economies, in other words, label certain bodies as privileged and other bodies as
transgressive. Wright uses the emotion of fear to expose how violent histories inform the present
racist social scripts by delving into the individual consciousness of Bigger Thomas as he
confronts an “invisible white force.” Through the figure of Mrs. Dalton, Wright evokes the
unseen, transcendent white normativeness that controls African American lives. As Mrs. Dalton
represents a haunting legacy of cultural trauma, Wright is able to extend the implications of
Bigger’s predicament unto an African American collective psychology. The newspaper sections
in Book Two serve as the narrative element that reveals how past histories are embedded in
current discourse.
5) The “Stickiness” of the Myth of the Black Male Rapist:
The Epideictic Function of the Newspaper Sections of Native Son
The newspaper sections in Native Son serve to amplify the affective economy of hate,
which Wright draws upon to show the deleterious psychological effects and social consequences
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of a black male caught in the inescapable thicket of the myth of the black male rapist. Wright
challenges the perpetuation of this myth in the novel – he shows the damaging effects the black
male rapist myth has on black men’s individual consciousness and how this racial oppression is
wrapped up in the social practice of reiterating the script to the larger collective consciousness.
Earlier, when Jan goes to visit Bigger in jail, the Reverend tells Jan that they need to focus on
changing people’s hearts, and Jan replies, “How on earth are you going to change men’s hearts
when the newspapers are fanning hate into them every day?” (289). The problem is that those in
power – for instance, agencies like media companies that influence public perception – “stick”
particular meanings and values onto individuals, and in the context of Native Son, the news
articles stick subhuman qualities onto Bigger Thomas, an act which serves to cultivate an
“unlikeness,” a move that consequently fosters hate into the minds and hearts of its white, citizenreaders.
One of the ways social scripts become established and accepted is through what Ahmed
refers to as the “stickiness” of objects and signs.141 Ahmed’s theory of “stickiness” results from
141

To define her theory of “stickiness,” Ahmed begins by referencing William Ian Miller, who, in his book
Anatomy of Disgust, claims, “horrifying things stick, like glue, like slime” (Miller, quoted in Ahmed, p.
89). Ahmed points out that it is reasonable to assume that slimy things might be associated with “disgust,”
but the notion that glue is disgusting is questionable. She argues that “stickiness” has to do with objects
and bodies and that “perhaps stickiness becomes disgusting only when the skin surface is at stake such that
what is sticky threatens to stick to us” (90). Ahmed asserts that stickiness works like glue, and even slime,
in that these things are not inherently disgusting. She contends, “Rather than using stickiness to describe an
object’s surface, we can think of stickiness as an effect of surfacing, as an effect of the histories of contact
between bodies, objects, and signs. To relate stickiness with historicity is not to say that some things and
objects are not ‘sticky’ in the present. Rather, it is to say that stickiness is an effect. That is, stickiness
depends on histories of contact that have already impressed upon the surface of the object” (90). The way
surfaces become “sticky,” Ahmed claims, results from contact with other sticky things – “Stickiness is
about what objects do to other objects – it involves a transference of affect,” stickiness gets transferred
amongst objects (91). In similar fashion, signs become sticky through repetition.
To make her point, Ahmed references a passage by Charles Darwin in which he encounters a native of
Tierra del Fuego who touches his food, and Darwin writes that the native is disgusted by the softness of the
meat, while Darwin is disgusted that a “naked savage, though his hands did not appear dirty,” touched his
food (82). Darwin defines “disgust” as “something offensive to the taste (bad taste).” In this example,
Ahmed points out that the declaration that the native “is not dirty” associates the native body with dirtiness.
Ahmed points out that disgust is connected to an object, and that this feeling affects the body
physiologically, thus implicating the object, the emotion, and the body. In other words, disgust “is clearly
dependent upon contact: it involves a relationship of touch and proximity between the surfaces of bodies
and objects” (85). She concludes, “It is not that an object we might encounter is inherently disgusting;
rather, an object becomes disgusting through its contact with other objects that have already, as it were,
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the “effect of the histories of contact between bodies, objects, and signs.”142 In other words, the
sticky effect is that which has been generated by histories of contact that have “impressed” upon
the object. Ahmed builds upon David Hume’s concept of “impressions” in his work on emotions
to define impressions as a potential effect on an individual’s feelings – a belief, an imitation or
image, or a mark on a surface. Ahmed wants to emphasize the “press” in an impression to
illustrate the “experience of having an emotion with the very affect of one surface upon another,
an affect that leaves its mark or trace.”143 Although she clarifies that she does not want to only
associate literal stickiness with physical objects, and metaphorical with language, in order to
demonstrate her theory, she explains how surfaces become sticky by giving the example of an
object that is not inherently sticky imparting some of its stickiness onto another object that it
comes into contact with, so much so that even after the contact, a sticky surface can “pick up”
other objects. Stickiness involves “a transference of affect” whereby “what sticks ‘shows us’
where the object has travelled through, what it has gathered onto its surface, gatherings that
become a part of the object.”144
Regarding how signs become sticky, Ahmed argues that through repetition, signs
accumulate affective value. She writes, “if a word is used in a certain way, again and again, then

been designated as disgusting before the encounter has taken place” (87). Thus, Darwin’s association
between “dirt” and the “native’s body” represents Ahmed’s theory of “stickiness,” for she writes, “Through
sticking these two objects together (adherence), disgust allows the subject to recoil, as if from an object,
even given the lack of an inherent quality to the object” (88).
142
Ahmed, p. 90.
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Ahmed, p. 6. Ahmed then claims, “not only do I have an impression of others, but they also leave me
with an impression” (6).
144
Ahmed, p. 91. Ahmed states that there is no “distinction between passive and active” objects in terms of
stickiness, despite the fact that one object might be sticky before the other. Stickiness pertains to what
objects do to each other. Ahmed illustrates that objects, signification, and meaning are all implicated and
involve a “form of relationality” that creates a “withness” – she stresses, “elements that are ‘with’ get
bound together” (91). She distinguishes between “literal stickiness,” and “metaphorical stickiness” which
she notes is “a sign that gets repeated and accumulates affective value” (90), but she warns that “stickiness
involves a form of relationality”: “One can stick by a friend. One can get stuck in traffic. Some forms of
stickiness are about holding things together. Some are about blockages or stopping things moving. When a
sign or object becomes sticky it can function to ‘block’ the movement (of other things or signs) and it can
function to bind (other things or signs) together” (91).
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that ‘use’ becomes intrinsic.”145 Ahmed gives a very telling example with the word “Paki” and its
association with an ethnic insult. She observes that the word has a “binding effect” in that it
corrals others as “Paki,” and the word also functions as a “blockage,” meaning, it rejects new
meaning or value based on a historicity of the word’s association with other forms of “derision.”
Therefore, she argues that a sign is a sticky sign “as an effect of articulation,” and this repetitive
process allows the sign to accumulate value, which becomes intrinsic to the sign through past
histories of association. Therefore, because of this process, she claims that words that are not
spoken, like “immigrant, outsider, dirty, and so on,” may stick to the term “Paki.”146 Ahmed
explains that when one names something disgusting, for example, she transfers a set of effects
associated with disgusting objects onto the object named. Therefore, the speech act both names
and generates as it transfers the “stickiness” of the word disgust onto the object. 147 However,
Ahmed mentions that a speech act is always spoken to others and it depends on a “shared
witnessing” of the signification in order for “the affect to have an effect.”148 The effect is the
theoretical stickiness, or, the binding of an object and associated signifiers that progress towards a
shared witnessing and normalization. This theory very much illustrates how racist social scripts
are generated and maintained as well, for the myth of the black male rapist carries with it an
effect (i.e. the “stickiness”) of signifiers and meanings attached to the black male body.
Within the narrative, Wright weaves the case of the Robert Nixon and models the
newspaper accounts in Native Son after those depicting Nixon’s accused crime in order to expose
145

Ahmed, p. 91, italics original.
Ahmed, p. 92.
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Ahmed explains that objects can become stickier than others due to particular past histories of contact.
Ahmed references Judith Butler’s notion of “performativity” providing Butler’s definition of the
performative as “the power of discourse to produce effects through reiteration” (Butler quoted in Ahmed, p.
92). See Judith Butler, Bodies that Matter: On the Discursive Limits of “Sex.” (New York: Routledge,
1993), p. 20. Ahmed explains that this construction is “futural” – it generates effects in terms of what is
“not yet.” She writes, “But on the other hand, performativity depends upon the sedimentation of the past; it
reiterates what has already been said, and its power and authority depend upon how it recalls that which has
already been brought into existence” (92-93). What is important to note is the power of the “process of
repeating past conventions.” Ahmed discusses the naming of something produced in a speech act as
performative – “It relies on previous norms and conventions of speech, and it generates the object that it
names” (93).
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the generative effect and promulgation of the black male rapist through repetition in a 1930s
Chicago society. In Native Son, the narrative serves as a literary speech act149 – it depends on
community of readers, etc., who will either accept or reject, endorse or condemn, the sentiments
issued forth. As mentioned, in “How Bigger Was Born,” Wright cites Robert Nixon’s case as
“paralleling” Bigger’s and how he used the newspapers as source-work for his novel. Applying
Ahmed’s theories of the affective economy of fear and the stickiness of signification to Native
Son reveals Wright’s purpose for incorporating the newspaper accounts into the narrative. Wright
displays the transmissive process on the part of a white supremacist society to foster the myth of
the black male rapist as evidenced by the reports of the Robert Nixon case. Robert Nixon’s
accused crime serves as Wright’s epideictic exigence and frame of reference. However, by
exploring Bigger’s predicament in narrative form, Wright is able to delve into Bigger’s
consciousness as he interprets the hate and the fear that is circulating via the newspapers, and as a
result, Wright reveals the sticky process of the word “black” with the racist notion that “The
Negro is an animal, the Negro is bad, the Negro is mean, the Negro is ugly.”150
148

Ahmed, p. 93-94.
For more on literary speech acts, see J. H. Miller, Literature As Conduct: Speech Acts in Henry James.
(New York: Fordham University Press, 2005). Miller captures the definition of a literary speech act very
effectively:
The author's act of writing is a doing that takes the form of putting things in this way or that….
The narrators and characters in a work of fiction may utter speech acts that are a way of doing
things with words - promises, declarations, excuses, denials, acts of bearing witness, lies,
decisions publicly attested, and the like. Such speech acts make up crucial moments in the
narrator's or in the characters' conduct of life . . . . The reader, in his or her turn, in acts of reading,
criticism, or informal comment, may do things by putting a reading into words. (2)
Also, see Mary Louise Pratt, Toward a Speech Act Theory of Literary Discourse. (Bloomington: Indiana
University Press, 1977).
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This passage is taken from Franz Fanon’s Black Skin, White Masks. Introductions by Homi Bhabha and
Ziauddin Sardar. (London, Pluto Press: New Edition, 2008), p. 86. In Native Son, the narrator reflects,
“And regulating his attitude toward death was the fact that he was black, unequal, and despised [….]
Maybe they were right when they said that a black skin was bad, the covering of an apelike animal” (275).
Wright’s demonstration of the stickiness of language/signification here foreshadows Franz Fanon’s
reflection regarding a white boy’s reaction to his black body and further illustrates how “impressions” are
left on surfaces, for Fanon’s reflection carries traces of Bigger Thomas’s predicament as it registers on a
cultural identity. In Black Skin, White Masks, Fanon tells the story of an encounter he had with a white
boy. The passage continues,
“Look, a Negro!” It was an external stimulus that flicked over me as I passed by. I made a
tight smile.
“Look, a Negro!” It was true. It amused me.
149
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On a deeper level, the newspapers evince a communal witnessing not only of the horror
of the event, but of the signification of the black male individual as a “fiend” and “rapist.” For
instance, the news accounts refer to Bigger as a “Negro sex-slayer,” “the black killer,” an “ape,” a
“black slayer,” and a “brutish Negro.” News articles focusing on the Robert Nixon case referred
to Nixon as a “Brick slayer,” a “sex killer,” a “jungle beast,” “a sex fiend,” and one source
pointed out, “[Nixon] is very black – almost pure Negro.”151 As Mary Pattillo explains, only two
days after the killing of Florence Johnson, Nixon and Hicks were brought back to the crime scene
by the police to reenact the murder, and a crowd of angry residents had congregated to “hurl
racist invective.” At one point, “the crowd jeered, ‘Why don’t they lynch them!’”152 Similarly,
Bigger is brought back to Mary Dalton’s room and told to reenact the murder, and as he is
leaving, he sees a burning cross and a crowd of onlookers who yell, “You black ape!” and “Shoot

“Look, a Negro!” The circle was drawing a bit tighter. I made no secret of my amusement.
“Mama, see the Negro! I’m frightened!” Frightened! Frightened! Now they were beginning to
be afraid of me. I made up my mind to laugh myself to tears, but laughter had become impossible.
I could no longer laugh, because I already knew that there were legends, stories, history, and
above all historicity,….Then, assailed at various points, the corporeal schema crumbled, its place
taken by a racial epidermal schema. In the train it was no longer a question of being aware of my
body in the third person but in a triple person…. I was responsible at the same time for my body,
for my race, for my ancestors. (84)
Fanon later reflects,
My body was given back to me sprawled out, distorted, recolored, clad in mourning in that white
winter day. The Negro is an animal, the Negro is mean, the Negro is ugly; look, a nigger, it’s
cold, the nigger is shivering, the nigger is shivering because it is cold, the little boy is trembling
because he is afraid of the nigger, the nigger is shivering with cold, that cold that goes through
your bones, the handsome little boy is trembling because he thinks that the nigger is quivering
with rage, the little white boy throws himself into his mother’s arms: Mama, the nigger’s going to
eat me up. (86)
Ahmed reads this passage as illustrating how emotions work to establish the relationship between the
bodies in the encounter. The boy’s articulation of “I’m frightened!” declares to Fanon as the other that he
is the cause of the fear. However, Ahmed points out that fear tightens not only Fanon’s smile, but his entire
black body becomes overwhelmed with fear not as something that originates from within, but as a result of
this encounter. Furthermore, the boys’ reaction is based on “memory traces of the black man” (62).
Ahmed claims that the fear of the black body is felt as a coldness and his body shivers. She states, “While
signs of affect seem to pass between the bodies (the shivering of the Negro becomes the trembling of the
little white boy), what passes is not the same affect, and it depends on a (mis)reading the other’s feelings”
(Ahmed, 63).
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See Mary Pattillo, Black on the Block: The Politics of Race and Class in the City. (Chicago: University
of Chicago Press, 2007), pp. 41-45. Pattillo references the following articles: “Brick Moron Tells of Killing
2 Women,” Chicago Daily Tribune, May 29, 1938; “Fasten Double Murder in West on Brick Killer,”
Chicago Daily Tribune, May 31, 1938, p. 3; “Brick Slayer Is Likened to Jungle Beast,” Chicago Daily
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the bastard!” (336-337). In both instances, a community of white individuals gather to witness
the black body and proceed to reiterate the racial signifiers that the newspapers helped to
generate. Moreover, “Black” becomes the signifier/signified and will be associated with
blackness, black skin, and the black community at large, for the very first news headline reads
simply, “HUNT BLACK IN GIRL’S DEATH” (241). The headline insists that it is not one
individual that authorities are looking for, but a body, any body that identifies with blackness.
The narrative touches upon this by revealing that “police and vigilantes” searched “every Negro
home under a blanket warrant,” and that “Negro men were beaten” in several neighborhoods, and
“Several hundred Negroes resembling Bigger Thomas were rounded up from South Side ‘hot
spots’ [and] are being held for investigation” (244).
“Black” in the newspaper section of the novel becomes a signifier invested with a racial
history of violent contact between whites and blacks. The news stories include testimonials of
editors and law enforcement personnel that articulate a precedence of violent consequences for
black men who interact with white women. Wright connects the news account to the Nixon case
to put the novel’s action in conversation with a recent, racially charged event, but he further
connects it to a racial script rooted in history. As Pattillo notes, while investigating Robert
Nixon, “Chicago police contacted the sheriff in Tallulah, Louisiana, where Nixon was born and
spent his childhood. The sheriff informed them that Nixon had been a pickpocket and thief
throughout his youth and that ‘nothing but death will cure him.’”153 In Native Son, after referring
to Bigger as a “brutish Negro,” an Irish police captain “remarked with deep conviction: ‘I’m
convinced that death is the only cure for the likes of him’” (280, italics added). While Wright also
includes the exact same declaration in the novel, even more revealing of the affective stickiness is
when an editor from Bigger’s hometown invokes Southern racial history, stating, “Down here in

Tribune, June 5, 1938, p. 8; “Sanity Tests Arranged for Nixon, Hicks,” Chicago Defender, July 2, 1938, p.
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Dixie we keep Negroes firmly in their places and we make them know that if they so much as
touch a white woman, good or bad, they cannot live” (281). The editor from the Jackson Daily
Star refers to the Thomas family as “a poor darky family of shiftless and immoral variety,” and he
asserts: “Our experience in Dixie with such depraved types of Negroes has shown that only the
death penalty, inflicted in a public and dramatic manner, has any influence upon their peculiar
mentality” (280, italics added).
Crucial to the novel’s plot, this passage endorses, and reiterates, the historical executions
done in public and in dramatic fashion, and further underscores the convention of death as a
reasonable and favorable form of punishment involving black crime committed against a white
woman. The newspaper account also contrasts the “Southern Negro” with the “Northern Negro”
by claiming that blacks in the North “get more education than they are organically capable of
absorbing” (281), which was a similar charge made against Nixon.154 Alarmingly, there is no
room for error for men like Robert Nixon or Bigger Thomas, for “When Negroes become
resentful over imagined wrongs, nothing brings them to their senses so quickly as when citizens
take the law into their hands and make an example out of a trouble-making nigger” (281, italics
added). Here, “blackness” is associated with mental depravity, and the news outlets call upon,
and generate, a mental incapacity and an inferiority previously associated with black individuals.
This focus on the black male’s lack of mental faculties is an attempt to justify the forbidden
contact between black males and white females, and more importantly, to justify the violent and
deathly punishments used to uphold the separation of black males and white females. Wright,
within the narrative of the novel, references the myth of the black male rapist as it existed in a
violent and racially charged Southern history.
The newspaper accounts refer to historical scripts in terms of a violent history of lynching
and death, and generate anew by creating a moral panic regarding the black male rapist that
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evokes enough fear to maintain the social practice of executing black men accused of such
crimes. Wright exposes this racist practice by embedding a fatalistic fate for Bigger determined
by the accusation alone. The narrative illustrates the script in progress when Bigger grabs a
newspaper and reads the headline, “REPORTERS FIND DALTON GIRL’S BONES IN
FURNACE. NEGRO CHAUFFEUR DISAPPEARS. FIVE THOUSAND POLICE
SURROUND BLACK BELT. AUTHORITIES HINT SEX CRIME” (242-243). The beginning
of the article includes language of speculation, like “hint,” and “Police expressed belief that Miss
Dalton met her death at the hands of the Negro, perhaps in a sex crime” (243, italics added).
However, almost immediately, the news report abandons the speculative possibility that Bigger
solely murdered, and did not sexually assault Mary Dalton: “Indignation rose to white heat last
night as the news of the Negro’s rape and murder of the missing heiress spread throughout the
city” (243, italics added). Wright alludes to historical associations of black men and white
women as the impetus for the illogical induction that could lead to such surety.
Even more telling, the narrative pauses as Bigger rereads the line “AUTHORITIES HINT
SEX CRIME” in order to amplify the racial history associated with the rape of a white woman by
a black man. The narrative reports, “Those words excluded [Bigger] utterly from the world. To
hint that he had committed a sex crime was to pronounce the death sentence; it meant a wiping
out of his life even before he was captured; it meant death before death came, for white men who
read those words would at once kill him in their hearts” (243). Wright is touching upon the
violent history that has been attached to black male bodies and white female bodies by illustrating
the “exclusionary” power generated by the affective economy of hate and fear. The history of the
accusations of black men sexually assaulting white women is invested with hate, for the white
men who read the headline will be overcome with a hate that prompts them to kill Bigger. The
fact that the men kill Bigger in their hearts touches upon the emotionality of the situation, for the
154
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men will endow Bigger’s life with a meaning and value that only befits the death that comes
along with the social transgression. Bigger is both excluded from a fair trial at this point, and
even more detrimentally, the fate that those words signal “death before death came” references a
history where it is natural for death to follow such an accusation.
Bigger’s proleptic fate, his “death before death came,” stems from the value of contempt
and lifelessness that his black body has become invested with as a result of the history of racist
social scripts, and the history of institutionalized terrorism that punished the imagined fulfillment
of the myth of the black male rapist; but the newspaper reports not only carry that history in their
discourse, but they also continue the affective economies of hate and fear that maintain those
racist scripts and the violent outcomes that follow. For instance, an earlier newspaper story in the
novel illustrates the power of such outlets for influencing public perception. The account begins
by establishing Mr. and Mrs. Dalton’s white bodies as “powerful symbol[s] of helpless suffering”
in order to contrast the representation of Bigger’s black body that will follow. To view the white
Mr. and Mrs. Dalton as symbols of suffering creates a psychological distance in the hearts and
minds of the white readers who will then view Bigger as the cause of that suffering. The
discourse becomes representative of power relations as the newspaper tracks the search for the
perpetrator and aligns white individuals with the suffering Daltons, and black individuals with the
monstrous Bigger. The article goes into more detail in describing, and inscribing, Bigger’s black
body: “Though the Negro killer’s body does not seem compactly built, he gives the impression of
possessing abnormal physical strength. He is about five feet, nine inches tall and his skin is
exceedingly black. His lower jaw protrudes obnoxiously, reminding one of a jungle beast” (279,
italics added). Bigger’s arms are “long, hanging in a dangling fashion to his knees,” and his
“shoulders are huge, muscular, and he keeps them hunched, as if about to spring upon you at any
moment” (279-280, italics added). Bigger represents a danger to individuals he may come into
contact with, for his strength is not normal, but excessive, and in order to remain safe, he must be

“moron.”
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labeled monstrous and then consequently eradicated. The sentiment offered by the news account
provokes both fear and hate, as Bigger’s body is described as “obnoxious” and like that of a
“jungle beast,” promoting an unlikeness that garners hate. But at the same time, the story creates
fear for suggesting the surreptitious nature of Bigger’s movement. The warning elicits fear
because an individual may be unable to identity the threat and the object of fear could pass them
by, a possibility that, as Ahmed has articulated, produces even greater fear.
The former description of Bigger’s body in the newspaper inspires fear in the minds of
the reader and further attributes signs of unlikeness to Bigger’s black body. The newspaper calls
Bigger a “brutish Negro,” that is “out of place in a white man’s civilization,” and even more
dehumanizing than that, he “seems a beast utterly untouched by the softening influences of
modern civilization. In speech and manner he lacks the charm of the average, harmless, genial,
grinning, Southern darky so beloved by the American people” (280). Not only is Bigger expelled
from the white world in which he exists, but the language here also distances him from the black
community – he is distinguished from the socially approved “Southern darky.” He is not only
“unlike” the white civilized people – he is also “unlike” the others of his race that fit in with
white society. This even incites more fear, and because Bigger is an object of fear that might
“pass by” the white community, in order for the white community to contain its fear of the black
male rapist, it must identify the object that causes its fear and affix a terminable fate to that
object. This is why Bigger understands, according to historicity and the racial social scripts
called forth in this section of the novel, that the whites “were determined to make his death mean
more than a mere punishment; that they regarded him as a figment of that black world in which
they feared and were anxious to keep under control” and they would use his dead body as “a
bloody symbol of fear to wave before the eyes of the black world” (276).
The article further generates a moral panic by amplifying the belief that Bigger has
tainted blood by mentioning the possibility that Bigger has “a minor portion of white blood in his
veins, a mixture which generally makes for a criminal and intractable nature” (281). Not only is
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Bigger ostracized, but also this also further promotes separation of black and whites and inspires
fear in white people to avoid comingling with the black race. The newspaper admonishes that
“segregating all Negroes in parks, playgrounds, cafes, theatres, and street cars” is “imperative” in
order to “lessen their attacks against” white women (281). The language here accumulates values
of hate and fear that work to distance bodies and limit contact. The degree of unlikeness that
Bigger exhibits results from the affective economy of hate and fear operating amongst black and
white citizens, and the newspaper is facilitating a shared witnessing that maintains the myth of the
black male rapist.
It is only after the newspaper accounts have impressed upon Bigger’s black body
associations of “unlikeness” and contempt that Max’s epideictic argument can become powerful
in the novel. While Wright’s epideictic task is implicit at times – the newspaper accounts and the
stickiness of signs and objects work pervasively – he uses Max to explicitly blame media outlets
controlled by white racist objectives for causing the myth of the black male rapist to “stick.”
During his defense in the courtroom, Max expresses,
“How can I, I asked myself, make the picture of what has happened to this boy show
plain and powerful upon a screen of sober reason, when a thousand newspaper and
magazine artists have already drawn it in lurid ink upon a million sheets of public print?
Dare I, deeply mindful of this boy’s background and race, put his fate in the hands of a
jury (not of his peers, but of an alien and hostile race!) whose minds are already
conditioned by the press of the nation; a press which has already reached a decision as to
his guilt, and in countless editorials suggested the measure of his punishment?” (384)
Max reels the central issue of the novel into a national moral dilemma. Max indicts the public
and national print agencies for circulating the emotions of hate and fear that are associated with
the myth of the black male rapist. He wants to demonstrate the reality of Bigger’s situation “upon
a screen of sober reason” that is untainted by a preceding, national history of racial hatred, as
opposed to facing a “conditioned” collective mentality. The newspapers communicated Bigger’s
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activity in a way that incited shock and disgust over the sexual connotations associated with the
myth of the black male rapist, despite the fact that Bigger did not rape Mary. In other words, the
sexualized content took precedence in the reporting of the crime. While in the newspaper
accounts, Bigger was classified as “other,” here Max charges the white jury members as “alien”
and other to Bigger. In the same way that Bigger was deemed “hostile” and a threat inflicting
fear into the minds of the homogenous white community, Max inverts the affective economy of
fear through his epideictic discourse to suggest that the white community is hostile and opposed
to Bigger’s survival, exerting the same affective response of fear and hate in Bigger. Rather than
redirecting the onus, Max redistributes the burden of Bigger Thomas onto the fate of the nation,
procured through national and public news agencies, and prolonged by citizens who continue to
inscribe the black body with negative affective values.

6) Max as the Medium of Epideictic Discourse
Bigger’s lawyer eventually delivers a speech that fuses all of the events and actions
within the novel, and a speech that functions epideictically by seeking to assign responsibility for
the social ills that are unraveling. As a narrative speaker, he serves as the medium to deliver
Wright’s epideictic argument. Max places his speech in an epideictic context, stating that before
he “proceed[s] to cast blame,” the court must consider “the raw stuff of life, emotions and
impulses and attitudes” (387, italics added). Epideictic seeks to connect individual citizens with
communal beliefs and values, and a very effective method of epideictic is the use of emotional
discourse. Wright, through Max, creates a national moral dilemma over the debasement of
African American citizens. Max begins by historicizing the founding of the country and the
pursuit of conquest, and he concludes that in conquering, our nation “used others,” used lives as
“tools and weapons to be wielded against a hostile land and climate” (389), and in building a
“nation, mighty and feared,” Max charges that those in power have told men like Bigger Thomas,
“‘This is a white man’s country!’” (393). Max has evoked an expansive history of American
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progress, yet he does so in order to underscore the chain of effects that have contributed to the
current state of affairs regulating the interaction between whites and blacks.
The epideictic discourse in this instance works to challenge the social and psychological
separation in order to unite the fates of the black and white communities under one national
agenda. Max declares that what is at stake in the case of Bigger Thomas “touches the destiny of
an entire nation,” and that exploring the causes for Bigger’s activity will emphasize “how subtly
and yet strongly his life and fate” are “keys” to the nation’s future (382). Max asserts, “The
complex forces of society have isolated here for us a symbol, a test symbol. The prejudices of
men have stained this symbol, … The unremitting hate of men has given us a psychological
distance that will enable us to see this tiny social symbol in relation to our whole sick organism”
(382-383). Max has symbolized Bigger and the entire black population as test symbols for the
nation to evaluate its adherence to democratic principles. He points out that the manner in which
society hunted and captured Bigger, the assault, the firings out of fear, the lies, all served as
methods to “terrorize the entire Negro population,” all of which “was something unheard of in
democratic lands” (385). His discourse establishes the nation as a body, a unified body
comprised of millions of components, including white and black individuals in this context. He
has established Bigger as a case study for moral examination by incorporating Bigger as a part of
the national body, and a body that has transformed into a “whole sick organism.”
Max begins to construct his rhetoric of blame by calling into question the forces that have
created the social climate of hate – and the resulting racialized fear – that informs Bigger
Thomas’s existence. Furthermore, Max is insisting that members of society look at their own
complicity in regards to the events that have taken place by shifting the onus onto their
“prejudices.” The affective economy of hate has created a divide that infringes upon the
democratic health of the nation, for Bigger’s body is the object that is lacking health or vibrancy,
but, as Max’s argument goes, Bigger is part of the larger, national body, which is suffering a selfinflicted wound.
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As a result, he has implicated a community of citizens that is united by the nation’s
founding principles and values. He is amplifying the history of contact between whites and
blacks, a history in which the black laboring body was appropriated for the advancement of
American civilization, and what is even more damaging is the way in which that history created a
socioeconomic distance. The geographic juxtaposition of the Black Belt and the white
neighborhoods across the “line” in the novel illustrate the effect of this history. The narrative
reports that blacks had to pay twice as much as whites for housing despite the fact that they
cannot receive decent paying jobs, and Bigger reflects, “They keep us bottled up here like wild
animals,” forbidden to cross the line. Additionally, the narrative adds, “Almost all the businesses
in the Black Belt were owned by Jews, Italians, and Greeks. Most Negro businesses were funeral
parlors; white undertakers refused to bother with dead black bodies” (249). Mr. Dalton and other
white proprietors profit from this housing arrangement, contributing to the economic growth of
the city, while Bigger and other African Americans are suspended in a geographic and economic
deadlock. African American men and women, like Bigger Thomas, have not experienced
opportunities to participate in the society that they helped create. This of course captures Wright’s
sentiment in Black Boy, when he sates, “Whenever I thought of the essential bleakness of black
life in America, I knew that Negroes had never been allowed to catch the full spirit of Western
civilization, that they lived somehow in it but not of it.”155
Essentially, Max is working to amplify the affective economy of hate that has separated
white and black bodies in order to reel the predicament of Bigger Thomas, and the entire African
American community, into a larger national dilemma. Native Son’s epideictic discourse captures
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how the affective economies of hate and the social environment work on individual African
Americans, for the separate nation of African Americans is described in terms applicable to the
body – it is “held captive,” its growth “stunted,” and human rights are “stripped.” Max accuses
the affective economies of hate and fear that are circulating in the social environment, as this
connects back to Wright’s point about the social environment shaping individual consciousness.
Max is beginning to steer the blame onto those who keep the current racist social scripts and he
insists that the crime is committed by those that have shaped or influenced Bigger’s attitude
toward life. Therefore, Max argues that Bigger could only live as society dictated, and he attests,
“This Negro boy’s entire attitude toward life is a crime! The hate and fear which we have inspired
in him, woven by our civilization into the very structure of his consciousness, into his blood and
bones, into the hourly functioning of his personality, have become the justification of his
existence” (400). Yet, according with Wright’s claim that the social environment influences
consciousness, Max connects Bigger’s emotional and psychological distress to the fate of every
African American that must struggle to exist in such an oppressive social environment. He
propounds, “Multiply Bigger Thomas twelve million times, … and you have the psychology of
the Negro people…. Taken collectively, they are not simply twelve million people; in reality they
constitute a separate nation, stunted, stripped, and held captive within this nation, devoid of
political, social, economic, and property rights” (397).
The ultimate atrocity that Max is working towards is the dehumanization that African
Americans have been suffering and he accomplishes this epideictic objective by discussing
quality of life, or modes of living. The problem of Bigger Thomas is an intricate one, involving a
myriad of social abuses that has “last[ed] for three long centuries and which exists among
millions of people over thousands of square miles of territory” (391). This is culminating towards
Max’s major pronouncement:
I plead with you to see a mode of life in our midst, a mode of life stunted and distorted,
but possessing its own laws and claims, an existence of men growing out of the soil
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prepared by the collective but blind will of a hundred million people. I beg you to
recognize human life draped in a form and guise alien to ours, but springing from a soil
plowed and sown by all our hands. I ask you to recognize the laws and processes flowing
from such a condition, understand them, seek to change them. If we do none of these
then we should not pretend horror or surprise when thwarted life expresses itself in fear
and hate and crime. (388)
Here Max combines the individual and the collective, the “us” and the “them” into one communal
predicament and he implicates those who continue to “blindly” enforce and follow the racist
social practices. He illustrates how a society operating by laws and customs that benefits white
citizens, but “stunts and distorts” black citizens, directly leads to the life and fate of Bigger
Thomas – that type of social environment hinders any advancement towards quality of life for
those who are excluded from the laws and freedoms. Max attempts to disrupt the continuation of
the affective economies of hate and fear by drawing a correlation to guilt, and therefore, Max
objects to those who refuse to question or challenge a (im)moral obligation to “throttle or stamp
out” the alien form of life that has sprung from a societal irresponsibility and issues a call for
action. Bigger’s humanity was constantly denied by others, but rather than establish Bigger as a
form of life cut off from the rest of society, Max refers to Bigger as shaped and marked as “alien”
by the people and the environment that cultivated his existence. The epideictic discourse in this
passage takes away the moral high ground of those that judge Bigger inhuman when Max
suggests that the distorted expression of life stems from the fear, hate, and crime that are natural
conditions of such a social environment. Max charges the societal conditions that “have made it
plain” that society does “not recognize that [Bigger] lives” (404). The problem, Max insists, is
that if the court decides to kill Bigger, then they should have “the courage and honesty to say:
‘Let us kill them all,’” and pronounce the entire race as subhuman (405). That is the fundamental
problem that Wright is trying to address in the novel – the fact that African Americans are denied
human dignity. Max stresses, “What does matter is that he was guilty before he killed! That was
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why his whole life became so quickly and naturally organized, pointed, charged with a new
meaning when the thing occurred” (403). The affective economies of hate and fear have
obstructed the democratic principles for men like Bigger Thomas, and consequently, have snuffed
out the possibility of life.

7) Conclusion
Wright’s narrative resembles epideictic discourse because it critically reflects upon the
psychological ramifications for African Americans as a result of the day-to-day operations of a
racist American society, and Native Son’s closing arguments correlate those outcomes with a
larger national dilemma of race relations. In a literary epideictic fashion, Wright is able to reveal
what white society had previously failed to recognize: the immediate, local consequences that
racist social practices produced for Bigger Thomas, as well as the collective complicity of
American society in Mary Dalton’s murder. Placing the murder of Mary Dalton in the context of
the Robert Nixon case in 1930s Chicago, Wright both derides and subverts the moral panic of the
black male rapist by centering on the damaging psychological effects of racist myths on the
racialized black other. The murder is condemned by the bloodthirsty white members of society,
both despaired and celebrated by Bigger, and redirected to social conditioning by Max the
Communist lawyer. In the novel’s final scene, Bigger, “under the shadow of death,” wants Max
to “tell him about life,” for Bigger felt “that a knowledge of how to live was a knowledge of how
to die” (424). When Max struggles to understand and relate to Bigger, Bigger confesses: “They
wouldn’t let me live and I killed. Maybe it ain’t fair to kill, and I reckon I really didn’t want to
kill. But when I think of why all the killing was, I begin to feel what I wanted, what I am…”
Bigger finally professes, “I didn’t want to kill! ... But what I killed for, I am!…,” while “Max’s
eyes were full of terror” (428-429).
Critics have debated over the meaning of those words and the significance of Max’s
inability to understand Bigger. JanMohamed believes that for Bigger, “life and death are sutured
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to each other,” and he concludes that in the end, “what Bigger implies is that the only way in
which he can ‘live’ is to take the death that is constantly penetrating him and turn it outward onto
others, or, in short, to commit himself to suicide/murder.” 156 Like JanMohamed, W. Lawrence
Hogue also sees the murder of Mary Dalton invested with a personal teleology for Bigger, and he
claims, “The ultimate truth about Bigger, a truth from which Max recoils in horror, is that the
only outlet for his tortured emotions is murderous revolt, and Bigger wants desperately to tell the
world of his actions and his psychological freedom.”157 As I have pointed out, the narrative
reveals that Bigger never “committed” himself to murder; contrastingly, he was committed to
doing everything in his power to evade the objects containing his fear, despite the fact that the
social environment made it nearly impossible to elude systemic racialized fear. The problem with
JanMohamed and Hogue’s arguments is the fact that they both rely on an intentionality on the
part of Bigger Thomas, and they assign it retrospectively. For instance, when Bigger meets Mr.
Dalton and he becomes conscious of his black skin as a result of the white gaze, the narrative
expresses Bigger’s desire to “blot out the white man who was making him feel this way” (47).
The intentional act of “blotting something out” never occurs in the murder scene even though that
phrase appears multiple times throughout the novel.
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However, the affective economy of fear is already in place, and any purpose or agenda
attached to the murder of Mary Dalton is predicated upon the affective economy of fear in
circulation. Thus, Bigger interprets the disturbance his act has caused in reference to the affective
economy of fear, not in and of itself. Ira Wells touches upon this sentiment too and he believes
that the “terror” in Max’s eyes reveals that Max’s “interpretive paradigms have failed” and he has
misunderstood Bigger. Wells writes, “If we are duped into thinking that Bigger has killed ‘for
something,’ so have we [misunderstood]. For Bigger Thomas is not a freedom fighter; he’s not a
revolutionary warrior—and to see him as such is to posit both a political agenda and an
autonomous self that were radically absent from the moment of Mary’s murder.”158 As Paul
Siegel points out, along with a feeling of power, Wright gave Bigger a sense of “guilt” and
“emptiness.”159 What this shows is that the murder is, for obvious reasons, very complicated for
Bigger. Wells does state that Bigger responded to the “ingrained patterns of structural
oppression”; however, he refers to the murder as an “automatic response.” As I have argued, the
murder, while empowering Bigger perhaps at times, cemented Bigger in a tragic fate that was
predicated upon economies of fear and hate. Bigger’s reaction was automatic because it was
conditioned by racist scripts that were situated in a racial history of contact between black male
bodies and white female bodies. As a result, Wright utilized the murder scene to expose how the
affective economies and the historical traces of racist social scripts can shape, or “warp,” African
American individual consciousness.
The point in the narrative that really embodies Bigger’s proclamation, “What I killed for,
I am!”, is when the narrative depicts Bigger en route to see Bessie after he has killed Mary and, as
he is looking out of the car at “the white faces near him,” the narrative reports,
He wanted suddenly to stand up and shout, telling them that he had killed a rich white
girl, a girl whose family was known to all of them. Yes; if he did that a look of startled
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horror would come over their faces. But, no. He would not do that, even though the
satisfaction would be keen. He was so greatly outnumbered that he would be arrested,
tried, and executed. He wanted the keen thrill of startling them, but felt that the cost was
too great. He wished that he had the power to say what he had done without fear of being
arrested; he wished that he could be an idea in their minds; that his black face and the
image of his smothering Mary and cutting off her head and burning her could hover
before their eyes as a terrible picture of reality which they could see and feel and yet not
destroy. (129-130, italics added)
Later, Bigger wishes he “could cower Jan and Britten into awe, into fear of him and his black skin
and humble manners” (172-173, italics added). What Bigger wants, and what happens as a
consequence of his action, is to subvert the affective economy of fear that is unraveling him. As a
black man living in a white supremacist society that inflicts fear upon black men and women,
Bigger knows firsthand the longing to contain his fear in an object in order to manage, and to
avoid, that which terrorizes him. However, the racial social environment that Wright depicts
evokes a violent racial history in which there is no protection for African Americans – fear is
constantly displaced and the anticipation of future injury has no precise containment. Bigger is
cognizant of the fact that he is an instrument of fear in white citizens’ minds while he walks
among them.160
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At one point in the novel, Bigger clutches his gun for protection, and the narrative reads, “he need not be
afraid” because the gun offers him a way to eliminate any potential threat to his existence. However,
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While the murder did grant Bigger a sense of agency in the novel, it is solely based on his
influence on the affective economy of fear already in place, and critics’ attempt to assign
autonomy to his act relies on a retrospective intentionality that is heretofore embroiled in the
affective economies. However, the murder was not premeditated, and Bigger did not feel in
control, but felt that his “life had been leading to this,” like he was living a “nightmare.” Prior to
the end of the novel, Bigger would fear Mary and all the racist allegations and violent
repercussions historically inscribed on her white, female body. The fear would elicit a normal
response in Bigger to flee the object that endangered his very existence, desirably, towards a
protective space. However, Bigger had no recourse; the social environment was too big of an
adversary for him as the historicity and meaning of his black skin would move, shift, and change
signifiers, constantly terrorizing him. He had nowhere to turn, and he ended up carrying out the
murder that was ascribed to his black body. Any emotional release for Bigger would come about
from the fulfillment of the myth of the black male rapist that had been haunting him throughout
his entire life. Thus, in terms of the affective economy of fear surrounding Bigger’s existence,
the object containing his fear – the white female body of Mary – has been identified and has
contained his fear. Now that she is dead and the script has been fulfilled, there is no anticipation
of future injury for Bigger. In other words, the injury is now-in-progress – Bigger’s death has
been pronounced and he knows he is about to die. He does not have to feel like his “life will lead
to something awful” because a horrific fate is already in motion and the fact of his impending
doom has ceased his psychologically tormenting anticipation.
Wright’s ultimate epideictic accomplishment in the novel is his subversion of the
affective economy of fear as a call for a conscious effort to face the problem of race in the 1930s
American societal context. Wright indicts a social environment that oppresses individuals like

fear. Bigger is vastly outnumbered, and yet, the white mob fears coming into contact with his body. But
Wright makes it clear that the circulation of hate and fear go round and round, for this scene ends with
Bigger’s capture, his coming arraignment, trial, and death sentence.
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Bigger Thomas by denying them an equal and dignified chance at life, and he does so by
amplifying the limited life possibilities that constrain Bigger, and then by invigorating Bigger’s
act of murder with meaning, threateningly insinuating that countering the systemic oppression
may potentially be the only event that registers an African American’s existence on the white
radar of (non)recognition. The murder of Mary Dalton was the only meaningful thing in Bigger’s
life because the corollary, before it culminated in death for Bigger, was a rupture in the affective
economy of fear – Bigger affected white society; he exerted a force back on the very social
environment that formerly oppressed and acted upon him. Most importantly, reading Native Son
epideictically reveals the affective economy of fear at work in a racist society and Wright is
supplying the readerly imagination with, on the one hand, a drastic measure that resists racialized
terror (the murder and dismemberment of Mary Dalton), along with a call for American society to
recognize the race problem as a national moral concern, and, a provocation for individual citizens
to confront the racialized terror suffered by black individuals.
Wright’s task was to push for equal rights as human beings, and Ralph Ellison will pick
up on that mission as he strives to move from human rights to democratic rights – another nudge
in the direction of equality. Max presages this next step in the process with his ultimate plea.
Max requests, “Your Honor, give this boy life. And in making this concession we uphold these
two fundamental concepts of our civilization, those two basic concepts upon which we have built
the mightiest nation in history – personality and security – the conviction that the person is
inviolate and that which sustains him is equally so” (405). However, the novel depicts the
opposite. Bigger Thomas’s security is violated by a history of racist scripts that have
accumulated great fear over time. Thus, as Arnold Rampersad points out, the novel begins with a
“clanging” alarm clock calling America to “awaken from its self-induced slumber about the
reality of race relations” (ix), and the social environment that creates Bigger’s intense racialized
fear beings to unfold. But the novel also ends with the “clanging” of the cell door as Max leaves
Bigger, who smiles a “faint, wry, bitter smile” (430). The significance here is that the novel, in
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one manner, encapsulates the real racial predicament facing the nation and the readers of Native
Son – it invites the readers, as the citizens who create and uphold the social environment
represented, to draw upon their moral faculties and evaluate the democratic impasse narratively
depicted. Wright has captured the extreme on both sides – the extreme lengths that whites will go
in creating a moral panic to prolong the racist social scripts, and the extreme violent ends a black
man could potentially go in the face of an intense racialized fear. Wright strips Bigger of his
humanity only to demand human dignity, making way for Ralph Ellison who will issue a call for
the recognition of democratic rights for all African American citizens.
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“Let America be the dream the dreamers dreamed –
Let it be that great strong land of love
Where never kings connive nor tyrants scheme
That any man be crushed by one above.”
Langston Hughes
“Let America Be America Again” (1935)

“We have learned through the grim realities of life and history that hate and violence
solve nothing. They only serve to push us deeper and deeper into mire. Violence begets
violence; hate begets hate; and toughness begets a greater toughness. It is all a
descending spiral, and the end is destruction – for everybody. Along the way of life,
someone must have enough sense and morality to cut off the chain of hate by projecting
the ethics of love into the center of our lives.”
Martin Luther King, Jr.
“The Current Crisis in Race Relations” (1958)

Chapter III: “We’ll Be Dispossessed No More!”:
Invisible Man’s Epideictic and Emotive Discourse Uniting the “Uncommon People”
Introduction
During a pivotal scene in Ralph Ellison’s Invisible Man, the narrator eulogizes a fallen
member of the Brotherhood, Tod Clifton. Speaking to an unsettled crowd following Clifton’s
violent murder by a police officer, the Invisible Man declares, “His name was Clifton and he was
young . . . he was black and they shot him.” The narrator continues by attributing the fatal
incident to “an old story” recurring time and time again throughout history. He assigns Clifton a
major role in that story, as a character “full of illusions,” thinking “he was a man when he was
only Tod Clifton,” a man who believed he was “not meant to be pushed around.” Yet, the
narrator reveals, Clifton “forgot his history, he forgot the time and the place.”161 The time and
the place the narrator refers to is a postwar American society where African American individuals
did not receive equal access to democratic freedoms, which, in this instance, is the right to refuse
to be pushed around, or, to avoid being “crushed” by another as Langston Hughes’s poem
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articulates. To put this in a historically democratic perspective, in Franklin Roosevelt’s “Four
Freedoms” speech from January 6, 1941, he assigns the world “four essential human freedoms,”
namely, “freedom of speech and expression,” “freedom of every person to worship God in his
own way,” “freedom from want,” and “freedom from fear.” This had a profound impact on the
individual within American society, for Roosevelt concludes, “Freedom means the supremacy of
human rights everywhere.”162 The fourth freedom – the freedom from fear – exposes the injustice
suffered by African Americans in the midcentury. Black individuals were subject to immense
fear in regards to their safety in a racist society, and in the essay, “Richard Wright’s Blues,”
Ralph Ellison speaks to this historical and social condition, which permeates the Clifton funeral
scene: “For the Negro there is relative safety as long as the impulse toward individuality is
suppressed.”163 Any attempt by a black individual to act in a manner that clashed with the white
normativeness of postwar society could potentially threaten his physical well-being.
In this chapter, I apply an epideictic framework to Ellison’s novel, and reading Invisible
Man in this way – as exhibiting the rhetoric of praise and blame – will reveal how the novel
constructs an ethical dilemma, as well as how it resolves some of the discrepancy over Ellison’s
argument regarding the social role of the novel. Just as the two epigraphs above, which include a
poem and a nonfiction article, implicate a social defect from different mediums, epideictic
discourse allows Ellison to bridge art and protest. Throughout the novel, Ellison invokes the
idealistic vision of America that Hughes laments – a nation that is a “great strong land of love”
would indeed relinquish the power of tyrants, for “diversity is the word,” as the Invisible Man
relates in the Epilogue: “Let man keep his many parts and you’ll have no tyrant states” (577). In
centering his novel on the quest for “the condition of man’s being at home in the world, which is
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called love, and which we term democracy,”164 Ellison answers Dr. King’s call for an individual
to come along and “cut off the chain of hate” by projecting an ethics of love into the center of the
protest narrative. Thus, I argue that epideictic provides a most useful approach to reading
Invisible Man because the novel uses the theme of invisibility to reveal the social death caused by
“the internal violence of spirit” resulting from the nonrecognition of African American
individuals as a part of a collective, national identity.165 By delving into the notion of invisibility,
Invisible Man imparts the social and ethical implications related to the nonrecognition of African
American individuals in an emerging postwar American society.
In order to develop these claims, I will analyze the scenes that contain speeches following
specific occasions for the narrator, occasions that provide a sociocultural context leading into the
speeches. These narrative speech acts within the novel condemn the social conditions that are
responsible for the nonrecognition of black individuals. I will analyze the Battle Royal scene, the
Eviction speech, the Brotherhood speech, and Tod Clifton’s death and eulogy as scenes that
exhibit epideictic discourse that illustrate the narrator’s objective to cultivate a democratic
consubstantiality amongst the readers.166
1) The Value of Epideictic Discourse for Reading Invisible Man
Ellison’s acceptance speech for the National Book Award in 1953 had already provided
some insight into what he perceived to be the social function and significance of his epic novel.
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Ellison commented that his task was “to challenge the apparent forms of reality – that is, the fixed
manners and values of the few – and to struggle with it until it reveals its mad, vari-implicated
chaos, its false faces, and on until it surrenders its insight, its truth.”167 Ellison’s language is
highly indicative of epideictic discourse (“fixed manners and values,” “reveal,” “truth,” etc.), and
epideictic rhetoric helps unveil Invisible Man’s narrative and rhetorical strategy to critique
existing social orders. As discussed in the introduction, Aristotle defined epideictic rhetoric as
the rhetoric of “praise” and “blame” employed in ceremonial situations. Lawrence Rosenfield
however, perceived a flawed connotation in the terminology of praise and blame and believed
“[w]hat was involved is more accurately rendered as ‘acknowledgement’ and ‘disparagement,’
the recognition of what is (goodness, grace, intrinsic excellence) or its denial.” Ellison crafts a
novel that fuses the social context of postwar American society into a narrative that captures the
absence of democratic ideals in the lived experiences of African American individuals. In this
way, he ventures away from centering his plot on the physical violence suffered by black men
and women in a racist American society and educates the readers on the undisclosed internal
violence of spirit that leads to a social death for black individuals.
In the article, “The World and the Jug,” Ralph Ellison responded to Irving Howe’s
criticism that Invisible Man was “apparently” free from “the ideological and emotional penalties
suffered by Negroes” in the U.S. by asserting his authorial intention “to transform these elements
into art,” and to “transcend the painful conditions with which [racial oppressions] deal.” Ellison’s
attitude was predicated upon his belief that “the work of art” is a “social action in itself.”168 This
fundamental view of the novelist’s role sparked many debates over the role of literature, most
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notably between Ellison and Howe here, and Ellison, Richard Wright, and James Baldwin.169
The debate as to how Invisible Man performs its objective of social criticism is still strong.170 For
instance, Kenneth Warren challenges Ellison’s notion that the novel is a social action in So Black
and Blue: Ralph Ellison and the Occasion for Criticism, when he asks, “What might it mean to
regard Ellison not as a writer for the ages but rather as simply an extraordinary writer for the
particular era in which he lived a good portion of his life – the roughly six decades of a legally
Jim Crow American society?”171 Warren concludes, “the degree to which Ellison … remain[s]
capable of speaking for us may point less to [his] universality than to a broader social and
political failure that keeps us mired in the racial commonsense of the twentieth century,” because
“unfortunately many issues that should long ago have faded away are very much with us.”172
Warren’s focus tends to fall on how Invisible Man loses its impact due to the persistence of social
injustices and his main argument is that Invisible Man owes its success more to the fact that
contemporary society has retained the same issues plaguing Ellison in the mid-century. Warren
continues to distinguish Ellison’s project between the “political and the cultural,”173 while Ellison
169
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himself stated that he sees “no dichotomy between art and protest.”174 Warren overlooks the
social import of the theme of invisibility as it connects to a politics of recognition.
The discourse of epideictic allows for a better reading and understanding of Invisible
Man as a text of social action itself. Applying an epideictic framework elucidates why Invisible
Man retains a profound impact because of how Ellison fuses the social and cultural influences
along with the medium of literature to become a social action itself. Ellison’s novel is exemplary
because of the way it correlates the social environment, the readers, and the narrative into a moral
examination, and what I refer to as a literary epideictic process. I propose that the narrative – and
hence, the Invisible Man and the reader – enter what can be construed of as an epideictic
relationship. To explain, John Callahan has already noted that Ellison has “transformed the
written word” into a “conversational act” between the narrator and the reader.175 Michel Fabre too
has acknowledged that the narrative presupposes the existence of a reader who potentially relates
to actual readers, and Fabre explains that the narrator enters a “contract” with the narratee in the
Prologue, one which implies that the narrator and narratee share a certain knowledge together,
mostly, that they “live in the same world to which the novel refers,” and the “style of the
narrator” defines both the narrator and narratee culturally. Fabre also comments that the narrator
expects a particular “moral” activity on the part of the narratee and places a “responsibility” upon
him to grapple with the narrator’s dilemma, all of which points towards an epideictic process.176
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Robert Bataille has recognized the rhetorical nature of the “author-reader relationship,” but
concludes that the narrator is engaging in “a notion of rhetoric as a kind of catharsis.”177
Similarly, John S. Wright claims, “the central drama of his work is the unraveling imaginative
confrontation with the chimeric forms of power and of freedom,” which ultimately, Wright
determines, is “a cathartic release of anger and angst.”178
Callahan and Fabre are right to focus on the notion of a narratological “contract” between
the narrator and the reader, but they overlook the importance of the emotional component of the
narratological exchange, while Bataille and Wright misinterpret the novel’s rhetorical aim. What
is missing in these critics’ readings of the novel is a focus on the emotive discourse in the
narrative, a focus that an epideictic framework can elucidate. Applying an epideictic framework
to the narrative – and consequently, to the narrator and the narratee’s relation – will not reveal a
cathartic release, but a value-laden ethical process that incorporates the components of epideictic
discourse. The narrator, and hence, the narrative, seeks to incite an emotional response in the
audiences in order to initiate an ethical process whereby the audience considers value systems
depicted literarily as they relate to lived democratic sensibilities.
A brief example exists in the Epilogue where the narrator charges, “You won’t believe in
my invisibility and you’ll fail to see how any principle that applies to you could apply to me.
You’ll fail to see it even though death waits for both of us if you don’t” (580). The “principle”
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refers to the nation’s founding principles of American democracy alluded to in the narrator’s
grandfather’s riddle.179 The narrator issues a challenge to the reader to consider the extent to
which democratic principles apply to “invisible” men and women, initiating an ethical reflection
about American society’s reification of democratic ideals. The reader is lured in when the
Invisible Man makes the fate of the reader complicit with the fate of his own. Thus, the moral
examination that takes place is not free of emotions, nor are the emotions cleansed or purged.
Rather, the emotive discourse is designed, epideictically, for community building, and
considering the tenets of epideictic discourse, the (reading) audience must make a judgment to
confirm the literary-world-as-status-quo, or to resist the social structures that are responsible for
denying democratic values to certain individuals, and this is how the Invisible Man and the novel
seek to create change.

2) Epideictic Discourse and The Epideictic Exigency:
The Blinding of Isaac Woodard
Referring back to the Tod Clifton eulogy, the narrator alludes to a “history” that
determined Clifton’s fate – he forgot that he was not a man, but a black man living in a racist,
postwar society. One particular historical incident, the case of Isaac Woodard, makes up the
historical context that applies to Invisible Man and its theme of invisibility. A letter from Ellison
to Richard Wright – who was residing in France at the time – dated August 24, 1946, touches
upon the social context of the postwar period that illustrates the correlation of Clifton’s death and
the lived experiences of victimized African Americans: “Things here have gone to hell in a zillion
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directions. The lynchings … have broken out all over the place; about eight in a month’s time,
with a lot of liberal & C.P. excitement being made over a vet whose eyes were gouged out by
police nightsticks in [South] Carolina.”180 The World War II veteran Ellison referred to was Isaac
Woodard.
Woodard served in the Army from October 1942 to February 1946, spending time in the
Pacific and experiencing combat. He was honorably discharged from Camp Gordon, GA and
from there, Woodard took a Greyhound bus from Atlanta, GA to Winnesboro, SC, headed home
to see his wife.181 Along the way, Woodard got off the bus to use the restroom, and he got into an
altercation with a white bus driver who cursed Woodard for taking too long to use the “colored”
restroom, thereby humiliating the uniformed combat veteran who spent the last four years
fighting to ensure freedom and democracy for people around the globe. However, the social
reality determined that Woodard was “still a black man in the Jim Crow South.”182 The white bus
driver later testified that Woodard requested the bathroom break in a vulgar manner, asking if he
could “take a piss.”183 After the driver ordered Woodard to sit down and to not “talk out so loud,”
Woodard replied, “talk to me like I’m talking to you. I’m a man just like you.”184 When the bus
reached Batesburg, SC, the driver notified police of Woodard’s alleged obstinate behavior,
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accusing the vet of drunkenness and a failure to properly address white folks. Woodard denied
consuming any alcohol, but nevertheless, the police arrested Woodard for disorderly conduct. A
further altercation ensued between Woodard and the police officers, whereby Woodard attempted
to take one of the officer’s nightsticks – much like Clifton who refused to be pushed around
senselessly – and the officers “pummeled and beat Woodard until he was unconscious, crunching
out his eyes with the end of a billy.”185 The next morning, Woodard could not see, but the
officers postponed medical treatment for the injured veteran and presented him to the judge who
charged him with drunk and disorderly conduct. After the judge fined Woodard, he was taken
back to the jail where he was improperly treated for his injuries. Eventually, the police took him
to the veterans’ hospital in Columbia, SC “where he stayed from February 13 to April 13,
1946.”186
Thus, while the case of Woodard reflects the “visible” physical violence an African
American man could suffer at the time, Ellison composes a novel revolving around the invisibility
of the narrator in relation to democratic rights and freedoms, ones that postwar American society
purported but withheld from individuals like Isaac Woodard, who was a black veteran who fought
for those rights abroad and returned to what was billed as the American fountainhead of
democracy. In this way, Invisible Man is experimental because it counterbalances the visible
violent racist acts, like in the case of Isaac Woodard, with the theme of invisibility. Lucas Morel
helps put this in perspective: “The tragic irony for black Americans is that they have suffered
from both visibility and invisibility. Their ‘high visibility’ as blacks living in a predominantly
white society made them the legal and social target of racism, while their individuality remained
in-visible to a white society that judged them only by their color.”187 The novel’s subject of
184

Isaac Woodard Testimony, 1947, NAACP Papers (Reel 30, Frame 125), quoted in Myers, “The Blinding
of Isaac Woodard,” p. 65.
185
NAACP, “Southern Schrecklichkeit.” The Crisis. Vol. 53, No. 9. September 1946, p. 276.
186
Ibid., p. 276.
187
Lucas Morel, “Should America Be Blind to Race?” On Principle, August, 1998, http://www.ashbrook
.org/publicat/onprin/v6n4/morel.html. See also George Yancy, “African-American Philosophy: Through

120
invisibility is itself a call for recognition, but it is experimental because it is focusing on the
psychological consequences of a racist society on the narrator in the face of a social environment
that that permitted visible violent attacks on African Americans all too regularly.
As Ellison’s letter to Wright indicates, he was aware of the brutal and dehumanizing case
of Isaac Woodard, and this incident was symbolic of the degree of depravity that race relations in
the United States at the end of World War II had reached. Ellison began writing Invisible Man in
1945, but composed the novel over the following seven years.188 This is not to say that Invisible
Man is a novel responding to the specific attack on Woodard, or that Ellison had Woodard in
mind when crafting his masterpiece. At the same time, I am claiming that Ellison was indeed
influenced literarily by the sociocultural conditions that surrounded the Woodard incident,
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conditions that revolve around recognition. Woodard signifies the victimization caused by
random acts of violence issued to African Americans to quell any aspirations for change or
equality following the war for democracy abroad. Woodard did not have the right to speak out on
what was budding into an injustice done to him, nor did he have an opportunity to state his case
or receive the right to presume innocence. It is the social climate of postwar American society
that Ellison weaves into the narrative of Invisible Man, one that initiated the brutal attack on
Woodard, and furthermore, permitted racial attacks on a regular basis without civil protection for
the safety of African Americans.
This invests Ellison’s text with great power as it amplifies that which is not visible – the
invisibility of African American individuals in terms of democratic potentiality, what amounts to
a lack of recognition. Ellison’s novel acquires epideictic capital when read against the social
backdrop of a society that can blind a black man and then charge that victimized black man with a
crime. Pertaining to the existing state of affairs, Isaac Woodard was referenced as an exemplar
figure of the brutality against African Americans and his story was used as a prominent example
for the cause of civil rights as his incident had a profound impact on the nation and the world. To
explain, in an introduction to a special edition of Survey Graphic titled, “Color: Unfinished
Business of Democracy,” Alain Locke talks about the global war and how the objective is
revolutionary change in “hearts and minds.” He writes, “The crux of this inner conflict is whether
our vision of world democracy can clear-sightedly cross the color line, whether we can break
through the barriers of cultural racialism to reach the Four Freedoms in their universal goals.
Certainly here, both nationally and internationally, color becomes the acid test of our
fundamental honesty in putting into practice the democracy we preach.”189 Later, Locke writes,
“In the neglected and unsolved problem of the Negro in America, the Achilles of the West has a
dangerously vulnerable heel. At any time, in any critical position requiring moral authority before
189
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the world, this threatens to impair our influence as an exemplar of democracy.”190 Similarly, in
his acceptance speech for the National Book Award, “Brave Words for a Startling Occasion,”
Ellison talks about how “the Negro was the gauge of the human condition as it waxed and waned
in our democracy,” connecting to Survey Graphic’s point.191 Both Ellison and Survey Graphic
viewed the black individual as a barometer for democratic success, and with the horrific case of
Woodard, the blind World War II black vet was infused with a rhetorical urgency for social
change.
Woodard’s attack proved to be a stopping point for black leaders and others involved in
fighting for the protection of African American individuals, and Woodard even had an impact on
presidential policy. For instance, Lynda Dodd examines the role of presidential leadership in
implementing legislation, and specifically, Harry Truman’s efforts to “reform civil rights
enforcement policies.”192 After recounting the turbulent years leading up to 1946 that included
uninterrupted reports of racial lynchings, mob violence, and attacks against African American
veterans, Dodd reports that civil rights groups and the NAACP increased pressure on Truman to
address this “unchecked” social “terror” or “frightfulness.” Dodd states that Black leaders “railed
against the hypocrisy of fighting Nazi persecution abroad while ignoring racism and
discrimination at home.”193 What followed was a coalition of civil rights, veterans, religious, and
other organizations that formed the National Emergency Committee Against Mob Violence
(NECAMV). The NEC met with President Truman, and Dodd mentions that “The President’s
face ‘distorted in horror’ when [the NEC] recounted the story of Isaac Woodard.”194 Shortly after
the incident, Truman mentioned Woodard in a letter he wrote to a man he served with in World
War I, stating that when law enforcers “can take a Negro sergeant off a bus in South Carolina,
190
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beat him and put out [both] of his eyes, and nothing is done about it by State Authorities, then
something is radically wrong with the system.”195 As a result, “[o]n December 5 1946, Truman
issued Executive Order 9808 to establish the President’s Committee on Civil Rights … asserting
that such behavior ‘is subversive of our democratic system of law enforcement and public
criminal justice, and gravely threatens our form of government.’”196
The PCCR’s primary objective was to investigate law-enforcement protocols to ensure
the civil rights of the citizens and to recommend improvements where measures fell short.
However, Robert Carr, the head of the committee, was careful to advise the PCCR “not to lose
sight of its larger responsibility to educate the public about civil rights.” Carr alludes to the
challenge of inculcating a public morality through legislative means, and I argue that epideictic
and literature (the literary epideictic) provides the imaginative space for readers to contemplate
such a national, moral dilemma: “Law enforcement largely depends on the communities. You
can’t legislate morals in the people; you have to educate morals into people.”197 Even Carr
recognizes that legislative measures can only do so much to enforce, but that if there is to be a
bigger change, communities must recognize moral values. Ellison’s perspective of the American
novelist seemingly supplies this need for postwar society, and I propose that Ellison’s Invisible
Man works to educate individuals about moral obligation in democratic systems by exposing the
personal suffering caused when one refuses to see another.
Literature provides a more conducive space for Carr’s primary aim to educate morals into
people. Applying an epideictic framework to Ellison’s novel reveals narrative scenes in Invisible
Man that work to critique the social and cultural conditions that create the type of injustice
suffered by Isaac Woodard, not only in the physical sense, but in a social context as well, that
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which kills the human spirit. In “Hidden Name and Complex Fate,” Ellison points out that the
American novelist is “involved with values which turn in their own way, and not in the ways of
politics, upon the central issues affecting his nation and his time,” and that there is a
“contradiction between noble ideals and the actualities of our conduct,” and this predicament has
“generated a guilt, an unease of spirit … and the American novel at its best has always been
concerned with this basic moral predicament.”198 In other words, Ellison goes after the “hearts
and the minds” of readers by augmenting the visible, violent physical abuse African Americans
suffer with the dehumanizing internal violence of spirit. While readers may certainly not have an
immediate experience of violent attacks on black men and women, the social environment that
Isaac Woodard navigated – one in which individuals and law enforcement personnel can
violently violate African American individuals without recourse – serves as a frame of reference.
Ellison’s novel takes readers into the depths of an African American torn consciousness, which
exposes both the physical and social destructiveness of a postwar racist American society.
The blinding of Isaac Woodard matters to Invisible Man because it serves a reference to
the social climate of postwar American society and not only connects to issues of visibility – the
violent attack on Woodard’s body and the fact that his eyes were damaged – but it also connects
to Ellison’s theme of invisibility and calls for recognition. In essence, Woodard-associohistorical-context provides a historical event that integrates visibility, invisibility,
recognition, and democratic freedoms, and Ellison’s novel does the same – it correlates those
issues throughout the narrative. Because of the cultural and political significance of Woodard’s
case, readers may recall the incident due to the similar themes, and even if not, readers would
most likely understand the prevalence of such violent events occurring in postwar society.199
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Thus, the emotional discourse and the societal values that the Invisible Man appeals to when
discussing Tod Clifton – he was a man who “forgot his history, forgot the time and place” –
comprise the contextual capacity for the readers to process the social conditions leading up to
violence and nonrecognition. While there exists no direct reference or discussion of the blinding
of Isaac Woodard, the novel targets the heart and minds of readers in regards to civic virtue, and
perhaps the most correlative historical event that speaks to the novel’s themes is Woodard’s
victimization, which prompts a literary epideictic novel that challenges a social environment that
witnesses such events.
Invisible Man critiques, or indicts, a society that does not recognize all African American
individuals, and at the same time, seemingly paradoxically, Ellison’s novel issues a call for
recognition through its plea for love and through the call for the recognition of complicity
amongst readers. Axel Honneth mentions Ellison’s novel and its Prologue to question how an act
of “recognition” is understood epistemologically. Honneth begins by differentiating between the
acts of “cognizing” and “recognizing” by assigning cognizance the perception of physical
visibility of a situated body “within a spatio-temporal framework,” and “recognition” as going
beyond the “reinforcement of an individuating identity” through “the expressive (and
consequently publicly accessible) demonstration of an assessment of worth that accrues to the
[social validity] of persons.”200 Thus, recognition is a “performative act” due to the public
reception, or rejection, by way of facial expressions, body gestures, and language use to signal
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either the acknowledgment of an individual, or the rejection and public “humiliation” that is the
result of its absence.
Furthermore, Honneth situates this act in the realm of ethics, for the addressee possesses
a degree of “motivational readiness” to restrict “her egocentric perspective in order to do justice
to the worth of the other person.”201 Charles Taylor has also speculated on the sociopolitical
ramifications of recognition on identity formation. For Taylor, identity is defined as “a person’s
understanding of who they are, of their fundamental defining characteristics as a human being.”
Taylor proposes that “identity is partly shaped by recognition or its absence, often by the
misrecognition of others,” and that the acts of “nonrecognition or misrecognition can inflict harm,
can be a form of oppression, imprisoning someone in a false, distorted, and reduced mode of
being.”202 And Julia Eichelberger examines how Ralph Ellison depicts the relationship of the
individual to society and she refers to Ellison a “prophet of recognition” who “offer[s] readers a
vision of an as-yet-unrealized democracy in which individuals acknowledge or recognize the
innate worth of one another.”203 To put this in the context of a “politics grounded by recognition,”
201
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Eichelberger cites John McGowan who “believes recognition takes place already in countless
social circumstances,” and she concludes, “[Invisible Man] portray[s] American society as
‘always already’ capable of recognizing the intrinsic value of the individual.”204
However, Eichelberger is missing the point that Ellison is actually depicting the opposite
– that society is not in a state to recognize the intrinsic value of the individual. The narrator
reveals the negative impact of society’s intentional nonrecognition – it feels like “stand[ing]
naked and shivering before the millions of eyes who look through you unseeingly. That is the real
soul-sickness” (575, italics added). Eichelberger, therefore, performs a misreading of the novel
as social action, for Invisible Man acknowledges the depravity resulting from nonrecognition.
Both Eichelberger and McGowan fail to account for the complexities involved in the politics of
recognition, especially in regards to when an individual must construct an identity in relation to
others. Eichelberger, McGowan, and Honneth require too much of a willingness on the part of
the other to participate in the act of recognition; the victimizer may not be willing to, or open to,
feeling guilt, shame, or fear over his victimization of the victim.205 My position falls more in line
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with Taylor, for instance, who states that identity is dependent on dialogical relations with others,
and he acknowledges that, because of this fact, there does not exist an “always already”
capability: “Yet inwardly derived, personal, original identity doesn’t enjoy this recognition a
priori. It has to win it through exchange, and the attempt can fail. What has come about with the
modern age is not the need for recognition but the conditions in which the attempt to be
recognized can fail.”206
Invisible Man focuses on the social conditions that lead to the nonrecognition of African
American individuals and the narrative casts a blame or a responsibility onto society for the
debasement of black men and women. Yet, an epideictic framework elucidates how the novel
functions as social action because the narrative employs emotive discourse that attempts
community- and morality-building in line with the current social climate – it incorporates the
present milieu, focuses on democratic values, and discourses on responsibility, and as a result,
Invisible Man represents the literary epideictic. Ellison’s project, then, is almost forcing the
victimizer to confront this issue (much like the Invisible Man forces himself upon Mr. Norton in
the Epilogue of the novel in the subway station).207 Ellison’s method does not leave itself
vulnerable to the compliance of the victimizer but puts more control in the hands of the
victimized individual. The individual must acknowledge his own invisibility, but also, as the
narrator posits, accept “the responsibility for all of it, for the men as well as the principle, because
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we were the heirs who must use the principle because no other fitted our needs? Not for the power
or for vindication, but because we, with the given circumstance of our origin, could only thus find
transcendence?” (574). The narrator suggests the power of the individual to accept the
responsibility for all, for the principle, but most importantly, for his historicity, and by doing this,
he can perhaps transcend “the false, distorted, and reduced mode of being” resulting from
society’s nonrecognition.
To begin with, there is the curious predicament to make the novel’s overarching theme
that of invisibility. Ellison’s novel begins with the famous line, “I am an invisible man,” and sets
the experimental theme of invisibility throughout the Prologue. John Wright reads the opening
line as a “creative heuristic” spawned from the “rebuttal of the sociological truism that most
African Americans’ troubles sprang from their ‘high visibility,’” which led Ellison to explore, in
experimental form, the nature of black leadership in American society.208 However, the theme of
invisibility is not designed to comment as prominently on black leadership in American society as
it is designed to issue a call for recognition by revealing the debilitating effects of nonrecognition
on black individuals. The narrator reveals that people see “everything and anything,” but they
“refuse” to see him. The ever anonymous “I” retorts that he is “not a spook,” or one of the
“Hollywood-movie ectoplasms,” but rather, he declares that he is “a man of substance, of flesh
and bone,” who “might even be said to possess mind” (3, italics added). Here, Ellison utilizes the
double entendre of the word “spook” to not only allude to the notion that others perceive him to
be a ghost or an embodied “ectoplasm,” but also to associate the racial slur (“spook”) for African
Americans with the social and historical context.209 The first sentences imbue the narrative with
207
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the Invisible Man’s conflict between asserting his physical presence in human terms, right along
with the existence of dehumanizing social attitudes that do not grant him the possession of a mind
– a distinguishing human quality – based on the fact that he is a physical, human body. In
essence, the very beginning of the novel assigns an intentionality to members of society who
actively refuse to see the Invisible Man. Furthermore, the narrator pits what he is against what he
is not, associating this conflict with the issue of recognition. Eventually, Ellison corrals all
individuals into a national, moral dilemma revolving around recognition, and Invisible Man is an
example of the literary epideictic because the novel accomplishes this task by 1) pinpointing
societal flaws that withhold democratic principles, and 2) by fostering communal complicity to
achieve a consubstantiality among the readers.

3) Epideictic and Emotive Discourse and the Reading of Invisible Man
A major characteristic of epideictic rhetoric, but one that is not thoroughly recognized by
scholarship, is the appeal to emotions because the speaker is trying to establish a connection with
an audience founded on particular values. Social cohesion is accomplished when an audience
feels connected by common values. The process therefore is affective. In order to demonstrate
how epideictic discourse applies to Invisible Man, I borrow from William Reddy’s work in The
Navigation of Feeling: A Framework for the History of Emotions. In discussing cultural
anthropology, Reddy explains that emotions are representative of collective performances of
communal expectations, or, the expression of emotional states as part of learned behavior and
social construction, which indicate how emotional management and political power are
intertwined. Reddy offers the following definition of “emotion”: “An emotion is a range of
loosely connected thought material, formulated in varying codes, that has goal-relevant valence

discussion on the social attitudes and current usage of ethnic slurs. The Prologue establishes the racial
dynamic of invisibility over the course of the following pages, with remarks implicating a “tall blond
man…[with] blue eyes” in an altercation; of how he resided in the “jungle of Harlem … in a building
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and intensity, that may constitute a ‘schema.’”210 Emotion can then be broken down into various
components in Reddy’s theory.
First, there is “emotional management,” which refers to the “instrumental use of the selfaltering effects of emotives in the service of a goal,” and “emotional navigation,” which contains
the “possibility of radically changing course, as well as that of making constant corrections in
order to stay on a chosen course.”211 Lastly, Reddy’s concept of “emotional suffering” and
“emotional effort” will come into play within the narrative of Invisible Man. Since Reddy defines
emotion as involving goal related intentions, “emotional suffering” is “an acute form of goal
conflict,” in which actuality conflicts with the intended emotional goal. “Emotional effort”
involves “maintaining a goal or action plan in spite of rising suffering due to goal conflict.”212
Thus, emotions are geared toward a type of desired outcome on the part of the individual.
However, as a member of a part of a larger community, an individual’s emotional navigation is
impacted by the social structures in place as well as by relations with others.
For instance, in postwar American society, some African American individuals are
expected to suppress emotions of displeasure in regards to their social status in a white-privileged
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society.213 Such a condition exists in what Reddy terms the “emotional regime” located within
“political regimes.” Reddy reveals, “Any enduring political regime must establish as an essential
element a normative order for emotions, an ‘emotional regime.’ Such emotional regimes can be
placed, in a preliminary way, on a spectrum.” Reddy explains that at one end of the spectrum are
“strict regimes which require individuals to express normative emotions and avoid deviant
emotions,” with the goal of the regime to establish “habituation.” Additionally, those who
“refuse” are met with “severe penalties,” like “violence, deprivation, confinement, [or] exile.”214
The opposite end of the spectrum has “loose regimes [which] allow for navigation and allow
diverse sets of management tools to be fashioned locally, individually, or through a robust
subgroup formation.”215 The political regimes in place establish a standard of emotional responses
to incidents occurring in society.
In a postwar context, a “strict regime” punishes African Americans for expressing
deviant emotions, as seen by the excessive cases of lynchings and mob violence, and in the case
of Isaac Woodard. However, individuals in the midcentury began to speak out against such
injustices, and their expressions of nonconformity are expressed in what Reddy refers to as
“emotive discourse.” Reddy defines “emotives” as speech acts that pertain to “exterior referents”
that are “not passive in the formation of the emotive…. emotives are influenced directly by, and
alter, what they ‘refer’ to. Thus, emotives are similar to performatives (and differ from
213

A prime example of this is Richard Wright’s autobiography, especially the scene in chapter twelve in
which Wright and one of his peers, Shorty, discuss proper elevator etiquette for a black elevator operator.
See Richard Wright, Black Boy. Introduction by Edward P. Jones. (New York: Harper Perennial Modern
Classics), 2005.
214
Reddy, p. 125.
215
Ibid., p. 126. America, then, must fall somewhere in between according to postwar social conditions.
For instance, postwar American society proclaimed open society, but the lived experiences of particular
individuals, here African Americans, did not reflect an adherence to such democratic principles. Therefore,
there were modes of habituation and a regime, a hidden regime, but an oppressive one nonetheless, that
impeded the actualization of democratic freedoms. Reddy explains, “Capitalist democracies, for example,
appear to offer great scope for navigation, but, in practice, capacities and options are limited by contractual
relationships (that is, by access to money and property). . . . Such societies thus belong more to the middle
of the spectrum and produce all sorts of configurations: conforming majorities, marginalized minorities,
varying management strategies within the majority, organized cults and mafias” (127-128).

133
constatives) in that emotives do things to the world.”216 The relationship between “external
referents” and emotives that Reddy alludes to will be imperative for my development and analysis
of epideictic discourse in Invisible Man.
One manner in which I depart from Reddy’s scheme is in where I locate the emotive
discourse. Reddy turns to speech acts, but since I am dealing with a literary text, I define a
literary speech act not only as dialogue within the narrative, but also as constituting interior
monological snippets of the narrator’s consciousness. Many times, the Invisible Man reflects on
events and situations that reveal the emotive discourse he uses to translate the world around him
and communicate to the reader. In Ellison’s narrative, I define the epideictic discourse as
language that serves either as a call for, or a critique of, the social conditions of recognition. In
order to accomplish the epideictic objective, Ellison incorporates emotive discourse that 1)
illustrates the negative effects of nonrecognition on African Americans, and 2) is designed to
create an affective response in the reader to (re)evaluate the individual’s role in a democratic
society. Therefore, the emotive discourse is epideictic because it reveals the negative effects
resulting from the failure of postwar American society to reify the democratic ideals for all
individuals and in doing so, the novel catalyzes an ethical process regarding the status of
recognition for African American individuals within a larger, national identity. Furthermore,
within the narrative, the exterior referents include the action that the narrator encounters – for
example, the ritualistic and violent Battle Royal he must participate in before he gives his speech
provides an external referent for the narrator to navigate emotionally prior to the speech he gives,
which itself contains emotive discourse. Yet, both the Battle Royal and the speech contribute to
216
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the epideictic exigency in the novel – the sociocultural context of postwar American society that
prompted the text and the theme of invisibility and recognition.
The opening scene of the novel following the Prologue, “The Battle Royal,” begins to
demonstrate the epideictic discourse, for in this scene, the narrator introduces emotive discourse
that a) describes the physical and psychological torment the young black boys suffer, b)
establishes a communal bond on the part of the black boys, and a separate community of high
profile whites, and c) discloses the tension between the lack of recognition of African American
individuals and the call for recognition that rings of the upcoming Civil Rights movement. In
terms of the epideictic, the emotive discourse depicting the scene sets up the social regime of a
racist postwar American society, a society that has instituted events like the Battle Royal as
normative activities for a white audience. Initially, the Invisible Man believes the evening
presents an outstanding opportunity to impress very important white men following the success of
his high school graduation speech. However, the evening quickly turns to a grotesque
masquerade of racially oppressive entertainment for the white men in attendance.
The narrator relates, “We were rushed up to the front of the ballroom . . . Then we were
pushed into place. I almost wet my pants. A sea of faces, some hostile, some amused, ringed
around us, and in the center, facing us stood a magnificent blonde – stark naked” (18-19). The
first, and perhaps most important, point to emphasize in this scene involving the white woman is
the emotive discourse that bridges the internal suffering of the narrator and the black boys to a
social and historic context. Arnold Rampersad writes that the Battle Royal scene carries
“overtones of the classic slave narrative … introducing elements of myth and ritual,” such as the
“parading of the naked blond woman before young black men” (217); the fighting between black
men to amuse whites; and the Speech delivered to an audience of whites for their mockery.217
Barbara Foley puts the scene in a more specific context, proposing that the threat of violence that
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whites make towards blacks regarding sexual repression is a “function of conditioning.” She
writes, “the battle royal ritually enacts the psychological castration signaling the young men’s
initiation into manhood according to the ethics of living Jim Crow.”218
The narrator’s goal is to survive the Battle Royal as unscathed as possible in order to give
his speech. However, this scene portrays how the narrator must manage and navigate his
emotional suffering brought on by the racist regime. Emotionally, the narrator reports the fears
resulting from the threats that some of the men issue to the boys if they watch the naked woman,
while other white men threatened the boys if they do not. One boy “fainted,” while another could
not hide his erection and “plead[ed] to go home,” and others were “crying in hysteria” (19-21).
The Invisible Man navigates his internal consciousness, a psychological tour that extends to the
collective group of black youths – “Some of the boys stood with lowered heads, trembling. I felt
a wave of irrational guilt and fear. My teeth chattered, my skin turned to goose flesh, my knees
knocked” (19).
The fear that the Invisible Man and the other boys experience is magnified by the fact
that they have no choice but to participate in this horrific event. The protagonist finds himself in
a situation he has no control over, for the social norm of the battle royal determines what he must
do next – fight Tatlock until one of them is left standing. The narrator continues to describe the
scene leading to the finale between the Invisible Man and Tatlock, who presented a look of “hate
[for him] aglow with a feverish terror from what had happened to us all” (24). Lucas Morel
argues that the novel is about freedom, but that Ellison depicts freedom not as “the untrammeled
exercise of human will,” but how through the “lack of control, choice, or responsibility,” black
characters can still exercise freedom. Morel uses the Battle Royal scene as a case in point –
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namely, that Ellison portrays the narrator’s mind at work, “free and active” in how he loosens the
blindfold placed on him and thinks about his speech during the melee.219
Yet, when the narrator tries to negotiate with Tatlock, offering him five, and then seven
dollars of prize money if he acts like the Invisible Man knocked him out, his freedom is repressed
by the unwillingness of Tatlock. Tatlock is out for himself, and when the Invisible Man hears a
voice put money on Tatlock, he is once again confused by the emotional regime – “Hearing this, I
almost dropped my guard. I was confused: Should I try to win against the voice out there?” (25).
Morel’s evaluation of freedom in the scene is not strong, especially considering the activity that
follows the boxing spectacle where the boys are led to an electrified carpet where they are
encouraged to pick up as much money as they can while they are electrocuted, all to the laughter
of the white men in the audience. Summing up the entire evening up to that point, the narrator
explains, “It seemed a whole century would pass before I would roll free, a century in which I
seared through the deepest levels of my body to the fearful breath within me and the breath seared
and heated to the point of explosion” (28). The narrative reveals the emotional suffering and
dehumanization of the black boys that exposes not only the permissiveness of the white men in
attendance, but their sadistic enjoyment of such treatment.
What is most important in situating the epideictic discourse within the Battle Royal
chapter, but is a rather subtle detail of the scene, is the community that the narrative constructs:
the scene involves numerous black youths along with very important men in the community –
“bankers, lawyers, judges, doctors, fire chiefs, teachers, merchants” (18). These men play an
integral part in establishing social structures and maintaining social order. In essence, before they
allow a future leader of the African American community to address them, a boy who will “some
day … lead his people in the proper paths” (32), they impose a socially demeaning and
undignified event that robs the Invisible Man of the freedom of speech – he must pay a violent
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and humiliating price to speak on the behalf of his people, an occasion that is further void of
significance when the men mock the narrator. Ellison is able to expose the dehumanization of the
social, white normativeness of the midcentury, and further reveal the internal emotional suffering
of the young black boys due to their mistreatment. Through emotive discourse, the narrative
confronts the reader with an ethical dilemma – she must choose to either remain stolid, or to
abhor the social conditions that permit such activities and inflict such emotional pain on the
sufferers.
Of course, this all leads up to the speech the narrator gives to the men. The narrator’s
speech at the smoker is merely an afterthought, for the M.C. declares that they “almost forgot” an
integral part of the evening. The Invisible Man begins by invoking the words of Booker T.
Washington. Here, the narrative calls upon Washingtonian ideals, namely, “social responsibility”
and, as John Wright states, the “cooperation with the ruling whites.”220 Robert O’Meally further
explains that Washington “felt that blacks had to sacrifice social and political advancement – as
well as superfluous academic exercising – and concentrate on the industrial arts.”221 What is
interesting to note about this speech epideictically is the Invisible Man’s objective for the speech.
Resembling epideictic’s concern with values, the narrator calls attention to the values
established by Washington, but he admits that he “spoke automatically.” This brief
acknowledgment amplifies the climactic moment of the speech coming up where the narrator is
asked to repeat “social responsibility” over the laughter and disrespectful hum of the crowd, and
instead, he blurts out “social equality” (30, italics added). The fact that the speech begins by
alluding to Washingtonian ideals automatically in terms of race relations in American society and
ends on this note invests the speech with epideictic currency. It jars the narration by interrupting
the narrator’s speech and presents a conflict between African American subservience to the
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societal standard of “cultivating friendly relations” with white individuals based on a social
responsibility, with that of an idealistic call for society to grant a status of equality for African
Americans.
At this point in the novel, the narrator is still naïve and only beginning to develop and
cultivate his skills, but epideictically, whether or not the narrator classifies this as a “mistake” is
irrelevant – narratively the scene is amplified to introduce the ethical dilemma of social
responsibility versus social equality. The ultimate ideal the novel strives for is democratic
equality for all individuals, and the narrator expends an emotional effort in the speech when he
points out that his mouth had filled up with blood from the fighting and “almost strangled” him.
However, “wanting to stop” and relieve himself, he notices that the men were listening to him, so
he “gulped” the blood down, and continued on: “What powers of endurance I had during those
days! What enthusiasm! What a belief in the rightness of things!” (30). The protagonist persists
through his emotional and physical suffering to make his first attempt at changing the social
conditions that oppress black individuals.
The Invisible Man’s oratory prowess evolves in the eviction scene, which plays another
important role in establishing the appeal to, and further push for, communal values and
contributes to the epideictic framework. John Wright articulates, “The speech marks his
translation from a phase of egocentric leadership ‘for’ society to a phase of self-effacing
leadership ‘against’ the social order. And his extemporaneous rhetorical pyrotechnics signal his
regenerated political will to freedom and his new mastery of oratorical ‘technique.’”222 Julia
Eichelberger views the scene as incorporating multiple voices: “the voice of official authority and
the voices of people like the Provos.”223 However, Wright and Eichelberger downplay the role of
community in the scene that overrides the element of leadership and provides a goal for
222
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incorporating multiple voices. The eviction speech shows the development of the narrator as an
orator, but more importantly, it expands the epideictic reach of the narrative.
In the Harlem eviction scene, the Invisible Man condemns the social conditions that lead
to eviction, dispossession, and shame on particular African Americans who may have suffered
that fate in the midcentury. He constructs and strengthens the sense of community through
emotive discourse that conjures thoughts of familial relations and associations with the Provos
and the shame that results from being forcefully evicted from their home and having nothing to
show for all their “day labor.” He concludes, “When you look at all you haven’t got in eightyseven years you feel ashamed, . . . these folks had a dream book, but the pages went blank” (279280, italics added). This is where emotions and values become crucial. To explain, a look at the
exchange following the speech on the Harlem curbside between the Invisible Man and Brother
Jack alludes to the epideictic discourse found within the speech. Brother Jack calls the oration an
“effective piece of eloquence,” that, “with a few words…[the protagonist] had [the spectators]
involved in action.” And while Brother Jack is thankful for the “most instructive experience,” he
still cannot comprehend how the Invisible Man managed to arouse the citizens so quickly to
action (289). However, Brother Jack does acknowledge that the narrator was extremely moved
emotionally, but advises the Invisible Man not to “waste your emotions on individuals, they don’t
count,” despite the fact that the narrator feels connected to the people in some manner. Brother
Jack rejects individuality, objecting that certain individuals are “incapable of rising to the
necessity of the historical situation” (291). This is where Brother Jack errs; he fails to understand
the nature of epideictic discourse in conjoining individual action within a larger collective agenda
based on values.
In the beginning of the scene, the crowd is not unified. The emotional discourse and the
societal values that the Invisible Man appeals to comprise the contextual capacity for readers to
connect the scene to historical accounts of dispossession. Gerard Hauser, for instance, discusses
epideictic rhetoric in relation to the teaching of public morality. Hauser writes, “Understanding
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the implications of actions for oneself and the community is of little value without a
corresponding capacity to make this understanding known through words and deeds sufficiently
powerful to gain assent.” Hauser attributes the need for a “communal ethos” in order for
individuals to grasp the nature of ideals or of social ills. He points out, “epideictic offers
instruction on recognizing virtue and thereby on retaining persuasion as an alternative to authority
or force in the public domain.”224 The function of the narrator’s speech is the same – i.e. a
teaching function on public morality – although he goes about this process in a slightly different
manner. In other words, Hauser is discussing how the epideictic rhetor utilizes praise and
encomium to instruct civic virtue. The Invisible Man uses reprobation, but still arrives at a
similar end.
The narrator recounts how he encountered a silent and “sullen-faced crowd” observing
white men escorting an old couple and their belongings out of a building and onto the street.
Here is where Ellison incorporates the epideictic exigency of historicity into the narrative, for the
narrator describes, “I realized that what I’d taken for junk was actually worn household
furnishings” (268). This seemingly unimportant observation by the narrator serves as a
commonplace for postwar American readers regarding the Harlem housing situation, especially in
regards to certain African Americans’ experience with eviction leading up to the midcentury.
John Callahan has pointed out Ellison’s tendency to play on associations and enhance the
significance of particular sociohistorical issues. He mentions the eviction scene and how Ellison
does not mention the Great Depression in the narrative. He writes, “Needless to say, it was for
some purpose Ellison resisted the pull to get some explicit mileage from the thirties. He seems
unwilling to restrict the Provos’ dispossessed condition to one point in time, perhaps because of
224
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the danger that, if he did so, what has been archetypal in black experience might be laid simply at
the door of hard times.”225
Claudia Durst Johnson adds that following the Great Depression, Harlem was witnessing
somewhere in the neighborhood of “10 to 20 evictions a day.”226 Additionally, George Brown
notes, “It is not a rare sight to see an evicted family’s belongings callously dumped on the
sidewalks somewhere in Harlem.”227 More importantly, Mark Naison explains the tactic of
“eviction resistance” during instances where individuals were forcefully removed from their
homes, enacted by Communist-led activist groups in the 1930s, whereby “organizers would move
the furniture from the street back into the apartment.” He writes, “some of them led to
confrontations with police in which hundreds of people participated, but most of them led to some
peaceful resolution, and that by World War II, tenant organizations had become a major force
combatting the increasing housing crisis in Harlem.”228
The eviction scene in Invisible Man corresponds very closely to this sociocultural history
of Harlem, for the narrator can be viewed as an epideictic rhetor who rallies a communal ethos for
a peaceful resolution, or “law abiding” approach to the situation as he calls it, by carrying the
furniture back into the apartment. When he further approaches the curbside scene, someone in
the crowd suggests, “we ought to stop ’em,” and questions the will power of the group. Another
man disagrees, expressing, “All they need is someone to set it off” (268). At this point, the
narrator begins to describe his emotional navigation:
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Something had been working fiercely inside me, and for a moment I had forgotten the
rest of the crowd. Now I recognized a self-consciousness about them, as though they, we,
were ashamed to witness the eviction, as though we were all unwilling intruders upon
some shameful event; and thus we were careful not to touch or stare too hard at the
effects that lined the curb; for we were witnesses of what we did not wish to see, though
curious, fascinated, despite our shame, and through it all the old female, mind-plunging
crying. (270)
The sense of community is building for the narrator as he incites the crowd to resist the
individuals evicting the Provos, and more importantly, for the readers, the scene attacks the
process of dispossession. Part of that motivation lies in the emotive discourse of “shame” in this
passage that the narrator not only feels individually, but shares with the group gathering on the
street. The Provos’s belongings contribute to the sense of community because the objects have an
increasingly greater effect on the Invisible Man and the crowd who are initially “unwilling
intruders” on this event. The portrait of the old couple, the “knocking bones,” a straightening
comb, an Ethiopian flag, a rabbit foot, a breast pump, and Primus Provos’s free papers, among
other things, had a profound impact on the narrator. These objects illustrate long lives lived, but
the objects are strewn on the street, having the symbolic representation of discarding their history
as well. In an intimate reflection, the narrator expresses,
And it was as though I myself was being dispossessed of some painful yet precious thing
which I could not bear to lose; something confounding, like a rotted tooth that one would
rather suffer indefinitely than endure the short, violent eruption of pain that would mark
its removal. And with this sense of dispossession came a pang of vague recognition: this
junk . . . all throbbed within me with more meaning than there should have been: And
why did I, standing in the crowd, see like a vision my mother hanging wash on a cold
windy day . . . why were they causing me discomfort so far beyond their intrinsic meaning
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as objects? And why did I see them now, as behind a veil that threatened to lift, stirred by
the cold wind in the narrow street? (273, italics original)
The Invisible Man begins to feel like he is being dispossessed too, not of his material belongings,
but of his history. He states that he feels like he is “being drawn to the old couple by a warm,
dark, rising whirlpool of emotion which [he] feared” (270). The objects are commonplace objects
that spark associations within the narrator, and one can assume, in the other spectators as well,
because they are artifacts of quotidian life, representative of lives accumulated over the years, and
they invoke familial relations. While the narrative only affords insight into the Invisible Man’s
consciousness, his speech extends the emotive discourse to the collective group and creates a
sense of a bonded community and hence, functions epideictically.
To achieve this goal, the Invisible Man infuses the speech with familial associations,
which really strengthen a common investment on the part of the gatherers in the Provos’s
eviction, for the crowd on the street becomes a united group with a common concern and cause.
For instance, the narrator engages Primus Provo in a conversation about his age and work, and he
reveals the larger social issue lingering within the scene. He exclaims, “Eighty-seven years, and
poof! like a snort in a wind storm. Look at them, they look like my mama and my papa and my
grandma and grandpa, and I look like you and you look like me. Look at them but remember that
we’re a wise, law-abiding group of people…. What’s happened to them? They’re our people,
your people and mine, your parents and mine” (278, italics added). He drives his speech and his
goal home by trying to convince the men to let them back in the house to pray – a nonviolent
solution to the issue that remains within the law, but also challenges the marshals’ authority:
“They’re facing a gun and we’re facing it with them. They don’t want the world, but only Jesus.
They only want Jesus, just fifteen minutes of Jesus on the rug-bare floor . . . How about it, Mr.
Law? Do we get our fifteen minutes worth of Jesus? You got the world, can we have our Jesus?”
(279). When he asks, “Where do we go from here?,” the crowd is roused to action and they storm
the marshals and enter the premises. The narrator tells the crowd to take furniture back into the

144
apartment and relates it back to the law-abiding principle: “It’s blocking the street and the
sidewalk, and that’s against the law…. Put it out of sight! Hide it, hide their shame! Hide our
shame!” (281). The Invisible Man creates a communal ethos by concentrating on the Provos with
familial discourse, which translates to the community of individuals taking up the Provos’s
eviction as implicating the entire community of gatherers. By playing on the emotive discourse
and depicting the scene similarly to the historic context of postwar, Harlem evictions, Ellison
constructs a narrative that critiques the historical process of dispossession, and the epideictic
framework illustrates how the text connects to social action.
The larger social issue looming over the eviction scene, that of nonrecognition, is
expounded in the narrator’s first Brotherhood speech in the arena. The whole scene reverberates
with issues of recognition. Anticipating the results of this “new phase” that has distinguished him
from his innocent beginnings of the Battle Royal and college, he reflects, “Few people knew me
now, but after tonight . . . How was it? Perhaps simply to be known, to be looked upon by so
many people, to be the focal point of so many concentrating eyes, perhaps this was enough to
make one different; enough to transform one into something else, someone else” (336).
Narratively, the narrator is expressing a rather simplistic desire for recognition – simply the act of
being looked upon by so many people pleases him. However, epideictically, this is another
transition point for the Invisible Man’s social project – he will begin to develop a more complex
objective of recognition in this scene.
The Brotherhood speech utilizes the emotive discourse of anger and resentment that
enhances the communal bond amongst the audience. It can be viewed as an epideictic call for the
recognition of what makes the individuals gathered different and unified at the same time – the
fact that they are “uncommon” people. Morris Dickstein views the scene as indicating a selftransformation: “the narrator is shedding his old skin, exercising his power over language and
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people.”229 But that is only half the significance. He is transforming as an individual, but he also
transforms the relation of the individual to the collective in an epideictic manner. The protagonist
uses indignant language to touch upon the injustice being done to African Americans and others
in the community. This contributes to strengthening a communal bond, but does so in an intricate
way. On the one hand, the Invisible Man discloses the lack of recognition black individuals
suffer, but he also plays on a recognition of what makes all of the individuals congregating in the
arena different, or uncommon. His objective is seemingly paradoxical – he is attempting to target
what makes them different, but in doing so, he is gathering a group of uncommon individuals.
I am arguing that the speech reflects epideictic discourse due to its focus on establishing a
communal interest and a stake in the social issue of “dispossession” through emotive discourse.
For instance, the narrator reveals that he was incorporating “The old down-to-earth, I’m-sick-andtired-of-the-way-they’ve-been-treating-us approach” and cries out, “They call us the ‘common
people.’ But I’ve been sitting here listening and looking and trying to understand what’s so
common about us. I think they’re guilty of a gross mis-statement of fact – we are the uncommon
people” (342). He proclaims that the oppressive society, “they,” treat and call the uncommon
people “dumb” and never give them a break. He asks, “And what do they do with the dumb
ones? […] It’s dispossess him! Evict him! Use his empty head for a spittoon and his back for a
doormat! It’s break him! Deprive him of his wages! It’s use his protest as a sounding brass to
frighten him into silence, it’s beat his ideas and his hopes and homely aspirations into a tinkling
cymbal!” (342). He uses exclamatory language in describing how society has failed to recognize
individuals as worthy of dignity by pointing out how those “above” use the uncommon folk as
“doormats” and how they break them down and take away their ways of life essentially.
Christopher Hanlon interprets the speech as a “spiritual and musical, drawing upon a tradition of
call-and-response oration,” and Herbert Rice notices the “emotionalism” of the speech, but
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ultimately, Rice lumps the Invisible Man and Ras the Exhorter into the same rhetorical category –
“They live by manipulating audiences with the oldest snake oil in the business: rhetoric.”230
However, the narrator does not “manipulate” the audience in this speech; he intends to plot
common ground. The Invisible Man amplifies an individual reaction to dispossession with
incensed language in order to establish a commonplace for the audience to psychologically latch
onto. It is an epideictic endeavor to not only build a community, but to enhance communal
support to another level that can foster change.
The Invisible Man targets the communal readiness for action by navigating the crowd’s
emotions from victimization towards the context of a social responsibility, to use his earlier
phrase in the novel. For example, in discussing the dispossession of uncommon people, he
speculates, “And do you know what makes us so uncommon? … We let them do it!” (343). He
continues,
“Dispossession! Dis-possession is the word! …They’ve tried to dispossess us of our
manhood and womanhood! Of our childhood and adolescence you heard the sister’s
statistics on our infant-mortality rate…. Why, they even tried to dispossess us of our
dislike of being dispossessed! And I’ll tell you something else—if we don’t resist, pretty
soon they’ll succeed! These are the days of dispossession, the season of homelessness,
the time of evictions. We’ll be dispossessed of the very brains in our heads! And we’re
so un-common that we can’t even see it! Perhaps we’re too polite. Perhaps we don’t care
to look at unpleasantness. They think we’re blind—un-commonly blind. And I don’t
wonder. Think about it, they’ve dispossessed us each of one eye from the day we’re born.
So now we can only see in straight white lines.” (343, italics added)
Here the narrator weaves victimization with agency. If, on the one hand, the crowd decides not to
resist, they will suffer the dispossession of manhood, womanhood, and childhood, whereby the
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protagonist makes this not only a communal issue, but also a generational one. Furthermore, he
amplifies the idea of “dumbness” on the part of the crowd, or at the very least, simplicity. He
castigates the group’s ignorance towards “unpleasantness,” their unrefined manner and politeness,
and their lack of awareness as reasons for dispossession.
Yet, perhaps the biggest impact epideictically is the call for recognition that the narrator
makes to a group of “uncommon” people. Take for example Charles Taylor’s discussion of a
politics of difference in his essay, “The Politics of Recognition.” He states, “with the politics of
difference, what we are asked to recognize is the unique identity of this individual or group, their
distinctness from everyone else. The idea is that it is precisely this distinctness that has been
ignored, glossed over, assimilated to a dominant or majority identity,” and that such a politics of
difference is “full of denunciations of discrimination and refusals of second-class citizenship.”231
The Invisible Man employs this politics of difference in order to, paradoxically, gather the crowd
under a united front that recognizes its “second-class citizenship,” and therefore, he aspires to
incite the crowd into demanding recognition. He declares, “But I believe one eye is enough to
lose without resistance and I think that’s your belief. So let’s get together. Did you ever notice,
my dumb one-eyed brothers, how two totally blind men can get together and help one another
along? They stumble, they bump into things, but they avoid dangers too; they get along. Let’s get
together, uncommon people. With both our eyes we may see what makes us so uncommon, we’ll
see who make us so uncommon!” (343-344).
The narrator begins to employ a discourse of blame by acknowledging the presence of a
“who” that makes the people uncommon, in addition to the “what” that makes them uncommon.
He calls for a confrontation between the uncommon people, and those who refuse to see them or
recognize them. Again, paradoxically, the uncommon people are also blinded, with only one eye
as the Invisible Man refers to them as “a nation of one-eyed mice” who “can only see in straight
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white lines.” Most importantly, though, the unification of uncommon people takes place
oratorically. The narrator calls for the individuals to come together and help one another
“stumble” around and “get along.” He spurs the crowd into believing in a common fate, and he
insinuates that if they band together and take action, they can potentially break the cycle of
nonrecognition.
The narrator works toward the climactic moment of the speech that brings the epideictic
task together. The Invisible Man touches upon community, emotive discourse, and recognition
by using what Hanlon has observed is a “call-and-response” technique common in jazz and
spirituals;232 however, the narrator’s purpose is tied to social action as he employs this strategy to
emphasize the notion of recognition, for the call-and-response style of the speech scene helps the
Invisible Man engage in a process of recognition in which the crowd recognizes him. For
instance, he responds, “I must confess…. We share a common disinheritance…. Something
strange and miraculous and transforming is taking place in me right now . . . as I stand here
before you!” (345, italics in original). Temporally, the narrator is amplifying the moment to
include a very dramatic and significant point for the audience. He calls attention to himself as he
builds a notion of suspense and attention. He continues,
“Let me describe it. It is something odd. It’s something that I’m sure I’d never experience
anywhere else in the world. I feel your eyes upon me. I hear the pulse of your breathing.
And now, at this moment, with your black-and-white eyes upon me, I feel…I feel….
suddenly that I have become more human…. I feel able to get things done . . . I feel the
urge to affirm my feelings … I feel that there, after a long and desperate and
uncommonly blind journey, I have come home … Home! My true people! My true
country! I am a new citizen of the country of your vision…” (345-346)
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The Invisible Man concludes with a declaration: “SISTERS! BROTHERS! WE ARE THE TRUE
PATRIOTS! THE CITIZENS OF TOMORROW’S WORLD! WE’LL BE DISPOSSESSED NO
MORE!” (346). The narrator has achieved the goal of establishing a strong sense of community
within a discussion of the nonrecognition of uncommon individuals, which includes both white
and black men and women, culminating in the call for recognition. The Invisible Man
demonstrates this by orchestrating an act of recognition. The crowd witnesses his own process of
becoming, vis-à-vis his oration on human dignity. He reflects, “The audience seemed to become
one, its breathing and articulation synchronized” (340), and the community has observed the
tenets of recognition – agency (“able to get things done”), affirming one’s feelings, and feeling at
home.
Kerry McSweeney views the arena speech as “inauthentically personal,” while Mark
Shiffman argues the contrary, stating, “this suggests that overcoming invisibility involves
attaining personal and social integrity through honesty with oneself and others about ones’
interiority, which requires being given the chance to externalize one’s inferiority for a receptive
audience.”233 However, McSweeney and Shiffman are mistaken, for the emotive discourse of the
speech invests the scene with authenticity, and the Invisible Man navigates the crowd’s feelings
of inferiority – whether the crowd is cognizant of those feelings or not – only in order to
transition from victimization to the call for action. The speech is epideictic in nature because the
audience is not only receptive of the incensed language, but it participates in an ethical process by
reflecting upon the social conditions that lead to such feelings of inferiority or dispossession – in
essence, nonrecognition. Additionally, the audience is faced with the task of considering social
responsibility: they are called to either allow things to remain as they are, or to challenge the
status quo. In this way, the Invisible Man transmits an emotional effort in confronting the social
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issues panging the community, and he puts this emotional effort on display for the community of
audience members.
Brother Tod Clifton’s funeral oration, with which I began the chapter, also incorporates
language of recognition on display for a communal gathering. Clifton’s funeral scene is an
exemplary form of epideictic discourse because it most strongly illustrates the manner in which
the narrative denounces the social nonrecognition of an individual who belongs to a collective
group. Kenneth Warren compares the scene to “not quite a million men marching,” but
comments that the narrator “seizes the opportunity to make a collective statement.” However,
Warren concludes, “but precisely what the crowd means to express and affirm remains largely a
matter of interpretation.”234 In a similar vein, Rice claims that the speech employs
“understatement and sarcasm,” and, “in disavowing a rhetoric that operates through creating a
possibility of transcendence, the narrator has lost his power to politicize the event. But he has
also lost the power to move the audience.”235 Rice seems to agree with Brother Jack’s assessment
of the speech, which I will discuss shortly, in which he accuses the narrator of not responding to
the incident in Brotherhood-like political fashion. Brother Jack states, “our job is not to ask them
what they think but to tell them!” (473). However, applying an epideictic framework to the
speech will reveal how the narrator targets values and emotions in order to create an ethos of
rhetoric – or an imaginative space – for the audience to ethically evaluate the scene and its social
implications. As an example of literary epideictic, the crowd in the scene, in essence, affirms its
indignation at nonrecognition and, consequently, its demand for recognition.
To begin with, the narrator casts blame on the societal players who only uphold
individual freedoms for particular members of a democratic society. He refers to the ambiguous
“they” who are responsible for the social conditions of nonrecognition that lead to such abuse.
Ellison assigns the Brotherhood and the cop the condemnatory role of those who refuse to
234
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recognize African American individuals. The Invisible Man reports seeing Clifton escorted by a
cop who “pushed him, jolting him forward . . . in a head-snapping forward stumble until he
caught himself, saying something over his shoulder again, the two moving in a kind of march that
I’d seen many times” (435-436, italics added). The narrator vividly describes the altercation
between Clifton and the police officer that ended in “rapid explosions.” Describing Clifton’s
death, he states, “He fell forward on his knees, like a man saying his prayers …The cop was
standing now and looking down at Clifton as though surprised, the gun in his hand” (436, italics
added). The Invisible Man sets up the tension between the “kind of march” he’d seen many
times, and the cop’s surprised demeanor. The depiction of the cop “as though surprised” suggests
the narrative absurdity that the cop would be shocked at the incident, shocked at the unjustified
death of a black man within a social regime like a racist, postwar American society. Trying to
make sense of it all, the protagonist wonders why Clifton had resisted in the first place when he
knew the social customs of being arrested as a black man, reflecting, “And suddenly it occurred
to me that he might have been angry before he resisted, before he’d even seen the cop” (446-447).
At this point in the narrative, the protagonist alludes to a historical and social context that Clifton,
the audience, and the readers will find familiar.
Ellison critiques a society that not only fails to treat African American individuals
equally, but also chastises individuals – here, the cop and others in authority – within society who
abuse their power to inflict violence against African Americans. Narratively, the Invisible Man
drives the epideictic discourse by establishing the blame for Clifton’s murder on the cop:
“Let me tell it as it truly was! His name was Tod Clifton and he was full of illusions….
He lost his hold on reality. There was a cop and a waiting audience but he was Tod
Clifton and cops are everywhere. The cop? What about him? He was a cop. A good
citizen. But this cop had an itching finger and an eager ear for a word that rhymed with
‘trigger,’ and when Clifton fell he found it. The Police Special spoke its lines and the
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rhyme was completed. Just look around you. Look at what he made, look inside you and
feel his awful power.” (457)
Eventually, the narrator concludes that Clifton “resist[ed] reality in the form of a .38 caliber
revolver in the hands of the arresting officer.” The Invisible Man continues, “Now he’s in the
box with the bolts tightened down. He’s in the box and we’re in there with him, and when I’ve
told you this you can go. It’s dark in this box and it’s crowded” (458). Epideictically, the speech
is the most complex of the novel, for while the narrator’s discourse reflects the components of
epideictic in blaming law enforcement’s “awful power” as responsible for the occasion, he also
attempts to navigate the emotions of others – “What we want is not tears but anger. We must
remember now that we are fighters, and in such incidents we must see the meaning of our
struggle” (449). The Invisible Man touches upon the ethical matter by indirectly reporting what
Clifton would say to the crowd: “… get out of the box and go teach the cops to forget that rhyme.
Tell them to teach them that when they call you nigger to make a rhyme with trigger it makes the
gun backfire” (458). The narrative employs vivid description and emotive language to describe
the action leading up to Clifton’s murder, and to rouse the indignation of the audience in
reference to the discrimination of Clifton and others who suffer similar fates. This scene creates a
sense of community among those gathered and utilizes emotive discourse to accomplish the
epideictic task of locating the origin of nonrecognition, and calling for the desire to take the
“awful power” away from those who abuse it within a racist social regime.
Clifton’s death and funeral also serve as reference points that further implicate the
Brotherhood as complicit in the nonrecognition or misrecognition of African American
individuals under the false notion of increased freedoms for all individuals in a democratic
society. For example, the Invisible Man compares the Brotherhood’s and the community’s
reaction to the death and funeral of Clifton. He goes on to say that the Brotherhood misinterprets
the incident by focusing on the dolls, and that Harlem views the death of Clifton in a different
manner. For instance, what was wrong with the speech in Brother Jack’s (glass) eyes was that

153
“under [the Invisible Man’s] leadership, a traitorous merchant of vile instruments of anti-Negro,
anti-minority racist bigotry has received the funeral of a hero” (466). However, the narrator
counters by focusing on the humanity of Clifton asking, “Isn’t the shooting of an unarmed man of
more importance politically than the fact that he sold obscene dolls?” (467). The narrator argues
with Brother Jack and Brother Tobitt because they are both concerned with the strategy of the
“response” to Clifton’s death, or, the “side show of a funeral” for the “body of a Brutus” as the
Brothers put it. But the Invisible Man refutes, “[Clifton] was shot because he was black and
because he resisted. Mainly because he was black … and as far as the cops were concerned
Clifton could have been selling song sheets, Bibles, matzos. If he’d been white, he’d be alive.
Or if he’d accepted being pushed around” (469, italics added). Here the narrator touches upon
both the nonrecognition and misrecognition of Clifton on the part of the Brotherhood. They fail
to recognize Clifton as a (defenseless) man who was shot, as an individual suffering an unjust
fate. But, the Invisible Man also rebukes the Brotherhood for misrecognizing Clifton. The
organization shows an interest in Clifton’s death and funeral but only in terms of how the
Brotherhood comes off politically to the community. The Brotherhood views Clifton as an
ideological instrument for their cause as opposed to a democratically free individual who has the
right to refuse to be pushed around.
The narrator then asks Brother Jack a pivotal question – what if Brother Jack “misjudged
the occasion?” The Invisible Man says the people of Harlem came to the gathering for Clifton
because “we gave them the opportunity to express their feelings, to affirm themselves” (469).
The Brotherhood not only misjudges the occasion, but it also misjudges the relationship of the
individual to the community, a point contended in the eviction scene earlier. At one point during
Clifton’s funeral, the protagonist says, “The crowd sweated and throbbed, … And as I took one
last look I saw not a crowd but the set faces of individual men and women” (459). Here is the
factor that Brother Jack cannot grasp in terms of the Brotherhood’s objective, a notion that
epideictic discourse accomplishes – the agglomeration of the individual and the communal, for
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even in the mass of the crowd, the Invisible Man “sees” individual men and women. In
recognizing the humanity, the individuality, and the murder of Tod Clifton, the crowd affirms
themselves in the face of a social order that refuses to recognize them.
Narratively, the epideictic exigency is invested when the narrator ponders the concept of
the historian. For instance, he asks, “Where are the historians today? And how would they put it
down?” Yet, he admits, “the cop would be Clifton’s historian, his judge, his witness, and his
executioner…. We who write no novels, histories or other books. What about us, I thought”
(439). The issue that the Invisible Man pulls from Clifton’s death is the misrecognition of the
African American individual as a member of a larger democratic collective. The Invisible Man’s
speech on recognition is roused by his anger and begins with furiosity: “What are you waiting for
me to tell you?. . . Go home, he’s dead as he’ll ever die. That’s the end in the beginning and
there’s no encore . . . Go home, forget him” (454-455). But, then he emphasizes the larger
meaning of his death, much like he exposed the significance of the Provos’s dispossession – “Can
I say in twenty minutes what was building twenty-one years and ended in twenty seconds? What
are you waiting for, when all I can tell you is his name? And when I tell you, what will you know
that you didn’t’ know already, except, perhaps, his name?” (455). A name is how someone can
be recognized, and he amplifies the meaning and significance of Clifton’s name in the speech in
order to reveal the lack of recognition that society – and here, the police officers specifically –
imposes on an African American individual like Clifton, for the narrator actually educates the
audience, illustrating what more resides in a name – an individual who is a part of a larger social
identity, but one who is not protected by the same laws.
His goal – the emotional goal – is to make it known that the “meaning of [Clifton’s]
death was greater than the incident or the object that caused it…. For they had the power to use a
paper doll, first to destroy his integrity and then as an excuse for killing him” (448). He
reproaches,
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“His name was Clifton and they shot him down…. His name was Clifton and his face
was black and his hair was thick with tight-rolled curls – or call them naps or kinks. He’s
dead, uninterested, and, except to a few young girls, it doesn’t matter . . . Have you got
it? Can you see him? Think of your brother or your cousin John. His lips were thick with
an upward curve at the corners. He often smiled. He had good eyes and a pair of fast
hands, and he had a heart. He thought about things he felt deeply. I won’t call him noble
because what’s such a word to do with one of us? His name was Clifton, Tod Clifton,
and, like any man, he was born of woman to live awhile and fall and die. So that’s his
tale to the minute.” (455, italics added)
William Nash is spot on when he contends, “What the reader and author know, despite the
narrator’s convictions to the contrary, is that the great strength of the speech is its transcendence
of conventional rhetoric to achieve the remarkably personal insights that come from the recurrent
emphasis on the slain individual. By telling the particulars of Clifton’s story as he does, Invisible
Man finds a way to touch on the universal experiences of injustice and exploitation that the crowd
knows.” Nash suggests that the narrator evokes the systemic racism that affects the majority of
interactions between police and community members, but “he does not let his congregation forget
the individual who has been lost.”236
I agree with Nash that the narrator evokes a postwar racist society, but he appeals to the
concept of familial ties much like he did in the eviction speech in order to strengthen the
communal bond amongst those gathered to witness Clifton’s funeral: “Think of your brother or
your cousin.” For instance, the Invisible Man wonders why the people had gathered, “Because
they knew Clifton? Or for the occasion his death gave them to express their protestations, a time
and place to come together, to stand touching and sweating and breathing and looking in a
common direction?” (452). The narrator creates a space for the Harlem community to express
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sorrow and frustration in a communal way. On the one hand, a man in the procession begins to
sing an old spiritual titled, “There’s Many a Thousand Gone,” and the crowd joins in. By singing
together, the members of the gathered community symbolically share in a cultural history as the
song represents a generational legacy of suffering injustices. But the narrator also provides a
place for the individuals to affirm their exploitation by a white supremacist society. While he
suggests that the funeral provided the “occasion” for the crowd to express its protestations, the
context of the funeral oration provided the narrator the means to achieve that goal through his
emphasis on familial connections. The Invisible Man pitches many physical qualities for the
audience to connect with in terms of “knowing” somebody like Clifton in order to work towards
his goal of demonstrating the social import of Clifton’s death. He points out his hair, lips, and
eyes, painting a vivid description of an individual man the crowd can relate to. This familial
connection diffuses a wide range of possibilities for the audience to express past grievances that
fit Tod Clifton’s funeral procession bill.
The communal act of publicly recognizing Clifton as a dignified human being worthy of
an honorable funeral occurs because of the collective grievance for the unjustified murder of an
African American individual member of society. The Brotherhood and Brother Jack remain
uninterested in Clifton’s individuality, and what is interesting in this scene is how the Invisible
Man acted individually to commemorate the fallen individual, in spite of the Brotherhood’s
command that no member should act alone without the recommendation of the committee. But,
when Brother Jack accuses the narrator of “riding ‘race’ again” and downplaying the “dolls,” the
Invisible Man replies that he is “riding the race [he’s] forced to ride” (469), and that Clifton was
“only a salesman, not the inventor” of the dolls (448). Finally, the tension has escalated and the
narrator refers to Brother Jack as “Marse Jack,” the Harlem community’s “great white father”
(473). By calling Brother Jack “Marse Jack,” the Invisible Man invests the name with tones of
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misrecognition. The narrator blasts Brother Jack and those in society who refuse to recognize
African Americans as worthy of nobility in the form of a rhetorical question that includes a sense
of communal ties – “us”: “I won’t call him noble because what’s such a word to do with one of
us?” (455). Epideictically, the Invisible Man amplifies the societal insignificance of Clifton’s
death in order to critique the social circumstances and the institutional powers that lead to
unjustified acts like the defenseless murder of black individuals.

4) Conclusion
This chapter has argued for the epideictic characteristic of the scenes involving the Battle
Royal, the eviction, the first Brotherhood speech, and Tod Clifton’s funeral and proposes an
epideictic framework for reading Invisible Man, which helps elucidate Ellison’s statement that the
novel is “social action itself.” And perhaps, reading the narrative activity in between the Prologue
and Epilogue epideictically will complete the literary epideictic illustration of nonrecognition
along with the novel’s plea for love and complicity as the celebratory side of epideictic. The
Prologue and Epilogue form a circular structure in the narrative, for in the Prologue, the narrator
comments that he is “getting too far ahead of the story, almost to the end, although the end is in
the beginning” (6). For instance, the narrator defines his “invisibility as “a peculiar disposition of
the eyes of those with whom I come in contact. A matter of the construction of their inner eyes,
those eyes with which they look through their physical eyes upon reality” (3, italics added). The
novel’s ending line, “Who knows but that, on the lower frequencies, I speak for you?” dominates
discussion of the Epilogue. However, prior to that, the Invisible Man relates, “Being invisible
and without substance, a disembodied voice, as it were, what else could I do? What else but try to
tell you what was really happening when your eyes were looking through? (581). As Axel
Honneth points out, “the colloquial expression for such active forms of intentional invisibility is
‘looking through’ someone ... [which] has a performative aspect because it demands gestures or

(Lexington: The University Press of Kentucky, 2004), p. 115.
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ways of behaving that make clear that the other is not seen not merely accidentally, but rather
intentionally.”237 What my discussion of epideictic discourse reveals is the extent to which the
narrator’s Prologue confession amplifies acts of (non)recognition as the novel’s ultimate
revelation.
After the unnamed narrator recounts a story of how he almost beat a “tall blond” and
“blue eyed” man who called him an insulting name after bumping into him, The Invisible Man
professes:
I can hear you say, ‘What a horrible, irresponsible bastard!’ And you’re right. I leap to
agree with you. I am one of the most irresponsible beings that ever lived. Irresponsibility
is part of my invisibility; any way you face it, it is a denial. But to whom can I be
responsible, and why should I be, when you refuse to see me? And wait until I reveal how
truly irresponsible I am. Responsibility rests upon recognition, and recognition is a form
of agreement. Take the man I almost killed: Who was responsible for that near murder –
I? I don’t think so, and I refuse it. I won’t buy it. You can’t give it to me. He bumped
me, he insulted me. Shouldn’t he, for his own personal safety, have recognized my
hysteria, my ‘danger potential’? He, let us say, was lost in a dream world – which, alas,
is only too real! – and didn’t he rule me out of it? And if he had yelled for a policeman,
wouldn’t I have been taken for the offending one? Yes, yes, yes! Let me agree with you, I
was the irresponsible one; for I should have used my knife to protect the higher interests
of society. Some day that kind of foolishness will cause us tragic trouble. All dreamers
and sleepwalkers must pay the price, and even the invisible victim is responsible for the
fate of all. (14, italics added)
The Invisible Man introduces the issue of recognition and its relation to social responsibility.
This scene helps establish he rhetorical contract between the narrator and the reader through the
dialogical style, “I can hear you say,” etc. This is important because it invests the narrative with a
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theme of interconnectedness – recognition and social responsibility implicate both the invisible
ones and the “sleepwalkers.” Therefore, whether the reader is an invisible entity, or a
sleepwalker, she has a vested interest in the novel’s depiction of sociality. The narrator satirizes
the notion that an invisible man can be held responsible for his actions by exposing the voluntary
act of “denial” possible in social acts of recognition. Furthermore, the protagonist elaborates on
the social agreement within recognition. In other words, if others deny invisible men and women
social recognition, those men and women, in turn, can (and should?) deny responsibility for any
actions that are deemed questionable by such a social regime.
Epideictically, and for a postwar, American sense of “communal” interests, this amplifies
the notion of “danger potential,” the idea that adapts Charles Taylor’s insistence that
misrecognition oppresses only the unrecognized. Within the novel, Ellison invests the
unrecognized, or invisible narrator, with a “danger potential” rather than a victimized state. Due
to his invisibility, he postulates what would happen if he “shirks” his responsibility, and in terms
of a society that has habituated compliance on the part of African American individuals within
racist social structures, this challenges the status quo. However, the narrative does not issue a
threat of violence; that is the complex nature of Ellison’s literary task. Rather, the novel
illustrates that individuals in American postwar society need to “affirm the principle on which the
country was built,” to “take the responsibility for all of it, for the men as well as the principle”
(574), to “affirm all of it, the whole unhappy territory and all the things loved and unlovable in it”
(579). When the reader considers the epideictic discourse that can be applied to Invisible Man,
Ellison’s theme of invisibility contributes to his belief that the novel is a social action by
embodying a call for recognition. Ellison’s literary task adds to the notion that most African
Americans’ troubles sprang from their high visibility through his focus on the inward affliction,
the “internal violence of spirit,” suffered by an individual traversing a racist society. Ellison
portrays invisibility in his novel as a social and ethical defect on the part of a self-proclaimed
American democratic society, and thus, he exposes the “danger potential” that can result from a
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nation that purports to be the principal source of democratic freedoms and yet denies those rights
to the men and women who have helped shaped the “whole unhappy territory.”
Addressing a West Point cadet class that was assigned to read Invisible Man, Ellison
faced a question regarding social taboos surrounding interracial relationships and ties to the
Communist party. He mentions the fear over the intermingling of the races, a fear that he referred
to as “unpleasant.” However, his answer reveals the epideictic function of his literary objective.
He concluded, “yet it is in the unpleasant, in that which is charged with emotion, fears, with
irrationality, that we find great potential for transforming attitudes.”238 The Invisible Man’s
sentiment that as a nation, we should affirm both the “loved and the unlovable” illustrates the
ethos of rhetoric, the imaginative space for readers to consider extending recognition to those
who were priorly deemed “unlovable.” Ellison reveals the painful consequences of withholding
democratic ideals from African American individuals through the depiction of the narrator’s
consciousness as he suffers mistreatment due to his race. Additionally, Ellison’s project
consisted of making the problem of one, the problem of many, for the narrator declares in the
Epilogue, “Our fate is to become one, and yet many” (577), reinforcing the nation’s motto, e
pluribus unum. In this way, Ellison fashions a narrative that serves an epideictic purpose
extremely effectively – as a literary-rhetorical device to call for the recognition of every
individual’s complicity in the injustices permitted by a democratic society, and this culminates in
a collective, national moral dilemma.
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“If the later nineteenth century can be described as a culture of imitation, and the
first part of the twentieth century a culture of authenticity, then our own time
might be called the culture of the factitious. We have a hunger for something
like authenticity, but are easily satisfied by an ersatz facsimile.”
(Miles Orwell, The Real Thing, p. xxiii)
“Is it our fault that Lawrence, Miller, Kerouac, Burroughs, Artaud, and Beckett
know more about schizophrenia than psychiatrists and psychoanalysts?”
(Gilles Deleuze, Negotiations, p. 23)
“The only form of resistance is to move.”
(David Harvey, Paris, Capital of Modernity, p. 42)

Chapter IV: “Whither goes thou, America?”: On the Road and the
“Purity of Moving and Getting Somewhere” in an Era of Containment
Introduction
This chapter examines desire in Jack Kerouac’s On the Road. First, I use the rhetoric of
desire to reveal how On the Road recodes social desire and offers a “new vision” of postwar
existence that has sociopolitical import. Lucien Carr proposes what he calls a “New Vision,” or
“trying to look at the world in a new light . . . in a way that gave it some meaning,” by “[t]rying to
find values . . . that were valid.”239 Along with Allen Ginsberg and Jack Kerouac, the core of the
Beat generation at its inception, they believed that “literature” would be the venue in which this
was accomplished and Kerouac was the forerunner. I argue that desire in On the Road is a
rhetorical construct operating as a social critique that produces the “new vision,” and it is not an
abstract, psychological affect detached from sociopolitical influences and implications. In other
words, the novel is not only about “kicks for kicks’ sakes”; rather, the rhetoric of desire operates
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epideictically in the narrative, exposing inauthentic desire at times, while at others, producing a
“new vision” for authenticity in a postwar social context.
As an example of the literary epideictic, On the Road features a rhetoric of desire that
performs the epideictic function of “praising” or “blaming” the behavior of a developing mass
consumer society.240 In order to demonstrate the rhetoric of desire, I turn to Gilles Deleuze and
Félix Guattari’s work on desire in Anti-Oedipus. The two aspects of Deleuze and Guattari’s
concept of desire that are relevant to On the Road include the argument that some “needs” come
from social production and are manufactured, and that desire is not about lack, but is a productive
construct. Deleuze and Guattari propose, “desire produces [and] its product is real,” and they
claim,
240

My argument is that “desire” is a rhetorical device performing a social critique of postwar existence and
relationships among people, bureaucracies, and things. Jeffrey Walker has called epideictic discourse the
“rhetoric of belief and desire.” See Jeffrey Walker, Rhetoric and Poetics in Antiquity. Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2000. Walker emphasizes the nature of “desire” within the epideictic process as it pertains
to the audience and to action. He points out that Aristotle assigns a “positive” role for the audience,
namely, that of one who makes “observations” about “what is praise-worthy, preferable, desirable or
worthy of belief,” or, “to form opinions about and in response to the discourse presented” (9). Walker
contends that the audience is presented subject matter in order to contemplate “matters of philosophical,
social, ethical, or cultural concern” with the aim of forming new – or revising existing – opinions and
desires. Therefore, Walker illustrates how epideictic “shapes and cultivates codes of value” for individuals
who live in a particular society and who will rely on these presuppositions that will impact decisions made
in the more pragmatic forums. Walker concludes, “When conceived in positive terms and not simply in
terms of lack, […] the distinction between the epideiktikon and the pragmatikon comes down to this: the
epideiktikon is the rhetoric of belief and desire; the pragmatikon the rhetoric of practical civic business, a
rhetoric that necessarily depends on and appeals to the beliefs/desires that epideictic cultivates” (10).
Authenticity is a component in the rhetoric of desire. It is that which is free from external influence in
terms of desire – desiring wealth, things, and ways of living. See Charles Guignon, “Authenticity.”
Philosophy Compass 3/2 (2008): pp. 277-290. Guignon points out that almost all uses of the notion of
authenticity rely on the central meaning of the word tied to “authorship,” as “original,” or “faithful to the
original” (277). He writes, “To say that a person is authentic is to say that his or her actions truly express
what lies at their origin, that is, the dispositions, feelings, desires, and convictions that motivate them. Built
into this conception of authenticity is a distinction between what is really going on within me – the
emotions, core beliefs, and bedrock desires that make me the person I am – and the outer avowals and
actions that make up my being in the public world” (278). Guignon captures the tension between an
internal “core” and a public theory of recognition that both play into notions of authenticity.

163
Desire is not bolstered by needs, but rather the contrary; needs are derived from desire:
they are counterproducts within the real that desire produces. Lack is a countereffect of
desire; it is deposited, distributed, vacuolized within a real that is natural and social.241
Kerouac’s novel relates to Deleuze and Guattari’s work because it critiques a postwar desire that
is socially produced under a capitalist regime. It also offers a new form of desire that is in line
with Deleuze and Guattari’s process of “schizoanalysis,” and as such, it resists the influence of
the capitalist machine. Therefore, desire works in the following two ways: 1) as a rhetorical
maneuver revealing and critiquing containment culture’s inauthentic manufactured needs, and 2)
as a discursive thematic displaying the quest for, and celebration of, an authenticity that rejects
postwar containment culture’s conformity.242 And finally, I argue that Deleuze and Guattari’s
concepts of “desiring-production,” the “plane of immanence,” and/or the “Body Without Organs”
connect to authenticity represented in On the Road, which I define as a way of living life in
postwar American society that resists the social, external pressure to conform to developing
national political agendas.
In the context of an era referred to as a culture of containment,243 On the Road endorses
mobility, as Sal and Dean are on a quest for authenticity in a deteriorating American sociocultural
landscape. The theory of mobility integrates the social, political, and affective dimensions of
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movement, and as a result, On the Road features mobility as movement embedded with authentic
meaning. Kerouac’s novel critiques what “containment narratives” construct as the objects of
desire, and the novel itself presents a theory of desire that Kerouac endorses, one which
contributes to the philosophy of an entire Beat movement.
My focus on the novel as a countercultural text in an era of containment is concerned
with containment narratives based on domesticity and consumerism, and how the novel celebrates
a mobility discourse in the face of such containment narratives. Movement/mobility possesses
social significance in relation to the social climate of the postwar period, namely, as a resistance
to a culture of containment in a geographic, domestic, and economic context, dimensions I will
discuss shortly. To put this as succinctly as possible, the epideictic discourse of the novel unfolds
out of the rhetoric of desire in the context of the American postwar period – containment culture
produced inauthentic desire, while mobility functioned as a form of resistance to narratives of
containment providing the revolutionary impulse for becoming-authentic.
Kerouac’s novel critiques a developing postwar inauthentic desire and calls for an
authenticity (as the social counter-object-ive of postwar conformity) that only the road, in its
“purity,” can provide for Sal Paradise and Dean Moriarty at this point in American history. As
they are about to leave New York in 1949, Sal, the narrator, reflects,
I said goodbye to my [aunt] and promised to be back in two weeks and took off for
California again. You always expect some kind of magic at the end of the road.
Strangely enough, [Dean] and I were going to find it, alone, before we finished with it.
[...] the purity of moving and getting somewhere, no matter where, and as fast as possible
and with as much excitement and digging of all things as possible.244
Sal and Dean are leaving the “home” and the mother-figure (additionally, the aunt is actually
Kerouac’s mother in the Original Scroll edition) in order to search for the authentic “at the end of
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the road.” The passage features movement – “getting somewhere . . . as fast as possible,” and
Kerouac categorizes this movement as “pure,” touching upon two definitional components of the
authentic in his novel: movement, and “the digging of all things as possible.” Finally, Sal and
Dean desire an authenticity that is connected to American ideals and an American identity and the
novel contains a rhetoric of desire that operates epideictically by concurrently implicating the
inauthenticity of a consumerist society, and performing a “new vision” of authenticity for
American postwar society.

1) On the Road’s Epideictic Discourse and America
Kerouac’s main subject in his writing is America.245 However, Kerouac viewed the
American identity developing in the postwar years as dispiriting, or inauthentic, with its emphasis
on material “goods” and consumption, which contrasted with his “new vision” of desire and the
authentic as the “penetration into the heart of things” – even the language he uses to define the
authentic incorporates “movement.”246 One of the conventions of epideictic rhetoric is the
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The Original Scroll version provides a very telling definition of the authentic for Kerouac:
All I wanted and all Neal wanted and all anybody wanted was some kind of penetration into the
heart of things where, like in a womb, we could curl up and sleep the ecstatic sleep that Burroughs
was experiencing with a good mainline shot of M. and advertising executives were experiencing
with twelve Scotch & Sodas in Stouffers before they made the drunkard’s train to Westchester –
but without hangovers. And I had many a romantic fancy then, and sighed at my star. The truth
of the matter is, you die, all you do is die, and yet you live, yes you live, and that’s no Harvard lie.
(Original Scroll version, 279)
Of course, on the one hand, “penetration” refers to “passing into or through something” (OED), and the on
the other hand, Kerouac is discussing an immobile, “ecstatic sleep.” This is more explanative of the
process of “becoming” authentic in which an individual agent “dies” and “yet lives,” suggesting even a
movement between different states of consciousness.
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inventive and strategic use of language to counsel the audience in matters of human judgment and
conduct.247 Kerouac alludes to this role of the epideictic rhetor in a letter to Allen Ginsberg in
which he admonishes society for becoming “evil,” declaring, “I believe there will be a judgment
day, but not for men . . . for society. Society is a mistake. . . . It is evil. It will fall.”248 Kerouac is
more specific in terms of why society is “evil” during an interview with Kenneth Allsop where he
charges, “Everyone in America just consumes,” stating, “What we Beats are against is technique
and efficiency. Everyone in this country is a slave to Deepfreeze and the hi-fi. They’re too rich –
a kind of sinister luxury.”249 Kerouac sums up the developing postwar American desire for
material objects by touching upon the social production of consumerist desire as a process of
entrapment – goods that lead to technique and efficiency enslave individuals insidiously.
Kerouac’s main rejection of the developing postwar society exists in its desire for wealth and a
way of life that neglects authenticity for convenience, and thus, Kerouac passes a value judgment
on the current state of affairs.
Kerouac embeds the latter critiques on American society within the narrative of On the
Road. For instance, in a journal entry dated 1948, one year following Kerouac and Neal
Cassady’s (Dean Moriarty’s) first cross-country trip, and a year preceding the above passage in
On the Road where Sal and Dean leave New York for California, Kerouac provides important
contextual implications in terms of what the book challenges in American society:
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AUGUST 23, 1948. Told my mother she ought to go live down South with the family
instead of spending all her time slaving in shoe factories. In Russia they slave for the
State, here they slave for Expenses. People rush off to meaningless jobs day after day,
you see them coughing in the subways at dawn. They squander their souls on things like
“rent,” “decent clothes,” “gas and electricity,” “insurance,” behaving like peasants who
have just come out of the fields and are so dreadful tickled because they can buy baubles
and doodads in stores. . . . The next thing you know, they’ll all be marching off to some
annihilating war which their leaders will start to keep up appearances. Shit on the
Russians, shit on the Americans, shit on them all.
I have another novel in mind—“On the Road”—which I keep thinking about: two
guys hitchhiking to California in search of something they don’t really find, and losing
themselves on the road, coming all the way back hopeful of something else.250
Here, Kerouac places his “road novel” within the social context of the Cold War and containment
culture. In this journal, he touches upon the socially manufactured needs and desires of the
developing postwar American citizenry, and, he even juxtaposes the fomenting consumerist
behaviors against the Russians, just as politicians did in the political sphere.251 He sees a decline
in the value of postwar existence, referring to the labor-intensive life as “meaningless,” and the
pursuit of “baubles and doodads” as “squander[ing] the souls” of the masses. What is important
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about this journal entry is the fact that following this observation, he proposes the idea of his new
novel as something that stands out against the social commentary just presented.
The very opening of On the Road provides glimpses into the epideictic objective of the
novel, for Robert Danisch points out that the epideictic rhetorician must “define” the present
moment, and “reinvent the culture within which he or she is situated.”252 The narrative reports
that the character of Dean Moriarty begins the narrator’s “road life” across America, and reads, “I
first met Dean not long after my wife and I split up. I had just gotten over a serious illness that I
won’t bother to talk about, except that it had something to do with the miserably wearly split-up
feeling that everything was dead.”253 The main point of the opening lines, whereby Kerouac
references a feeling that “everything was dead,” establishes the epideictic context as he invokes a
peculiar type of sadness in the very beginning of the text. As Ben Giamo notes, the most frequent
word appearing in Kerouac’s oeuvre is “sad.”254 The sense of loss and sadness in the novel takes
on the negative characteristic similar to blame, and this sentiment exposes the failings of
America, which is ultimately the entity under scrutiny.
In Sal’s perspective, sadness is everywhere in America: in its people, places, and its
relationships, and Kerouac chooses to narratively define the present era as a “sad drama in the
American night” (148). Towards the end of the novel, when Sal is headed home, he has a vision
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while he is standing on the road and reflects, “when I heard the sound of footsteps from the
darkness beyond, and lo, a tall old man with flowing white hair came clomping by with a pack on
his back, and when he saw me as he passed, he said, ‘Go moan for man,’ and clomped on back to
his dark. Did this mean that I should at last go on my pilgrimage on foot on the dark roads
around America?” (303). Here is where Kerouac’s text takes on an epideictic objective – it
adapts the characteristics of “blame” by incorporating language of loss and sadness, which
ultimately reveals the deterioration of an authenticity in an American historical and social
context. Sal will “moan” for humankind here, but his lamentation is tied to a specific American
historical context, and moaning implies a complaint or grievance for something lost: in this case,
the value of authenticity.
However, while Sal will “moan for man’s” squandered soul, he also has a vision of
authenticity to counter the inauthentic desire he observes. Kerouac’s novel presents different
values as the objects of desire and transforms what a consumerist society judges as the “good
life.” For example, authenticity, Somogy Varga points out, is the Western world’s “ubiquitous
ideal,” and he emphasizes that an examination of authenticity cannot proceed without some
recourse to what constitutes the “good life.” He articulates that authenticity functions as a critical
concept, “a measure against which particular self-relations and patterns of societal interactions
can be considered distortions.”255 Kerouac touches upon this sentiment in the essay, “The Origins
of the Beat Generation.” He writes, the America of old was “invested with wild selfbelieving
(sic) individuality and this had begun to disappear around the end of World War II,” as a result of
the development of an affluent and consumer based society that stifled authentic individualism.
The organization of consumerist-based desire “distorted” authenticity by subsuming individuality
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under the guise of consumer choice – i.e., with an abundance of products to choose from,
individuals can demonstrate their individuality and preferences through which products they
choose. However, desire then becomes controllable. Instead, Kerouac calls for a “revolution in
manners,” in which the Beats oppose “technique and efficiency” in favor of a “new gesture, or
attitude, which I can only describe as a new more.”256
The “new vision,” the “new more,” refers to the potential to become authentic. At one
point, Sal refers to himself as the “prophet” passing along a judgment: “I pictured myself in a
Denver bar that night, with all the gang, and in their eyes I would be strange and ragged and like
the Prophet who has walked across the land to bring the dark Word, and the only Word I had was
“Wow!” (35). The novel features “kicks” and the authentic through the celebrated language of
“Wow!,” “IT,” “madness,” and “dig,” for example. Sal will navigate the country and witness the
decrepit state of affairs in postwar society, but his counter-response is embedded in the word,
“Wow!”. As I will show, “wow” is indicative of the “new more,” the “digging of all things,” the
authentic, for Sal reflects, “But why think about that when all the golden land’s ahead of you and
all kinds of unforeseen events wait lurking to surprise you and make you glad you’re alive to
see?” (135). The road serves as the pathway to the “wild selfbelieving individuality,” the
authentic that overcomes the distortions of socially organized patterns of interactions.

2) Epideictic Exigency: Containment Culture & Conceptions of the Home
Mark Richardson points out that Kerouac’s novel indeed represents American fiction in
an era of containment, observing how “all the essential Cold War questions trouble” On the Road,
even despite the fact that its representation of the Cold War context is, as Elizabeth Wheeler puts
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it, “conspicuous.”257 It is within the sociocultural context of containment that the Beats’ “new
vision” is best understood. “Containment” is a political concept coined by Secretary of State
George Kennan in 1947 that captured the American policy toward the Soviet Union during the
Cold War era.258 As John Lewis Gaddis explains, “the idea was to prevent the Soviet Union from
using the power and position it won as a result of [World War II] to reshape the postwar
international order, a prospect that seemed, in the West, no less dangerous than what Germany
and Japan might have done had they had the chance.”259 Gaddis notes that Kennan essentially
feared a rippling effect, attributing the effects of such a communist expansion in Western Europe
and Japan to influencing the fate of American society. For instance, Kennan’s telegram insisted
that Russian leaders were bent on the destruction of rival powers like the US. In Kennan’s “Long
Telegram,” he writes, “In summary, we have here a political force committed fanatically to the
belief that with the US there can be no permanent modus vivendi, that it is desirable and necessary

as a new more. ‘Beat Generation’ has simply become the slogan or label for a revolution in manners in
America” (61-62).
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that the internal harmony of our society be disrupted, our traditional way of life be destroyed, the
international authority of our state be broken, if Soviet power is to be secure.”260
While the aim of the theory of containment was to suppress Soviet power and influence
across the Atlantic, that did not free the US from an internal battle. The permeation of the foreign
policy of containment into the cultural landscape in postwar American society was a result of the
US’s attempt to extend its influence and reputation as a world leader of democratic freedoms.
David Ryan comments on the US role in the Cold War: “Within this framework, the United
States was identified as the guarantor of Western security, the regenerator of its economy, and the
instigator of a period of freedom and prosperity.”261 However, in order to accomplish this task,
Ryan explains, The Truman administration had to monitor the American public’s attitudes to
make sure the “disease” of communism was not spreading among the citizens. Therefore, Ryan
suggests that the Truman Doctrine employed a “strategy of Otherness,” which Michael Hogan
elaborates, “[T]he national security ideology framed the Cold War discourse in a system of
symbolic representation that defined America’s national identity by reference to the un-American
‘other,’ usually the Soviet Union, Nazi Germany, or some other totalitarian power.” 262 This pitted
desirable American values against “hostile” Soviet values for example. As a result, the Soviet
system was associated with “a controlled economy, minority rule, and the oppression of basic
liberties, while the American system was associated with free markets, majority rule, and
democratic politics.”263 The consequence of this binary opposition was the inopportunity for
social and political dissent among citizens.
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Thus, US foreign policy initiated the theory of containment, but the dubious nature of
postwar existence soon began to stretch the parameters of the political concept to incorporate the
cultural sphere as well. On the Road makes its countercultural intervention by recoding what
Alan Nadel refers to as cultural “containment narratives” in his book, Containment Culture, and
most notably, challenging a specific narrative within what Elaine May refers to as “domestic
containment.”264 Nadel puts this into perspective, defining “containment culture” as an
“American narrative during the cold war” that not only describes U.S. foreign policy from the
1940s until the 1960s, but “also describes American life in numerous venues and under sundry
rubrics during that period.”265 Nadel claims that the American Cold War period enforced
particular cultural narratives to “unify, codify, and contain – perhaps intimidate is the best word –
the personal narratives of its population.” He therefore recognizes how a large portion of postwar
Americans generally accepted a “small set of narratives,” narratives that coded “conformity” as
“a positive value in and of itself,” and established a pool of public knowledge for individuals to
draw from.266 As a consequence of the Cold War and the political strife between the Soviet
Union and the US, a distinct American way of life was pitted against a perilous Soviet modus
operandi – individuals who bought into what the society deemed the “good” life were patriotic,
and those individuals who did not adopt the idealistic behaviors were held in suspicion and
labeled outsiders, thus issuing an age of conformity.267
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Containment culture ushered in an era of conformity that relied on the home and
consumerism to accomplish its goals of internal security.268 The concept of the “home” played an
extremely prominent role in the development of what constituted the “good life” and the home
cultivated “good citizens” in American society following the Second World War. Elaine Tyler
May’s book, Homeward Bound: American Families in the Cold War Era, discusses how the
postwar period was one of uncertainty brought about by the advent of an atomic age and how, in
an age of anxiety, the home was the place that afforded security. As a result, May declares that
American citizens were “homeward bound.” She explains that “domestic anticommunism” was
another branch of the theory of containment: if “subversive individuals” could be contained, then
they would be unable to spread “their poisonous influence through the body politic.” She relates
how according to a “cold war ethos,” conflict within the United States served as a more
dangerous threat to leaders, and these included “racial strife, emancipated women, class conflict,
and familial disruption.”269 She writes,
In the domestic version of containment, the “sphere of influence” was the home. Within
its walls, potentially dangerous social forces of the new age might be tamed, so they
could contribute to the secure and fulfilling life to which postwar women and men
aspired. Domestic containment was bolstered by a powerful political culture that
rewarded its adherents and marginalized its detractors. More than merely a metaphor for
268
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the cold war on the homefront, containment aptly describes the way in which public
policy, personal behavior, and even political values were focused on the home.270
Thus, the home plays an important role in cultivating proper citizens, and both political and
personal agendas become infused in the home. As May points out, one of the cultural narratives
that exerted a controlling force in domestic containment was that of marriage and the family.271 In
forming a domestic ideology, American culture advocated the upbringing of “well-adjusted”
children in an uncertain age as a way to prepare for the future. As a result, the home became the
arena in which this objective was carried out. The home becomes a fixed-material and an
abstract-presence in postwar society, one that both grounds and is grounded in within a particular
set of values.
Sal and Dean take to the road because their idea of the authentic is disrupted by the
political and cultural impact of containment narratives. And as containment narratives code and
mandate the American way of the good life, this repressive social environment fractures Sal and
Dean’s sense of a national “home,” a concept that the novel infuses with affect and feeling.272 The
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home becomes inscribed as one of the objects of economic desire in an era of containment, and as
a result, the home becomes a political and economic strategy of US foreign and domestic policy;
however, while it unifies American citizens in an abstract ideological sense, the home also
provides the material and spatial means of separation amongst individuals – the home provides a
private space from the public space, a public space where members of the private home work or
conduct affairs. American citizens belong to the same public collective, but the home separates
the members from the public and in essence, contains their private lives. Sal and Dean turn to
movement across the American landscape, leaving the confinements of the postwar home in
search of “The Essence” of all individuals that unites them in a more authentic American identity.
This is how movement in On the Road emerges as a form of resistance to containment in postwar
society.
Postwar society began to witness a fragmenting of a national identity across peoples, and
On the Road channels that loss through the theme of “at-homeness,” which counter-defines
containment era’s concept of the home. I define “at-homeness” in Kerouac’s novel as an
experience of authenticity that occurs outside of the material home, and a process that views
America as the “home,” thus transferring containment’s definition of home from the material
spatial home to the idea of a national home; additionally, the quest for at-homeness in the novel
begins with mobility, specifically, the movement on the open road, and as a result, it transposes
an American identity generated from the fixed, stable place of the home, to the mobility afforded
by the open road. Therefore, Sal and Dean’s search for at-homeness is infused with national
identity.273 For Kerouac, and the characters of Sal Paradise and Dean Moriarty, the authenticity
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they desire is described as “The Essence,” or “The One,” in which everyone is interconnected.
For instance, in a letter to Allen Ginsberg, Kerouac writes, “the only real is the One, the One
Essence that all’s made of . . . .”274 In the novel, Sal hitches a ride on a truck with two farmers
from Minnesota, along with seven others, including “Mississippi Gene,” who was a hobo who
rode freight trains around the country” (23). Sal reminisces about a “tall rawboned fellow from
Louisiana called Big Slim Hazard who was hobo by choice.” Sal reflects, “There was something
so indubitably reminiscent of Big Slim Hazard in Mississippi Gene’s demeanor that I said, ‘Do
you happen to have met a fellow called Big Slim Hazard somewhere?’” (26). After Mississippi
Gene confirms Sal’s query and they go back-and-forth regarding Slim, Sal declares, “Well, damn
me, I’m amazed you know him. This is a big country. Yet I knew you must have known him”
(27). Later on in the novel, while Sal is in New Orleans on the Mississippi river, he once again
reminisces, “Old Big Slim Hazard had once worked on the Algiers ferry as a deckhand; this made
me think of Mississippi Gene too; and as the river poured down from mid-America by starlight I
knew, I knew like mad that everything I had ever known and would ever know was One” (147).
Mobility and authenticity overlap here, for it is movement across the country that familiarizes
Mississippi Gene with Big Slim Hazard and acquaints Sal with Mississippi Gene. Furthermore,
mobility is the source of Kerouac’s revelation, and referring to the loss of individualism
following WWII, it is mobility that rescues the individual from oblivion here. Kerouac recodes
the nation as the spatial imaginary home, and the road as the pathway to an authentic feeling of
“at-homeness.”

Movement, Rest, and Encounter, David Seamon summarizes Relph’s concept of “existential insideness” as
inaugurating the concept of “at-homeness.” Seamon writes, “The person who feels inside a place is here
rather than there, safe rather than threatened, enclosed rather than exposed. The more profoundly inside a
place the person feels, Relph explains, the stronger will be his or her identity with that place…. Existential
insideness, says Relph, is the experience of place ‘that most people experience when they are at home and
in their own town or region,’…the person is bodily and emotionally immersed in place; life holds
continuity and regularity and its mundane aspects, at least, are taken for granted and rarely reflected upon.”
See David Seamon, A Geography of the Lifeworld: Movement, Rest, and Encounter. New York: St.
Martin's Press, 1979.
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As mystical as this viewpoint might be, it has political overtones in the postwar era if we
take into account Benedict Anderson’s notion of the nation as an “imagined community.”
Anderson defines a nation as an “imagined political community,” one in which the “members of
even the smallest nation will never know most of their fellow-members, meet them, or even hear
of them, yet in the minds of each lives the image of their communion.”275 As Kerouac has stated,
his main subject was America, and within On the Road, there exists a rather serious
preoccupation with conceptions of “home” and “nation.” I contend that Sal Paradise and Dean
Moriarty are in search of a feeling of “at-homeness” within a changing American landscape, and
that the very shift in a national identity from individuality towards a mass consumer- and
conformist-society catalyzes their desire to “move.” For Sal and Dean, their movement is
intended to eliminate the notion of “imagined” in community, for they desire to know or “dig”
every individual they encounter. In other words, while Anderson is recognizing how citizens of a
nation will never know one another on a personal level, Sal and Dean, even if implausibly, desire
and attempt to acquaint themselves with other Americans on their mobile journey rather than
accept the imponderability of the endeavor.
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London: Verso, 2006, p.6. Additionally, the nation is “limited” because each nation “has finite, if elastic
boundaries, beyond which lie other nations,” and it is “sovereign” because the concept of nationality
developed in an age where “the legitimacy of the divinely-ordained, hierarchical dynastic realm” was
destroyed (7). Anderson finally declares that a nation is a “community” because of the “deep, horizontal
comradeship” that leads people to live and die for their nation (7). Anderson cites the literary novel and the
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He writes, “The idea of a sociological organism moving calendrically through homogeneous, empty time is
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the image of an imagined community (26-27).
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Most importantly, Kerouac began to see a disintegration of the American nationalism he
had known and dedicated himself to,276 and he weaves this loss of, and desire for, a return to an
authenticity or a feeling of “at-homeness” in American postwar existence into the narrative of On
the Road. Kerouac, in writing On the Road, tries to re-imagine the community; containment
culture is bent on creating homogenous citizens, but Kerouac creates a “New Vision” of the
American-imagined-nation in the postwar period, one that rejects the mass consumer- and
conformist-society and celebrates the “mad ones,” those who are anything but “commonplace”
and are “desirous of everything at the same time” (5).

3) Desire, Mobility, and Authenticity in On the Road
In terms of On the Road’s rhetorical discourse, desire and authenticity are both part of the
epideictic objective. What an individual desires can have an impact on the theme of authenticity,
and one can also desire authentically or inauthentically. For instance, in the same letter to
Ginsberg where Kerouac insists that society is “evil,” he writes,
History is people doing what their leaders tell them; and not doing what their prophets
tell them. Life is that which gives you desires, but no rights for the fulfillment of desires.
It is all pretty mean – but you can still do what you want, and what you want is right,
when you want honestly. Wanting money is wanting the dishonesty of wanting a servant.
Money hates us, like a servant; because it is false.277
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For specific references to this, see Kevin Hayes, Ed., Conversations with Jack Kerouac. Jackson, MS:
University Press of Mississippi, 2005, p. 84; 94. In a 1968 interview for the Boston Sunday Globe,
Kerouac expresses a nostalgia for America, saying, “America was an idea that was proposed and began to
deteriorate at the turn of the century when people came in waving flags. And now their grandchildren dance
on the flag. Damn them” (84). In an interview for the St. Petersburg Times a year later in 1969, he tells a
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Kesey, and the Merry Pranksters. He recalls, “Ginsberg … At a party with Kesey’s Merry Pranksters
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and Shakespeare. But now Ginsberg’s anti-American” (94).
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The postwar period was labeled an age of conformity and the development of an affluent and
consumer-based society served more as a way of life in which individuals did what their
“leaders” promoted, and this crushed individuality in favor of production, as Kerouac implies. As
Charles Guignon states, individuals who “absorb the patterns of action” that are promoted as
appropriate via a cultural context, and those that internalize social norms and “go with the flow”
automatically in the world, are in essence conformists who adopt public norms and standards that
are expected, and desire and live “inauthentically.”278
In Kerouac’s On the Road, he critiques a developing, conformist postwar desire that is
inauthentic and coded by the body of capital. Deleuze and Guattari’s work in Anti-Oedipus
applies to Kerouac’s novel because Sal and Dean desire an authenticity that is free from the
conditions of capitalism, and rather than “absorb the patters of action” dictated by a capitalist and
consumer-based society, they follow “lines of escape” through their mobility, and this rhetoric of
desire functions epideictically by protesting the developing consumerist society dictated by a
culture of containment.279 The cultural representation of the “good life” as attainable in the home
and in consumer goods subjects desire to a material-based belief system that feeds the capitalist
machine and implants a fear or lack into desire – if an individual does not possess a home, or
participate in consumerist practices, or behave properly, they are overwhelmed by feelings of lack
or need. Society implants these needs or affects into the consciousness of its citizens. Sal and
Dean’s desire is authentic because it, like the schizophrenic process, is at odds with the social
field that they navigate and resists the attempt of the “social machine” to “arrest [their] process
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Deleuze and Guattari write, “What complicates everything is that there is indeed a necessity for
desiring-production to be induced from representation, to be discovered through its lines of escape” (AO
314-15). Later, they comment on how capitalism is threatened by “an exterior limit,” and the lines of
escape “constitute an investment of the social field that is no less complete, no less total than the contrary
investment. The paranoiac and the schizoid investments are like two opposite poles of unconscious libidinal
investment, one of which subordinates desiring-production to the formation of sovereignty and to the
gregarious aggregate that results from it, while the other brings about the inverse subordination, overthrows
the established power, and subjects the gregarious aggregate to the molecular multiplicities of the
productions of desire” (376).
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and assign it goals” (AO 382), goals encoded with the lack or the feeling of necessity brought on
by the Cold War era of containment.
To this end, Deleuze and Guattari want to reveal how “social production and relations to
production are an institution of desire, and how affects or drives form part of the infrastructure
itself” (AO 63).280 Deleuze and Guattari observe how capitalism and psychoanalysis contribute to
the indeterminacy of desire broadly, and challenge the viewpoint of desire as lack specifically.281
They combine psychoanalytical and capitalistic theory in order to illustrate how desire, and its
“countereffect,” lack, is socially manufactured. They see desire as a means of production that
produces what individuals take to be reality, and only under certain social conditions does
desiring-production become fixated on lack. For instance, as a result of Freudian thought, desire
was relegated to a “theater” of fantasy, stripped of all productive power and based on
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281
One of the contributions of Deleuze and Guattari’s Anti-Oedipus is the notion of a productive form of
desire, or “desiring-production,” that produces what an individual takes to be reality through “psychical
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Oedipal law as a foundation for conceptualizing desire. First, Deleuze and Guattari recount traditional
conceptions of desire as a dichotomy of “production” and “acquisition.” They claim that the moment
desire is viewed from the perspective of acquisition, desire becomes an “idealistic” conception, which
causes one to look at desire as “a lack of an object: a lack of the real object.” This leads to a “production of
fantasies” as demonstrated by psychoanalysis, and Deleuze and Guattari contend, “On the very lowest level
of interpretation, this means that the real object that desire lacks is related to an extrinsic natural or social
production, whereas desire intrinsically produces an imaginary object that functions as a double of reality,
as though there were a ‘dreamed-of object behind every real object,’ or a mental production behind all real
productions” (25-26). The “double reality” that Deleuze and Guattari mention here pertains to the notion
that because desire as a lack detaches itself from the object, at the same time it can “intensify” that lack by
making the object absolute, as something that is unattainable in this world, and thus suggesting that not
every object is contained in social reality so there must be some other place that contains the “key to
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182
representation.282 In a similar vein, capitalism functions on a system of substitution and
representation in which money is substituted for, and represents, the value of objects and
behaviors. Therefore, Deleuze and Guattari see no difference in a psychic “mental reality” and an
objective “social reality”: “desire produces reality, or stated another way, desiring-production is
one and the same thing as social production. It is not possible to attribute a special form of
existence to desire, a mental or psychic reality that is presumably different from the material
reality of social production” (AO 30). Deleuze and Guattari propose, “desire produces [and] its
product is real,” and ultimately, “social production is purely and simply desiring-production itself
under determinate conditions” (AO 29). What constitutes the “determinate conditions” comes
about through a process of coding.
For Deleuze and Guattari, capitalism exists as a social machine that codes the “flows” of
desire. Coding assigns values to objects and behaviors, qualitative values that amount to what is
either desirable or undesirable in order to regulate the thoughts, opinions, and actions of
individuals regarding how to live the good life. However, they label capitalism as a system that is
“more pitiless than any other” because it introduces an exchange equivalent and substitutes an
“axiomatic of abstract quantities” in the form of money for the codes in order to “maintain the
energy of the flows in a bound state on the body of capital” (AO 246). Therefore, capitalism
possesses the ability to axiomatize, or operate on coded and decoded flows, through the cash
nexus in order to replace the old codings and “organize all the decoded flows . . . for the benefit
of the capitalist system and in the service of its ends” (AO 233). By replacing the contextual,
qualitative codes of certain objects and behaviors with abstract values, capital regulates the flows
of desire within a system of substitution and representation that abrogates any code that fails to
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Deleuze and Guattari, Anti-Oedipus, p. 24. They write, “The great discovery of psychoanalysis was that
of the production of desire, of the productions of the unconscious. But once Oedipus entered the picture,
this discovery was soon buried beneath a new brand of idealism: a classical theater was substituted for the
units of production of the unconscious; and an unconscious that was capable of nothing but expressing
itself – in myth, tragedy, dreams – was substituted for the productive unconscious” (24).
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naturally progress capitalism’s agenda to create surplus value.283 The objects and behaviors are
detached from authentic desire and replaced with abstract quantities. This in turn influences the
activity of individuals within society because desire is detached from its object and replaced by
feelings of lack. Because of the capitalist formation of desire, social agencies subject desire to a
formulation of need and introduce the “abject fear of lacking something” into its citizenry (AO
27).
Capitalist society then corrals individuals towards an economic and consumerist belief
system that destroys desire in its free-form. In this way, authentic desire is repressed. Deleuze
and Guattari call desire in its free-form “schizoanalysis,” the death of capital from within. They
claim that capitalism creates a “schizophrenic charge” because it decodes the coded flows of
desire in order to axiomatize them under the exchange equivalent of the cash nexus. Capitalism
not only codes desire, but it also decodes and deterritorializes the flows in capitalist production.
They define “decoding” as “understanding and translating a code,” and additionally, as the
“destroying” of the code (AO p. 245), whereas “deterritorialization” is the process of “coming
undone” (AO 322).284 So capitalism only frees up the flows of desire from coding in order to bind
them to the law of cash value (in this way they are decoded, deterritorialized, and recoded or
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reterritorialized).285 However, at moments within this process, desire is decoded and is
potentially free from any codes, capital or other. Schizoanalysis thus has a revolutionary
potential because it is capitalism’s difference, “its death.”286
I argue that what Deleuze and Guattari refer to as “schizoanalysis” or “the plane of
immanence,” defined as an unimpeded, unfazed movement of flows through a coded socius that
attempts to regulate the flows, represents the authentic. In discussing the Body Without Organs
(BwO), they write, “The body without organs is not a projection; it has nothing whatsoever to do
with the body itself, or an image of the body,” and it belongs to the “realm of antiproduction,”
which means that the BwO serves as the “surface for the recording of the entire process of
production of desire” (AO 11). It exists in tension with the socius by establishing a
“counterflow” that attempts to prevent the productive activity of desiring-production under the
determinate conditions, or, to thwart the organ-ization that imposes a specific, goal-oriented
regime. In A Thousand Plateaus, they write, “The BwO is the field of immanence of desire, the
plane of consistency specific to desire (with desire defined as a process of production without
reference to any exterior agency, whether it be a lack that hollows it out or a pleasure that fills
it).”287 The “schizo,” then, traverses the BwO, the “plane of immanence,” which is the surface of
inscription in the coding process, and schizoanalysis as a process involves mobility – what
Deleuze and Guattari call the schizophrenic escape or “lines of flight.” They propose, “The
choice is between one of two poles, the paranoiac counterescape that motivates all the conformist,
reactionary, and fascisizing investments, and the schizophrenic escape convertible into a
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revolutionary investment.” This process does not lead to an impassionate escape; Deleuze and
Guattari place the term in a positive context, stating, “Courage consists, however, in agreeing to
flee rather than live tranquilly and hypocritically in false refuges” (AO 341).288 Movement, then,
across the social field of inscription is one way to challenge the coding of the socius that leads to
“conformist” and “reactionary” behavior.
Deleuze and Guattari even mention Jack Kerouac, as “the artist possessing the soberest of
means who took revolutionary ‘flight’” (AO 277-278). Kerouac is an example, Deleuze and
Guattari point out, of “men who know how to leave, to scramble the codes, to cause flows to
circulate, to traverse the body without organs. They overcome a limit, they shatter a wall, the
capitalist barrier,” and “through the impasses and the triangles a schizophrenic flow moves,
irresistibly” (AO 132-133).289 The characters, Sal Paradise and Dean Moriarty, exhibit the
schizophrenic process laid out by Deleuze and Guattari by fleeing the coded territories in search
for an authentic desire that is not encoded by an outside agency – they are desiring-machines
exposing the theater of representation, and through their mobility and resistance, they push back
on the limits of the capitalist machine that produces inauthenticity. Sal and Dean desire an
authentic existence, which Kerouac (inadvertently) describes in Deleuzian fashion as a way of life
that resists the postwar “delusionary world-work and fake imagination . . . [which manufactures]
imaginary goods for the world’s impure attachments,” and rejects consumer society’s inclination
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to “multiply imaginary needs and obeisance to the outside Society.”290 In an era of containment
that focused on the home and domesticity, On the Road celebrates a mobility discourse, one that
scrambles the politics of containment and the cultural dynamics purveyed by a mass consumerist
society.
The most explicit Cold War passage of the text occurs when Dean and Sal are driving
through Washington in 1949 on the day of Harry Truman’s second inauguration, placing the
narrative within the historical context of the postwar period. After commenting on the “great
displays . . . of war material that looked murderous in the snowy grass,” the narrative reads, “We
suddenly found ourselves trapped in a circular drive from which there was no exit. We had to go
to the end of it. We huzzahed” (135-136). Here, there exists a literal sense of containment – they
find themselves “trapped,” or “contained” with no exit in this localized setting, and more
importantly, they are trapped in a precise time and locale – this historical moment documented by
times of war. Countering the feeling of containment in a literal context, but connected to the
political association in this passage, is their movement as a form of resistance. Containment
culture’s impact is felt in this scene with the display of military equipment in service of the
Truman Administration’s goal to stifle communist expansion, but also, Dean, Sal, and the gang
feel stifled as well. They look for a way out of this communal act of political recognition and
when they find it, they “huzzahed,” or shout in celebration for a way out.
The narrative reports the ensuing “huzza: ‘“Whooee!’ yelled Dean. ‘Here we go!’ And he
hunched over the wheel and gunned her; he was back in his element, everybody could see that.
We were all delighted, we all realized we were leaving confusion and nonsense behind and
performing our one and noble function of the time, move. And we moved!” (134). What Kerouac
accomplishes in the narrative is the infusion of the social and cultural meanings of containment
into the gang’s movement, creating an authentic form of mobility that pushes against the forces of
containment culture. The politicized culture that the narrative amplifies only causes the
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characters a state of “confusion” as they witness “nonsense”: the “B-29s, PT boats, [and]
artillery” overshadowed the “regular small ordinary lifeboat that looked pitiful and foolish” (136).
Aside from its literal name, the narrative juxtaposes the war equipment with the lifeboat and Dean
“shakes his head in awe” for, they cannot ally their values and way of life with the “great displays
of war might” for public viewing in Washington, and this discord serves as an impetus to move.
Sal’s reflection of movement as a “function of the time” captures the social significance of
Kerouac’s road novel in the postwar period, and his description of movement as “noble” invests it
with meaning and authenticity. More importantly, this scene establishes the cultural
(containment) context and the significance of the event that follows, for after they leave the
decorous Presidential inauguration, they are stopped by authority figures and treated as criminals
on account of their mobility.
Not long after Dean, Sal, Marylou, and Ed Dunkel witness the political symbols of
Truman’s inauguration and desire to move, they are stopped by the police who could “smell jail”
all over Dean. Initially, the officers question Marylou, inquiring as to how old she was – “they
were trying to whip up a Mann Act idea. But she had her marriage certificate” (136). The police
officers interpret the gang’s mobility within a particular context – an unlawful and felonious one,
for the Mann Act was designed to “protect women and girls from forced prostitution and sex
trafficking” by making it “illegal to transport, or cause the transport of, women over state lines for
the purposes of prostitution, debauchery, or ‘any other immoral purpose.’”291 Thus, the novel’s
mobility in this scene connects to containment culture because Dean is labeled as a detractor who
represents a threat to Marylou’s well-being and furthermore, the fabric of an American society
that values domesticity.
Eventually, Marylou’s official marriage certificate exonerates Dean, but not after the
officers respond to the legal documentation with more questions as to whom was really
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“sleeping” with her. The officers finally fine Dean “twenty-five dollars,” and when Dean objects
to the fine, the cop “threatened to take him back to Pennsylvania and slap a special charge on
him.” Dean objects, ‘“What charge?’ ‘Never mind what charge. Don’t worry about that, wise
guy”’ (136). After settling the dispute, Sal reflects, “The American police are involved in
psychological warfare against those Americans who don’t frighten them with imposing papers
and threats. It’s a Victorian police force; it peers out of musty windows and wants to inquire
about everything, and can make crimes if the crimes don’t exist to its satisfaction” (137). Here,
when domestic containment fails to tame the natures of individuals like Sal and Dean because
they take to the road and leave the home, the narrative reports another strategy of containment –
the concerted effort to “sniff” out any illegal activity, even if none exists, among a band of
vagrants in order to contain them.
It is against this backdrop that the novel’s mobility functions. After dealing with the
police, the narrative reports that the group drives onward, on the “magical road,” exploring the
“golden land,” and it is this socially invested mobility that represents authenticity, for they
discuss “the goodness and joy of life,” with Dean exclaiming, “Now dammit, look here, all of
you, we all must admit that everything is fine and there’s no need in the world to worry, and in
fact we should realize what it would mean to us to UNDERSTAND that we’re not REALLY
worried about ANYTHING” (135). This feeling that “everything will be fine” represents the
“pearl” that the narrative mentions in passing, the pearl representing the authenticity the novel
endorses as Sal affirms, “[Dean] and I saw the whole country like an oyster for us to open; and
the pearl was there, the pearl was there” (138).
Dean’s insistence that “everything will be fine” also speaks against a popular
containment narrative couched in capitalist and consumerist ideologies, and connects to
Deleuze’s argument about desire and lack. Social production, according to Deleuze and Guattari,
manipulates desire with “determinate conditions,” meaning, rather than allowing desire to flow in
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free-form (i.e. uncoded, undirected), social production substitutes lack for an attainable object.
For instance, Deleuze and Guattari write,
Lack is created, planned, and organized in and through social production. It is
counterproduced as a result of the pressure of antiproduction; the latter falls back on the
forces of production and appropriates them. It is never primary; production is never
organized on the basis of a pre-existing need or lack. It is lack that infiltrates itself,
creates empty spaces or vacuoles, and propagates itself in accordance with the
organization of an already existing organization of production. The deliberate creation of
lack as a function of market economy is the art of a dominant class. This involves
deliberately organizing wants and needs amid an abundance of production; making all of
desire teeter and fall victim to the great fear of not having one’s needs satisfied; and
making the object dependent upon a real production that is supposedly exterior to desire
(the demands of rationality), while at the same time the production of desire is
categorized as fantasy and nothing but fantasy. (AO 28)
In other words, “antiproduction” appropriates desire by rerouting desire into the realm of fantasy,
making the object appear to be attainable, only to vanish amidst the “fear of not having one’s
needs met” over and over again in production. The dominant social codes and the dominant
systematic flows of desire, along with the ambivalent exchange method of the market economy,
creates the “vacuoles” of lack and fear of not having one’s desire met. However, antiproduction
works to create a reality “exterior to desire” so that individuals become victims to a fantasized
pursuit of some object, all the while the capitalist machine reinvests the forces of production back
into the system. Antiproduction, then, inhibits individuals from functioning as autonomous
beings or desiring freely by manifesting fear and lack amongst the citizenry. An extremely
representative passage in On the Road, but an often overlooked one, especially in terms of its
commentary on desire, fleshes out this point.

190
After reaching California, Dean and Sal decide to head back east and hitch a ride with a
“typical halfway tourist” couple out of San Francisco headed to Denver. Dean and Sal are in the
back of the car sharing childhood visions about when they would ride in cars and imagine that
they would cut the landscape with “scythes,” and it is this schizophrenic energy that accompanies
their mobility in the scene. Furthermore, the authenticity of the moment further represents desire
in a free-form state, for they have no worries. The narrative reads, “We were telling these things
and both sweating. We had completely forgotten the people up front who had begun to wonder
what was going on in the back seat. At one point the driver said, ‘For God’s sakes, you’re
rocking the boat back there.’ Actually we were; the car was swaying as Dean and I both swayed
to the rhythm and the IT of our final excited joy in talking and living to the blank tranced end of
all innumerable riotous angelic particulars that had been lurking in our souls all our lives” (209).
Afterward, Dean “whispered, clutching [Sal’s] sleeve, sweating”:
“Now you just dig them in front. They have worries, they’re counting the miles, they’re
thinking about where to sleep tonight, how much money for gas, the weather, how they’ll
get there – and all the time they’ll get there anyway, you see. But they need to worry and
betray time with urgencies false and otherwise, purely anxious and whiny, their souls
really won’t be at peace unless they can latch on to an established and proven worry and
having once found it they assume facial expressions to fit and go with it, which is, you
see, unhappiness, and all the time it all flies by them and they know it and that too
worries them to no end. Listen! Listen! ‘Well now,’ he mimicked, ‘I don’t know –
maybe we shouldn’t get gas in that station. I read recently in National Petroffious
Petroleum News that this kind of gas has a great deal of O-Octane gook in it and someone
once told me it even had a semi-official high-frequency cock in it, and I don’t know, well
I just don’t feel like it anyway…’ Man, you dig all this.” He was poking me furiously in
the ribs to understand. (209-210)
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This scene contrasts the earlier scene in the car when Dean, Sal, Marylou, and Ed Dunkel are
leaving the “nonsense and confusion” behind and Dean says that there is nothing to worry about.
The tourists desire these things because they lack them, or at the very least, they are led to believe
that they lack them and hence, their desire is produced. Dean points out their worry in terms of
navigating the way to their destination, but states, “all the time they’ll get there anyway,” which
nulls the lack that is “created, planned, and organized” through social production by institutions
such as the “National Petroffious Petroleum News.” The lack is not a preexisting need, but a
result of the “already existing organization of production” in the fuel industry within a capitalist
economy (in relation to this narrative scene). Dean possesses the revolutionary power of the
schizo because he can see the process at work as he navigates the social field, commenting on the
tourists’ “need for urgencies false or otherwise.”
The important point to note here about this passage is that Kerouac is amplifying
narrative action and character reactions to Dean that reflect the postwar containment narrative of
what a “good citizen” is like. Good citizens are like the tourist couple, concerned with worries
and anxieties that are tied to capitalist ideology (i.e. paying for gasoline, procuring a secured
place for rest – an abode), and good citizens are able to recognize “delinquency.” Dean had
become absolutely “mad,” or schizophrenic, in his movements; later, when he is driving, Dean
“hurled the Plymouth head-on at a truck,” “wobbled and hovered in front of it,” “swung away at
the last moment,” “balled right through the desert … demonstrating various ways of how not to
drive” (211). The tourists, who are locked in the system of capitalist social production, are in a fit
of terror and tell Sal, “We can’t let him drive any more, he’s absolutely crazy, they must have let
him out of an insane asylum or something” (211).
While Dean functions as the schizo in this scene, the tourists are representative of
individuals who are ensconced in a capitalist system that manufactures needs. For instance,
Deleuze and Guattari charge “The State” for forming a “gigantic enterprise of antiproduction,”
that creates “an equivalent flow of stupidity . . . that ensures the integration of groups and
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individuals into the system. Not only lack amid overabundance, but stupidity in the midst of
knowledge and science” (AO 236). Here, the tourists’ desire is not allowed to realize its capacity
because it is redirected towards a fear of procuring gas, lodging, and other sundry needs they feel
they have not attained. Antiproduction causes the disconnect between Dean’s desire and the
tourists’ desire because it does not allow for a mutually affective relation between them in terms
of desire.
In other words, Kerouac uses the narrative to amplify, not only Sal’s inability to
recognize this current social strategy, but others who are caught up in a capitalist society as well.
At one point in On the Road, Sal engages with Old Bull Lee and Lee touches upon this notion of
antiproduction. Sal refers to him as a “teacher” who imparts the “facts of life,” but clarifies Lee
is an individual who learned “not only out of necessity but because he wanted to” (143). This is
an important distinction that relies on the concept of “necessity.” For instance, Old Bull Lee tells
Sal that he is going to produce a shelf that will “last a thousand years!” Following this
declaration, Lee places this in a Deleuzian context of desire:
“Why, Sal, do you realize the shelves they build these days crack under the weight of
knickknacks after six months or generally collapse? Same with houses, same with
clothes. These bastards have invented plastics by which they could make houses that last
forever. And tires. Americans are killing themselves by the millions every year with
defective rubber tires that get hot on the road and blow up. They could make tires that
never blow up. . . . Same with clothes. They can make clothes that last forever. They
prefer making cheap goods so’s everybody’ll have to go on working and punching
timeclocks and organizing themselves in sullen unions and floundering around while the
big grab goes on in Washington and Moscow.” (149-150)
Here Old Bull Lee juxtaposes products of inferior quality against the unrealized potentiality of
currently nonexistent products in order to focus on lack. What the existing products of shelves,
clothes, and tires lack is the potential to last beyond a timeframe predicated on “general use.”
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What is interesting to note in this passage is Sal’s unawareness of this predicament that is
narratively couched in Old Bull Lee’s “wisdom” and educational moment of the passage. The
narrative illustrates both the lack of knowledge of the masses and also the lack of quality of the
products in current circulation. The point of this passage is not a statement solely on the
materiality of goods in American society, but about the fact that there is an intentional social
production that creates a lack of knowledge among the individuals in society, and simultaneously
fosters the desire to continually invest labor power (“punch time clocks”) in order to purchase
products that keep the capitalist flows of desire circulating. In essence, the capitalist and
consumer-based society lures individuals into its system of “lack amid overabundance” and
entices them into a slavish pursuit of expenses, as Kerouac iterated earlier. And, as Kerouac also
points out, this way of life causes individuals to “want” dishonestly, and to live inauthentically
because “money is false.”

4) “Everyone in America Just Consumes”: “The Valueless Abyss of Modern Life”292
Kerouac’s narratives of desire in On the Road amplify the increasing moral and spiritual
bankruptcy in American postwar society. Bankruptcy is a fitting word because Kerouac sets up
an exchange discourse of give and take, with space invested with authenticity, versus an
American culture that can “rob” the individual of authentic meaning, culminating in a reflection
in which Sal compares the gains and losses that result from authentic vs. inauthentic movement.
Perhaps no other passage better captures the (in)authentic embedded in the interplay of
desire, containment culture, and mobility than Kerouac/Sal’s description of an American tourist
292
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family “on the road.” In the Original Scroll version, Kerouac reflects upon what he refers to as a
“typical” American family, and while he is making a generalization, in a social climate that called
for conformity, the typical members of this family are made to represent every-man/woman/ boy
/girl in postwar American society. In this scene, the epideictic critique begins by amplifying the
family’s desires in order for Kerouac to reveal the spiritual bankruptcy of America, made up of
families similar to the one under discussion and with similar socially manufactured desires. He
reflects,
Whole families that had driven from the country in old jalopies went put-put-put across
Sunset and Vine with their eager faces searching everywhere for movie stars. All they
saw was other families in other jalopies doing the same thing. They came from Okie flats
outside Bakersfield, San Diego, Fresno, and San Berdoo; they read movie magazines; the
little boys wanted to see Hopalong Cassidy conducting his great white horse across the
traffic; the little girls wanted to see Lana Turner in a deep embrace with Robt. Taylor in
front of Whelan’s; the mothers wanted to see Walter Pidgeon in tophat and tails bowing
at them from the curb; the fathers – gaunt crazy jalopy Americans – scented money in the
air. They were ready to sell their daughters to the highest bidder. On the sidewalk
characters swarmed. Everybody was looking at everybody else. It was the end of the
continent, no more land. Somebody had tipped the American continent like a pinball
machine and all the goofballs had come rolling to LA in the southwest corner. I cried for
all of us. There was no end to the American sadness and the American madness.
Someday we’ll all start laughing and roll on the ground when we realize how funny it’s
been. Until then there is a lugubrious seriousness I love in all this. (OS 206)
To begin with, Kerouac was not impressed with the Hollywood machine, and he had commented
on Hollywood throughout his career because both films and books capture moments in time, but

of which “are the result of more or less the same conviction – namely that the valueless abyss of modern
life is unbearable.”
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he felt that writing retained a more authentic vision.293 For instance, he refuses to talk to a
“Hollywood Starlet” about “love” after a performance on the Steve Allen Show “because in
Hollywood man love is for sale,” and Hollywood is full of “fuffoonery and charaderess (sic).”294
In this Road passage, the members of the typical American family composed of mother, father,
daughter, and son are depicted as desiring inauthentic objects of desire that are socially produced
by Hollywood. Kerouac’s passage represents epideictic discourse because it critiques a postwar
desire for “ersatz facsimile.” This passage serves as a value judgment as it observes and critiques
the behaviors and actions of others who choose to desire false representations of authentic values.
Furthermore, Kerouac’s response to the behavior of the typical American family is critical as
indicated in his negative language.
He begins by depicting the boys as desiring to witness the aura of Hopalong Cassidy,
which is socially manufactured in a realm of theatricality, and with this association, Kerouac
comments on the social production of desires within the cinematic and the capital system at large.
In the book, He was Some Kind of Man: Masculinity in B Westerns, Roderick McGillis discusses
William Boyd’s (who played Hopalong Cassidy) awareness of his role to young boys and girls
and how he therefore endorsed certain behavioral principles that he solicited as the “Creed for
293

See Ann Charters, Kerouac: A Biography. San Francisco: Straight Arrow Books, 1973, p. 123. Charters
references correspondence between Kerouac and Ginsberg in which Kerouac considers moving
permanently to San Francisco, stating he could get a job in Hollywood for $100 “if he wanted it, but he
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For instance, in Big Sur, Kerouac reflects on a time when he was asked to rehearse a reading for the
Steve Allen Show, and afterwards, the studio sends him out with “a Hollywood starlet” who reads her
poetry to Kerouac, who refuses to talk to her about love “because in Hollywood man love is for sale.” He
writes, “the hell with the hot lights of Hollywood” (Big Sur 24-25).
Additionally, in Visions of Cody, there is a section in which Kerouac recounts a time when he stumbled
across the filming of the 1952 Joan Crawford film, Sudden Fear. In describing the filming, he observes
that the entire crew of technicians, camera operators, and directors work together to produce the film, but
all of their effort and contributions are not seen in the finished product, a point demonstrated by the fist line
of the section, “Joan Shawshanks stands all alone in the fog” (Visions of Cody 275). He concludes that the
film crew makes the “backbone of Hollywood for the movies [and they] have nothing now but great
technique to show, …[an] imposed but useful and will-get-you-there (ho ho) task huddled in the night
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American Boys and Girls.” Among these principles included, “Your parents are the best friends
you have. Listen to them and obey their instructions”; “Only through hard work and study can
you succeed. Don’t be lazy”; “Our country’s laws are made for your protection. Observe them
carefully”; and “Children in many foreign lands are less fortunate than you. Be glad and proud
you are an American.”295 What this list of “commandments” amounts to is a manifesto of what it
means and looks like to behave as a “good citizen.” The examples listed speak to American
values of obedience, loyalty, and the American dream, values inculcated in an era of containment.
Here, Cassidy takes on a very important social and political role in educating future adult
citizens on these values, and in that sense, he becomes the epideictic rhetor shaping communal
values. Furthermore, McGillis points out that for boys and girls growing up in the 1950s who
wanted to show their affection for Cassidy, there was no shortage of products that could endorse
this affection and loyalty, such as pistols, board games, and in a chapter fittingly titled,
“Corporate Cowboys and the Shaping of a Nation,” he concludes a long list with the sentiment,
“Hoppy’s name and face appeared on just about anything you could imagine,” illustrating the
connection between containment culture’s value-laden project within capitalist regimes.296
However, Kerouac’s treatment of Hopalong Cassidy and the typical American family in this
passage engages epideictic discourse, for it criticizes the values as inauthentic, for the values are
doing their work behind the fuffoonery and charaderees of Hollywood so mad.” Ultimately, Kerouac
questions the authentic reality of the whole filmmaking industry (Visions of Cody, 284).
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personified in the figure and character of Hopalong Cassidy who is a product of Hollywood, and
the imagery he presents of Hopalong Cassidy “conducting his great white horse across the traffic”
is something the boys expect and wish to see, but would prove to be quite a spectacle if it were to
occur.
Kerouac then challenges the packaged romance of Lana Turner and Robert Taylor by
referencing them together in the film Johnny Eager. Writer Margarita Landazuri points out that
Turner and Taylor were “two of the most beautiful faces ever to appear onscreen [and] were
dynamite in their one and only film together.” Landazuri also mentions how the “steamy onscreen
chemistry carried over to real life, as the married Taylor fell hard for the . . . 21-year old blonde
bombshell.”297 What is interesting to note here is Kerouac’s choice of these two Hollywood actors
to represent the desire for romantic love. Kerouac could have chosen from a myriad of actors and
actresses for this passage,298 but instead he chose two individuals who appeared in only one film
together as representing authentic romantic love, which is further significant due to the fact that
they had a real-life romance; however, Taylor was married, and Landazuri points out that Taylor
“told his wife he was in love with Turner and asked for a divorce.” At the time, Taylor was thirtysix and Turner twenty-one, and, as Elaine May points out, guidebooks suggested twenty-one as a
recommended age for marriage, and popular opinion agreed.299 What’s more, May provides an
exemplary couple, Joseph and Emily Burns, in order to illustrate the marital values of the midcentury, quoting Joseph as valuing “honesty” and “obedience to the Ten Commandments,” which
includes a forbiddance on adultery; and Emily as possessing “the desire to give up all for the love
of one.”300 Additionally, May affirms that postwar Americans “were determined to get married
297
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and stay married,” citing sociologist Andrew Cherlin as indicating that postwar married couples
were the only ones to “show a substantial, sustained shortfall in their lifetime levels of
divorce.”301 Seeing as Taylor was married, along with his desire to divorce his wife for Turner,
this “romance” constituted an immoral one for 1950s American society, another sign of
Hollywood’s errant influence.
In a similar vein, Kerouac portrays the wife as desiring the courtly behavior of Walter
Pidgeon, whose “urbane, unruffled manner” and the “gentle, intelligent charm” of Greer Garson
made the “perfect screen pair” and won over film viewers in the eight films they made
together.302 Impressively, Kerouac here juxtaposes the polite and polished character of Walter
Pidgeon with the “real” husband, representative of the “gaunt crazy jaloppy” (sic) Americans and
their desolate and gloomy behavior of “selling their daughters to the highest bidder,” a
reprehensible act that readers can assume the noble Walter Pidgeon would never conceive of.
The father is also depicted as the head of the family, captaining the American jalopy to
Hollywood. Here, the family is a mobile unit, but their desire is based on lack, and as a result,
they desire inauthentically. Kerouac had stated that society was “evil,” it was a “mistake,” that
Americans want “falsely” and slave after money and expenses. In this passage, Kerouac
mentions the “lugubrious seriousness” of this, connecting earlier to his sentiments of “moaning
for man” in the “sad drama of the American night.” He appreciates the quest for the authentic, but
mourns the current state of inauthentic values circulating in America.
After Sal finally returns to the East after moving around the country with Dean, he
reflects upon the different “return of investments” of road life against that of the hustling and
bustling New York scene. He ruminates, “I had my HOME to go to, my place to lay my head
301
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down and figure the losses and figure the gain that I knew was in there somewhere too” (107).
Sal notes,
Suddenly I found myself on Times Square. I had traveled eight thousand miles around the
American continent and I was back on Times Square; and right in the middle of a rush
hour, too, seeing with my innocent road-eyes the absolute madness and fantastic hoorair
of New York with its millions and millions hustling forever for a buck among
themselves, the mad dream – grabbing, taking, giving, sighing, dying, just so they could
be buried in those awful cemetery cities beyond Long Island City. The high towers of the
land – the other end of the land, the place where Paper America is born. (107)
Here is where Kerouac incorporates an epideictic discourse through his rhetoric of desire. He
amplifies and juxtaposes Sal and Dean’s road desire with that of a capitalistic desire in order to
critique the current state of postwar American consumers’ socially produced desire. His
“innocent road eyes” provide that epideictic critique as they are unaccustomed to the values
celebrated in Times Square after moving around the country with Dean. The passage pits
containment and movement against each other. While there is movement unfolding in Times
Square, it is taking place within that geographical point. Even the literal name of the location as a
“square” speaks to the containment within this narrative activity. Times Square is a very precise
and minuscule plot of land within the nation. Sal and Dean’s mobility occurs outside of these
confines, and this display of inauthenticity in Times Square will serve as the catalyst for Sal’s
desire for mobility, the road, and the authentic.
Thus, the portrayal of a large aggregate of individuals in Times Square represents the
American desire for wealth, for the narrative describes the actions of the individuals in an
American capitalist context as following the “mad dream,” a comment on the erroneous, and
failed, American dream, as well as a rare instance of a negative usage of the word “mad.” “Paper
America” too is an allusion to the consumerist society that is emerging in the postwar years and
refers to an industrial-capitalist machine. Sal associates the ultimate end of their mission to being
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buried in the “awful cemeteries,” suggesting that such a life will incur no value or meaning
ironically. As another example, in the Original Scroll, Kerouac reflects similarly on the city of
Detroit. He calls Detroit a “sullen town,” and he describes it further, “actually one of the worst
towns possible in America. It’s nothing but miles and miles of factories and the downtown
section is no bigger than downtown Troy N.Y. except the population is way up in millions.
Everybody thinks about money, money, money” (343 OG).
In both of these passages depicting what Kerouac typifies as the American City and the
American Dream, Kerouac is “presaging the ghostly day when industrial America shall be
abandoned and left to rust in one long Sunday Afternoon of oblivion.”303 While Sal does not
come out and utter it directly, with his connection to the “cemeteries” and ghost-town future or
doom of Times Square akin to his description of Detroit, the scene amplified in New York incurs
more loss if one keeps track of the gains and the losses. As a case in point, at the end of the
Times Square scene, Sal even mentions that he and his aunt “decided to buy a new electric
refrigerator with the money [he] had sent her from California; it was to be the first in the family”
(107), amplifying a commodity that connects to the domestic ideology of containment culture’s
household consumerist agenda. However, Sal mentions that he cannot sleep that night and the
narrative constructs a very somber feel as the chapter closes, noting that with the departure of
Dean from his life, “Now it was too late and I had also missed Dean” (108). After focusing on
Times Square and the purchase of an electric refrigerator, the very next section leads into the next
journey on the road with his compatriot: “now the bug was on me again, and the bug’s name was
Dean Moriarty and I was off on another spurt around the road” (115). Here the narrative pits an
economic and status gain against road life. What Sal gains, and what Kerouac ultimately
celebrates though, is a “new vision,” a “new more,” connected to authenticity that stands out
against Times Square and the “valueless abyss” of consumer culture.
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5) On the Road and the Process of Becoming-Authentic
Containment culture attempted to create a nation of “good citizens” that conformed to
narratives that fostered a secure sense of homogeneity. As Deleuze and Guattari show, social
conventions and institutions that enforce a framework for social relations engage in
antiproduction in order to remain unaffected. Containment culture coded certain ways of life as
commendable, and other behaviors as illegitimate, and in this way, the individual had a difficult
time in affecting or shaping the fixed relations and fixed values of the postwar period.304
However Kerouac endorsed an authenticity that “dug” the unrealized potentialities of desire that
resulted when Sal and Dean encountered differences – that-which-is-other-than containment
culture’s ideal.
One scene in which Kerouac pits Sal and Dean’s authentic desire against containment
culture’s conformist desire is when Sal and Dean discuss living as hobos. In part Four, Dean is
living in New York with his third wife, Inez, and for the first time, Sal realizes he is leaving Dean
behind as he prepares once again to head West. The narrative reports that Dean “was reduced to
simple pleasures,” as Dean expresses to Sal, “That’s Inez . . . Oh, I’ve talked with her and we’ve
got everything straightened out most beautifully. We’re going to go and live on a farm in
Pennsylvania this summer . . . and have lots of kids in the next few years” (250). Dean is talking
about owning a home, having children, settling down, all the makings of the “good citizen” in the
postwar period. However, Sal mentions an important aspect of Dean’s character, specifically,
how this version of Dean is not authentic. The narrative reads, “It didn’t seem to fit Dean. He
looked more like himself huddling in the cold, misty spray of the rain on empty Madison Avenue
at night” (250).
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Sal describes Dean as a vagrant or hobo and the qualities that the narrative amplifies are
significant because of the repression of authenticity that containment culture promotes. They
engage in the following discussion:
Dean: “You see man, you get older and troubles pile up. Someday you and me’ll be
coming down an alley together at sundown and looking in the cans to see.”
“You mean we’ll end up old bums?”
“Why not, man? Of course we will if we want to, and all that. There’s no harm
ending that way. You spend a whole life of noninterference with the wishes of others,
including politicians and the rich, and nobody bothers you and you cut along and make it
your own way.” I agreed with him. He was reaching his Tao decisions in the simplest
direct way. “What’s your road, man? – holyboy road, madman road, rainbow road,
guppy road, any road. It’s an anywhere road for anybody anyhow. Where body how?
[…] You’ve seen me try and break my ass to make it and you know that it doesn’t matter
and we know time – how to slow it up and walk and dig and just old fashioned spade
kicks, what other kicks are there? We know.” (251, italics added)
The praiseworthy characteristics of the hobo include mobility and a desire that is untouched by
social conditioning. Dean acknowledges that hobos are unfazed by politicians and social
normative behavior, such as domestic ideology encourages – marriage, family, and the home. A
hobo can “make his own way,” or, live his life authentically by detaching his desire from any
type of interference from others. In this passage, the pattern of the societal relationship of
marriage between husband and wife is interfering with Dean’s authenticity and with his desire to
journey on the road with Sal – Dean as the husband should be “breaking his ass” to “make end’s
meat,” while Inez, the wife, is also “contained” by the script of the mother-figure who should
birth their children and stay home to take care of them.
Of course, Kerouac’s novel presents the gendered assignments that containment culture
promotes in terms of the road versus the home, for Sal and Dean are the masculine figures who
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take to the road, while the women are either left at the home to tend to the children, or represent
“passengers” in the masculine automobile of “kicks.” As Sidonie Smith notes, On the Road is the
“quintessential tale” of “man, auto, motion, and masculinity.” She reveals how the car provides
the opportunity for men to escape domestic responsibilities and work obligations, and in On the
Road, “‘girls’ enter the narrative as passengers in automobiles, passengers in the ride of life.” I
agree with Smith regarding the way in which the mid-century viewed the automobile, the road,
and gendered identities in relation to the car and motion, but I disagree with her overall
evaluation claiming that “an integral part of [On the Road’s] journeys and that narrative is the
‘making’ of girls.”305
I speculate that part of the problem most likely stems from the identities of the novel’s
protagonists. Dean is married to three different women (Marylou, Camille, and Inez). And when
Smith discusses the road as a way for the man to escape domesticity, while the woman is
“dependent and sessile,” having “no place and no way to go” but to stay at home, which is then
representative of “a site not of leisure, consumption, and pleasure, but of dead-end dreams and
captivity,” the reader can certainly think of Inez in this situation.306 However, Sal is not married,
and as the narrator, he includes a perspective of road life that, while it captures the gendered
dynamics of the postwar period, it remains more focused on the social implications of mobility.
For instance, Smith points out how the automobile is “associated with male sexual prowess” and
she asserts, “with cars, men can pick women up, feel them up, knock them up. In front seats and
backseats they can assert their attractiveness to women and their power over them.”307 While I am
not trying to argue that On the Road is not a text full of masculinity, I am pointing out that the
type of sexual prowess that Smith discusses in relation to the automobile is hardly the central
focus of the novel. Rather, the novel is better understood as a commentary of the social
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production of desire in an era of containment that constructed the home as the immobile base of
operations. Kerouac’s narrative captures a resistant ethos from a male perspective only, whereas
Beverly Donofrio’s autobiography, Riding in Cars with Boys, provides a female perspective
regarding the home and mobility from a female perspective, albeit a decade later and from a
younger perspective.308 Nonetheless, Kerouac describes how Dean ultimately rejects the
containment narrative of domestic stability, and instead, tells Sal he “ain’t a man ‘less he’s a
jumpin man,” and that “no matter where I live, my trunk’s always sticking out from under the
bed, I’m ready to leave or get thrown out” (251). In this way, he overcodes the containment
narrative of domesticity by desiring mobility, which calls for a departure from the home in opting
for the road. The road again is the object that offers the authentic, for it opens up potentiality as it
can be “any road.” Dean comments on how they “know time,” they know how to “slow it up”
and “dig kicks,” and it is through this language that On the Road (over)codes desire and the
authentic.
One of the references to the authentic in On the Road is through the ambiguous and
elusive referent of “IT.” In the back of a tourist car, hitching a ride, Dean tells Sal that the alto
man the previous night had “IT.” The narrative reads,
I wanted to know what “IT” meant. “Ah well” – Dean laughed –“now your asking me
impon-de-rables- ahem! Here’s a guy and everybody’s there, right? Up to him to put
down what’s on everybody’s mind. He starts the first chorus, then lines up his ideas,
people, yeah, yeah, but get it, and then he rises to his fate and has to blow equal to it. All
of a sudden somewhere in the middle of the chorus he gets it – everybody looks up and
knows; they listen; he picks it up and carries. Time stops. He’s filling empty space with
308
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the substance of lives, confessions of this bellybottom strain, remembrance of ideas,
rehashes of old blowing. He has to blow across bridges and come back and do it with
such infinite feeling soul-exploratory for the tune of the moment that everybody knows
it’s not the tune that counts but IT –” (207-208)
Ben Giamo refers to the moment of “IT” as a “transcendent state of pure excitement” that
“springs” Sal and Dean “from the prisoner house of calendar and clock into an eternal now”
through the act of “improvisation.”309 Jason Haslam also calls “IT” a “transcendental moment,”
one that is “epitomized in the road,” and “available through drugs and jazz,” but notes “ITS”
“community-building manner” and “form of universal communication.”310 Erik Mortenson also
touches upon the transcendental nature of “IT” as a product of jazz music, but points out that “IT”
symbolizes “empty space where time stops [and] brings together individuals to form a
collective.”311 Marco Abel points out a connection between “IT” and a Deleuzian becoming,
stating, “this ‘IT’ eludes Sal as long as he conceives of it as an object that can be attained,” but
that Sal “realizes that he has been encountering the ‘IT’ all along, since the mysterious ‘IT’
structures an algorithm for traveling, rather than being a code or symbol in need of
interpretation.” Abel claims “IT” only occurs “as the road itself, only in and as the process of
their becoming-road.”312
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However, I disagree with Abel that the novel features a “becoming-road” as if the road is
an extension of Sal and Dean, and instead I argue that the road is a pathway, the “plane of
immanence,” leading to authenticity. I assert that what “IT” represents is an authenticity that is
akin to a Deleuzian becoming-authentic, and one of the more important features in this process is
this notion of time – “Time stops.” The other important aspect of “IT” is this notion of change, of
a difference unfolding – the alto man “lines up his ideas,” and “somewhere” in space and time, he
“gets it,” and when this transpires, everybody knows a transformation has taken place. The alto
man fills the “empty space with the substance of lives.” Therefore, the authentic moment of the
“IT” consists of separate lives, separate histories coming together in the present moment when IT
has come to pass. “IT” and “knowing time” are both about consciousness, but in “knowing
time,” the alto man, Sal, and Dean are able to produce a reality. “IT” connects to the “new
vision,” the attempt to view the world in an authentic, meaningful way, pinpointing a new value
system that praises authenticity because “IT” evades fixed social parameters.
I argue that authenticity is what Deleuze and Guattari call in Anti-Oedipus an “intensive
state”: “There is a schizophrenic experience of intensive quantities in their pure state, to a point
that is almost unbearable – a celibate misery and glory experienced to the fullest, like a cry
suspended between life and death, an intense feeling of transition, states of pure, naked intensity
stripped of all shape and form” (AO 18). This “intensive state” relates to the moment of “IT”
Dean identifies in this passage. The alto man is – perhaps suffering is an acceptable term due its
emphasis on being overwhelmed by the intensity of a feeling – suffering from the moment of
experiencing “IT” as a “pure state” “stripped of all shape and form,” as Dean describes the
moment as filled with the “substance of lives,” meaning, in this context, many lived experiences
coming together, stripped of real or imaginary barriers that may disconnect one individual from
another. In other words, it is not the individual subject that matters, the alto player himself, but
the flows of life that come together in time. As Todd May points out, for Deleuze, “time is not a
psychological matter that belongs to a single individual. Rather, it is an ontological matter that
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lives itself through individuals psychologically.”313 Thus, time is perceived as constituting a
whole in which each instant is a component, and “IT” is a whole comprised of single instants that
are connected to one another. May argues that for Deleuze, the “content of time” is best
understood as a concept of difference: “Becoming is the unfolding of difference in time and as
time.”314
“Becoming,” then, regards the interplay of forces and energy amongst objects, peoples,
and ideas and the transition that occurs when these forces come together. In the social field,
individuals and social forces interact, and Deleuze and Guattari propose, “the opposition of the
forces of attraction and repulsion produces an open series of intensive elements, . . . that are never
an expression of the final equilibrium of a system, but consist, rather, of an unlimited number of
stationary, metastable states through which a subject passes” (AO 19). Thus, the individual is not
a stable construct remaining the same in the social field, but is, as Cliff Stagoll terms it, a
“changing assemblage of forces.”315 The alto man suspends time and he eliminates boundaries of
self and other – he fills the empty time and space and takes on the process of “putting down
what’s on everybody’s mind,” passing through the “metastable states” through the remembrance
of ideas, of people, as he goes through the “soul-exploratory” process that appears to cross over
the barriers of time and space.
313
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What Deleuze and Guattari call “intensive states,” then, are an integral component in the
process of becoming. The intensive states are comprised of “flows of intensity,” or affects, that
replace the world of the “subject.” Deleuze and Guattari explain,
These [intensive states] are often described as hallucinations and delirium, but the basic
phenomenon of hallucination (I see, I hear) and the basic phenomenon of delirium (I
think…) presupposes an I feel at an even deeper level, which gives hallucinations their
object and thought delirium its content – an “I feel that I am becoming a woman,” “that I
am becoming a god,” and so on, which is neither delirious nor hallucinatory, but will
project the hallucination or internalize the delirium. Delirium and hallucination are
secondary in relation to the really primary emotion, which in the beginning only
experiences intensities, becomings, transitions. (AO 18-19)
Later on, they write that the intensive emotion, “affect,” is “both the common root and the
principle of differentiation of deliriums and hallucinations” (AO 84). The affect takes precedence
in becomings and transitions, not the self. The self ceases to be the point of convergence, and the
intensive states, the movements, and the flows become the focal points. Deleuze and Guattari
“believe that everything commingles in these intense becomings, passages, and migrations – all
this drift that ascends and descends the flows of time: countries, races, families, parental
appellations, divine appellations, geographical and historical designations” (AO 85). Therefore,
there is no separate self, but a subject “who passes through a series of states, and who identifies
these states with the names of history” (AO 21).
Kerouac, in a letter to Allen Ginsberg in 1955 as he is writing On the Road and two years
before its publication, touches upon the connection between “IT” and becoming, focusing on the
“primary emotion” of “I feel.” While he is talking about reading Buddhist sutras, the concept of
315
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“Mind Essence / The One” appears in On the Road and correlates with the process of becoming
as it applies to a social context of authenticity. While riding on the subway, Kerouac writes,
I realized that everybody in the subway and all their thoughts and interests and the
subway itself and their poor shoes and gloves etc. and the cellophane paper on the floor
and the poor dust in the corners was all of one suchness and essence. I thought, “Mind
essence loves everything, because it knows why everything is.” And I saw that these
people, and myself to a lesser extent, all were buried in selfhood which we took to be real
. . . but the only real is the One, the One Essence that all’s made of, and so we also took
our limited and perturbed and contaminated minds (hankering after appointments,
worries, sorrows, love) to be our own True Mind, but I saw True Mind itself, Universal
and One, entertains no arbitrary ideas about these different seeming self-hangs on form,
mind is IT itself, the IT . . . 316
This letter is important because it describes, in more detail, Kerouac’s philosophy of “IT,” “Mind
Essence,” and “The One,” all of which represent the authentic, I argue. Similar to Dean’s
explanation of “IT,” this instance stops time – time becomes nonexistent in the moment Kerouac
is depicting. Furthermore, he fills the empty space of the subway and of the page with “the
substance of lives” – the other passengers, their thoughts and interests, ideas, etc., but everything
is interrelated. He also acknowledges the tendency of individuals to think of themselves as
separate selves, believing in a “false selfhood” which arises from social production of
“appointments” and “worries” and other social pursuits. Towards the end of this discussion, he
writes to Ginsberg, “This is not bullshit I really believe this and not only that I will prove it to you
at some time or other.” Sal will say something very similar to Dean in the novel, placing this
concept in an American postwar light, as the narrative reads, “I told Dean that the thing that
bound us all together in this world was invisible, and to prove it pointed to long lines of telephone
poles that curved off out of sight over the bend of a hundred miles of salt” (211). Sal reveals the
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interconnectivity of everything in the world that is at once “invisible,” but also mobile, evident by
the telephone lines that carry information across time and space.

6) “Down in Denver, down in Denver / All I did was die”:
Becoming and the “Penetration into the Heart of Things”317
First, the passage in On the Road that best emphasizes the nature of “becoming” and
authenticity is the “Denver colored section” scene. After he leaves Dean in a “sullen moment,”
Sal reflects while walking in the “Denver colored section,”
[…] wishing I were a Negro, feeling that the best the white world had offered was not
enough ecstasy for me, not enough life, joy, kicks, darkness, music, not enough night . . .
I wished I were a Denver Mexican, or even a poor overworked Jap, anything but what I
was so drearily, a “white man” disillusioned. All my life I’d had white ambitions . . . I
was only myself, Sal Paradise, sad, strolling in this violet dark, this unbearably sweet
night, wishing I could exchange worlds with the happy, true-hearted, ecstatic Negroes of
America. (180)
Critics tend to glean the racial insensitivity from the passage because it neglects the subjectivity
of African Americans and instead focuses on Sal Paradise’s appropriation. James Baldwin
commented on this narrative, stating that it is “absolute nonsense . . . offensive nonsense at that,”
but he notes, “yet there is real pain in it, and real loss, however thin; and it is thin, like soup too
long diluted; thin because it does not refer to reality, but to a dream.”318 And the subject, Baldwin
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would argue, is the dreamer himself rather than the lived realities of African Americans, making
Sal’s understanding of the world “diluted.” Robert Holton calls the passage “a sort of fantasized
racial version of cross-dressing” and compares it to “a peculiar inversion of the earlier AfricanAmerican concern with ‘passing,’” but notes, “Sal’s desire to be a ‘a Negro’ is a very different
matter since he is seeking downward mobility in the belief that life is fuller outside the confines
of a materialistic modern white America.”319 Brendon Nicholls also claims that the passage’s
representation of African Americans “sentimentalizes the carefree, musical, and ultimately
ahistorical ‘Negro.’”320 However, Nicholls is more sympathetic, pointing out that Kerouac was a
“a man divided against himself” who attempted to “map his marginal identity” by exploring his
racialized desire for African Americans, Native Americans, and Mexicans. As Nancy
McCampbell Grace points out, Kerouac possessed a “hybrid status” as the French-speaking son
of French-Canadian working class parents and experienced an identity crisis of his own.321
I agree with Baldwin and Holton that the passage is problematic, in one sense, due to the
fact that Sal fails to portray an awareness of the social oppression that led to racial exclusion, and
I most certainly agree that in passing, Kerouac fails to take into account the lived reality of black
individuals within American history. I also feel that the concept of “becoming” helps elucidate
the “pain and loss” that Kerouac is touching upon, and Baldwin acknowledges. Understandably,
these critics read the passage from the perspective of Sal Paradise, as the racially insensitive
319

See Robert Holton, “Kerouac Among the Fellahin: On the Road to the Postmodern.” Modern Fiction
Studies 41 (1995): 265-83, and Robert Holton, On the Road: Kerouac’s Ragged American Journey. New
York: Twayne, 1999, specifically pp. 89-93.
320
Brendon Nicholls, “The Melting Pot that Boiled Over: Racial Fetishism and the Lingua Franca of Jack
Kerouac’s Fiction. Modern Fiction Studies 49.3 (2003), p. 533.
321
Nicholls, p. 525. Nancy McCampbell Grace makes a similar argument in “A White Man in Love: A
Study of Race, Gender, Class, and Ethnicity in Jack Kerouac’s Maggie Cassidy, The Subterraneans, and
Tristessa.” College Literature, Vol. 27, No. 1, “Teaching Beat Literature”(Winter, 2000), pp. 39-62. She
begins by stating that readers must “not lose sight of Kerouac’s hybrid status,” as “a French-speaking son
of working class, French-Canadian Catholics” who were labeled as “stupid and lazy” (40-41). She also
explains how Kerouac claimed “Irish and Native-American descent, an ancestral mix that, whether actual
or a product of family lore, aligned him with peoples long denied personhood” (41). John Leland also
views the passage in a more positive manner, claiming that Kerouac is “not trying to develop an identity
but to escape identity” in order “to invent himself anew. See John Leland, Why Kerouac Matters: The
Lessons of on the Road (They're Not What You Think). New York: Viking, 2007, p. 83.

212
narrator of On the Road. However, if one reads the passage as indicative of Deleuze and
Guattari’s concept of becoming, Sal then becomes a “changing assemblage of forces” undergoing
an intensive state.
The feeling of sadness, ecstasy, and sentiments of death are what connect this passage to
Deleuze’s theory of becoming. For instance, in this passage, which spans a page and a half, the
narrative references sadness, ecstasy, or death three times each. In the sentences following the
above excerpt, Sal progresses down the street where a softball game is playing out and he
expresses, “Near me sat an old Negro who apparently watched the games every night. Next to
him was an old white bum; then a Mexican family, then some girls, some boys – all humanity, the
lot. Oh the sadness of the lights that night!...all I did was die” (180). This is important because
the “intensive” and affective discourse here connects this passage to other narrative scenes that
reveal the concept of becoming.
For instance, at other times in the novel, Sal relates the feelings of sadness, ecstasy, and
death, and he expresses the yearning for “sweet nauseas of all kinds” in the “remembrance of
some lost bliss” that “can only be reproduced in death” (124). The other rather explicit scene
symbolizing a becoming is when Sal is in San Francisco on Market Street and while he is walking
down the street, he is confronted by a proprietress of a “fish-n-chips joint.” He stops and is
overwhelmed with a vision – “It suddenly occurred to me this was my mother of about two
hundred years ago in England, and that I was her footpad son, returning from gaol to haunt her
honest labors in the hashery” (172). Sal is “frozen with ecstasy,” and he does not know whether
he is on “Canal Street in New Orleans” or “42nd Street in New York,” and he has a “whole host of
memories leading back to 1750 in England,” but now he finds himself “in San Francisco now
only in another life and in another body” (172). And then Sal reflects,
And for just a moment I had reached the point of ecstasy that I always wanted to reach,
which was the complete step across chronological time into timeless shadows, and
wonderment in the bleakness of the mortal realm, and the sensation of death kicking at my
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heels to move on, with a phantom dogging its own heels, and myself hurrying to a plank
where all the angels dove off and flew into the holy void of uncreated emptiness, the potent
and inconceivable radiancies shining in bright Mind Essence, innumerable lotus lands
falling open in the magic mothswarm of heaven . . . . I realized that I had died and been
reborn numberless times but just didn’t remember especially because the transitions from
life to death and back to life are so ghostly easy, a magical action for naught, like falling
asleep and waking up again a million times, the utter casualness and deep ignorance of it
[…] I thought I was going to die the very next moment. (173, italics added)
Sal is experiencing a becoming – a transhistorical, fantastic vision in which he is able to cross the
barriers of time and space and can embody a human history across time periods. Of course, this
is a mental vision captured literarily, but as Deleuze and Guattari show, there is no mental reality
that is separate from the social reality, and given the context of the “new vision” and search for
meaningful values, this narrative activity has a socially relevant implication in postwar society.
Similarly, in the “Denver colored section” passage, Sal is experiencing the intensity of
death that is indicative of a becoming – he desires to become a “Negro.” This passage is
representative of the process of becoming, for Deleuze and Guattari illustrate that becoming is
like that cry “suspended between life and death” – it is the intensity from the forces of “repulsion
and attraction.” The experience of death, they say, “is the most common of occurrences in the
unconscious, precisely because it occurs in life and for life, in every passage or becoming, in
every intensity as passage or becoming,” and they conclude that desiring-machines “grow or
diminish according to an infinity of degrees” (AO 330, italics added). Sociality then involves
individuals that possess the potential to differ based on relations with other bodies or forces. As
Bruce Baugh explains it, “bodies experience increases or diminutions of their power or force of
existing,” and when combining with other bodies that “agree with the body’s constitutive

214
relation,” “joy” is the result; when the relation is “incompatible,” then the result is “sadness.”322
Sal experiences both – sadness and ecstasy in this passage, and as a result, his encounter with the
African American man only increases Sal’s intensive state.
Kerouac is attempting to celebrate something authentic in African Americans in the
passage, but unfortunately, Sal does not elaborate as to what it is exactly that makes the black
individual authentic in his eyes, but the narrative offers some postulations. Kerouac, through
literature, is trying to create a new vision for postwar existence, and his recognition of
authenticity in the marginalized presents a differing value for those on the outside of society. By
wanting to “dig” African Americans, as portrayed in this passage, Sal desires to view them on a
human level and “penetrate” the barrier that separates them. For instance, Eldridge Cleaver notes
in his memoir, Soul on Ice, how Kerouac and other “beatniks” “dared to do in the light of day
what America had long been doing in the sneak-thief anonymity of night – consorted on a human
level with the blacks.”323 This passage, and the desire embedded within it, resists the standard
white way of thinking that Baldwin, ironically, expresses in The Fire Next Time. Baldwin
discusses an “inherent superiority” that white people believe they possess over black individuals,
and the whites’ ensuing failure to see black individuals as human.324 He charges white people
with doing everything they can to secure their advantage and superiority, and one could
categorize that as a “white ambition,” to put it in the “Denver colored section” context, and the
failure to acknowledge the humanity of black individuals as a “white disillusionment.”
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However, Sal rejects the white world, the American postwar society that values
conformity, and one of the dimensions of that conformity entails white superiority. Sal is
choosing to celebrate African Americans in this scene. Because epideictic is the rhetoric of
beliefs, values, and desires, Sal is rejecting a value system in place that he finds inauthentic
because it constructs barriers that differentiate. Sal refers to himself as a “white man
disillusioned,” led astray by “white ambitions” and this contrasts with the black man he sees who
is on the outskirts of the white world, but he fails to acknowledge in the passage that black men
and women were denied access to that white, privileged world. At the same time, Sal is trying to
escape the very world that produces inauthenticity, and he desires something authentic in the
black experience. Of course, the reason African Americas are outside of the system is because
they are forced to the margins, and this is not an equal “escaping field” so to speak.
Nonetheless, Kerouac is rejecting the white ambitions and trying to undo his
disillusionment by witnessing the humanity of African Americans in this passage, and his desire
is revolutionary, as Deleuze and Guattari point out, because it affects and attempts to imagine
changes to the established order of a white supremacist society. Sal’s peregrination and desire in
that scene represents the “schizorevolutionary type or pole that follows the lines of escape of
desire; breaches the wall and causes flows to move . . . proceeding in an inverse fashion from that
of the other pole: I am not your kind, I belong eternally to the inferior race, I am a beast, a black”
(AO 277).325 It is at this point in Anti-Oedipus that Deleuze and Guattari directly mention
Kerouac as “the artist possessing the soberest of means who took revolutionary ‘flight,” and
“cross[ed] limits and frontiers, causing deterritorialized flows of desire to circulate” (AO 277).
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flows to move;…proceeding in an inverse fashion from that of the other pole: I am not your kind, I belong
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When the “Denver colored section” passage is read within the context of becoming, the “Negro”
characters in the scene then become infused with an American and democratic impetus, very
similar to the special edition of the magazine Survey Graphic discussed in the Ellison chapter
where Alain Locke states, “color becomes the acid test of our fundamental honesty in putting into
practice the democracy we preach.”326 Kerouac recognizes the humanity of black individuals and
this alternative vision resists racist scripts in postwar society that repressed and devalued African
Americans. As Wright and Ellison have shown, American society around the turn of the century
was a violently racist one, and a society that failed to recognize African Americans
democratically, and Kerouac here does not portray Sal as expressing the sentiments of a violent
racist, or one who looks down upon African Americans socially; Sal may come off as a
disillusioned and superficially ignorant white man, but not the hate-filled racist white man that
Wright depicted, most notably in Wright’s autobiography, Black Boy (1945), nor the deceptive
white man using black individuals for their causes like Ellison portrays in Invisible Man. Rather,
Sal and Dean desire to know the lots of black men and women in the novel, and they view their
experience as something desirous, albeit in racially assumptive ways, but as something worthy of
attention and exploration. This represents a break in thinking, for not only do black individuals
become more human in the eyes of white Sal, but this encounter reveals characteristics that are
desirable and as something leading to the authentic. This is not the most racially sensitive
passage, but it is a movement away from the racist white culture that has preceded postwar
American society.
7) Conclusion
Containment narratives project an illusion, or a system of equilibrium amongst all
individuals; however, as Deleuze and Guattari insist, individuals are subjects that continuously

eternally to the inferior race, I am a beast, a black. Good people say that we must not flee, that to escape is
not good” (AO 277).
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pass through intensive, fluctuating states that produce variable intensive forces. Thus, the result
is a world inhabited by different individuals, different desiring-machines that produce positive
and negative forces. This connects to the Invisible Man’s closing thoughts in Ellison’s novel,
namely, the problem that Ellison so eloquently phrased – “America is woven of many strands; I
would recognize them and let it so remain,” because “Our fate is to become one, and yet many.”
The problem with containment culture and the conformity promulgated, is that it overemphasizes
the one and neglects that which constitutes or differentiates the many. And Kerouac protests this
way of living, and Sal and Dean’s desire speaks to this sentiment through the language of
“digging” and authenticity. Kerouac, through the characters of Sal and Dean, rejects containment
culture’s consumer politics as imbued in the home, and instead features mobility on the road as
leading to an American authenticity. Thus, Kerouac’s novel of mobility and authenticity attempts
to preserve Ellison’s formula, at least in Kerouac’s “particular area of the American
experience,”327 and he couches his critique of the postwar American experience in terms of desire
– containment culture amplifies a consumer-based domesticity in the home, and Kerouac moves
away from the home in order to get to know the many that make up the one national American
identity. In the end, Sal and Dean demonstrate the Invisible Man’s admonition that “Life is to be
lived, not controlled.”328
Desire in containment culture is socially manufactured – it is controlled. As containment
culture attempted to code the physical, suburban home as part of a politicized agenda, the
mobility on the road also functioned as a resistance to the sociopolitical culture of the postwar
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period. The transformation of authenticity as embedded in desire and mobility that Sal and Dean
introduce takes place against this cultural code of home, marriage, and stability. After Sal tells
Dean about wanting to get married and settle down, Dean relates: “I’ve been digging you for
years about the home and marriage and all those fine wonderful things about your soul” (117).
Yet, with the advent of a culture of containment, Sal and Dean desire mobility and they traverse
the American landscape interacting and coming into contact with various bodies and ideas. As a
result, they experience “intensive states” of becoming-authentic in On the Road, and it is this
process of becoming that connects the authentic to a national identification with America-ashome in the novel.
In a very important passage following Carlo Marx’s query into the meaning of their
mobility, Dean becomes “tremendously excited about everything he saw, everything he talked
about, every detail of every moment that passed. He was out of his mind with real belief” (120).
Dean characteristically discusses “knowing time,” but in what follows, he bridges the concept of
authenticity from “knowing time” to “knowing America”:
“Furthermore, we know America, we’re at home; I can go anywhere in America and get
what I want because it’s the same in every corner, I know the people, I know what they
do. We give and take and go in the incredibly complicated sweetness zigzagging every
side.” There was nothing clear about the things he said, but what he meant to say was
somehow made pure and clear. (121)
These passages revolving around Dean and mobility contain the “schizophrenic” energy that
Deleuze and Guattari discuss and revolutionary potential in a postwar American climate. To put
it another way, this passage carries out the transformation of the process of becoming – as a result
of their travels, Sal and Dean now “know America,” they have “IT,” the “pearl.” In the postwar
period, the home is connected to the ideological parameters of containment culture, i.e. marriage,
the suburbs, and consumerist spending. By declaring they feel “at home” in America after
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moving around the country, they transform the concept of home from a political agent in
conditioning “good citizens” to an authentic home where they “know the people” – they becomeAmerica. Dean then comes to a revelation and overcodes the home from one of marriage and
stability, to America and mobility – they “know America” after they “give and take and go in the
complicated sweetness.” Now, America is not only an imagined community; with mobility,
America becomes, in a way for Sal and Dean, an embodied community.
In other words, rather than sitting back at home and imagining the nation, Sal and Dean
traverse the landscape attempting to discover and “dig” the individuals that make up the
community. A more authentic desire exists in “penetrating into the heart of things,” and Sal
proclaims, “the only people for me are the mad ones, the ones who are mad to live, mad to talk,
mad to be saved, desirous of everything at the same time, the ones who never yawn or say a
commonplace thing, but burn, burn, burn like fabulous yellow roman candles across the night (56). Sal praises these “dingledodies” who “rush” and “dance” down the street “digging
everything” and who escape “impure attachments” and “obeisance to the outside Society.”
Kerouac presents a neologism, “dingledodies,” to represent the Deleuze and Guattari
“schizophrenic” traversing the plane of immanence and desiring in free form. More importantly,
Kerouac is creating his own code here through the novel’s most representative language (“IT,”
“madness,” “dig,” “wow,” etc.). Thus, “madness” becomes a plane of understanding and is
celebrated as a praiseworthy quality, for Sal explains that he and Dean communicated with one
another through “levels of madness” (4). Dean’s madness opened up possibilities for him and Sal
that were otherwise suppressed, or one could say “contained.”
Kerouac’s novel presents different values as the objects of desire and transforms what a
consumerist society judges as the “good life,” and this is how On the Road is representative of the
literary epideictic: it amplifies the social conditions that repress authentic desire, and by
displaying those conditions as unworthy or undesirable, and Sal and Dean’s desire as authentic
and praiseworthy, it issues a value judgment on the current state of affairs. For Kerouac, and the
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Beat movement he inaugurates, the best means for surviving the conditions threatening their very
existence exists within the creation of a new way of thinking, a new way of being.
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“Perhaps I know best why man is the only animal that laughs: he alone suffers so
excruciatingly that he was compelled to invent laughter.”
(Friedrich Nietzsche, The Will to Power, p. 74)
“What springs from great books is schizo-laughter or revolutionary joy, not the
anguish of our pathetic narcissism, not the terror of our guilt…. There is always
an indescribable joy that springs from great books, even when they speak of ugly,
desperate, or terrifying things…. You cannot help but laugh when you mix up the
codes.” (Gilles Deleuze, Nomadic Thought, p. 258)
“What, then, is the right way of living? Life must be lived as play, playing certain
games, making sacrifices, singing and dancing, and then [individuals] will be
able to propitiate the gods, and defend [themselves] against [their] enemies, and
win the contest.” (Plato, Laws, vii, 803)

Chapter V: The Therapeutic Value of Play as Power:
Power, Play, and Laughter in One Flew Over the Cuckoo’s Nest
Introduction
This chapter presents a literary epideictic theory of play as power for reading Ken
Kesey’s One Flew Over the Cuckoo’s Nest. This theory combines elements of play, power, and
laughter in a way that “mixes up the codes,” to put it in Deleuzian terms. In Kesey’s novel, play
is always-already-ensconced in power. While the book in fact addresses “ugly, desperate, and
terrifying things,” it is also preoccupied with laughter, even when the nature of the mental ward
patients’ fate is not humorous. Indeed, laughter springs in Cuckoo’s Nest when the patients
“play” with the codes and as a result, play and laughter impede disciplinary power’s control over
them. To prioritize this argument, this chapter is predominantly concerned with play as power,
which is narratively adjoined to laughter. However, I am not concerned with the humor or the
meaning of laughter per se, but with its narrative presence as a representation of the “asignifying
rhetorical force” to use John Muckelbauer’s terminology.329 Laughter possesses the rhetorical
329
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force of play as power, which serves as a counterstrike to the Big Nurse’s domination, or, as
Kingsley Widmer puts it, it represents McMurphy’s “countertherapy in the world as psychiatric
ward.”330
I am not making the argument that Cuckoo’s Nest is a humorous novel, or even a text ripe
with “black humor” as some critics have claimed;331 but just as equally, I am not saying that
humor is absent in the novel. While Cuckoo’s Nest is not overtly humorous, it does overtly
feature power and play. Play and humor do not always coexist, which may seem obvious, just as
laughter and humor are not directly correlated. To put this into perspective, Brian Boyd
acknowledges in his article, “Laughter and Literature: A Play Theory of Humor,” that individuals
do not “only laugh at jokes,” and many people find disparate things funny – “words, intonations,
accents, appearances, characters, actions, situations – whether or not they are designed to be
funny”;332 and Cate Watson distinguishes between laughter and humor in the following way:

way in which “speakers turn to rhetoric only after they have decided upon the proposition that they will
advocate,” and in this case, rhetoric serves as “a supplement to the proposition” (16). Additionally, Muckelbauer distinguishes between “acts of communication” and “acts of persuasion” – an act of communication
possesses “a signifying operation,” which “envisions the proposition as a meaning, a signified content, and
attempts to transmit this meaning to another person’s understanding” as “if that proposition were a
meaning, as if it were, above all, an identifiable content that can be reproduced” (17). Mucklebauer assigns
acts of persuasion an “asignifying operation,” meaning they do not attempt to “reproduce” meaning, but
attempt “to make the proposition compelling, to give it a certain force,” relying instead on the “capacity to
exert a compelling force, its ability to evoke particular responses in specific audiences” (17, italics added).
330
Kingsley Widmer, “The Post-Modernist Art of Protest: Kesey and Mailer as American Expressions of
Rebellion.” The Centennial Review, Vol. 19, No. 3 (Summer 1975), p. 130.
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See Jingqiong Zhou, Raymond Carver’s Short Fiction in the History of Black Humor. New York: P.
Lang, 2006. Zhou spends time talking about Kesey’s Cuckoo’s Nest, pointing out that black humor deals
with death, decay, disease, fear, and insanity among the many characteristics, and she claims that
McMurphy is the “hero” who fights against the “system,” and ultimately, the “humor of the novel, based on
a comic vision, however, prevents this oppressiveness of death and decay from becoming dominant in the
novel” (122). My argument begins with the fact that an oppressive system of control – with threats of
death and decay – is already dominant, and play as power counters that system. I also claim that the novel
is not overly humorous and McMurphy is not a hero, but he is a pseudo-epideictic rhetor. Also, see
Raymond Olderman, “The Grail Knight Arrives: Ken Kesey, One Flew Over the Cuckoo’s Nest.” In
George Searles, Ed. A Casebook for Ken Kesey’s One Flew Over the Cuckoo’s Nest. Albuquerque:
University of New Mexico Press, 1992, p. 75. Raymond Olderman believes McMurphy’s laughter
represents “black humor” as the only method to resist the world established by the Big Nurse.
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Brian Boyd, “Laughter and Literature: A Play Theory of Humor.” Philosophy and Literature, vol. 28,
no. 1, 2004, p. 1; 2. Boyd discusses play in animals and humans and points out that “it is the surprise
movements [in play] that produce the greatest vocal release and the greatest apparent pleasure, the
unexpected within the context of harmless play. And in human laughter we find the same” (10). And see
John Morreall, “Humor as Cognitive Play.” Journal Of Literary Theory 3.2 (2009): 241-260. Morreall
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humor is “an attitude of play and an awareness of the comic potential of the human condition,”
and laughter is the “interruption which brings about a change of outlook.”333
Thus, there is a complicated relationship between play, power, and laughter. First,
laughter emerged as a “play signal”; but, as pointed out, it does not always accompany play or
humor.334 In Cuckoo’s Nest, the World Series debacle, for instance, is not very comedic; and on
another note, the fishing trip that the patients take does in fact contain humorous activity, but that

references the work of ethologist Jan van Hooff, who has theorized that human laughter evolved from prehuman apes and functioned as “play signals” (qtd. 253 in Morreall). Morreall begins his article by
discussing the difficulty in navigating theories of humor and laughter because of the similarities and
associations among terms and definitions. He delves into the main three theories of humor: The Superiority
Theory, the Relief Theory, and the Incongruity Theory. His theory of humor as cognitive play more closely
aligns with the Incongruity theory and its emphasis on cognitive activity – “perceptions, thoughts, mental
patterns, and expectations,” for the Incongruity theory involves a “cognitive shift,” one that is “sudden,
abrupt,” and is “pleasurable” (250-251). Morreall adds that humor is “a non-serious activity in which we
suspend practical concern and noetic concern – concern about what is true,” and Morreall believes humor is
“a social experience,” and “a form of play” that produces what he refers to as “mental jolts” (251). He
points out that in enjoying something that violates our mental interpretations, we are not concerned with the
truth or meaning, much like Mucklebauer’s insistence on the asignifying force. Morreall claims that the
suspension of practical concern is a notion of play (252-253), and he proposes that when an individual
experiences a “cognitive shift,” she is in “play mode,” and when she finds the shift “pleasurable,” she does
not react with negative emotions, and this process is expressed in “laughter, which signals to others that
[she] can relax and enjoy the cognitive shift” (254). For more on the different theories of humor, see John
Morreall, Comic Relief: A Comprehensive Philosophy of Humor. Chichester, U.K: Wiley-Blackwell, 2009;
Cate Watson, “A Sociologist Walks Into A Bar (And Other Academic Challenges): Towards A
Methodology Of Humour.” Sociology 49.3 (2015): 407-421; and Anca Parvulescu, Laughter: Notes on a
Passion. Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 2010.
Of course, in the context of Cuckoo’s Nest, this needs a bit of qualifying. First, what Morreall calls
“surprise movements” is the unexpected behavior of McMurphy. And there is a great notion or feeling of
“harmless play” in the novel, especially in the conversations that Harding and McMurphy have in relation
to flustering Nurse Ratched and their bet, for they initially comment on how she cannot do anything to
McMurphy if he keeps his “cool,” making it seem as if it is harmless activity to “get her goat.”
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As a case in point, John Bruns’s article, “Laughter in the Aisles,” discusses an incident that took place in
1994 in which two high school students laughed at a scene in Schindler’s List that depicted a Nazi soldier
gunning down a Jewish woman. See John Bruns, “Laughter in the Aisles: Affect and Power in
Contemporary Theoretical and Cultural Discourse.” Studies in American Humor 7 (2000): 5-23. Following
the spectacle and the ensuing exit of the students from the theater, there was a large cultural reaction to the
incident in which the students were seen as deviant and disrespectful. Bruns wants to consider the other
possibilities in explaining the laughter and he concludes that there is “a possibility of seeing laughter not as
reactive to power, but as altogether different, free from the terms and conditions of power so central to our
cultural investigations” (5). He does a fine job at arguing that the laughter at the scene could be other than
oppositional, as in “cooperative and coadjutant” if one considers the historical significance that the class
saw the film on Martin Luther King Day, and the significance of the “premise of Oakland ghetto life” (10).
However, in Cuckoo’s Nest, I argue that the laughter is absolutely connected to the terms and conditions of
institutional power and it is a counterforce to that power on the part of McMurphy and the patients.
Laughter is a rhetoric of play and power, or, what I am trying to establish, the rhetoric of play as power.

224
scene is more concerned with power (and by extension, play as power). Secondly, laughter has
not been associated with power in a critical sense, and Gaëtan Brulotte’s article, “Laughing at
Power,” touches upon the complicated theoretical relationship between laughter and power. He
begins by defining power as the ability of an individual, institution, or idea to influence the
behavior of others, and he contends that laughter indeed does have power. However, when
discussing economic, political, or other discursive powers, he concedes that laughter has no place
in those realms because those with economic or political power, for example, possess “the means
of dissuasion, punishment, persuasion, or conditioning.” Yet, he states, “laughter is therefore not
in power and probably never will be, since it is power’s most feared enemy; but it does have
power.”335
Furthermore, in discussing laughter and power, critics have employed the epideictic
language of “unmasking” and “educating” an audience in civic matters and in the development of
values.336 Brulotte continues, using epideictic language to convey his point, stating, “the principal
aim of traditional comedy was not so much to make its audience laugh as to unmask, avenge or
educate. Laughter is just a means to achieve this end.”337 Therefore, the force that laughter
excoriates can be viewed as a form of “seriousness.” Anca Parvulescu calls laughter’s “enemies”
the “guardians of the prohibition on certain laughs … heralds of a heavy seriousness.” She points
out that historically, seriousness has an “official tone,” one that has “intimidated, demanded,
prohibited, oppressed,” connecting to Brulotte’s point about power’s “means of dissuasion.” She
too emphasizes epideictic themes when she discusses how authoritative figures establish “values
and rules of appropriate behavior [that] become habits of a sedentary body,” communicate with
335
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“dogmatic solemnity in language, gesture, face and tone,” and make “Thou shall not laugh [their]
aegis.”338 These “heralds of seriousness” fear laughter because laughter and humor, as Michael
Billig points out, possess the power to “disrupt order.”339 Therefore, laughter, and play as power,
both possess an epideictic quality. Epideictic addresses matters of the present, and epideictic
evaluates the social values and conduct of a community in a present predicament, and play as
power addresses the spatial boundaries of social order. However, with play as power, the three
elements of play, power, and laughter are seldom divorced from each other, especially in Kesey’s
novel, and they work together to carry out an epideictic objective.
Ken Kesey’s novel is epideictic because it captures and illustrates a particular quality of
the postwar moment, one that reveals how the social environment attempted to control the
individuals within it. Kesey witnessed a society that began to experiment with modes of social
control. The late 1950s and the 1960s were impacted by government and CIA-funded mindcontrol experiments with drugs, like LSD, and by psychiatry’s role in “adjusting” the “insane”
with psychiatric methods, like Electro Convulsive Therapy (ECT).340 Kesey would have insider
338
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Both Billig and Nick Butler discuss laughter in epideictic terms. See Nick Butler, “Joking Aside:
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talks about laughter in disciplinary and rebellious language, stating it possesses the “power to enforce the
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access to the bowels of psychiatry from his experiences at Menlo Park Veteran’s Hospital, as he
experienced both of these institutional phenomenon – his visions as a drug volunteer and as an
aide in a mental hospital allowed him to see the power dynamics at work in the psychiatric
profession under the aegis of therapeutic community. Kesey incorporated his experiences on the
ward into Cuckoo’s Nest, and he even went so far as to secretly administer a “shock therapy”
treatment to write the scene where the Chief and McMurphy undergo the procedure.341 As Rick
Dodgson notes, Kesey drew from the patients at the mental hospital where he worked as an aide
to craft the characters in Cuckoo’s Nest, even incorporating some of their language, like Ruckly’s
“Ffffuck the wife” comment, and Kesey, discussing McMurphy, even acknowledges, “Yes

possible to modify an individual’s behavior by covert means” (57). Marks explains how the CIA began to
focus on “individuals,” quoting an official involved with the testing as claiming the CIA wanted to know
how the drugs affected “normal people, not sick ones,” detailing, “We thought about the possibility of
putting some in a city water supply and having the citizens wander around in a more or less happy state, not
terribly interested in defending themselves” (59; 58). The CIA’s academic researchers published their
findings on “pulse rates” and other physiological matters, but “they would only tell the CIA how the drug
could be used to ruin that patient’s marriage or memory” (61). Thus, LSD and the CIA mind-control drug
experiments are linked to psychiatry’s use of ECT in the attempt to alter the mind and memory. For more
information on psychiatry’s use of ECT and “control,” see David Ingleby, “Mental Health and Social
Order,” in Social Control and the State. Ed. Stanley Cohen and Andrew Scull. New York: St. Martin’s
Press, 1983; and Edward Shorter and David Healy, Shock Therapy: A History of Electroconvulsive
Treatment in Mental Illness. New Brunswick, N.J: Rutgers University Press, 2007; and Laura Hirshbein
and Sharmalie Sarvananda, “History, Power, And Electricity: American Popular Magazine Accounts Of
Electroconvulsive Therapy, 1940–2005.”Journal Of The History Of The Behavioral Sciences 44.1 (2008):
pp. 1-18.
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the background to Cuckoo’s Nest, and he explains that the novel was written while on the mental ward, a
ward that he would end up working at as an aide. In an episode where he describes a doctor administering
drugs during the government experiments that he volunteered for, he tells the doctor that he does not hear
anything, “Just the room full of men outside my door (the experiment being conducted on an actual ward)
clamoring their mutual misery, calling with every word and laugh and cough for help, for light, for God at
least.” See Ken Kesey, Kesey's Garage Sale. New York: Viking Press, 1973, p. 7. And as Stephen Tanner
notes, while working at Menlo Park Veteran’s Hospital, Kesey had experienced “unpleasant encounters
with rigid and demanding nurses; he scuffled with a black aide; he attended patients with a variety of
peculiar behavior patterns; and he observed generally how a psychiatric ward functions” (Tanner 21). See
Stephen L. Tanner, Ken Kesey. Boston: Twayne Publishers, 1983, p. 21. In reference to the shock therapy
treatment, in The Electric Kool-Aid Acid Test, Tom Wolfe describes how Kesey “even had someone give
him a shock treatment, clandestinely, so he could write a passage in which Chief Broom comes back from
the ‘Shock Shop’” (Wolfe, 49).
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McMurphy was fictional, [but he was] inspired by the tragic longing of the real men I worked
with on the ward.”342
1) “For the Patient’s Good”: Parens Patriae
and The Epideictic Exigency of Therapeutic Community
One morning, the patients of Cuckoo’s Nest are on their way to get chest X-rays for TB,
and they pass the “Shock Shop.” The Chief describes the “twinkling tubes” and the screaming of
the “victim,” and McMurphy inquires as to the purpose of the room. Harding explains the Shock
Shop’s function of “brain burning,” financing a “trip to the moon” with the patient’s “billions of
brain cells on deposit.”343 When McMurphy clarifies it as “shooting electricity through [a] skull,”
Harding informs him that it is “entirely painless,” and does in fact have its advantages – “it’s
cheap [and] quick” (162). Then Harding explains the origin of the method, how two psychiatrists
visiting a slaughterhouse witnessed the butchers using a “hammer” on the cows to induce an
epileptic convulsion; but then Harding explains “a man wasn’t a cow,” and if medical
practitioners were going to “knock a man in a head,” the needed something they could rely upon,
and they “finally settled on electricity.” McMurphy, stunned, asks, “didn’t they think it might do
some damage? Didn’t the public raise Cain about it?” Harding responds, telling McMurphy that it
is for “the patient’s good of course. Everything done here is for the patient’s good,” and he
admonishes his new friend, “I don’t think you fully understand the public my friend; in this
country, when something is out of order, then the quickest way to get it fixed is the best way”
(163).
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parentheses.
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Harding is giving McMurphy a lesson in contemporary psychiatric treatment methods,
namely, of Electro Convulsive Therapy, or, as the novel labels it, Electro Shock Therapy
(EST),344 and the novel’s treatment of this therapeutic method connects the novel to the social
climate of the 1950s and 1960s. Laura Hirshbein and Sharmalie Sarvananda, in the article,
“History, Power, and Electricity: American Popular Magazine Accounts of Electroconvulsive
Therapy, 1940-2005,” discuss ECT’s tainted reputation of a psychiatry of “coercion,” not only in
terms of treatments, but in terms of defining “normality.” They analyze popular accounts in
magazines, journals, and media that illustrate both sides of the debate surrounding ECT between
1940-2005, specifically, whether or not ECT was a therapeutic measure to “eradicate illness,” or
a method in psychiatry’s (alleged) tradition of “overuse and misuse” of power.345 They write,
“one commentator in the early 1950s identified problems that could result form the dynamic
344
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between practitioner and ECT patient. In 1953, journalist Lucy Freeman explained that the
widespread use of convulsive therapies acted as a quick fix for patients and complained that this
approach interfered with psychiatrists’ abilities to truly understand their patients.” Hirshbein and
Sarvananda explain how Freeman insisted that psychiatrists “needed to talk with their patients
and get to know them rather than assume that psychiatric treatments administered from a distance
could solve complex human problems.”346
Kesey actually touches upon this very sentiment in in a transcription of his “first [drug]
trip” at the Menlo Park Veteran’s Hospital. As Scott Parker notes, it is crucial in understanding
Kesey as a writer, and I believe it adds to the epideictic nature of the narrative of Cuckoo’s Nest.
The transcription reads, “Nurse: (from the hallway) ‘Are you all right in there, Mr. Nichols?’
Kesey: ‘Are you all right in there, Mr. Nichols?’ See listen to that, that’s candy from home.
They’re all right. Everybody’s all right. The doctors can’t really give any of theirselves (sic),
which is what the patients want.”347 This conflict between the practitioners “giving of
themselves,” versus “giving the push of a button” that releases electricity to be administered on
the brain, implicates the relationship dynamics between the patients and the practitioners,
specifically in regards to ECT, for the patients were rather passive in this treatment, sometimes
even unaware of ECT while it was being administered. Hirshbein and Sarvananda even conclude
that to an extent, patients undergoing the treatment have to “surrender their power” to the doctors
and staff and what they think is best for them in the end.348
To place this in an epideictic context, David Ingleby, in his article, “Mental Health and
Social Order,” talks about the work of Robert Castel and Foucault and how the “medical model’
is defined in “a particular set of practices and power relations.” He clarifies, “In these practices,
circulate because of the public perception of “psychiatrists [who] actively sought out control over all
aspects of patients’ lives and indeed anyone else who crossed their paths” (7).
346
Ibid., p. 5.
347
Taken from “Ken Kesey’s First ‘Trip.’” Reprinted in Conversations with Ken Kesey. Ed. Scott Parker.
Jackson: University Press of Mississippi, 2014, p. 8.
348
Hirshbein and Sarvananda, “History, Power, an Electricity,” p. 14.

230
first, authority is exerted not in the name of law or morality, but by virtue of the doctor’s right to
choose for the sick person what shall be done in his own interests.” He goes on to explain that
when a medical practitioner’s authority is “coupled with parens patriae – the right of the state to
manage the lives of person deemed lacking in responsibility – the doctor’s power is more
formidable still; but even the private patient who voluntarily seeks treatments puts himself ‘under
the doctor,’ as the saying goes,” submitting to the doctor’s appraisal of what treatment is
necessary for “[the patient’s] own good,” leading to an (ir)rational trust on the part of the patient
for the doctor to select the methods that will lead to the avoidance of pain and even death.349 In
this way, psychiatry plays an important epideictic role in “not only policing norms, but also in
creating them.” Ingleby asserts that doctors have a “a domain of power all of [their] own” and
psychiatry became aligned with the state because it functioned as a “soft apparatus of control” – it
was not the “penalty” of incarceration of the prison system, but became a “parallel apparatus” to
the legal system, intervening by controlling the insane under the guise of “benevolent
paternalism.”350
Furthermore, as Timothy Kneeland and Carol Warren explain, ECT stirred quite the
controversy over the legal and ethical implications of the psychiatric method. They suggest the
legal implications, writing, “Prior to the 1960s, mental patients were considered wards of the
state, and ECT was given without consent,” but a Supreme Court decision ruled that patients “had
a right to treatment, a right to informed consent to treatment, a right to refuse treatment, a right to
access their own patient records, and a right to due process in involuntary civil commitment.”351
Additionally, the “Foucault Tribunal on the State of Psychiatry,” a four-day event in Berlin in
1998, brought together scholars, practitioners, and former patients to discuss the institution of
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psychiatry and its relationship to human rights, finding that the institution of psychiatry violated
and committed crimes against humanity, including coercion, forms of torture, and noncompliance
of therapy, from its inception until the then-present day.352 Tristano Ajmone, president of Italian
Observatory on Mental Health (OISM), states in a speech published on the International
Association Against Psychiatric Assault website, psychiatry is not a “branch of medicine”
because mental illnesses are “measured by means of eye observation and verbal interaction (or
worse, often just by means of third party reports.”353 He continues, “Psychiatry performs a
function of social control on behalf of the State, it deprives of liberty people who have not
committed crimes, or it excuses people who have committed crimes on the assumption that they
were not responsible [for] their actions when they committed their criminal act.”354
The main point regarding this correlation of psychiatry to state control is that Kesey
would have been aware of the social implications of the psychiatric treatments in vogue at the
time. To put this into perspective, during an interview where Kesey is talking about the novel, he
recalls his experiences on the ward, as a volunteer for drug experiments, and as an aide, and he
recalls,
I saw the looks on these people’s faces [in the mental institution] and realized that Freud
was full of shit. Something really dug deep in these people’s minds, and it wasn’t the
way they were treated when they were toilet trained; it wasn’t the way their father
rejected them when they were thirteen. It was something to do with the American
Dream. How the American Dream gave us our daily energy and yet the dream was
perverted and not allowed to develop fully. Cuckoo’s Nest was supposed to be a
352
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revolutionary book. It was supposed to be about America, about how the sickness in
America is in the consciousness of the people. Not the government, not the cops, and not
Big Nurse.”355
The “sickness” is in the consciousness of the people, and the government, psychiatrists, and the
Big Nurse – all players in Kesey’s notion of the Combine – plant the seeds of the disease into the
minds of the people. They pervert the American Dream and they spread the “sickness,” or, more
fittingly, inject the sickness into the individual consciousness of the people. Kesey is pointing out
how Cuckoo’s Nest is misinterpreted, by readers and critics alike – it was not a novel featuring a
prankster in McMurphy, for “kicks,” or to illustrate drug-influenced hallucinations on the part of
Kesey as author, and the Chief as unreliable narrator. Rather, Kesey is examining a specific form
of social control in the novel through the lens of psychiatry, connected to the cultural promise of
the American Dream. He is depicting how power relations work on the consciousness of the
people, commenting on the forms of power and control wrapped up in the invisible ideology of
the American Dream and how it is making people “sick.”
Kesey, then, would have been aware on how ECT affected men in the postwar era, and he
even includes a sampling of the current social and psychiatric trend in relation to ECT in the
narrative through the character of Harding, which I will discuss shortly. Kneeland and Warren
explain how electroshock therapy was widely used by health professionals during the 1940s1960s to maintain fixed gender roles and normative behavior, but the coming era of social
progress would begin to challenge the treatment in this capacity. Kneeling and Warren point out
that two thirds of ECT patients in the mid-century were women, but that “men were also
hospitalized and given ECT in the context of gender and sexual roles. Males who deviated from
the prescribed sexual interest in females,” and men who “behaved in ways unbecoming to men,”
354
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including dissentious behavior and a disregard for authority in relation to 1950s and 1960s
standards, were “liable for EST and other treatments.”356 Jamie Scott, a project manager for ONE
National Gay & Lesbian Archives, discusses how the American Psychiatric Association, points
out that in the mid-twentieth century, therapies for homosexuality sought to “physically” remove
the “illness.” She writes, “In the 1940s, homosexuals were also involuntarily committed to
psychiatric facilities by their families, with the hospitals promising that the patient would
eventually leave the facility cured of their ‘sexual illness.’ Not only were they not allowed to
leave, but they were often subjected to cruel and inhumane treatments, including castrations,
torture drugs, shock therapy, and lobotomies.”357
Harding’s character serves as just one example of the epideictic exigency for the novel,
and also extends it to the broader social atmosphere of the time regarding power and control.
Whether or not the character is based on a real character is irrelevant. The point is that Kesey
narratively captures remnants and similarities to the social environment and mirrors the
psychiatric and social context in the novel. Towards the end of the novel, McMurphy asks
Harding what will happen after he escapes and they wake up on the ward the day after the party.
Harding goes into detail about why he is in the ward in the first place, and it is here Kesey
connects the microcosm of the “Inside” world of the ward, to the macrocosm of the “Outside”
social world of postwar America. Harding exclaims,
“I don’t think I could give you an answer. Oh, I could give you Freudian reasons with
fancy talk, and that would be right as far as it went. But what you want are the reasons
for the reasons, and I’m not able to give you those. Not for the others, anyway. For
myself? Guilt. Shame. Fear. Self-belittlement. I discovered at an early age that I was –
356
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shall we be kind and say different? It’s a better, more general word than the other one. I
indulged in certain practices that our society regards as shameful. And I got sick. It
wasn’t the practices, I think, it was the feeling that the great, deadly, pointing forefinger
of society was pointing at me – and the great voice of millions chanting, “Shame. Shame.
Shame.” It’s society’s way of dealing with someone different.” (265)
Here, Harding is describing his homosexuality, which is also demonstrated in the beginning of the
novel when he is the subject of the first group meeting, where the Nurse consults her log book
and summarizes, “[Harding] has also been heard to say that he may give her reason to seek
further sexual attention. He has been heard to say, ‘My dear sweet but illiterate wife thinks any
word or gesture that does not smack of brickyard brawn and brutality is a word or gesture of weak
dandyism” (39). Later, his wife, Vera, visits the ward and tells McMurphy Harding’s friends do
not stop coming by the house looking for him: “‘You know the type, don’t you, Mack?’ she says.
‘The hoity-toity boys with the nice long hair combed so perfectly and the limp little wrists that
flip so nice’” (158).
Harding is just an example of a male EST patient who fits with the social climate of the
time Kesey wrote Cuckoo’s Nest. Harding’s homosexuality clashed with social standards and
gendered roles of men and masculinity. He is an example of a homosexual man who was
voluntarily admitted to the hospital to “cure” his so-called illness. The more thing to consider,
and perhaps why Kesey does not explicitly proclaim Harding’s sexuality, has to do with the fact
that Kesey is connecting psychiatric control to the larger issue of social control, and specifically,
how social relations of power are excluding, or, to put it in Kesey’s wording earlier, hampering
the full development of the American Dream for all individuals. Harding is labeled “strange” and
“other,” and he is placed in a mental ward for his condition of homosexuality. He reveals that
society can control individuals with shame in this instance.
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It is interesting too that Harding is the character who apprises McMurphy of all the
happenings of the ward – the policies, procedures, staff members and even psychiatric treatments.
Harding has informed McMurphy of EST as discussed previously, and at one point, he also talks
about the consequences of EST treatment. Harding focuses on how the procedure specifically
can affect memory. He explains that EST is “painless,” but continues,
“The thing is, no one ever wants another one. You … change. You forget things. It’s as
if” – he presses his hands against his temples, shutting his eyes – “it’s as if the jolt sets
off a wild carnival wheel of images, emotions, memories. These wheels, you’ve seen
them; the barker takes your bet and pushes a button. Chang! With light and sound and
numbers round and round in a whirlwind, and maybe you win with what you end up with
and maybe you lose and have to play again. Pay the man for another spin, son, pay the
man.” (163)
Harding uses a more playful discourse to explain EST – he frames it as a betting game or a ride in
which you have to pay for admission. The images that accompany memories are conjured up in
the process, but with the push of the button – “Pushbutton Psychiatry” – the images can be
obliterated. The jolt of EST is actually painful, contradicting what he told McMurphy earlier.
While the patient may be unconscious and not feel the pain of the electric current passing
through, she may still lose something more painful – memories.
Harding’s language of “jolt” and “memories” serve an epideictic purpose in connecting
the narrative world of the novel to the social world of postwar America. “Jolt” was a popular
term and metaphor for EST, as Hirshbein and Sarvananda’s article points out. The authors
examine popular discourse used in written accounts of ECT, specifically citing one account in
1941 that described the shock as an attempt to “jolt a mental patient out of his dream world and
back into sanity.”358 Even more compellingly, the authors provide an actual real-life patient that
358
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functions as a quasi-case study for Harding’s “jolt of a wild carnival.” They describe an article
from 1974 in the New Yorker about a woman who went to a mental hospital “for a rest and to
avoid stress;” however, they continue, “it was revealed that the woman had lost all memory of
what was happening to her at the time, or even what happened in the past. Through her inquiries,
she discovered that she had been given ECT in the hospital (with questionable consent
proceedings).”359 The woman was Marilyn Rice, a former federal employee, who lost the ability
to perform her job due to ECT, she claimed.
This is not to say that Kesey had Ms. Rice, or any other individual, in mind when he was
crafting Cuckoo’s Nest, but he had stated that he created the characters based on real mental
patients. The significance of Rice’s account lies in the fact that it is a historically documented
case that portrays the (potential) negative effects of memory loss and how it can alter a person’s
sense of self. Therefore, what is relevant is not whether Kesey knew about this specific case, but
the fact that he brings this social reality into the novel. He creates a setting in Cuckoo’s Nest in
which the invisible power relations work on a group of individuals, and the narrative extends the
microcosm of the ward-as-world, to American society at large. It is the focus on the social issue
of control as it is implicated in the psychiatric treatment of individuals in the postwar era that
Kesey is commenting on in the narrative, and this only serves as the specific entry point for him
to critique the larger issue of power dynamics and control developing in the late 1950s.
In the face of coercive and unassailable power, Kesey’s novel counters the dominant
forces with a new and developing way of acting in the world, and laughter signifies play as power
and its epideictic ability to recreate. Epideictic is the rhetoric concerned with values and how
communities uphold or repress certain values among its members, and as a result, epideictic
discourse possesses great power itself – it has the power to deconstruct and to recreate, and, as
Robert Danisch points out, the power of self-creation. In his article, “Power and the Celebration
of the Self,” Danisch acknowledges that epideictic “involves telling the history of the present so
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that one can understand how subjects are constituted in a given historical moment so that one can
begin the project of self-creation.”360 However, Danisch does not acknowledge that when the
dominant values of a collective are controlling, suffocating, or viewed as undesirable, epideictic
rhetoric’s role is made more difficult as it must topple the dominant viewpoints in place before it
can (re)create.
One of the ways Kesey’s narrative creates a sense of self for the patients is through
laughter. For instance, Brulotte goes on to explain the many facets of laughter’s capable and, I
argue, epideictic influence, such as its expression of “a revolt against power or against boundaries
in life”; its signification of “solidarity” and “social cohesion”; its power of exclusion; its ability to
identify with a group and invite sympathy or other shared experiences; and lastly, its ability of
“making contact with others and with the world.”361 He concludes, “if [laughter] possesses any
kind of power, it is the power to free us from servitude and illusion.”362 It is this language of
“making contact” and “freeing” individuals from “servitude and illusion” that resonates with
Cuckoo’s Nest. Within a disciplinary environment where the Nurse exercises absolute power and
control, McMurphy code-switches – rather than meet her and the staff head-on with acts of
rebellion and physical brawls, he primarily employs forms of play: teasing gestures, “horsing
around,” jokes, and game-like behaviors make up his resistant scheme to her dominant power.
While the Big Nurse resorts to disciplinary and psychiatric methods to “make contact” with
McMurphy and the other patients, Kesey offers a narrative that features play and laughter as the
pathways to making contact with the patients, ultimately developing what I term the epideictic
theory of play as power.
2) Cuckoo’s Nest and the Epideictic Function of Laughter
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After McMurphy arrives on the ward, he learns more about the patients and the way
things are run on the Inside. He observes that the group of men is “scared to open up and laugh,”
and he charges, “Man, when you lose your laugh you lose your footing. A man go around lettin’
a woman whup him down till he can’t laugh any more, and he loses one of the biggest edges he’s
got on his side” (63, italics original). Here too Kesey infuses the narrative with play as power,
for the ability to laugh is connected to an advantage (“edge,” i.e. play), and to avoid getting
“whupped” (a power issue). Within the paradigm of play-as-strategic-conflict, laughter then
operates like the Big Nurse’s authority – within the narrative, it actualizes play as power as a
form of resistance to psychosocial control.
Of course, the theme of laughter has been thoroughly discussed in scholarship. Stephen
Tanner refers to McMurphy as “an unlikely savior disseminating a gospel of laughter.”363 Others
view McMurphy’s laughter as ushering in salvation, making McMurphy the hero,364 while other
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critics focus on the gendered dynamics of McMurphy’s battle with the Big Nurse.365 I do not
intend to ignore the gendered implications, but they have been addressed elsewhere, and Kesey
qualifies his portrayal of the nurse in “The Art of Fiction,” stating, “[Big Nurse] is not the villain.
She might be the minion of the villain, but she’s really just a big old tough ex-army nurse who is
trying to do the best she can according to the rules she has been given. She worked for the
villain and believed in the villain, but she ain’t the villain.”366 I fall in line with Michael
Boardman, who assigns a rhetorical purpose for the instances revolving around the sexist
portrayal of the Big Nurse, which are designed to allow the reader to experience McMurphy’s
fate as “moving and significant,” stating, “the last thing Kesey needed was a ‘humanized portrait
of Big Nurse,’” as that would only cloud the tragic path McMurphy was following. He argues
that the novel employs a “rhetoric of tragedy” that explains its “teleology.”367 Elaine Safer also
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qualifies the gendered context and categorizes the novel as an American Comic Epic, which
employs epic rhetorical devices and “uses a comic book style, reducing exalted, multifaceted
figures and their opponents to cartoon representations of good and evil.”368 Both Boardman and
Safer suggest that the pivotal focus of the battle between good vs. evil subsumes the focus on
gendered relations.
What is important about the conflict between McMurphy and Nurse Ratched for my
purposes is how these two characters engage each other and set up the conflict between play and
power. The former critics have discussed humor and laughter detached from theories of play, and
many have looked at McMurphy as a hero, or the power struggle as gendered. I am focusing on
how play as power is an epideictic construct. This reading views laughter as a narrative and
rhetorical “unveiling” of the characters’ use of “play” as a counter-strategy against the Nurse’s,
and the Combine’s, disciplinary power and control. As a result, play as power is epideictic
because it attempts to challenge the values of asceticism and overly stringent behavior, and it
attempts to recreate a new value system praising the “natural elasticity of life” that play and
laughter presents.369

nonsense, and madness to attain his goals,” and how both Ratched and McMurphy are “manipulative,”
claiming that speech act analysis reveals similarities between the two characters that might not be readily
apparent (287). While that may be an interesting and a compelling argument, the novel relies on the everlooming conflict between the two and their similarities are not as relevant. What is important about the
conflict in the narrative is not how these two characters are similar, but how the conflict sets up and
informs the concept of play as power.
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While Christian Messenger argues that play is “enervating and not a truly revolutionary
force,”370 Scott MacFarlane touches upon the resistant force of play in his book, The Hippie
Narrative, and even uses the phrase “play as power,” albeit, extremely superficially. MacFarlane
comments on how the “spirit of protest” in Cuckoo’s Nest is linked to McMurphy and “is best
exemplified through Kesey’s portrayal of McMurphy’s laughter, a robust laugh of humanity in the
face of authority and in a ward where nobody laughed,” and he sees McMurphy as sporting a
style of “pranksterism” that carries an “eccentric theatricality,” or a notion of “play as power.”371
Firstly, MacFarlane leaves it to the reader to infer what he means by “play as power,” and even
then McFarlane’s definition of “play as power” pertains to a “behavioral strategy” of the hippie
culture that embraced fun and pranks in order to “be heard and seen” and to “draw attention to a
cause.”372 Secondly, McMurphy exhibits the extreme opposite qualities of a hippie way of life –
McMurphy is a brawler, a hustler and criminal, who “disrupts” for the “sake of disruption” and
who has been arrested for “Disturbing the Peace,” rather than spreading the message of peace (24;
40) – all of which MacFarlane fails to point out. Lastly, MacFarlane only mentions “play as
power” on four extremely brief occasions in his chapter, and never fully unpacks what “play as
power” is, or means. He fails to see the power of play to reverse the terms – he relies too much
on the notion of “fun” and “pranks.”
Certainly McMurphy engages in pranks and at times seems to be having fun, but the
theory of “play as power” I am developing does not mainly rely on play as (merely) amusement.
There are many times when events in the novel are not humorous, are not “fun,” and are not tied
to pranks, but yet, McMurphy’s and other characters’ laughter reigns – the laughter resists the
370
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dominant power dynamics rather than creates an awareness for some cause. MacFarlane and the
other critics on laughter and play miss this important implication or differentiation. Play as
power, and by extension, laughter, is not always tied to the humorous or to pranks, but in
Cuckoo’s Nest, it is always linked to power relations.
In order to demonstrate this, I apply Michel Foucault’s work in Discipline and Punish to
Cuckoo’s Nest. Only Andrew Pepper has written on the affinities between Kesey’s novel and
Foucault’s thought, but he only focuses on the issue of power and (in)visibility, and I agree with
his argument in that capacity. Pepper claims, “the question of who exercises power, for Foucault
and for Kesey, is inextricably linked to the question of how power is exercised.” Pepper states
that Cuckoo’s Nest represents the Foucauldian conceptualization of power as “a boundless
network of decentered force relations in the guise of the Combine,” but that it would not be
accurate to equate the state with the Combine.373 He explains how, for Foucault, power cannot be
“seized” in any direct manner as there is no single point of control in society, claiming, “overt
practices of domination are less important than invisible strategies of normalization.”374 I agree
with Pepper’s reading of Foucauldian power dynamics in the novel, but I disagree with his
conclusion where he states, “Kesey’s attempts to get to grips with the amorphous nature of
modern power – a power that is not necessarily tied to leaders or even to institutions – makes this
a prescient and foreboding novel.”375 Kesey’s novel is definitely commenting on the notion of
psychiatric power and control, and this is linked to state control, and this serves as the epideictic
exigency calling forth the novel.
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Additionally, Pepper does not address the complexity of the intersection of Foucault’s
Discipline and Punishment and Cuckoo’s Nest; he merely assumes it. However, there are some
major correlations between Discipline and Punish and Cuckoo’s Nest that are worth stating, even
if rather obvious, for the principles in Foucault’s text are necessary in order to establish the
backdrop against which play as power operates in the narrative. For instance, while Pepper
notices how Cuckoo’s Nest illustrates invisible power networks at work, Kesey’s novel is actually
concerned with visibility quite a bit – the Chief as narrator can “see” the powerful network of
“wires” and “machinery” that operate and “install things” in the patients in order to control them.
Of course, these are attributed to hallucinations and unreliability,376 but Kesey, and Foucault,
thought the “mad ones” could see a “truth.”377 Even more interesting is the narrative’s continuous
obsession with commenting on the visibility of faces, which are the portals of insidious smiles
and/or resistant laughter.378 In other words, the novel’s slight preoccupation with these types of
visibility is connected to the power dynamics. For example, Miss Ratched is described by
Harding as “our sweet, smiling, tender angel of mercy, Mother Ratched,” and the Chief describes
her with a “painted smile [that] twists, stretches to an open snarl, and she blows up bigger and
bigger, big as a tractor, so big [the Chief] can smell the machinery inside” (55; 5). However,
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See for instance, Elaine Safer, “It's the Truth Even If It Didn't Happen”: Ken Kesey's One Flew Over the
Cuckoo's Nest.” Literature/Film Quarterly 5.2 (1977): pp. 132-141; Fred Madden, “Sanity and
Responsibility: Big Chief as Narrator and Executioner.” Modern Fiction Studies, Volume 32, Number 2
(Summer 1986), pp. 203-217; and Peter Beidler, “From Rabbits to Men: Self-Reliance in the Cuckoo’s
Nest.” Lex et Scientia 13 (1977): pp. 56-59.
377
See Dodgson, It’s All a Kind of Magic, p. 136. In an interview in 1961, Kesey is talking about the
psychiatric “nuts” he observed, and he expresses how he could sense, in his “altered” state, how they could
“see a truth that the doctors couldn’t see.” For Foucault’s thoughts on the matter, see Madness and
Civilization: A History of Insanity in the Age of Reason. London: Routledge, 2003. The introduction begins,
“Madness has in our age become some sort of lost truth,” and later refers to the Madman as “the guardian
of truth – playing here a role which is the complement and converse of that taken by madness in the tales
and the satires” (vii; 11).
378
For instance, see Ken Kesey, One Flew Over the Cuckoo’s Nest. New York: Penguin Classics Deluxe
Edition, 2007. This edition includes illustrations and an introduction by Kesey, titled “Sketches.” He
writes about his experience at Menlo Park and talks about the patients’ “faces all ghastly confessions,”
stating, “More was revealed in a human face than a human being can bear, face-to-face.” He talks about
how on the ward, he carried a “little notebook, to scribble notes,” but he recalls how he “also scribbled
faces. No that’s not correct. As I prowl through the stack of sketches I can see that these faces bored their
way behind my forehead and scribbled themselves” (vii; viii).

244
what is striking is the idea in which the power dynamics that inconspicuously operate on the ward
can be counteracted, which consequently complicates the relationship between power and
(in)visibility.
Therefore, the question becomes, why embed a narrative about (in)visible power
dynamics with laughter? Laughter preserves a type of visibility because one can “see” the face
and the opening of the mouth of one laughing. So, while Nurse Ratched uses electroconvulsive
therapy and lobotomy as threats in the novel, her power is not solely an “invisible strategy of
normalization” as Pepper contends. The Big Nurse’s actualized power, while couched in the
discourse of discipline and punishment, can manifest into visible acts designed to punish the body
of the individual. Additionally, while her threats are not always explicit, and the times the
narrative features actual EST episodes are not extremely numerous, her ever-present command
over the patients is something that is visible – to the Chief, to McMurphy, and to the others.
Because power began to evolve from overt authoritative measures towards more shrouded means
of imposition, alternative methods for countering forms of social control equally became more or
less indeterminate. And as such, the opposition the novel offers follows suit, I contend – it must
“mix up the codes.” “Mixing up the codes” becomes necessary because of the nature of power to
“switch” its expression from explicit to implicit authority.
Thus, the counter method of play as power to overt and/or anonymous authority is also
something that is not as readily perceivable; meaning, many do not see, understand, or value the
power of play, especially in the way that Kesey’s novel features it – laughter severed from the
humorous and paired with the power-ful. Or, to put it another way, the theory of play as power
shifts the emphasis of play from the humorous toward the powerful; it replaces leisure and
pleasure with power dynamics. Kesey is creating a novel that uncovers the values of social order
and control, and exposes the power relations at work in the ward-as-social-world. In Cuckoo’s
Nest, laughter signifies the shift in the characters’ perceptions of the world and the laughter
registers within the situated context of the postwar social milieu and countercultural period.
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While critics pick up on different components of the concept of play as power, none of them have
considered the interplay of play, power, and laughter that I am proposing.
3) Play and Conflict in Cuckoo’s Nest
In Cuckoo’s Nest, play exists in many forms,379 and the narrative does not advance more
than a few pages without some reference to a form of play or an expression of laughter. Among
the many examples, the narrative mostly includes countless references to the activities of card
games and gambling, like poker and monopoly (out of the many occurrences, see pages 9; 38ff.;
100ff.); storytelling and countless jokes (42 – “Do I look like a sane man?”; 139; 261); watching
television and the World Series (103ff.); swimming (146ff.); a basketball game (177); a fishing
trip (178ff.); the party in the ward (218; 251ff.); singing and whistling (81; 87); and sex (210ff.;
263). Throughout all of these events, the narrative records endless smiles, grins, and laughs. Yet,
what is most important about “play” in the novel is how it is used, and how it encompasses the
power dynamics and the main conflict between the Combine and the individual, and between
Nurse Ratched and the Chief, McMurphy and the other patients.
Essentially, in Cuckoo’s Nest, broadly speaking, play is a strategic conflict – a conflict
between the patients and the Big Nurse, and, with the arrival of McMurphy, a conflict between
disciplinary power and play as power. In fact, that main conflict also originated as a “playful”
game or bet between McMurphy and Harding. The notion of adult play as a form of conflict
comes from Brian Sutton-Smith’s work in The Ambiguity of Play. In The Ambiguity of Play,
Sutton-Smith navigates the ambiguous field of play studies and he is interested in the way “play
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rhetorics” are part of the larger cultural rhetorics and a part of the social value systems in which
cultures construct meaning.380 He offers seven rhetorics of play, out of which I am only
interested in the rhetoric of play as power.381 The rhetoric of play as power, Sutton-Smith
declares, “is about the use of play as the representation of conflict and as a way to fortify the
status of those who control the play or are its heroes.”382 Sutton-Smith claims the major form of
human play is contest, and he explains how contests play a role in the process of civilization. In
the chapter, “The Rhetorics of Power,” Sutton-Smith writes,
On the social play level, the general idea of the power rhetoric is that play or games or
sports or athletics that have to do with some kind of contest and reflect a struggle for
superiority between two groups (two people, two communities, two tribes, two social
classes, two ethnic groups, two or more nations) exist because they give some kind of
representation or expression to the existing real conflict between these groups.
Whichever side wins the game or contest is said to bring glory to its own group, bonding
the members together through their common contestive identity.383
Sutton-Smith ultimately defines play as “a facsimilization of the struggle for survival as this is
broadly rendered by Darwin.”384 He connects play to evolution and references the work of Jay
Gould and his emphasis on “variability” over “precision.” In his book, Full House, Gould writes,
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Precise adaptation, with each part finely honed to perform a definite function in an
optimal way, can only lead to blind alleys, dead ends, and extinction. In our world of
radically and unpredictably changing environments, an evolutionary potential for creative
responses requires that organisms possess an opposite set of characteristics usually
devalued in our culture: sloppiness, broad potential, quirkiness, unpredictability, and,
above all, massive redundancy.385
The key, Gould declares, “is flexibility, not admirable precision,” and Sutton-Smith develops his
own theory, what he terms “variability” and “adaptive potentiality,” based on this evolutionary
finding by Gould. Sutton-Smith defines “adaptive potentiality” as play that “prepares for the
unforeseeable future, not the foreseeable one,” and a concept of play that “produces an array of
responses of potential value.”386 He discusses how certain cultures, ones founded upon rigidly
prescribed roles, do not allow for time and space for play, and it is here where Sutton-Smith could
note the power potentiality of play in social contexts, specifically, situations in which power
dynamics are at work and govern the relations among individuals and groups, as opposed to
recreational play situations. In the mental ward of Cuckoo’s Nest, the Big Nurse attempts to
control play by only allowing precisely timed and scheduled leisurely activities, and she most
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definitely stifles laughter, and in essence, any type of play that might effect laughter on the ward.
The narrative touches upon the establishment of her dominant will – the patients “were all afraid
to loosen up; it’d been too long” (72).
While Sutton-Smith tends to focus on how the rhetoric of power informs play and play
theories, he does not reverse that relationship to discuss how certain forms of (adult) play can
inform, or even perform acts of power. Play as power can establish a will, and it can resist a
dominant will thrust upon it. For instance, Brian Boyd has also noted the potential value of play
in an evolutionary sense, and in his article, “Laughter and Literature: A Play Theory of Humor,”
Boyd argues that play was useful in training early humans “for coping with the unexpected.” This
theory rests upon the finding of evolutionary psychology that the mind “is crammed with
expectations, built in first through natural selection and then added to by experience,” most
specifically, the “expectation of danger, the unexpected manifestation of an expected threat.”387
What Boyd means by the “unexpected manifestation of an expected threat” is analogous to the
“startle reflex,” or surprise movements. In play, animals – and Boyd extends this to human
beings – can enact situations that provide the opportunity for “surprise movements” and can
prepare for the unexpected.388

“outstanding thrower of hand grenades,” denoting the flexibility to see connections and transfer skills from
play contexts to real, social contexts (46).
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Needless to say, this works differently with the literary epideictic theory of play as power
in Cuckoo’s Nest. Rather than prepare the patients for “expected danger” exactly, play as power
works to open up alternative visions and activities that perhaps challenge the dominant systems of
control, or, the dominant value systems currently guiding the communal progress. In fact, the
Chief describes himself and the other patients, and Nurse Ratched even, as caught off guard by
McMurphy’s playfulness. In social contexts with rigidly prescribed norms and standards, such as
in the mental ward, the engagement of play, which has been shown to include an almost limitless
catalogue of activities and has been shown to be quite ambiguous, can serve as a method to
counter forms of power and play as power can pose a threat or danger.
A very similar scenario relating to the discussion of play and the notion of surviving
(un)expected dangers as established by Sutton-Smith, Gould, and Boyd plays out in the narrative
of Cuckoo’s Nest. The patients already possess a natural fear of danger as it pertains to the
Outside world. When McMurphy finds out many of the men voluntarily committed themselves,
he blurts out, “you guys could get along outside if you had the guts.” Billy replies, “Sure! … If
we had the g-guts!”, chastising McMurphy further, “But did you ever have people l-l-laughing at
you. No, because you’re so b-big and tough!” (167, italics original). The patients have retreated
from the threat of societal interactions that include a ridiculing form of laughter, which has
manifested itself as a threat to their well-being as Billy describes here – they felt the need to
remove themselves from society and enter the Inside world of the mental hospital. However, the
narrative illustrates how the ward and the Big Nurse have “unexpectedly manifested” a new form

panic when a “bird-shaped kite with wings toward one end is towed overhead so that its wings are at the
front, but will be unperturbed if it is towed the other way, so the wings are at the back and the shape seems
more like a duck than a hawk” (9); in humans, he provides the example of “peek-a-boo games,” which
“primes alertness.” These surprise movements “produce the greatest vocal release” and pleasure, and Boyd
argues that in human play and laughter, we can find similar expressions (10). He explains that these
situations “simulate risk” and “recovery.” Of course, Boyd’s comparison is designed to explain how “play
with expectations offers a better explanation for humor than incongruity resolution” (10). He argues that
there is a good chance that something humorous is not incongruous – a exaggerative example of a person
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taking these points about the “play” with expectations in order to show how “play” has power to open up
alternative ways of acting in the world, especially in the ward-as-world of Cuckoo’s Nest.
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of an “expected threat” to their well-being: the power dynamics have added the expectation of
danger from failing to comply with ward policy. As Harding points out, the Chief is the symbol
at this point in the novel of a severe form of punishment, and he serves as a threat to the other
patients. Harding states that Chief suffered more than “two hundred shock treatments” and refers
to him as “your Vanishing American, a six-foot-eight sweeping machine, scared of his own
shadow. That, my friend, is what we can be threatened with” (62, italics added).
In addition, the first instance of play as power in terms of Sutton-Smith’s theory of
adaptive variability unfolds as the novel introduces its narrator, Chief Bromden, and establishes
the control the ward has over him, as well as his use of “play” to adapt to the power dynamics in
progress. First, however, there is a “play” on the Chief’s name by the members of the staff,
accompanied with a ridiculing laughter that the Chief’s “play” subverts. The narrative begins
with the Chief mentioning the “Black boys in white suits” who “hate everything,” and as they
come across Chief Bromden, one of them announces, ‘Here’s the Chief. The soo-pah Chief,
fellas. Ol’ Chief Broom. Here you go Chief Broom….’ Stick a mop in my hand and motion to
the spot they aim for me to clean today, and I go. One swats the backs of my legs with a broom
handle to hurry me past” (3). This opening demonstrates what Michael Billig calls in Laughter
and Ridicule “disciplinary mockery”: “The ridicule of onlookers may be necessary to ensure that
the mechanism of embarrassment acquires and retains its power to enforce the demands of social
order.”389 One of the men continues, “Haw, you look at ‘im shag it? Big enough to eat apples off
my head an’ he mine me like a baby,” while the Chief notes, “they laugh and then I hear them
mumbling behind me, heads close together. Hum of black machinery, humming hate and death
and other hospital secrets. They don’t bother not talking out loud about their hate secrets when
I’m nearby because they think I’m deaf and dumb. Everybody think so. I’m cagey enough to fool
them that much” (4). This mockery, a form of play by those in power, works to keep the Chief in
389
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his station, and to keep the social order of discipline and routine functioning, and the aides play
with the Chief’s name in an attempt to have it mirror his duty.
The Chief actually incorporates adaptive variability as a way to ward off danger, and
more importantly, to acquire agency and power. While the men ridicule Bromden in a way that
upholds the order of the ward through the disciplinary measure of maintaining the hospital, he is
sidestepping the disciplinary mockery through his playing deaf and dumb and acquiring power
instead – the ability to lurk in the halls and observe the power dynamics unfolding. Although this
is not a game, the Chief employs strategy and cunning in order to gain power and access to
information. He is able to trick the staff into thinking he cannot process its communication, all
the while he is privy to the staff’s secrets and “hate.” The Chief’s ploy even gets him on the
“inside” of the staff room in order to perform his hospital duties during staff meetings, and at one
point in the novel, the Chief worries that he may have been found out and he explains, “That’s
why they have me at the staff meetings, because they can be such a messy affair and somebody
has to clean up, and since the staff room is open only during the meetings it’s got to be somebody
they think won’t be able to spread the word what’s going on. That’s me […] I move around in
my chores, and they see right through me like I wasn’t even there” (131). This access allows him
to report “horrible things,” like “poisons” that are “manufactured right out of skin pores and acids
in the air so strong enough to melt a man,” and the time when the staff “kept talking about a
patient so long that the patient materialized in the flesh, nude on the table in front of them,
vulnerable to any fiendish notion they took” (131).
Interestingly, these individuals, the staff, a.k.a. “The Black Boys,” and Nurse Ratched,
dehumanize “ol’ Chief Broom” by refusing to grant him agency and treating him in like fashion
to Ellison’s “invisible” narrator – they refuse to recognize him and they underestimate his power.
And although they “see” Chief Bromden, they carry on as if he is unable to interpret their actions
and words, which fails to recognize the utility of his gaze and grant it any power. But in actuality,
Kesey constructs a novel that establishes his gaze as a narratorial, epistemological apparatus.
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Stephen Tanner mentions how Kesey wanted to create a narrator who “leaves the ground and
breathes in print.”390 By assigning Chief the role of the narrator, Kesey gives him authority of
breathing life into the actions of McMurphy and the others that represent struggles for personal
liberty using play as power.

Kesey has assigned Chief Bromden the authoritative, narratorial

gaze as the entire novel is filtered and told through his consciousness.
While most of the discussion (Madden; Beidler; Safer) on the narrator Bromden mentions
the potential issue regarding his (un)reliability due to his paranoid nature and the statement, “But
it’s the truth even if it didn’t happen” (CN, 8), I maintain that Kesey’s assertion and the novel
itself ultimately grants Chief Bromden agency. The novel is told through Chief’s consciousness,
and the events are narrated through his narratorial gaze. Throughout the novel, layers of history
are revealed that relate the oppression he had suffered, and he explains, “it wasn’t me that started
acting deaf; it was people that first started acting like I was too dumb to hear or see or say
anything at all” (179).391 However, the Chief has taken that experience and has adapted it in
order to survive on the ward. His “dumb and deaf” routine, as he refers to it, opens up access to
information, and although this knowledge and visibility, so to speak, of the Combine’s power
catalyzes the paranoid visions he suffers, the Chief’s condition of muteness is not based on a
diminished intellectual capacity, which would lead to potential unreliability, but it is a conscious
and active maneuverability and is not reducible to a “mental illness,” but a form of high-stakes
play-acting.
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In essence, the Chief is more important to the novel than McMurphy, even in spite of the
fact that McMurphy is the protagonist. The Chief tells the story – in terms of communication, he
is the epideictic rhetor revealing play as power. In an important section of the novel, the Chief
wakes up and he mentions how he is usually the first one up in the morning in an attempt to
“watch what machinery they’re sneaking onto the ward or installing in the shaving room,” but he
notices that McMurphy is up before him. He notices the variability of the routine: “But this
morning I hear McMurphy out there in the latrine as I come out of the covers. Hear him singing!
Singing so you’d think he didn’t have a worry in the world,” and he comments on how
“everybody’s thunderstruck. They haven’t heard such a thing in years, not on this ward” (81).
He wonders why the “black boys haven’t hushed him up,” how they “never let anyone raise that
much racket before,” how he’s “a man made outa skin and bone that’s due to get weak and pale
and die, just like the rest of us,” and wondering if “these things make him just as vulnerable to the
Combine as anybody else” (82). He discusses McMurphy’s ability to evade the control of the
Combine, describing the “schizo” reminiscent of Deleuze and Guattari’s work in Anti-Oedipus
and A Thousand Plateaus: McMurphy is a nomad, “batting around from one place to another,
never around one town longer’n few months,” “logging, gambling, running carnival wheels,
traveling light-footed and fast, keeping on the move so much that the Combine never had a
chance to get anything installed,” because “a moving target is hard to hit” (CN 82).
However, what is most important here is the event(s) of play as power, which is
comprised of McMurphy’s singing and the resulting effect it has – what the Chief calls “get[ing]
that black boy’s goat like not many men could” (84). The first thing to notice is here, and
elsewhere in the novel, when the narrative is describing the conflict between McMurphy and
Nurse Ratched getting each other’s “goat,” Kesey narratively describes the activity through
playful discourse. The phrase “to get someone’s goat” represents play as power because it means
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to annoy someone in a deliberate way as to “gain a psychological advantage.”392 The term is
thought to have originated in horse racing whereby racers would have a pet goat in the stable of a
rather highly temperamental racehorse in order to keep the horse calm. It was believed that goats
did not get flustered very often and had a calming effect on the horses. Rival competitors would
“kidnap” the goat from the stall of a racehorse that is scheduled for an upcoming race, thereby
making it upset and performing poorly in the race.393 While I am not claiming that Kesey
intentionally chose this idiom for the narrative, it is very interesting that the phrase has origins in
“play,” and that it is an utterance designed, originally and narratively, to work an advantage and
gain power.
To put this into perspective, in the narrative, this scene leads into one of the Chief’s many
tangential visions.394 After reflecting upon McMurphy’s deployment of play as power in this
instance, the episode with the singing and “getting the black boy’s goat” evokes memories of the
Chief’s “Papa,” and he recalls how his Papa also “got the white man’s goat” on one occasion.
When the US government officials came to speak to Chief Bromden (Papa) about his land, the
Chief looked up at the sky and said, “Canada honkers up there.” The men, confused, look up,
exclaiming, “What are you – ? In July? There’s no – uh – geese this time of year. Uh, no geese.”
Chief Bromden the narrator recalls how they talked to his father like “tourists from the East,” all
the while his father looked up, saying, “Geese up there, white man. You know it. Geese this year.
And last year. And the year before and the year before.” The Chief-as-narrator finally shares,
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By the time it dawned on the government men that they were being poked fun at, all the
council who’d been sitting on the porch of our shack, putting pipes in the pockets of their
red and black plaid wool shirts and taking them back out again, grinning at one another
and at Papa – they had all busted up laughing fit to kill. Uncle R & J Wolf was rolling on
the ground, gasping with laughter and saying, “You know it, white man.” It sure did get
their goat; they turned without saying a word and walked off toward the highway, rednecked, us laughing behind them. I forget sometimes what laughter can do. (85)
In the memory the Chief rehashes, the government men were the ones with all the power. They
were there to “negotiate buying off the treaty” (84). They had money and official standing – they
had the power. Yet, in this scene, Papa engages in play, a misdirection so to speak, for the
government men “were being poked fun at” with his goose bit. And the men erupt in a laughter
“fit to kill,” and the government men walk off, disempowered. The older Chief Bromden “got
their goat” by implementing a form of play which triggered laughter. Play as power operates
here because the laughter reverses the power dynamics of the players involved in the scene – the
white men leave the reservation without accomplishing their initial objective and have failed to
enforce their power. It is McMurphy’s laugh that triggers this memory for the Chief, and it is
interesting to note that the Chief is often commenting on McMurphy’s laugh (the “first” and
“real” laugh he’s heard, p. 11), which connects to the presence of play as power.
More importantly, the Chief is engaging in a particular type of play – the play of
daydreaming or reminiscing. John Caughey has commented on the playfulness of daydreaming,
stating, “In our society, at least, when an individual’s attention is not fully taken up by demanding
tasks or engrossing actual experience, his or her attention characteristically shifts inward to a
curious subjective world of silent language and imagery.”395 Erving Goffman too has commented
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on this notion: “While outwardly participating in an activity within a social situation, an
individual can allow his attention to turn from what he and everyone else considers the real or
serious world, and give himself up for a time to a playlike world in which he alone
participates.”396
While these occasions appear detached from the present reality, play as power adapts the
“playlike” subjectivity of the act Goffman addresses, especially in the realm of literary epideictic.
The narrative memory amplifies play as power by interweaving the memory against the backdrop
of power relations and it does so purposively. Therefore, while Caughey and Goffman are talking
about a disconnect from the serious reality in which an individual finds herself engrossed, the
kind of reminiscing that falls under play as power, which the Chief demonstrates in Cuckoo’s
Nest, is not a detached form of escapism. And perhaps no better testament to daydreaming as
play as power exists in the novel than the memory the Chief has when he and McMurphy receive
EST – a memory of a childhood game, “Tingle Tingle Tangle Toes.” The narrative streams,
Ting. Tingle, tingle, tremble toes, she’s a good fisherman, catches hens, puts ’em inna
pens … wire blier, limber lock, three geese inna flock … one flew east, one flew west,
one flew over the cuckoo’s nest … O-U-T spells out … goose swoops down and plucks
you out.
My old grandma chanted this, a game we played by the hours, sitting by the fish rack
scaring flies. A game called Tingle Tingle Tangle Toes. (246)
While the Chief is undergoing EST, he has this vision and memory. He has disconnected from
the reality of the “actual experience” of shock therapy, and has entered a subjective world of
Tingle Tingle Tangle Toes imagery. However, play as power has a more serious social context,
and in this instance, the Chief is not daydreaming or reminiscing about an old memory for
pleasure or leisure, but to stave off the dangerous threat of EST, and in doing so, he is disrupting
the process, for EST is said to make your memories vanish (in the novel and in real life).397 It is
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no wonder then that the Chief, on more than one occasion, says, “I forgot what laughter can do,”
because on the ward, memory is not the only thing patients stand to lose. The patients have lost
the ability to laugh, for after Harding asks McMurphy how he can beat the Nurse “other than
laughing at her,” the patients notice her “looking out through her window,” and when she sees
them looking at her, she “nods and they all turn away” (64); this is the same gesture she performs
towards McMurphy later, when he “walks past the window where she’s glaring out at him and
grins at her like he knows he’s got her whipped now. When he tips his head back and winks at
her she gives that little sideways jerk of her head” (124).
The narrative establishes this key conflict of the Nurse’s power to shut down laughter not
long after McMurphy is admitted into the ward and the patients have their first group meeting.
Just when Nurse Ratched insists that Doctor Spivey explain the “theory of our Therapeutic
Community,” Ruckly intervenes with the utterance, “Ffffuck da wife.” McMurphy, who has been
observing his new surroundings, raises his hand above his mouth and asks, logically perhaps,
“Whose wife?” This is an interesting moment because of the dynamics of humor, laughter, and
power, especially in how they intermingle in One Flew Over the Cuckoo’s Nest. For one,
McMurphy is trying to attain information to follow along with the discussion. It is not really a
joke, but a question, and yet, he anticipates laughter at his inquiry. The Chief narrates the central
dilemma of Kesey’s novel, one involving the interplay of laughter and power, and in the
beginning of the novel, he frames the narrative absence of laughter:
There’s a puzzled expression coming over [McMurphy’s] face. Something strange is
going on there, he’s finding out. He can’t quite put his finger on it. Like the way nobody
will laugh. Now he thought sure there would be a laugh when he asked Ruckly, “Whose
wife?” but there wasn’t even a sign of one. The air is pressed in by the walls, too tight
for laughing. There’s something strange about a place where the men won’t let

Accounts Of Electroconvulsive Therapy, 1940–2005.”; and Kneeland and Warren. Pushbutton Psychiatry:
A History of Electroshock in America.

258
themselves loose and laugh, something strange about the way they all knuckle under to
that smiling flour-faced old mother there with the too-red lipstick and the too-big boobs.
And he thinks he’ll just wait a while to see what the story is in this new place before he
makes any kind of play. That a good rule for a smart gambler: look the game over awhile
before you draw yourself a hand. (43)
Not only does this passage reveal that the ward environment is ensconced in power dynamics –
the men “knuckle” under the authority of the “matriarchy” as Harding puts it – but it also places
this discussion in play as power discourse. First, the Chief notes that the “air is pressed in by the
walls, too tight for laughing,” which indicates the invisibility of the controlling power, while
McMurphy is a “gambler” who scans the playing field of the “game” so to speak, thinking up his
next strategy of play. Furthermore, it suggests that on the ward, the men are forbidden to laugh
due to a rational mannerism of etiquette, enforced by the mother-figure, and laughter then would
signify an impoliteness. As Anca Parvulescu historicizes, the civilization process has “pruned”
laughter to moderation to the point where “passional laughter” is condemned by the “Western
polite world.”398 There has been a lot of energy, she states, that has gone into laughter’s
“management.” Parvulescu then discusses the “closed mouth” of a subtle smile that “accompanies
seriousness in its pursuit of its projects,” revealing, “the opening of the mouth into loud, passional
laughter is a revolt against seriousness.”399 And this is why the Nurse is only depicted as smiling
– she is never laughing, but smiling her “cold,” calculating smile that is connected to a project of
seriousness: “Her face is smooth, calculated, and precision-made, like an expensive baby doll,”
and she carries a smile “crimped between her chin and her nose,” even though she is “tense as
steel,” because she will not “relax a hair till she gets the nuisance attended to – what she calls
‘adjusted to surroundings’” (CN 6; 25).400
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McMurphy soon finds out how the ward is run under the direction of the Big Nurse,
specifically, the way she can manipulate questions, insinuation, and evaluation into a force of
control over the patients. For instance, Harding acts as a guide for McMurphy after he arrives,
informing him of life on the ward – its rules and regulations, actions and consequences, and the
players. Harding explains to McMurphy that in the hospital, Nurse Ratched holds all the power
because she possesses the power to “insinuate”: “She doesn’t need to accuse. She has a genius
for insinuation” (55). This invisible form of the power of coercion threatens the patients and
causes them to submit to the Big Nurse, and obey her commanding will. And when McMurphy
encourages some of the patients to push back and let Nurse Ratched know they cannot be pushed
around, he learns that one of their only mechanisms for change, for any type of resistance to the
Nurse’s regime, is the “democratic-ward manure” of “taking a vote,” and he states, “Don’t you
see you have to do something to show you still got some guts? Don’t you see you can’t let her
take over completely?” (63).
However, the Nurse has the power to code any patients’ behavior as “assaultive” and
there is a system of discipline and punishment that will then take over, one that results in the loss
of privileges, mostly tied to play. The control over forms of play that the Nurse wields is usually
enough to keep the patients in check, and the bodily punishment of EST and other measures
looms as a pending threat, the “unexpected manifestation of an expected threat.” After learning
about the Nurse’s authority, McMurphy counters that he will just “tell her to up and go to hell.”
Another Acute answers him, “Okay, you tell her that and you’re listed as Potential Assaultive and
shipped upstairs to the Disturbed ward,” where the patients do not get to watch TV, enjoy

grin, a baring of the teeth shown by a subordinate to a dominant, a nervous signal of submissiveness
common in many species, including many parts of the primate line.” In humans, he notes the traces of this
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Saturday movies, or play cards. Harding explains more grave consequences for that type of
delinquent behavior:
“And, my friend, if you continue to demonstrate such hostile tendencies, such as
telling people to go to hell, you get lined up to go to the Shock Shop, perhaps even on to
greater things, an operation, an –”
“Damn it, Harding, I told you I’m not up on this talk.”
“The Shock Shop, Mr. McMurphy, is jargon for the EST machine, the Electro Shock
Therapy. A device that might be said to do the work of the sleeping pill, the electric
chair, and the torture rack. It’s a clever little procedure, simple, quick, nearly painless it
happens so fast, but no one wants another one. Ever.” (62)
Harding calls it a “joint” procedure of therapy and punishment for his “go-to-hell behavior.”
McMurphy finally hatches a plan and says to Harding,
“But you say … she don’t send you up to that other ward unless she gets your goat?
Unless she makes you crack in some way and you end up cussing her out or busting a
window or something like that?”
“Unless you do something like that…. She’s powerless unless you do something to
honestly deserve the Disturbed Ward or EST. If you’re tough enough to keep her from
getting to you, she can’t do a thing.” (65)
Harding says, “Those are the rules we play by. Of course, she always wins, my friend, always”
(65).
Thus, the central conflict is established in the novel and the narrative features both play
and power discourse by presenting the play terminology of a contest and a bet, and the power
allusions to authority and weaponry. The coexistence of these two discourses includes behavioral
approaches that involve strategic conflict, play, laughter, discipline, punishment, and control. For
example, McMurphy presses on, “What I want to know is am I safe to try to beat her at her own
game?”. He refers to the Big Nurse as the undisputed “champ” of the ward and then he goes on
to “put a little money” on this venture. But Harding is not confident, stating that “laughter” is not
a “weapon” to combat the Nurse’s authority, charging, “[d]o you think, for all your claimed
psychopathic powers, that could effectively use your weapon against our champion?” (64). But
Harding misses the power behind laughter. In order to demonstrate how laughter represents play
as power in the novel, it is necessary to establish the overarching conflict that actually subsumes

261
the conflict between Nurse Ratched and McMurphy and the patients – that of disciplinary power
vs. play as power.
5) Disciplinary Power vs. Play as Power
Because epideictic discourse attempts to recreate an authentic reality that individuals can
relate to, in order to display and perhaps adapt communal value systems, it is necessary to
establish the backdrop of “power” that “play” is countering in the novel. I argue that in order for
play as power to manifest, there must first be instigation. In order to present play as power as a
counterstrike, I need to frame that which it is countering – disciplinary power. The notion of
disciplinary power comes from Michel Foucault’s revelations in Discipline and Punish, which
resonate profoundly with Cuckoo’s Nest, and especially the epideictic exigency that is calling
forth such a narrative. For instance, the narrative – and furthermore, my attention – is not
concerned with the meaning or details of the patients’ madness. Rather, the novel, like Discipline
and Punish, is concerned with power and the way in which discipline is carried out. Foucault
even extends his work in Discipline and Punish to mental hospitals: “Is it surprising that prisons
resemble factories, schools, barracks, hospitals, which all resemble prisons?”401
The most important part of this immense work that connects to the narrative, and my
reading of it, pertains to the Panopticon, the definitions of disciplinary power, and the written
records and formation of individual knowledge. First, Foucault addresses an important
definitional element of power. He writes, “Power has its principle not so much in a person as in a
certain concerted distribution of bodies, surfaces, lights, gazes; in an arrangement whose internal
mechanisms produce the relation in which individuals are caught up” (D&P 202). In discussing
discipline, Foucault turns to the Panopticon as the architectural tower shifting the nature of prison
401
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functionality. He talks about the central tower, ring-shaped, looking over a building divided into
cells, with a supervisor situated in the main tower, overlooking the collection of separated
individuals, which introduces a very nuanced relationship of visibility. He writes, “Hence, the
major effect of the Panopticon: to induce the inmate in a state of conscious and permanent
visibility that assures the automatic functioning of power,” making “surveillance permanent in its
effects.” This arrangement of space and bodies becomes a “machine for creating and sustaining a
power relation independent of the person who exercises it” (D&P 201).
The ward in Cuckoo’s Nest definitely meets the parameters of the Panopticon – the Nurse
hides behind her “glass” and observes the patients and records events. The Chief, describing a
day in the ward, depicts the Nurse as walking to the “glass Nurse’s Station where she’ll spend the
day sitting at her desk and looking out her window and making notes on what goes on out in front
of her in the day room during the next eight hours” (CN 5); and later, he accounts, “Seven-thirty
back to the day room. The Big Nurse looks out through her special glass, always polished till you
can’t tell its there” (CN 29). This meets the criteria of the Panopticon, which is “visible and
unverifiable,” because the patients know that she is watching them, but they are never certain as
to whether or not she is seeing, or hearing, everything that is transpiring. For instance, the Chief
refers to her as the “watchful robot, tend[ing] to her network with mechanical insect skill” (CN
26). She dispatches her “minions,” the aides who “never make any noise when they move,” but
“materialize in different parts of the ward every time a patient figures to check himself in private
or whisper some secret to another guy” (CN 27). Thus, in order to remain safe, they can only
assume that she will receive information of the ward happenings, and this belief alters their
behavior. The Nurse, behind her glass, represents the “disciplinary mechanism”: she sits and
observes an “enclosed, segmented space, observed at every point, in which the individuals are
inserted in a fixed place, in which the slightest movements are supervised, in which all events are
recorded, in which an uninterrupted work of writing links the center and the periphery, in which
power is exercised without division” (D&P 197).
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Nurse Ratched establishes a relation of disciplinary power not only through the situation
of bodies on the mental ward with her central post in the Nurse’s station, but also through
situating the patients in a communal group and coding the ward space under the aegis of a
therapeutic community. Foucault calls the “chief function” of disciplinary power “training,” and
the patients represent what he refers to as “docile bodies,” a body that is “subjected, used,
transformed and improved” (D&P 136). The Big Nurse’s mission is to train and to discipline the
patients and to get them “adjusted to their surroundings,” turning the ward into a “little world
Inside that is a made-to-scale-prototype of the big world Outside,” one to which the patients will
one day return (CN 44). The Chief describes the theory of the “Therapeutic Community” in the
narrative: how an individual has to “get along in a group” before he is deemed fit “to function in a
normal society,” and how the communal group can show him “where he’s out of place;”
purporting to be, under the direction of the Big Nurse, “a democratic ward, run completely by the
patients and their votes, working toward making worth-while citizens to turn back Outside onto
the street” (CN 44).
What the Chief is talking about, and what the Nurse establishes, is the invisibility of
power that Foucault describes: “Hence the major effect of the Panopticon: to induce in the inmate
a state of consciousness and permanent visibility that assures the automatic functioning of power”
(D&P 201, italics added). In terms of Cuckoo’s Nest, the automatic functioning is wrapped up in
the ward’s theory of a “therapeutic value” – The Nurse explains, “Please understand: We do not
impose certain rules and restrictions on you without a great deal of thought about their therapeutic
value…. I tell you this hoping you will understand that it is entirely for your own good that we
enforce discipline and order” (CN 170). Everything is intended for “therapeutic value,” for the
patients’ “own good,” including their own regulation of one another: “Talk, [the doctor] says,
discuss, confess. And if you hear a friend say something during the course of your everyday
conversation, then list it in the logbook for the staff to see. It’s not, as the movies call it,
’squealing,’ it’s helping your fellow. Bring these old sins out into the open where they can be

264
washed by the sight of all [….] There should be no need for secrets among friends” (CN 44). The
patients become a self-policing unit, contributing to the “automatic functioning” of the Combine
and increasing its force and control.
However, what is important is the irony of the theory of therapeutic community in terms
of its promulgated mission to “fix” or “adjust patients” to their surroundings, and what really
takes place in the novel is discipline and punishment in order to control the patients and exercise
authority. For instance, the Big Nurse runs the ward, and “the ward is a factory for the Combine.
It’s for fixing up mistakes made in the neighborhoods and in the schools and in the churches” (CN
36). The Chief defines the “Combine” as a “huge organization that aims to adjust the Outside as
well as she has the Inside” (CN 25, italics added). The Chief explains that the Nurse does not
work alone, for she is a “high-ranking official” for the “nation-wide Combine that’s the really big
force” (CN 164). The Nurse operates a panoptic wavelength, what the Chief labels, “The Big
Nurse’s frequency.” He describes it by explaining how she “never has to give orders,” or write
things out for her staff, because the staff is “in contact on a high-voltage wavelength of hate” with
a love of “efficiency” (CN 29). The Chief continues,
And I’ve watched her get more and more skillful over the years. Practice has steadied and
strengthened her until now she wields a sure power that extends in all directions on
hairlike wires too small for anybody’s eye but mine; I see her sit in the center of this web
of wires like a watchful robot, tend her network with mechanical insect skill, know every
second which wire runs where and just what current to send up to get the results she
wants. (CN 25-26, italics added)
The way disciplinary power works is not necessarily or always visible, as the Chief points out, for
only he has the ability to see it in the narrative world. For instance, he reflects, “[the Combine]
work[s] on you ways you can’t fight! They put things in! They install things. They start as quick
as they see you’re gonna be big and go to working and installing their filthy machinery when
you’re little, and keep on and on an on till your fixed!” (CN 189, italics in original). What this
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intense surveillance achieves is the elimination of any type of play that is associated with
“adaptive variability” that Sutton-Smith, Boyd, and Gould discuss. The patients are not allowed
the freedom to be “unpredictable,” or the freedom to arrive at “creative responses” to their current
situations, but they must relinquish all forms of play to the Big Nurse’s controlling authority that
is bent on “fixing mistakes.” However, the Combine, and in turn, the Nurse, are the authorities in
terms of what constitutes a “mistake,” and the Chief relates that the Big Nurse is not intent on
bettering the patients; rather, she transmits currents of “hate” that collaborate to achieve the
“results she wants,” which is ultimate control and authority.
All throughout the novel she controls the patients’ lives by structuring time, for even
Harding says, “with the element of time working for her she eventually gets inside everyone.
That’s why the hospital regards her as its top nurse and grants her so much authority; she’s a
master at forcing the trembling libido out into the open” (CN 65). She carries out what Foucault
labels the “strict” “time-table,” the “establish[ing] of rhythms,” the imposing of “particular
occupations,” the regulation of “the cycles of repetition,” which, he points out, were soon found
in hospitals, and here, in the mental ward (D&P, 149). The narrative describes the Big Nurse as
running the ward “like a smooth, accurate, precision-made machine,” constructing a “world of
precision efficiency and tidiness like a pocket watch with a glass back, a place where the schedule
is unbreakable” (CN 25; 26), incorporating language of the disciplinary “control of time”
consistent with Foucault’s discussion of time “without impurities or defects, a time of good
quality throughout which the body is constantly applied to its exercise” (D&P 151). And in the
context of Cuckoo’s Nest, the bodies are applied to the Nurse’s exercise of disciplinary
adjustment.
Lastly, Foucault discusses how individuality became a prominent feature in the exercise
of power, claiming that the individual may now be “described, judged, measured, compared with
others, in his very individuality,” and how the individual is the one “to be trained or corrected,
classified, normalized, excluded, etc.” (D&P 191). Talking about “administrative
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documentation,” Foucault touches upon the power of writing to “integrate individual data into
cumulative systems … so as to arrange things that an individual could be located in the general
register and that, conversely, each datum of the individual examination might affect overall
calculations” (D&P 190).
The Nurse keeps written records of what transpires on the ward, and in doing so, she is
accumulating knowledge and amassing power all in one. An example of the power of writing in
regards to Foucault’s discussion of record keeping as the simultaneous accumulation of
knowledge and power occurs when McMurphy is newly on the ward. When McMurphy is
beginning to show signs of challenging the Big Nurse, she turns to his “folder.” The scene
continues with the Nurse mispronouncing McMurphy’s name,
“McMurry, Randle Patrick. Committed by the state from Pendleton Farm for Correction.
For diagnosis and possible treatment. Thirty-five years old. Never married.
Distinguished Service Cross in Korea, for leading an escape from a Communist prison
camp. A dishonorable discharge, afterward, for insubordination. Followed by a history of
street brawls and barroom fights and a series of arrests for Drunkenness, Assault and
Battery, Disturbing the Peace, repeated gambling, and one arrest – for Rape.” (CN 40)
Following this proclamation, the Nurse refers to McMurphy as “our new Admission,” and the
Chief notes that as she passes his folder to the doctor, it seems as if “she’s got a man folded up
inside that yellow paper and can pass him on to be looked over” (CN 41). What is interesting
here is the addition of observing individual patients in the ward-as-Panopticon – the narrative is
suggesting how the written records of individuality are something to be observed too, much like
the physical body objects of patients or prisoners. Like Foucault states, the Panopticon employs a
“system of individualizing and permanent documentation” in an effort to constitute a “body of
knowledge,” which the Chief here fittingly describes with the reference to McMurphy’s folder.
The body of knowledge, Foucault points out, was used in order to assess whether it would be
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possible to “transform” the “inmate” into a useful member of society (D&P 250-251). Thus, the
individual has become a body of knowledge, an individual “to know.”
It is here that Foucault distinguishes the “delinquent” from the “offender,” also fitting
because McMurphy is transformed from an offender of the law to a mental patient. But what
Foucault says about the delinquent pertains to this scene in which the Big Nurse looks over his
file – “The delinquent is to be distinguished from the offender by the fact that it is not so much
his act as his life that is relevant in characterizing him” (D&P 251). The purpose is to discover
the “dangerous proclivities” and “harmful dispositions” of the delinquent and try to transform
him. This is exactly what happens with McMurphy on the ward. During the staff meeting where
the doctors and the Big Nurse meet to discuss McMurphy’s fate, one of the doctors states, “Even
if you haven’t read his history all one should need to do is pay attention to his behavior on the
ward to realize … he is definitely a Potential Assaultive…. Don’t you recognize the arch type of
psychopath? I’ve never heard of a clearer case. This man is a Napoleon, a Genghis Khan, Attila
the Hun” (CN 133). The other doctors throw in more diagnoses – “schizophrenic reaction,”
“Latent Homosexual with Reaction Formation,” and “Negative Oedipal,” which receives praise
(CN 136); finally, one doctor sums up the body of knowledge accumulated on McMurphy,
drawing upon written historical records and observation, stating, “His history shows, Alvin, that
time and again he has acted out his hostilities against authority figures – in school, in the service,
in jail! And I think that his performance after the voting furor today is as conclusive an indication
as we can have of what to expect in the future” (CN 134). The doctors in this scene rely upon the
written records and observations of McMurphy to classify him one way or another in order to
determine what should be done regarding McMurphy, mainly, whether or not they should send
him to Disturbed.
However, what is interesting in this scene is the use of this accumulated knowledge to
categorize the individual in order to exercise disciplinary measures, juxtaposed with Nurse
Ratched’s reaction to the discussion unfolding. The narrative reveals that she has lost “control”
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over the patients at this juncture, due to an insurrection against house chores in relation to the
World Series televised game. Yet, the Big Nurse insists that McMurphy is not “extraordinary”
like the doctors suggest, but he “is simply a man and no more.” She insists that they keep him on
the floor in order to “subject” him to “all the fears and all the cowardice and all the timidity that
any other man is subject to.” In other words, the Nurse is not bent on reform or training the
individual McMurphy in order to improve one of society’s citizens, but she is preoccupied with
imposing her dominant will in order to establish her control and power and deflate McMurphy’s
accumulating power. As a result, she informs the staff that the “length of time [McMurphy]
spends in this hospital is entirely up to us” (137). When McMurphy first arrives, he represents a
threat that will “disrupt” the disciplinary flow of the ward, and the Nurse charges that McMurphy
is a “manipulator,” one who will use anything he can to carry out the “actual disruption of the
ward for the sake of disruption,” and that “it may take months to get everything running smooth
once more” (24-25). But, she is blinded by her power. She fails to see what is really taking place
on the ward. He is not intent on disrupting the ward for the sake of disruption, but of
implementing laughter as the interruption of psychosocial control, and ultimately, he is a threat to
her “seriousness” project.
5) The World Series Vote: Play as Power and Revolt
The Big Nurse’s, and the Combine’s, disciplinary will and power instigate the need for
play as power and its representation, laughter. Their project of “seriousness” allows for
vulnerabilities and gaps where play as power can counter.402 For instance, Nurse Ratched has
402

This notion of “vulnerabilities” in authoritative institutions I borrow from Hub Zwart. See Ethical
Consensus and the Truth of Laughter: The Structure of Moral Transformations. Kampen, The Netherlands:
Kok Pharos Publishing House, 1996. Zwart explores the function of laughter to “expose” the “defects” of
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forces because they are “faced with a certain rationality, a moral regime that dominates moral discourse to
such an extent that they cannot offer any resistance without raising the suspicion of being unreasonable”
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established and maintained control over the Acutes and the Chronics, but McMurphy will model
a different mode of behavior that the patients will adopt. In this way, McMurphy is not so much
a savior as he is a quasi-epideictic rhetor or educator. This “learning” is epideictic because
somebody has to first reveal the vulnerabilities of those in power, and then display new values or
codes of behavior. Therefore, play as power does not function without the backdrop of
domineering power. While the patients appear to be “docile bodies” in Foucault’s sense, critics
fail to recognize what type of “subjects” they truly are – “inter-passive subjects,” patients at one
time passive and controllable, but individuals who participate in an Other’s play as power, and
who end up undergoing a transformation, thus becoming actual “players” themselves.
Perhaps no other event in the novel captures play as power in this context quite like the
scene dealing with the World Series vote. The World Series scene represents play as power
because McMurphy uses the game of baseball and various “play” signals to change the structure
and governing of the ward, while the patients enjoy the rebelliousness of McMurphy, ultimately
transposing their enjoyment and benefit onto McMurphy. In essence, they rebel through another.
The narrative explains how McMurphy had been taking bets from the patients regarding the
World Series, and he anticipated watching the games on TV despite the fact that the games did
not air during “regular TV time.” During the group meeting, McMurphy proposes an alternative
timeframe for attending to the chores – he suggests that they work at night, during regular TV
time, and watch the games during the afternoon, which was the designated “ordinary” timeframe
for chores. Yet, it is not the promulgated “democratic ward manure of taking a vote” that brings
about change to the ward’s operation – it is the result of play as power.

(Zwart, 10, italics added). He notes that the individual is ensconced within the discourse, but that at times,
certain “vulnerabilities” of the dominant regime are “revealed” - “and this is the experience of laughter,”
for while the established authority “cannot be criticized, it can be ridiculed” (10). Laughter then serves as
the gap of narrative vulnerability in Cuckoo’s Nest, for as Dale Sullivan reasons, epideictic offers a process
of evaluation and unveilment: “Unveiling a text can be an uncovering of the value system implicit in the
text,” thus “exposing the value system of a text or person to the gaze of spectators” (342). See Dale
Sullivan, “The Epideictic Character of Rhetorical Criticism.” Rhetoric Review, Vol. 11, No. 2 (Spring,
1993), p. 342.
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This event illustrates not only play as power, but it also features Slavoj Žižek’s notion of
“interpassive subjects.” In the essay, “The Interpassive Subject,” Slavoj Žižek discusses
relationships of substitution in terms of enjoyment – the “outsourcing” of enjoyment onto some
other object.403 While Žižek is talking about works of art and how they provide passive
participation for their viewers, this theory has implications for the narrative of Cuckoo’s Nest, not
in its reading reception, but in how the characters of the ward function as interpassive subjects,
participating in rebellion and laughter through their delegate, McMurphy. Žižek extends his
concept of interpassivity to include laughter through the concept of “canned laughter” in a section
of the essay dealing with feelings and attitudes, Žižek expressing, “with watching a TV miniseries with canned laughter, where, even if I do not laugh but simply stare at the screen, tired after
a hard day’s work, I nonetheless feel relieved after the show,” thus describing a situation in which
a viewer’s “most intimate feelings can be radically externalized; I can literally ‘laugh and cry
through another’” (Žižek). The patients experience – and perhaps, one can say that they even
enjoy – play as power through McMurphy.
The patients are (inter)passive in the scene because they do not engage in the conflict, but
enjoy the results of McMurphy’s playful contestation of the Nurse’s power and schedule of
activities. For instance, Cheswick is often depicted as having grievances with certain policies,
but he does not receive any attention from the patients or from the staff, nor does he experience
any powerful outcomes through his objections. However, when the Nurse attempts to shut down
McMurphy’s request, McMurphy counters with “Yeah, perhaps we should get on with the
sonofabitchin’ meeting,” and Cheswick agrees, “yeah, get on with the godblessed meeting,” with
the Chief reporting Cheswick looked “pleased to be sitting next to McMurphy, feeling brave like
this” (104, italics added). While Cheswick does utter forth his sentiment, his feeling of braveness
comes through McMurphy, for this is a literary depiction of an interpassive subject – meaning,
403
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Cheswick’s announcement is not the initial utterance of dissatisfaction. It is McMurphy who first
verbally suggests a change in policy, and when he is met with resistance, he voices displeasure
with his surly expression. Additionally, the narrative has not described Cheswick’s feelings of
“enjoyment” before, despite the fact that he has had previous complaints about ward policies
(enjoyment here meaning a sense of satisfaction for challenging the Big Nurse and her policies,
and in this case, despite the fact that McMurphy’s and Cheswick’s declaration reflect a tone of
irritability, Cheswick’s feeling of bravery possesses a positive quality).
Thus, when it comes time to take a vote for changing the scheduled routines, the patients,
like Cheswick, participate interpassively. The Chief describes,
The first hand that comes up, I can tell, is McMurphy’s, … and then off down the slope I
see them, other hands coming up out of the fog. It’s like … that big red hand of
McMurphy’s is reaching into the fog and dropping down and dragging the men up by
their hands, dragging them blinking into the open. First one, then another, then the next.
Right on down the line of Acutes, dragging them out of the fog till there they stand, all
twenty of them, raising not just for watching TV, but against the Big Nurse, against her
trying to send McMurphy to Disturbed, against the way she’s talked and acted and beat
them down for years. (121, italics added)
What is interesting to note here is that the activity in the scene seems involuntary, almost as if the
men are not willingly choosing to team up with McMurphy. However, the event of the novel –
the communal laughter of the patients on the fishing boat, which will be discussed shortly – is
beginning to develop at this stage; it is in the process of “becoming” and this scene marks a
significant point in that event. This is one of the early formations of community in the novel, for
the men will eventually rebel against the Big Nurse through McMurphy in this scene. They are
interpassive subjects participating in, and enjoying, the defeat of the Big Nurse. And here is play
as power at work – the men are not voting to watch TV and enjoy the game of baseball ipso facto.
The game of baseball (play) has much more at stake (power) for the men and ward-life. This act
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can disrupt the Big Nurse’s plans of sending McMurphy to Disturbed, for instance, and it also
carries with it past grievances and acts as a stand against “the way she’s talked and acted and beat
them down for years” (121).
However, the Nurse too employs play as power back at McMurphy by falling back upon
the “rules of the game,” so to speak, regarding the voting process on the ward, which mandates a
majority vote to change ward policy. While there are forty patients overall, twenty of the
patients, the Chronics, are not rationally coherent or even communicative. She relies on the
“ward constitution” and that alone has the authority to override what McMurphy has
accomplished in terms of a united front. In spite of this fact, McMurphy does not give up and he
moves along the Chronics without success until he comes to Chief Bromden. The Chief registers
the final vote in the World Series debate, and when McMurphy is trying to get him to raise his
hand, the narrative reports,
It’s too late to stop it now. McMurphy did something to it that first day, put some kind of
hex on it with his hand so it won’t act like I order it. There’s no sense in it, any fool can
see; I wouldn’t do it on my own. Just by the way the nurse is staring at me with her
mouth empty of words I can see I’m in for trouble, but I can’t stop it. McMurphy’s got
hidden wires hooked to it, lifting it slow just to get me out of the fog and out into the
open where I’m fair game. He’s doing it, wires … No. That’s not the truth. I lifted it
myself. (123, italics added)
Here again is where interpassive subjectivity comes again, with a twist on Žižek’s focus on
objects and works of art. In a literary narrative, the patients represent interpassive subjects
because the only way to illustrate their “enjoyment,” or interpassive activity, is through instances
like the one the Chief described. In these two passages concerning the vote, the men are
portrayed as both being manipulated by McMurphy, and as acting agents – they decided to
continue to stand along with McMurphy rather than retreat and go back to being passive. While
McMurphy may be depicted as “plucking” them out of the fog and draggin them into the conflict,
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the Chief describes how they vote against the Big Nurse and her power, emphasizing that
McMurphy did not work the “wires,” but the truth is he “lifted [his hand] himself” (123).
However, Žižek argues situations involving interpassive subjectivity are not as “stupid”
or “primitive” as one might think, “for they harbor a momentous liberating potential.” He
continues, “By way of surrendering my innermost content, including my dreams and anxieties, to
the Other, a space opens up in which I am free to breathe: when the Other laughs for me, I am
free to take a rest; when the Other is sacrificed instead of me, I am free to go on living with the
awareness that I have paid for my guilt, and so on” (Žižek). The patients all throughout the novel
struggle with laughing – for one reason or another, usually tied to fear and power; as the narrative
has iterated, they are unable to loosen up and laugh.
Yet, the scene following the vote better illustrates the nature of narrative-interpassivesubjects in the novel. McMurphy looks at the clock, which rules the activity on the ward and is
currently denoting chore-time, but McMurphy attempts to recode the agenda of the ward, and go
against the Big Nurse’s disciplinary structure. The narrative reports that McMurphy says “it’s
time for the game” and he leaves his “scouring rag where it lies” while “nobody else stops work.”
Then, “McMurphy walks past the window where she’s glaring out at him and grins at her like he
knows he’s got her whipped now” (124). The narrative reveals that everyone keeps on with their
chores “but they all watch out of the corners of their eyes while he drags his armchair out to in
front of the TV set, then switches on the set and sits down” (124). Here it is interesting that the
narrative includes the dominant gaze of Nurse Ratched from her Panopticon position, along with
the rebellious gaze of McMurphy sporting a grin, and the interpassive gaze of the patients
watching this power conflict unfold. The Nurse eventually turns the TV off from the control
room, but McMurphy “don’t even let on he knows the picture is turned off,” and he “sits that
way, with his hands crossed behind his head and his feet stuck out in a chair, a smoking cigarette
sticking out from under his hat brim – watching the TV screen” (125).
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However, McMurphy’s laughter has filled the ward and carries with it play as power, for
the Chief explains that McMurphy did something to him on that first day. In the beginning of the
novel, when McMurphy arrives, the Chief notices his laugh, and how “there’s nothing funny
going on,” but the laugh is “free and loud,” and the Chief “realize[s] all of a sudden it’s the first
laugh [he’s] heard in years” (11). A very interesting connection exists despite the fact that Žižek
is referring to the “canned laughter” of the TV show; while the “canned laughter” enjoys and
laughs for the interpassive subjects, McMurphy pretends to watch baseball and rebels for the
interpassive patients. In Cuckoo’s Nest, McMurphy is purportedly watching a baseball game on
the television set; however, the Nurse cuts the power, and McMurphy acts as if the game is still
on, enjoying it as if he were actually watching it. The patients begin to respond to McMurphy’s
pleasure so to speak, and engage in the game and McMurphy’s behavior. The real significance
lies in the fact that there is no televised game, and the patients are essentially reveling in the act of
rebelliousness, as opposed to enjoying the pleasure of sporting-entertainment. The patients, then,
can remain passive while McMurphy acts and rebels, and essentially, laughs, for them.
In reality, the scene has nothing to do with the game and play of baseball. Harding tells
McMurphy that a “baseball game isn’t worth the risk,” but in American and/or game culture, a
game of baseball is not really a risk of anything, but more of a game for sport and enjoyment; but
when power dynamics are intermingled with the game, as the social context of Cuckoo’s Nest
indicates, a game of baseball certainly poses a risk when interpreted within the mental ward
framework of discipline and punishment. The play as power resides in the act of pretending to
watch baseball on the blank screen while the Nurse’s power is diminishing as a result of that act
(of play essentially).
For instance, the Nurse tells McMurphy he is supposed to be helping with the
“housework,” that it is time for “working,” and she “warns him”:
“You’re committed, you realize. You are … under the jurisdiction of me … the
staff.” She’s holding up a fist, all those red orange fingernails burning into her palm.
“Under the jurisdiction and control -”
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Harding shuts off the buffer, and leaves it in the hall, and goes pulls him a chair up
alongside McMurphy and sits down and lights him a cigarette too.
“Mr. Harding! You return to your scheduled duties!”
I think how her voice sounds like it hit a nail, and this strikes me so funny I almost
laugh. (125, italics original)
Eventually, the other men follow, Cheswick, Billy Bibbit, then Scanlon and Fredrickson and
Sefelt pull up chairs and they sit there watching a blank TV screen like they could “see the
baseball game clear as day,” and the Chief notes, “If somebody’d of come in and took a look,
men watching a blank TV, a fifty-year old woman hollering and squealing at the back of their
heads about discipline and order and recriminations, they’d of thought the whole bunch was
crazy as loons” (126); or, they would have witnessed the power of play.
Following the World Series scene, the narrative reveals that McMurphy kept on the Big
Nurse and the staff “just as hard” as he ever was, “hollering up and down the hall, laughing at the
black boys, frustrating the whole staff,” “and the patients were loving it” (138; 137, italics
added). Rather than just skirting his duties all together, McMurphy engages in forms of play,
mostly in the context of humor and sarcasm in this instance. He “thanks” the Big Nurse for
“latrine duty,” telling her he would “think of her every time he swabbed out a urinal”; and he
responds to the Big Nurse’s criticism that his performance was an “outrage” with the quip, “No;
that’s a toilet bowl … a toilet bowl” (138). The other men too began to avoid their chores, all of
them lining up during the “non-ordinary” time for TV, despite the fact that “the power was shut
off in the Nurses’ Station and [they] couldn’t see a thing.” In spite of the Nurse’s attempt to
control the situation by cutting off the supply of electricity to the television, McMurphy would
again use play to “entertain” the group for hours, telling the patients “all kinds of stories,” and he
would “whack his leg and throw back his head and laugh and laugh, digging his thumb into the
ribs of whoever was sitting next to him, trying to get him to laugh too” (139). The Chief reveals
the significance of how the laughter represented play as power at work. He explains,
There was times that week when I’d hear that full-throttled laugh, watch him scratching
his belly and stretching and yawning and leaning back to wink at whoever he was joking
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with, everything coming to him just as natural as drawing breath, and I’d quit worrying
about the Big Nurse and the Combine behind her. I’d think he was strong enough being
his own self that he would never back down the way she was hoping he would. I’d think,
maybe he truly is something extraordinary. He’s what he is, that’s it. Maybe that makes
him strong enough, being what he is. The Combine hasn’t got to him in all these years;
what makes that nurse think she’s gonna be able to do it in a few weeks? He’s not gonna
let them twist him and manufacture him. (139-140, italics added)
McMurphy’s laughter in this passage ridicules the Big Nurse’s authority, exposing the
vulnerability in her already-established power to control. It has caused the Chief to reduce his
fear and worry over the Combine.
Additionally, McMurphy’s use of play as power has united a communal affront on Nurse
Ratched, and the significance resides in the before-and-after transformation the Chief describes
here. Prior to McMurphy’s arrival, the Chief and the other patients could not imagine a way to
counter the Nurse’s and the Combine’s controlling power. They were too enveloped in the
dominant discourse of the therapeutic community. However, McMurphy has not only instituted
play as power, but he has initiated the “adaptive variability” that Sutton-Smith and Boyd have
discussed through his play antics. However, rather than behavior that pertains to a “play-sphere,”
or a domain of leisure and entertainment, this usage of play as power has real productivity in
resisting and acting out against the dominant regime, with the biggest result being the
transformation of (inter)passive subjects into acting agents.
6) “Realizing the Power of Mental Illness”:
The Fishing Trip and Play as Power Actualized in Laughter
The patients transform from interpassive subjects to actual “players” during the fishing
trip. In this scene, the patients themselves play with the truth of their identities and situation in
order to gain power. Initially, the disciplinary power of the mental ward has disempowered them
– their diagnoses, what are the result of institutional control via classification and judgment,

277
constitute what they take to be the “truth,” with no opportunity for variability or creative
response; however, they take their power back by playing with that truth, or, more along the lines
of adapting to the situational context. For instance, when they embark on the fishing trip and stop
at a service station for gas, the employees begin to gaze at the men and inquire as to their origins,
asking them if they are “from that asylum” (201). The workers laughed at the doctor when he
stated that they were a work crew, and as a result, the Chief infers that they would sell them gas
that “would be weak and dirty and watered down and cost twice the usual price,” in addition to
unneeded oil filters and wipers (202). The men at the service station will take the group’s mentalpatient-status and use it to their own advantage and benefit from it. The Chief notes how the
doctor’s “lying made us feel worse than ever – not because of the lie, so much, but because of the
truth,” the truth that they were indeed from “that asylum” and not a work crew (202).
Interestingly, when McMurphy – who was absent for this initial greeting – comes back,
he explains that the confusion over whether or not they were inmates or a work crew was “just a
kindly precaution to keep from startlin’ you folks with the truth” (202), which McMurphy
ultimately spins, adapting the men’s individual stories in an attempt to counter the service
employees’ affronting behavior. McMurphy goes on to describe the group in ways more
affiliated with the untruth: they are “hot off the criminal-insane ward, on the way to San
Quentin,” Billy was an “insane knife artist that killed three men,” Harding was “unpredictable as
a wild hog,” and the Chief “beat six white men to death with a pick handle,” while McMurphy
himself was a “back-lot-boxer” who “killed a man in the ring” (203). The mechanic more
fittingly calls McMurphy a “back-lot-bull-thrower,” which is more along the lines of the truth.
However, while the real truth made the men feel bad, why is it that McMurphy’s “bravado” could
make them feel better, more powerful?
As Chief established, there is a conflict between the truth and falsehood, and it would
appear that the made-up identities of the men and the amplification of their mental illness is to
credit for their feelings of worth. However, that is not the case. What makes them feel powerful
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is the effect play as power offers them – a form of agency. After McMurphy models play as
power, the men take ownership of this “adaptive variability” and utilize it themselves – they play
with the truth, or adapt the fact that they are mental patients, and use that playfulness as a means
of attaining power – the ability to get others to act on behalf of their own will. McMurphy only
showed them the way.
For instance, the narrative reads, “By the time he got back everybody was feeling cocky
as fighting roosters and calling orders to the service-station guys … just like we owned the
show,” and Harding tells a man passing by who asks if they are in a “club,” “No, my friend. We
are lunatics from the hospital up the highway, psycho-ceramics, the cracked pots of mankind.
Would you like me to decipher a Rorschach for you? No? You must hurry on? Ah, he’s gone.
Pity.” He turns to McMurphy and says, “never before did I realize that mental illness could have
the aspect of power, power. Think of it: perhaps the more insane a man is, the more powerful he
could become” (204). Harding’s statement includes the repetition of the word “power,” and he
claims that the mental illness possesses the aspect of power. However, in 1950s and 1960s
American society, mental illness was not so much as power-ful as it was dis-empowering. What
Harding is really touching upon is the use of play as power – the way he and the other patients
play with their mental illness to adapt to the changing environment outside of the ward.
While the men began the scene disempowered and ashamed, they have transformed into
agents who utilize play to influence the situation. The men bark orders to the service employees,
who originally were intent on ripping them off, and now those same men are doing as they are
told. Harding even goes so far as to incorporate humor through metaphoric and psychiatric
language. He refers the group to “psycho-ceramics, the cracked pots of mankind,” and then asks
if the bicyclist would like a “Rorschach” deciphered; his statements serve as epideictic discourse
with the decorous language and the critique of psychiatry’s methods of evaluation. However, in
the end, the Chief also explains that the “tough looks were all show, because [McMurphy] still
wasn’t able to get a real laugh out of anybody” and that they were having “fun pretending to be
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brave” (205). The men have learned the power of play, but have yet to actualize play as power
through laughter.
This is setting up the culminating event of the novel, the scene on the boat where all the
men finally give in and “lose their footing” and laugh. What is important thus far is the
community that is forming – first with the World Series vote and revolt; then the patients
communally share a real-world encounter with others trying to disempower them; and finally,
they participate in McMurphy’s display of play as power. As a result of the experience – mostly
in reference to the fact that the men were only “pretending to be brave” because they hadn’t really
laughed yet – the Chief, fittingly touches upon a definitional component of play as power. He
juxtaposes play on the one hand, and dominant power on the other. He observes, “you can’t
really be strong until you can see a funny side to things,” while at the same time, he mentions “the
other side,” the powerful “pressures of the different beams and frequencies coming from all
directions, working to push and bend you one way or another” (205, italics added). At this point
in the narrative, the backdrop for the Event of laughter as a representation of play as power has
been set up.
The scene on the boat represents play as power finally actualized through the laughter of
the characters. The episode begins by featuring the patients’ activity in the world Outside. The
fishing boat scene amplifies narrative activity on the boat in order to pit play against power.
Interestingly enough, the patients have adjusted extremely well to their surroundings on the
Outside, but it is not because of the disciplinary agenda of the ward. Their laughter defies the
type of seriousness and “precision-made” structure that the Big Nurse desires in order to adjust
them for the Outside. The result of the action of the scene is a fit of laughter that goes against the
seriousness and disciplined order the Nurse wishes to enforce. The activity is chaotic, playful, and
the scene reads humorously rather than seriously.
For instance, the novel records numerous instances of McMurphy trying to get the
patients to laugh, the entire time the text commenting on how they are all too scared or powerless
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to laugh in the face of the Big Nurse. Her mission to discipline and punish the patients into welladjusted citizens drives her to utilize any means necessary to make “rational contact.” This
project of rationalization opposes the irrational, which comes in many forms, but in the narrative,
the irrational expresses itself predominantly in play and laughter. Kevin Casper contends that
laughter “produces effects by means of an asignifying force, one that exceeds signification and
rational control.”404 Deane Davis, in her book, Breaking Up [at] Totality: A Rhetoric of
Laughter, shares an interesting anecdote regarding an incident that occurred when she was an
adolescent in church battling an oncoming fit of laughter, and it establishes how laughter signals
such a loss of rational control:
My whole being wants desperately not to laugh, and yet it’s clear to me that my will is
not in control; something else has hold of me – I wonder if it’s God. Despite my
willpower, despite my squirming and my clenched teeth, I hear mySelf beginning to
“crack up,” both literally (the stability of the “I” is challenged when it becomes the object
of this laughter’s force) and figuratively. I feel harsh eyes boring into me from all sides,
and I fight desperately for control. But to no avail. My body has been possessed by the
force of laughter. Despite my reason and my will, laughter bursts out. The battle is over.
“I” have been conquered.405
Aside from the religious overtones, Davis’s reflection could replace any one of the patient’s inner
monologues, including the Chief’s. Looking back at the World Series vote, when the Big Nurse
is yelling at the men to get back to their duties, screaming about “law and order,” while they sit in
404
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front of a picture-less television, he states, “I think how her voice sounds like it hit a nail, and this
strikes me so funny I almost laugh” (125). Yet, the Chief does not allow himself to “crack up.”
The Nurse and the Combine always have “eyes” on him, the Chief at one point commenting on
how the Nurse “stabs me again with both eyes,” glaring at him “suspicious” of something (131).
Davis discusses the struggle the men have experienced on the ward, but she allows herself to be
“conquered” by the irrational. She argues that human beings are “caught in a co(s)mic sweep,
seized by outside forces,” which result in “bursts of irrepressible laughter,” claiming that “to be
possessed by this movement of energy, laughed by a co(s)mic Laughter, is to be thrown into a
petit mal in which one’s consciousness, one’s capacity for meaning-making is suspended.
And/but to fight with the sweep is to fight with life.”406
While Davis discusses how she is not in control of her will to laugh (or to not laugh), in
Cuckoo’s Nest the patients are too afraid to laugh, thus submitting their will to an external
authority founded upon rationality and discipline that overrules the oncoming fit of (irrational)
laughter. Davis uses very interesting language in connection to Cuckoo’s Nest. She refers to the
onslaught of laughter as being thrown into a “petit mal,” and in the novel, only the
electroconvulsive therapy or the patients with epilepsy experience this lapse in consciousness,
both instances due to psychiatric contingencies. Davis, in this recollection, despite her attempt at
rationality, suffers defeat – she is “laughed by a co(s)mic Laughter,” whereas the patients suffer
defeat to a system of discipline and punishment. The patients never allow such a loss of control
prior to this scene. They permit their fear of Nurse Ratched to extinguish any oncoming bouts of
laughter. Davis’s concluding point regarding fighting with the “sweep” of “co(s)mic” energy as
fighting with life also has an important implication for play as power as an alternative way of life.
Considering Parvulescu’s point about the “energy” placed in laughter’s management by the
406
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“heralds of seriousness,” the energy from laughter functions as a revolt against rationality and
seriousness, or, discipline and order (laughter can be aligned with the nonrational if seriousness
and the management of laughter both depend upon rationality).
Previously, the patients were stuck in a routine and were not living much of a life, but the
activity on the boat depicts the opposite. On the boat, they are not afraid to laugh, or to give in to
the oncoming burst of laughter, and the effect has a profound transformation for them. In a
lengthy, but absolutely crucial passage, in arguably the apex of the novel, the Chief narrates,
The scramble of action holds for a space, a second there on the sea – the men
yammering and struggling and cussing and trying to tend their poles while watching the
girl; the bleeding, crashing battle between Scanlon and my fish at everybody’s feet; the
lines all tangled and shooting every which way with the doctors glasses-on-a-string
tangled and dangling from one line ten feet off the back of the boat, fish striking at the
flash of the lens, and the girl cussing for all she’s worth and looking now at her bare
breasts, one white and one smarting red – and George takes his eye off where he’s going
and runs the boat into that log and kills the engine.
While McMurphy laughs. Rocking farther and farther backward against the cabin top,
spreading his laugh out across the water – laughing at the girl, at the guys, at George, at
me sucking my bleeding thumb, at the captain back at the pier and the bicycle rider and
the service station guys and the five thousand houses and the Big Nurse and all of it.
Because he knows you have to laugh at the things that hurt you just to keep yourself in
balance, just to keep the world from running you plumb crazy. He knows there’s a
painful side; he knows my thumb smarts and his girlfriend has a bruised breast and the
doctor is losing his glasses, but he won’t let the pain blot out the humor no more’n he’ll
let the humor blot out the pain.
I notice Harding is collapsed beside McMurphy and is laughing too. And Scanlon
from the bottom of the boat. At their own selves as well as at the rest of us. And the girl,
with her eyes still smarting as she looks from her white breast to her red one, she starts
laughing. And Sefelt and the doctor, and all.
It started slow and pumped itself full, swelling the men bigger and bigger. I watched,
part of them, laughing with them – and somehow not with them. I was off the boat,
blown up off the water and skating the wind with those black birds, high above myself,
and I could look down and see myself and the rest of the guys, see the boat rocking there
in the middle of those diving birds, see McMurphy surrounded by his dozen people, and
watch them, us, swinging a laughter that rang out on the water in ever-widening circles,
farther and farther, until it crashed up on beaches all over the coast, on beaches all over
all coasts, in wave after wave after wave. (214-215, italics added)
Stephen Tanner interprets the scene in the following way: “The cosmic dimension of this scene –
the novel’s epiphany – epitomizes Kesey’s playfully-conveyed theme of salvation through
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laughter.”407 However, Tanner’s reading elevates McMurphy above the other men and he
neglects the community formed here. The patients, who have been interpassive subjects, have
experienced interactions with members of society – i.e., adjusted individuals who live in the
Outside world – but this time, the patients do not only enjoy through McMurphy; they join him in
interacting and utilizing “play” in the ensuing social interactions. And, it is the Chief who is
elevated, like Nietzsche’s Zarathustra, who proclaims, “You look upward when you long for
elevation. And I look down because I am elevated. Who among you can laugh and be elevated at
the same time? Whoever climbs the highest mountain laughs at all tragedies, real or
imaginary.”408 While McMurphy is able to see the “funny side of things” more, the Chief
resembles Zarathustra in the ability to recognize that there is a “painful side,” but that one must
“laugh at the things that hurt you to keep yourself in balance.” The Chief, prior to this scene,
questions as to whether or not McMurphy is “blind to the other side” of the “funny side of things”
– i.e., the nature of the Combine to “twist and manipulate” individuals (205). Furthermore, during
the communal laughter, the Chief reflects upon the scenery, stating, “I could see the signs of what
the Combine had accomplished since I was last through this country,” things like “five thousand
houses punched out identical by a machine and strung across the hills outside of town,” and
McMurphy and the other men may have been able to “feel the pressures of the different beams
and frequencies,” “but [the Chief] was able to “see it” (206, italics original). More importantly,
the Chief can “see” the power of McMurphy’s laughter, which spreads and directs itself towards
the “five thousand houses and the Big Nurse,” and “all” of the Combine’s work.
In the first part of the passage, the Chief’s narrative amplifies the activity of the scene,
complete with “yammering,” “cussing,” and “struggling” with the fishing poles, action that would
never be permitted on the ward. This is not the rational, disciplinary activity of the ward; rather,
407
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the men are far from the activities of “group meetings” and “house chores” that Nurse Ratched
has scheduled for them. Additionally, the chief describes how this “scramble of action holds for a
space, a second there on the sea.” Time has been recoded into the play-sphere and is no longer
the disciplinary time of the ward, but it has been suspended, and just like Davis insinuates,
“meaning-making” too has been discarded – the patients are not trying to process any of the
action or make sense of what is happening. While the therapeutic community insists that the
others help each other process and interpret every action, decision, or spoken word, they finally
allow themselves to “crack up” without worrying about the psychological complexities. They are
possessed by the co(s)mic sweep and they do not fight with life, meaning, they do not fight the
“smarting” nature of existence, but allow themselves to be taken over by outside forces that care
little about social norms or disciplinary methods of order and control.
After the break in time and space that allows the Chief to observe the scene, there is
another break – the narrative action is ruptured by McMurphy’s laughter. The situation described
is not inherently humorous, but McMurphy sees the absurdity and the extraordinariness of the
activity on the boat, and once George crashes the boat, time stops once again and laughter erupts.
McMurphy’s laughter is contagious and it spreads, but its object is more than just the action
unfolding in the scene – like Davis explains, it “laughs” the other individuals on the boat and
individuals beyond. This is how laughter is a representation of play as power, which is itself an
alternative way of living in an environment of social control. The laughter of the scene expands
over time and space, for it is a laughter directed at the “captain back at the pier,” the “bicycle
rider and the service station guys and the five thousand houses and the Big Nurse and all of it.”
The laughter “swells” the men. The Nurse and the Combine have beaten them down and made
them small, but laughter makes them “big” again.
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This is the “Event” of the novel – all the other events the novel records flow into this one
major Event.409 An Event is the “turning point,” the moment of “tears and joys” (both of which
this passage contains) that mark a transformation, a “becoming.” The Chief even announces the
transformation after the fishing trip when the men dock the boat and see the same individuals that
ridiculed them prior to shipping out, noting, “They could sense the change that most of us were
only suspecting; these weren’t the same bunch of weak-knees from a nuthouse that they’d
watched take their insults on the dock this morning” (218). The “play” involved in the excursion
transposed the men from the ordinary space of the mental ward to the non-ordinary space of the
boat on the sea, and in doing so, provided a different system of governing principles that were
detached from the mental hospital’s system of discipline and control. However, it is not just the
change of scenery that offers the patients the opportunity to wield a form of power, for the men
409
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take their transformed selves back to the ward and enact play as power on the Big Nurse’s
hospital floor.
7) Conclusion
The conclusion of the novel deals with power in all its complexity as presented in the
narrative – physical power, the power of containment, and the power of play, ultimately
concluding the literary epideictic theory of play as power. In the context of the novel, and as it
reflects the contemporary issue of social control and psychiatry, the use of EST to “make contact”
with patients carries the risk of erasing memory. While EST threatens to erase memories, play as
power works in the opposite direction – McMurphy’s presence and recoding of the ward space
into a play-sphere created memories for the patients. More importantly, memory – as it serves as
a playful form of reminiscing in terms of leaving the boundaries of time and space, of ordinary
space – is another facet connected to play as power as the novel closes.
When McMurphy and the Chief are subjected to EST treatments, the narration follows
the Chief’s internal line of thought and the text actively portrays Harding’s description of EST as
a “wild carnival wheel of images, emotions, memories” (163). However, rather than “lose” this
figurative “game” as Harding describes it, the Chief wins with these memories in tact, which
overcomes the power of EST to “change you,” to make “you forget things” as Harding puts it
(163). The Chief notes how McMurphy does not “look a bit scared” and that he is “grinning.”
As the aides put the “robot arms” on McMurphy’s temples, “he’s singing to them, [and] makes
their hands shake” (244). He gives Chief a “wink,” and “says something to [Chief] around that
rubber hose,” but the Chief cannot make out what he says (245). Then, the Chief recalls, right
before he comes out of his unconsciousness,
What did you say to me when you winked?
Band playing. Look – the sky; It’s the Fourth of July.
Dice at rest.
They got to me with the machine again … I wonder …
What did he say?
… wonder how McMurphy made me big again.
He said Guts ball. (248)
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Prior to their turn at the “Shock Shop,” the lifeguard who is committed and used to be a former
football player, the same individual who inadvertently informed McMurphy about the
indeterminate sentencing time for committed patients, yells “Guts ball, guts ball” right before he
undergoes EST (243).
The significance extends broadly. First, the phrase comes from a character who is
primarily identified with “play” and the game of football. Second, it refers to “any kind of
fiercely aggressive and competitive ball game.”410 Third, and most important, it alludes to the
earlier event in which the patients form a basketball team and play the staff. In the game,
McMurphy gets into a fight with an aide and assaults him in the face and draws blood. What is
significant is the way in which the “play” of the game recoded the governing principles of the
ward in that moment.
For instance, if McMurphy would have assaulted the aide outside of the play-sphere of
the basketball court, he would have been sent to Disturbed, but because the game of basketball
contains the possibility of something like that occurring within the nature of the game, he cannot
be punished for it as an intentional act. McMurphy took advantage of the game and its
conventions to strike back at the aide, in essence, playing the “fiercely aggressive and
competitive” guts ball game. And most importantly, the phrase possesses power in this scene.
McMurphy says “guts ball” to the Chief prior to the administration of the Chief’s EST. After the
Chief receives the EST and the “carnival” of “memories” unravels, he comes out on the other side
and remembers what McMurphy said to him. His memory stayed in tact throughout the EST.
The phrase “guts ball” has provided a narrative litmus test in order to demonstrate play as
power’s victory over the disciplinary power behind EST. The Chief then reflects upon how long
he has been unconscious, and shares, “It’s fogging a little, but I won’t slip off and hide in it. No
410
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… never again,” recognizing that he’d “never worked at coming out of it before” and that he
finally “had them beat” (249).
Memory also plays a role in the final scene, when the Chief liberates McMurphy and
himself from the “mechanical grips” of the ward. After the Chief suffocates McMurphy, freeing
him from being “an example of what can happen if you buck the system,” Scanlon suggests he
escape (278). The Chief replies, “Oh, yeah, just like that. Just ask ’em to unlock the door and let
me out,” and Scanlon retorts, “No. He showed you how one time, if you think back. That very
first week. You remember?” (279, italics added). Interestingly, Scanlon triggers a memory that
pertains to the control panel. Earlier in the novel, the patients are discussing how McMurphy
would break out of the hospital and after contemplating the various objects in the room,
McMurphy settles on the control panel, and the narrative reports that it is “steel and cement” and
“probably weighs four hundred pounds.” McMurphy once again utilizes play as power, making
this endeavor of lifting the control panel, which is ultimately the concluding climax of the novel,
a game, or a bet – “nobody’s gonna convince me I can’t do something till I try it. Five bucks …”
(109). McMurphy puts forth grueling effort, but he is unable to achieve the feat, but he states,
“But I tried though, … Goddammit, I sure as hell did that much, now, didn’t I?” (110). The
significance of this moment is couched in play as power’s “adaptive variability.” McMurphy,
while portrayed as “always winning things” (233, italics in original), is really trying to show the
other Acutes potentiality – what seems like the impossible can be overcome.
This episode is setting up the future event, which is the bet between McMurphy and the
Chief regarding the Chief’s strength to lift the panel, but more importantly, it provides the
narrative opportunity for the Chief to define his philosophy of “big.” McMurphy asks the Chief
why he won’t “lay into” the staff, and the Chief says that he is not as big and tough as
McMurphy. McMurphy is confused because the Chief “stands a head taller’n any man on the
ward.” The Chief corrects McMurphy, stating he used to be big, but not anymore (187). The
Chief then tells McMurphy about his mother, who was “bigger” than him and his father
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combined, and he alludes to what being “big” really entails: having “fight” in you, standing one’s
ground, and “not giving in” (188). And this amounts to a type of liberation from social control,
like a wandering nomad free of social constraints, and he gives his father as an example of one
who evaded the government’s attempt to take the tribe’s land, and to “pay for a way a man lives”
(189). McMurphy then says, “when you were full-sized, when you used to be, let’s say, six seven
or eight and weighed two eighty or so – were you strong enough to, say, lift something the size of
that control panel in the tub room?” (190-191). The Chief again accesses his memory, recalling
the oil drums he lifted in the Army and how that should equate to lifting the control panel.
McMurphy ends by explaining the secretiveness of their deal, for “blowin’ a man up to full size is
a secret you can’t share with everybody, be dangerous in the hands of an enemy” (191).
McMurphy and the Chief are talking about play as power – they are both playing with the
language and this concept of “bigness,” which does not have to do with physical size, but with the
ability to evade the Combine’s domineering power.
The control panel serves as an object of play as power, for it originally represented
“play” as it functioned in the bets circulating among the men, but it also possesses great power for
it ends up liberating the Chief from the ward. In the final scene in the narrative, the Chief heaves
the panel through the window and flees, reflecting, “I felt like I was flying. Free” (280).
Immediately following the Chief’s escape, the novel once again hones in on memory – the Chief
wants to go back to the Dalles where he was from and “look over the country around the gorge
again, just to bring some of it clear in my mind again. I been a way a long time” (281). The
Combine diminished his size, and on the ward, it attempted to diminish his memory. However,
the notion of play as power returned the Chief to his “big” size and allowed him to overcome the
deleterious power of the Combine and EST to take away his power through the erasure of his
memories.
Although the Chief’s liberation is the final scene of the novel, and a very important one,
the true significance of Kesey’s text is what the Chief leaves the ward with – a recognition and
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awareness of a counter strategy to forms of social control. Perhaps the most poignant concluding
narrative moment occurs during the party on the ward, which is the true transformation of the
“ordinary” ward space into the “non-ordinary” play-space. Once a place of “house chores,”
precision, surveillance, and fear, the ward becomes part-saloon, part-brothel, part-amusement
park – the men are drinking, they have girls to dance and socialize with, and they are taking the
hospital wheelchairs for rides, etc. However, at one point, Harding makes what functions as a
quasi-prayer, but it takes a more rhetorical and epideictic form of speaking –– he recodes the
prayer with humor, subversion, and essentially, play. He proclaims,
“Most merciful God, accept these two poor sinners into your arms. And keep the doors
ajar for the coming of the rest of us, because you are witnessing the end, the absolute,
irrevocable, fantastic end. I’ve finally realized what is happening. It is our last fling. We
are doomed henceforth. Must screw our courage to the sticking point and face up to our
impending fate. We shall be all of us shot at dawn. One hundred cc’s apiece. Miss
Ratched shall line us all against the wall, where we’ll face the terrible maw of a muzzleloading shotgun which she has loaded with Miltowns! Thorazines! Libriums! Stelazines!
And with a wave of her sword, blooie! Tranquilize all of us completely out of existence.”
(262)
The beginning of Harding’s plea takes on a serious tone, and it shifts following his assertion that
they will all be “shot at dawn.” Rather than an execution-style shooting, the patients will receive
psychiatry’s catatonic weaponry – the bullets of tranquilization. As David Ingleby reveals in
“Mental Health and Social Order,” “the main achievement was the development in the 1950s of
the major tranquilizers for treatment of the psychoses.”411 This gives the passage further social
import, for it connects the narrative to not only EST, but to the institution of psychiatry as an
institution of social control, experimenting with physical and nonphysical methods of treatment,
and essentially forms of coercion. Ingleby also points out that psychiatry’s “drug revolution,”
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along with the awareness of the negative effects of institutionalization, began to phase out the
“asylum,” and there was some speculation that the drugs made it more difficult for patients to
adapt to life outside of the asylum, or, as Nurse Ratched says, “adjust to their surroundings.”
When play and laughter attempted to resist disciplinary measures in the novel, the subjects were
threatened with tranquilization – the Big Nurse relied on psychiatric drugs and other forms of
therapeutic measures to control the patients’ behavior, in essence, “tranquilizing them out of
existence.” However, at this point, the patients have learned play as power as a way to evade the
clutches of institutionalized control.
While Harding demonstrates the combination of “play” and “power,” the Chief expresses
the outcome of play as power and its relation to laughter – i.e., how laughter resists forces of
power, like the Nurse’s and the Combine’s. It is as if Gaëtan Brulotte has the Chief in mind when
he writes, “with laughter, the social machine creaks, its herd-like unanimity falters, its habitual
cohesion breaks up, and its mechanical reactions break down.”412 In a telling passage, the Chief
reflects,
As I walked after them it came to me as a kind of sudden surprise that I was drunk,
actually drunk, glowing and grinning and staggering drunk for the first time since the
Army, drunk along with half a dozen other guys and a couple of girls – right on the Big
Nurse’s ward! Drunk and running and laughing and carrying on with women square in
the center of the Combine’s most powerful stronghold! I thought back on the night, on
what we’d been doing, and it was near impossible to believe. I had to keep reminding
myself that it had truly happened, that we had made it happen. We had just unlocked a
window and let it in like you let in the fresh air. Maybe the Combine wasn’t all-powerful.
What was to stop us from doing it again, now that we saw we could? Or keep us from
doing other things we wanted? I gave a yell and swooped down on McMurphy and the
411
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girl Sandy walking along in front of me, grabbed them both up, one in each arm, and ran
all the way to the day room with them hollering and kicking like kids. I felt that good.
(263)
This experience of play as power is what the Chief takes with him when he flees the ward. He has
experienced the overcoding of serious, disciplinary space with play, and he has felt the power
behind it as he relates his resistance to the Combine, or the invisible network of power relations.
He has learned play’s “adaptive variability,” for play has taught him how to survive the
paralyzing fear inflicted upon him from the Combine. Additionally, the passage features traces of
memory, of “remembering” and “thinking back,” something the Chief will now be able to do
when he is free. The Combine’s control over him did not just dissipate on the ward; he feels the
possibility of being able to do “other things” on the Outside too. While the control panel freed
him, play as power has evolved him for survival on the Outside and he is taking his newly
recreated self out into the world. The Chief transforms through play as power; and as for the
Combine – it has lost its all-power-full-ness.
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Chapter VI: Conclusion
In the article, “Alas, Poor Richard,” James Baldwin recounts his troubled relationship
with Richard Wright following the publication of his essay, “Everybody’s Protest Novel,” in
which Baldwin criticized the protest novel for failing to capture human dignity, and in the case of
Native Son, for Bigger Thomas’s inability to transcend his blackness. Baldwin recalls a time
when he and Wright had a conversation about the purpose of protest literature, and Wright
proclaimed, “All literature is protest.” Baldwin replied that while “all literature might be protest
[not] all protest was literature,” to which Wright countered, “here you come again with all that art
for art’s sake crap.”413 The debate Baldwin narrates here inspired this dissertation. As discussed
in the Introduction, classical rhetorical traditions subsumed all literature under the catch-all
category of epideictic rhetoric, mainly because of literature’s and epideictic’s specific use of
ornate and decorous language to “praise or blame” a person, event, or thing.
However, while epideictic’s origins are found in oratory, the progression of literary
history and literary developments modified the relationship between literature and epideictic,
especially when it comes to the work of “decorous” language. For one, not all literature is
epideictic, and while most scholars and readers can argue that all literature comments on social
issues and can be viewed as a form of protest, not all protest literature qualifies as epideictic, for
the literary epideictic is less concerned with figurative or flowery language as it is with creating a
narrative discourse that depicts individual and collective experiences as they are rooted in
historical and institutional contexts. The literary epideictic develops out of a history of protest
literature and it comprises a specific brand of protest writing, one that utilizes a strategic
rhetorical approach, and as a result, not all protest literature qualifies as literary epideictic. In
other words, the literary epideictic is more concerned with the epideictic function of the literature
than with the literature in and of itself – the texts are performative, and they represent what
Walter Beale proposes as the “rhetorical performative.”
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Beale defines the rhetorical performative as a “unified act of rhetorical discourse which
does not merely say, argue, or allege something about the world of social action, but which
constitutes (in some special way defined by the conventions or customs of a community) a
significant social action in itself.”414 Revisiting J.L. Austin’s concept of the “performative,” Beale
observes that in the case of epideictic speeches, there is a particularly important context that
enters into the meaning or force of the rhetorical composition, what he terms “nuclei,” or
“unities” of social, cultural, or institutional dimensions that give “rise and sanction” to the speech.
These unities, Beale states, identify what a speech amounts to – as a “defense,” “celebration,” or
“condemnation” of something.415 Beale points out that in the traditions of deliberative, forensic,
and informative rhetoric, the audience is primarily directed to the “facts of the case,” or the
“locutionary aspect – one is given a speech that involves the framing of discourse to maintain or
argue something about the world or action” – while in traditional discourse situations associated
with epideictic, the audience is chiefly presented with “the communal or historical significance of
the speech itself,” or the “illocutionary aspect.” Beale writes, “[the epideictic] involves the
framing of discourse in the performance of or participation in an action. The epideictic or
‘rhetorical performative’ act is one that participates in the reality to which it refers.”416 Beale
413
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argues that Austin failed to pay attention to the “extralinguistic,” or the social and rhetorical
components of discourse, and based on this observation, he proposes his new theory of epideictic
performative discourse.
In discussing epideictic and rhetorical performative discourse, Beale presents three
defining features: “(1) the ‘illocutionary force’ of the speech – that is to say, what it ‘amounts to’;
(2) its setting; and (3) its origin.”417 In regards to the first element, the “illocutionary force,” Beale
once again calls upon Austin’s subclassifications of speech acts, and the category of
“behabitives” is the most useful and applicable to the literary epideictic. “Behabitives” act as “a
kind of performative concerned roughly with reactions to behaviour and with behaviour towards
others and [they are] designed to exhibit attitudes and feelings.”418 Ultimately, “behabitives” are
directed towards “social behaviour,” and some of the examples include “apologizing,”
“protesting,” “challenging,” “criticizing,” “congratulating,” and “blaming.” This language and
these acts are highly indicative of epideictic discourse, and “behabitives” in the literary epideictic
are represented by the literary speech acts that perform a critique of American postwar societal
relations. For instance, Native Son deplores the racialized fear instilled in the consciousness of
black individuals, and it carries out an indictment of a racist society that imposes violent, racist
social scripts. In Invisible Man, Ellison challenges the reification of democratic ideals when he
narratively demonstrates the nonrecognition of a black protagonist in a democratic context, and
his novel calls for democratic consubstantiality. Kerouac criticizes a postwar consumerist desire
fostered by the political influences of domestic containment, and On the Road conducts a search
for authentic desire detached from political ideology and material goods. And in Cuckoo’s Nest,
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Kesey resists systems of discipline and punishment, and his novel “plays” and “laughs” in the
face of power and control.
What distinguishes the four novels I have looked at in my dissertation as epideictic (and
others like them) is the way they use a rhetorical-narrative approach to make their interventions.
In the case of The Ethos of Dissent, it is the rhetorical performative discourse of Native Son,
Invisible Man, On the Road, and One Flew Over the Cuckoo’s Nest that is created by, and
responds to, each text’s epideictic exigency. This objective of the literary epideictic connects to
Beale’s component of “setting,” and my dissertation’s discussion of the “social environment.”
The literary epideictic connects the narrative world to the social reality the novels reflect, and
therefore, these texts comment upon and attempt to alter the social imaginary. Wright, Ellison,
Kerouac, and Kesey employ this rhetorical-narrative strategy in their novels to expose
instabilities, and to create literary “dwelling places” for citizen-readers to contemplate the values
that are operating in postwar American society, specifically, the values that govern individuality.
In this way, the authors and their novels answer Ellison’s call by “reporting what is going on in
[their] particular American experience,” targeting what they view as societal failings, and
ultimately imagining other possibilities.419 Thus, what distinguishes the literary epideictic from
other types of literature is the relationship between the epideictic exigency, the narrative and
affective discourse, and epideictic’s main concern with upholding, challenging, or recreating
communal values.
While all literature attempts to mirror a social reality, the literary epideictic, as featured
in The Ethos of Dissent, does so more precisely; the narratives, the social and cultural moment,
and the affect the texts produce unite for a common end – to expose the way “Anonymous
Authority” governs individuality, and to envision alternative ways of living. For instance, in
Native Son, Bigger Thomas’s situation closely resembles the historical account of the Robert
418
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Nixon case, and as a result, Wright creates a narrative that demonstrates the intense racialized
fear produced by a racist social environment that controlled Robert Nixon’s activity, fear, and
fate. His narrative asks readers to consider their complicit roles in creating such a reality.
Invisible Man is a very complex narrative, but in terms of carrying out the objectives of the
literary epideictic, the novel’s theme of invisibility is portrayed through events that comment
upon the lack of recognition for African American individuals. The narrative theme closely
resembles the social environment that refuses to recognize African Americans as worthy of
democratic values, much like institutional powers refused to see the WWII veteran Isaac
Woodard, who was blinded for failing to act in accordance with racialized scripts, worthy of
justice. Therefore, the novel features a character suffering a social death because he is not
granted equal rights by those who refuse to “see” him, and in the end, the narrator attempts to
imagine a shared democratic fate.
On the Road comments on the behavior of mass society as it is influenced by the political
strategy of domestic containment. Kerouac’s narrative challenges the social production of a
consumerist desire that determined “good” citizens in the postwar period, and it constructs a
rhetoric of desire represented by mobility and authenticity as the antithesis to the social and
cultural doctrine of containment. Kesey’s Cuckoo’s Nest creates a microcosm of society in the
mental ward, and the narrative activity is confronted with threats of discipline and punishment
that are the byproduct of a social environment attempting to control individuals; in the end, Kesey
champions play and laughter as the counter-activity to systems of control. In the end, these
novels contain affective discourses that are related to the social environments influencing the
texts, and in this way, the narrative worlds, the social realities, and the emotionally-laden values
are congruent in a way unique to the literary epideictic.
419
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Of course, the four authors featured in The Ethos of Dissent are male, but that does not
exclude female writers. The four authors were chosen because each of one of them was a literary
icon – Richard Wright became the face of postwar African American protest writing after the
publication of Native Son in 1940; Ralph Ellison eventually became regarded the preeminent
author of the American novel; Jack Kerouac was the King of the Beatniks and the face of a
generation; and Ken Kesey was influential in creating the 1960s counterculture, as well as the
upcoming Hippie movement. The Ethos of Dissent could have easily included Ann Petry’s The
Street, published in 1946, shortly after Native Son. Petry’s novel added the complexity of gender
to the race issue that Wright had tackled. Her character, Lutie Johnson also battled racism and
classicism, but she had to endure sexism in a manner that Bigger Thomas did not. Similarly, the
countercultural writer Sylvia Plath could also have had a place in The Ethos of Dissent for her
novel The Bell Jar. Plath’s novel, published in 1963, provides the perspective of a woman
suffering from mental illness in the 1960s. Esther Greenwood’s battle with depression and her
attempt at suicide also lead to electroconvulsive therapy, and the text considers how gender
implicates such psychological hardships and therapeutic measures in a way that Cuckoo’s Nest
does not. Wright’s, Ellison’s, Kerouac’s, and Kesey’s position as cultural and literary
spokespersons connects back to epideictic’s history of featuring distinguished speakers with
communal authority, something American male writers had more of in the American postwar
period. However, following World War II, female authors began to experience more
opportunities to voice their experiences in the social, cultural, and literary arenas, and their work
is just as important for the literary epideictic.
While my starting point was the African American protest novel, and after connecting
countercultural literature back to a literary protest tradition, I will turn my focus towards the ways
in which the literary epideictic framework changes or is modified by ethnic American
perspectives. For instance, both protest and countercultural literature reveal inequities or
instabilities related to America’s cultural scripts of individuality, and ethnic American authors
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carry out a similar task. Epideictic is the rhetoric of self and community, and Robert Danisch
notes how epideictic captures the present moment in which the self is constituted. Connecting
epideictic to Foucault’s work on genealogy, Danisch explains how epideictic constructs a history
of the present, and how epideictic is concerned with the self because the history of the present
determines self-creation and individual action.420 Thus, epideictic pertains to writing a history of
the present in order to demonstrate how an individual is shaped not only within, but also by a
historical moment.
Applying an epideictic framework to ethnic American literature will help illuminate how
the texts’ hybridized discourse represents the tension between cultural identity and assimilation,
and how the narratives capture the self-creation of individuals with hyphenated identities. To
place this in perspective, Oscar Acosta’s The Autobiography of a Brown Buffalo (1972) recreates
Kerouac’s On the Road, and although at times crude and sexist, Acosta provides an ethnic
perspective of the individual quest for identity on the road in the heyday of the 60s
counterculture; but after returning home to Mexico hoping to find his purpose, he ends up feeling
neither Mexican nor American. Dejected, he heads back to the United States and learns of the
Chicano movement developing in East LA, and the novel ends with the narrator arriving in Los
Angeles to begin a revolutionary movement, the Brown Buffalos, connecting the novel to the
epideictic exigency represented by the Chicano movement and the La Raza Unida party.421
Another example of characters struggling to bridge two cultural worlds in America is
seen in Diana Abu-Jaber’s novel, Arabian Jazz (1993), which chronicles the lives of the
Jordanian family of Matussem Ramoud and his two daughters, Jemorah and Melvina. After their
American-born mother, Nora, dies after visiting Jordan, the Ramoud family insists that
Matussem, Jemorah, and Melvina return to Jordan. The Ramoud family experiences racism in
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upstate New York, and when they decide to stay in America, they struggle to assimilate two
cultures and two identities. Matussem’s sister, Fatima, tries very hard to convince Jemorah and
Melvina to marry Arab men and follow Arab conventions.422 Through Fatima, Abu-Jaber
criticizes traditional Arab cultural expectations of Arab women, and the novel presents patriarchal
views of both cultures, “the whites,” and the Arabs, and from both female and male characters.
However, through the characters of Jemorah and Melvina, Abu-Jaber challenges patriarchal
ideals and preconceptions of Arab and Arab-American women, for the young women are not
interested in marriage or children, they do not wear makeup, and they refuse to submit to male
authority. Instead, they are educated and employed, and they value their personal and financial
independence. Arabian Jazz perhaps responds to the larger cultural backlash that ArabAmericans were suffering during the 1980s and 1990s in America.423 Abu-Jaber even stated in an
interview that her intention was to fulfill a gap by providing a closer look into the lives of an
Arab-American family, thus creating a literary epideictic text that challenges societal and cultural
misconceptions, and endorses a feminist perspective and alternative values.424
Similarly, Chimamanda Adichie explores the complexities of race in the different
contexts of Western and African societies in Americanah (2013). Her novel features the story of
the main character, Ifemelu, and her relationship with Obinze, whom she fell in love with in
Lagos. After leaving Nigeria for educational opportunities abroad, Ifemelu ends up at Princeton
University, where she experiences racism as she lives and studies in America, and Obinze works
menial jobs in London and eventually ends up returning to Nigeria. At one point, Ifemelu tells
her liberal friends that she did not consider herself “black” until she came to America because in
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Nigeria she did not experience the level of hostility that America’s racial politics seemed to
bestow. She eventually starts a blog, “Raceteenth or Various Observations About American
Blacks (Those Formerly Known as Negroes) by a Non-American Black,” so that she could voice
her experiences of “becoming black” in America, and interpret the racially complicated world
around her. She includes posts that examine how language inadequately captures authentic
experiences of race and blackness in America, posts titled, “Not All Dreadlocked White Guys Are
Down,” “Badly Dressed White Middle Managers from Ohio Are Not Always What You Think,”
“Why Dark-Skinned Black Women—Both American and Non-American—Love Barack
Obama,” “Understanding America for the Non-American Black: What Do WASPs Aspire To?,”
and “What Academics Mean by White Privilege, or Yes It Sucks to Be Poor and White but Try
Being Poor and Non-White.”425 What is fascinating about these blog posts is how they function
epideictically, serving as a narrative platform for Ifemelu’s social commentary. In the blog,
Ifemelu can reveal an underrepresented perspective – that of a “Non-American Black” – on race
issues within American society, and in essence, she explores the cultural attitudes, norms, and
assumptions of race, and, as a result, she challenges the values that underscore American race
relations.
What these narratives present, and what epideictic can help reveal, is a challenge to the
idea of America as a melting pot. Rather than portray a seamless transition, they operate more
like counternarratives in that they depict the struggles the characters experience in trying to
negotiate their identities with American cultural values. I think epideictic can help readers attend
to the narrative negotiation of old versus new identities, and it can help readers acknowledge this
struggle, as opposed to non-epideictic textual interpretations that make readers feel sympathetic
or “good” about multicultural literary perspectives. While I have offered a very limited sampling
of literature outside of this dissertation’s focus, what this demonstrates is the application and
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reach of epideictic as an interpretive framework for texts from different time periods and literary
genres.
Furthermore, and most excitingly, I am interested in expanding epideictic’s reach to
include new media. As the blog posts in Americanah illustrate, blogs themselves supply
individuals a platform to comment on social issues with their very own audience. One major
difference between epideictic oratory and the literary epideictic is the way these rhetorical
compositions are impacted by time and space – epideictic speeches possess a sense of immediacy
that the literary epideictic does not. While a speech could potentially be more empowering on an
emotional level as a result, a literary epideictic text is an artifact of cultural rhetoric that can
transcend the boundaries of time and allow individuals the opportunity to contemplate its words
for ages to come. Likewise, new media texts that follow an epideictic paradigm differ from
epideictic oratory and literature when it comes to presentation, publication, or “sharing” so to
speak. The epideictic rhetor of new media texts can create an account with a digital platform that
can send her/hir/his observations worldwide at the click of a button. I am interested in
researching how blogs and social media function as epideictic platforms for citizen-rhetors,
specifically how they provide an individual the power to question authority, present diverse ideas
and values, and campaign for social change on local and global levels; and I am also interested in
researching how professional blogs and social media accounts might be instrumental in creating
social awareness and leading to change.
In conclusion, using the rhetorical theory of epideictic rhetoric along with affect theory, I
have created a framework for interpreting postwar American novels that helps track the literary
and cultural development of postwar dissent. One of epideictic’s objectives is to expose societal
ills and call for change. However, in order to persuade a collective audience, epideictic seeks to
establish a common ground amongst a group of individuals, and epideictic’s main strategy in this
regard is to initiate identification with communal values.
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One of the insights my dissertation adds to theories of epideictic is that, within the
narratives of social literature, the epideictic is used to revise communal values by exposing the
failure of a predominant value system. In this way, the literary epideictic infuses its narratives
with rhetorical performative discourse that imagines alternatives to the current state of social and
political affairs. Perhaps the focus on inclusivity vs. exclusivity in regards to the literary
epideictic is the wrong approach. What this dissertation offers is a paradigm for acknowledging
the power of language to act as an instrument for personal, social, and political change, a
rhetorical framework that ultimately investigates the relationship between words, values, and
actions as they perform in textual, physical, and digital spaces.
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